CEP’s role in Stabilisation and Reconstruction

Since the decisions taken at the Riga and Bucharest Summits on a Comprehensive Approach to NATO operations, steps have been taken to increase the capacity of NATO forces to support stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in all phases of a crisis. NATO’s operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as individual Allies’ experiences, have shown that stabilisation and reconstruction are essential parts of today’s missions. A purely military approach is not sufficient.

It is important to clarify one slight ambiguity from the outset. The term reconstruction outside NATO circles is often associated with the concept of long term development. This is not NATO’s remit and NATO does not seek to become involved in this business. NATO’s role lies principally in the overlapping phases of «hot» stabilisation and very early reconstruction to bridge the gap which exists in the immediate aftermath of a conflict situation and before the arrival of aid agencies and NGOs which then begin the lengthy process of long term reconstruction. NATO’s contribution is to help create the conditions for this process to begin. Such a role invariably requires a strong civilian component as well as military support.

A number of practical steps could be taken to take this process forward, including making good use of existing Civil Emergency Planning mechanisms. First and foremost, coordinated joint civil-military planning is essential from the outset. This could involve participation of civilian stabilisation experts in military planning for operations. Second, given that stabilisation is inextricably linked to security, governance, law and order, a review of civilian expertise available to NATO could be conducted. Expertise could be broadened to include experts that combine knowledge in areas such as police, the judiciary and good governance, with an understanding of operational theatres and working with the military. Third, given that the lead for stabilisation operations will nearly always be civilian, deployable and trained civilian expertise will be required. Of course all these suggestions assume that civilian expertise made available to NATO will remain primarily a national responsibility, as now. NATO’s well-established clearing-house mechanisms and tools would be utilised and no new capabilities need be developed thereby ensuring maximum cost-effectiveness and efficiency.
The key to successful stabilisation operations is to ensure good teamwork between civilian and military elements at all stages: from the strategic planning level all the way down to implementation in the field. The PRTs in Afghanistan are NATO’s best example of stabilisation in action. Such teams facilitate civil-military interactions for stabilising the local environment and beginning the process of reconstruction. Whatever lessons are learned from the PRT experience, one principle is clear for the future: NATO should carefully assess the stabilisation operations it undertakes to ensure that its involvement does not contribute to the creation of long term development problems.

In terms of international cooperation, NATO’s actions in the field of stabilisation and reconstruction will always require close coordination with other international organisations such as the UN. In this context, a UN-NATO agreement, broad and generic in nature, would be a helpful framework to outline the respective roles of each organisation. Thereafter, more specific arrangements tailored to a given theatre could be developed. Again, teamwork between all relevant international actors is of the essence. Close international cooperation is of paramount importance and a principle to which NATO accords top priority.

This issue of perceptions is devoted to the theme of stabilisation and reconstruction. I invite you to read the various national contributions and experiences, together with articles expressing the military and other NATO viewpoints. The aim is to provoke debate on the issue with a view to progressing in an area which will become of critical importance for successful NATO operations in the future.

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**DID YOU KNOW?**

To date, 19 nations have subscribed to the MoU on the Facilitation of Vital Cross Border transport: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Lithuania, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* and the UK. This MoU improves the speed and efficiency of bringing assistance to victims of humanitarian crises and disasters, including those triggered by a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) event within the EAPC area.

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

*The Dutch Interior Minister Dr. Ter Horst signs the MoU in the presence of NATO Secretary General, 25 June 2008*
In discussions of the international community’s response to states in crisis, several concepts are often cited, including reconstruction and stabilisation, crisis management, conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and comprehensive approach. While these concepts are not interchangeable, they share a common understanding of the need for combined efforts to fill the gap between short-term actions to immediately stabilize a country, on the one hand, and longer-term security and development assistance. There also is a common understanding that effective action requires considerable resources and capabilities -- much more than are currently available. Effective action by international and regional organisations requires coordinated response mechanisms so that national capacities can be mobilized and brought to bear quickly and reliably. Ultimately, the burden falls on nations to deliver the human and material resources that make up the security, political, humanitarian and economic tools needed for an effective coordinated response.

Building national capacities to meet 21st century crisis recovery demands is a global priority. It is essential to meet the growing challenges posed by fragile states, which may suffer from weak governance, inadequate administrative capacities, chronic humanitarian crises, persistent social tensions, legacies of conflict, and high risks of insurgency or terrorism. Integrating solutions to these challenges in a comprehensive approach is vital to the success of recovery efforts. Until recently, the international community has generally responded to individual crises in an ad hoc manner to achieve specific security, humanitarian, human rights, or developmental objectives. There has been less attention to developing the mix of civilian response capabilities needed to address all of these objectives comprehensively and systematically in order to achieve sustainable peace and stability.

Recently the United States has taken steps towards dramatically improving its own civilian response capabilities. These efforts, involving 15 departments and agencies of the federal government, have been led by the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). President Bush has proposed for 2009 a Civilian Stabilization Initiative which, once funded by the U.S. Congress, will create a robust standing civilian response capacity of 4,250 persons. This would include a 250-strong full-time Active Response Corps deployable to crisis areas within 48-72 hours, a part-time Standby Response Corps of 2,000 experts drawn from many parts of the federal government and deployable within 30-45 days, and a Civilian Reserve Corps made up of 2,000 volunteers with relevant skills and expertise from outside the U.S. Government.

While the Civilian Stabilization Initiative represents a major commitment to strengthening civilian reconstruction and stabilization capabilities, the U.S. recognizes that the global need is much greater. For that reason, the U.S. is working closely with nations and organizations to help strengthen global capacities. In 2007 the U.S. and the EU agreed to a Work Plan on civilian crisis management and conflict prevention to serve as a framework for cooperative work in this area. In April 2008, the U.S. joined fellow NATO Allies in endorsing a Comprehensive Approach Action Plan intended to enhance cooperation with other international actors and improve civil-military coordination within NATO. Even with such integrated action, however, the primary burden falls on individual nations to create and make available the needed capabilities.

Ed Salazar, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, US Department of State
To further this goal, S/CRS, with the support of the U.S. Mission to NATO, organized and led a Workshop on May 27 at NATO Headquarters. The Workshop, entitled «Building National Capacity in Reconstruction and Stabilization: Meeting Demands for Deployable Capabilities,» drew more than 120 participants from 33 countries. The Workshop was organized for the explicit purpose of bringing together crisis response experts from Allied countries and members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace to share experiences and best practices and to learn from each other about developing and deploying national civilian response capabilities.

Unlike other workshops, seminars and conferences on this subject, this one was intended to be pure «nuts and bolts» -- about the «how» and not the «why» of building such capabilities - with a focus on the practical challenges to building, deploying, and managing civilian response capabilities for reconstruction and stabilization missions. These include identifying capability needs, planning for and managing operations, recruiting, training, equipping, deploying, protecting, and retaining civilians, and sustaining such efforts in the field in a comprehensive approach with other international actors.

NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Operations Martin Howard formally welcomed the participants. U.S. Ambassador to NATO Victoria Nuland delivered opening remarks that linked the value and timeliness of the Workshop to the implementation of NATO’s Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and priorities in Afghanistan. The Italian Foreign Ministry’s Iraq Task Force Director and former Ambassador to Iraq Gianludovico de Martino kicked off the substantive dialogue by chairing the first panel on matching capacities with capabilities needed. Gary Russell, S/CRS’ Civilian Reserve Task Force Director, chaired the second panel on recruiting, training and retaining deployable civilian expertise. Three concurrent Working Groups on related topics, chaired by staff from the UK’s Stabilisation Unit (SU) and Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START), took up the afternoon’s discussions, followed by a wrap-up plenary that highlighted key challenges identified during the event and possible ways forward.

The day’s dialogue covered a broad range of conceptual and technical challenges to building and strengthening national capacities that were common to many of the participating governments. Some of the more noteworthy included:

- The trade-offs between building comprehensive national capabilities or focusing on niche capabilities, and if the latter, how to ensure that niche capabilities developed by individual countries add up to a comprehensive whole;
- The trade-offs between focusing recruitment efforts inside or outside government, and if looking internally, to the challenge of motivating the staff of domestically-focused ministries to join an international civilian response corps and deploy to a potential conflict zone;
- How to put in place systems to ensure that deployed civilians can tap into the full capability of their sending agency, and that agencies play a role in screening candidates;
- The trade-off between building a full-time, fully trained cadre or using a roster/database pool to select individuals with specific skill sets for specific missions as needed;
- Whether to build a national training capability to prepare civilians for specific stabilization missions or to leverage existing training institutions in other countries that may not offer mission-specific training;
- How to ensure unity of effort among components of a national government, and the trade-offs between different structural and funding approaches for establishing civilian response capabilities;
- The challenges of achieving unity of effort in civilian-military joint operations, and in particular, how to establish an effective planning and operational «backbone» for each mission; and
- The trade-offs between different options for providing and paying for force protection of civilians when deployed to conflict zones, and the challenge of ensuring duty of care and legal protections and benefits.

The United States intends to continue the dialogue with Allied and Partner countries begun in Brussels, and looks forward to expanding it to other interested countries. Increasing international capacity will help to ensure that a full range of capabilities will be available in the future to help countries in crisis achieve sustainable peace and stability. A «one size fits all» approach is not a formula for success, since each crisis will require a different mix of security, governance, economic, humanitarian and development assistance. The best solution is one that allows each nation to invest in international peace and stability to the best of its ability with the best of its talents.
Since March 2006, Sweden is the lead nation for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e Sharif. This PRT covers four provinces (Balkh, Samangan, Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pol) in the northern region of Afghanistan. A total of 450 soldiers (360 Swedes and 90 Finns) and eight civilian advisors (Swedes, Finns and Americans) are engaged in stabilisation and reconstruction projects in this Area of Responsibility (AOR).

For the last six months, I have worked as development advisor to the Swedish PRT contingent. During that time, I have experienced the harshest winter in 30 years and the early arrival of summer, causing a mixture of floods and droughts. As an employee at the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and having worked since the late 60’s in Africa and Asia, I have very rarely seen people totally lacking in preparedness to cope with calamities. Roads become inaccessible and employment opportunities stall with the result that people and livestock can no longer feed themselves. I have encountered children, more often girls than boys, walking barefoot in the snow. I have visited houses with empty fire-places and no food on the table. I have seen women and children squatting on frozen soil, coughing and covering themselves in rags. I have looked poverty in the eye. It is a scary sight. This is where development workers, like myself have our niche.

Imagine a young Swedish soldier, relatively inexperienced to life outside Sweden, when he or she meets this stark reality. Their hearts bleed for the suffering people and their wish is to offer help immediately. Such reactions are natural and commendable but soldiers sometimes tend to forget why they are out there; their role is to provide security and stability to the people of Afghanistan. We learnt a number of lessons last winter, not least regarding the sensitivity of military personnel carrying out humanitarian activities. Humanitarian actions should only be performed by military personnel as a last resort where no civilian actor is in a position to deliver humanitarian aid. International guidelines in this area must be strictly obeyed. Uncoordinated humanitarian and military activities risk adversely affecting the need for humanitarian actors to be perceived as «neutral». Uncoordinated activity can reduce the desired effect and even be counterproductive. The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan has been clear to point out the importance of involving the Afghan authorities and making clear Afghan ownership.

Good cooperation between civilian advisers and military staff is therefore essential. Our PRT is, after some on-the-job-learning, jointly developing multifunctional approaches to both military, humanitarian and development operations. In this context, it is vital to mention that our PRT performs no direct implementation of long-term development aid, an otherwise common feature in most PRTs which manage large funds in order to implement projects. The only funds available to the Mazar-e Sharif PRT are funds for small and immediate impact projects under the CIMIC unit of the PRT.

In 2007, to meet development challenges, Swedish development assistance to Afghanistan in particular within our AOR, amounted to approximately 350 million SEK. 15-20 % of this amount is earmarked for the four northern provinces covered by the Swedish led PRT. The decision to revise the strategy for Afghanistan last June and earmark funds to the northern provinces was recognition by the Swedish government to get more closely involved with the development efforts in its AOR while respecting the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Efficiency. In addition, this measure was intended to address high expectations from provincial leaders regarding reconstruction and development programmes.
As is the case for many governments, participation in the efforts to stabilise Afghanistan has turned out to be a learning process of wider importance for Finland. Of particular relevance to the Afghan case, is multifaceted civil-military interaction on all levels. Finland joined the ISAF operation in January 2002 by offering a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) unit to the Kabul area. Since early 2004, the focus has gradually shifted to the north where Finland has contributed to two separate Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRT cooperation under the leadership of the UK, Norway and Sweden has proved to be fruitful. The different resources and funding mechanisms of individual nations obviously complement each other and highlight the advantage of being multinational. Currently, Finland deploys 100 soldiers and four civilian experts (political, development and police advisors) to the Swedish-led PRT in Mazar-e Sharif.

The PRTs provide a novel field platform for integrated approaches to stabilisation and reconstruction. In the Nordic model, the military and civilian components work by combining all means and resources to assist in local Security Sector Reform (SSR). In coordination with the daily observation and liaison by the military, Finland has supported the police, justice system and local administration through infrastructure projects, donations of equipment and sequenced training.

Towards comprehensiveness in Afghanistan: Finnish PRT experiences

As mentioned above, many PRTs have large funds for implementation of development projects as part of a strategy for counterinsurgency and with the goal of winning hearts and minds. In our AOR, the security situation is relatively stable and there are already many different government, IO, and NGO projects under way. Sweden is therefore focusing on implementing its assistance through the UN system such as UNICEF (schools), UNOPS (rural roads and bridges) and international/local organisations e.g. World Bank and NGOs (service delivery of schools, legal protection and justice for women and children, research and de-mining).

One shortfall identified was the lack of effective support to civil society. A local fund, specifically aimed at supporting civil society organisations in the north that promote democracy and human rights was established this spring to enhance development activities in the provinces where Sweden is active.

Finally in order to improve effectiveness of development efforts in all four provinces, it is my personal wish to be able to post one development adviser in each province.
Applying «Whole of Government» thinking to field operations necessitates further development of interoperability between different policy tools. Finland like many other nations has a great deal to learn. A logical step is to develop new modes for training personnel to be deployed in integrated operations. The objective should be to increase mutual understanding of diverse capabilities, practices and organisational cultures and consequently improve the ability to work together. Comparative advantage has already been seen as 75 % of Finnish military personnel in operations abroad are recruited from the reserve. Soldiers have a high level of education and they come from a wide variety of occupational backgrounds. Similarly designed is the Finnish civilian crisis management structure where experts are recruited broadly across society. Building on these systemic strengths the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management was established in June 2008. This virtual centre is aimed to nurture joint training and research across the civil-military boundaries.

Other challenges for PRT stabilisation and reconstruction are alignment to the Afghan national plans and integration with an international comprehensive approach in Afghanistan. These challenges underline a demand for a more coherent PRT network. The Government of Afghanistan at different levels, as well as international actors, call for a better definition of the PRT concept: what are the Provincial Reconstruction Teams for? The Nordic approach has been to run a limited number of PRT projects that are prioritised by the locals, vetted through the civilian advisors and implemented using local materials and labour.

A relatively neglected aspect in Afghan stabilisation and reconstruction is civil emergency planning (CEP). Not only does the country suffer from conflict but also from a range of humanitarian hazards. These draw plenty of aid, but lack support to meet needs other than the most acute ones. Longer term build-up of emergency services and civil protection has remained marginal. As there are no permanent and capable domestic systems to plan ahead and react to emergencies, people in need turn their attention to visible international actors such as the PRTs. Even if ad hoc assistance delivered by ISAF has been crucial, for example, during the harsh winter of 2008, expectations run too high. The military is not best suited for the humanitarian role, but may assist when requested by the Afghan government or the UN.

The lack of local capacity and sustainability detract from addressing problems that reoccur annually in Afghanistan. This topic should be set in a broader context in respect to operations that could be categorised as complex emergencies. NATO and its partners could, through CEP, add value to the civilian dimension of operations by increasingly supporting the emergency planning aspects of the international community's comprehensive approach.
Disasters cause widespread damage and disruption in Afghanistan with high frequencies of natural calamities such as earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, sandstorms and floods. In addition, the social impact of the creeping problem of drought takes a sustained toll on large parts of the country. Extreme winter is another phenomenon which has a severe impact on the population.

The prolonged war in Afghanistan has not only left the nation with direct casualties, it has also destroyed the coping capacity of the government as well as the communities. Consequently, most communities do not have affective disaster response plans.

Support in the area of disaster preparedness, is one of many fields where NATO Civil Emergency Planning can provide assistance to the Afghan Government in its stabilisation and reconstruction activities.

The Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA) has the official mandate to coordinate all aspects related to emergency disaster response. Nineteen line ministries, including the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Ministry of the Interior, have been appointed as the implementing agents for disaster assistance to the population. One of the Ministries playing a major role in disaster management, is the Ministry of Defence which has built up reasonable capabilities for disaster response. Day-to-day realities demonstrate that all too often, line ministries responsible take action in response to a disaster without proper coordination with other ministries or the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority.

In order to improve this situation, the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority has developed a multi year plan with the aim to have an effective system of disaster preparedness and disaster response in place by the end of 2010.

A number of issues have been identified by the Afghan authorities to improve their capabilities. In this context, more detailed disaster risk assessments need to be undertaken, also at the provincial level. Standing Operating Procedures for a rapid assessment and quick disaster response need to be developed. Furthermore, public awareness on disaster risk management needs to be improved and community based mitigation and action plans need to be created.

NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have agreed on a cooperation programme. The Civil Emergency Planning contribution to this plan is to develop practical cooperation drawing on Allies’ national institutions. As a first step, Afghan authorities will be invited to participate in a number of Civil Emergency Planning activities, such a course at the NATO School in Oberammergau, or Seminars and Conferences organised by the Civil protection Committee and the Joint Medical Committee.

In conclusion, it is envisaged that a multi-disciplinary team, consisting of national experts will visit Kabul to assess current capabilities and requirements and possibly initiate a number of assistance projects. As a first practical step to prepare for such a visit later this year, CEP staff from NATO Headquarters visited the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority in June 2008 and other organisations with a responsibility in emergency management.
STABILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

A VIEW FROM NATO’S DEFENCE POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION

NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Division has the lead on defence related aspects of NATO’s fundamental security tasks, including Stabilisation and Reconstruction. Its major responsibilities include defence policy, force planning, logistics planning, nuclear policy and the WMD Centre.

Stabilisation and Reconstruction: A New Growth Area for NATO?

There is no doubt that stabilisation and reconstruction are becoming increasingly important for NATO. Why? The rationale is clear. In most cases an operation cannot be brought to a successful conclusion through military means alone. Military security efforts need to be complemented by reconstruction and law enforcement, to pave the way toward development and good governance. Thus NATO needs not only to play a military stabilisation role but also to support stabilisation and reconstruction so as to help lay the ground for self-sustaining peace and long-term development.

In fact, NATO has been involved in stabilisation and reconstruction ever since it became engaged in crisis management operations in the second half of 1990s. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the bulk of the military tasks in the Dayton Peace Agreement had been implemented by December 1996 at the end of the NATO-led Implementation Force’s first year. But the overall objective of building long-term peace was far from achieved. The force was transformed into the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), and, admittedly amidst debates about «mission creep», undertook tasks that reached beyond traditional military ones and began supporting the implementation of Dayton’s civilian objectives as well.

In Kosovo, at the end of the conflict in 1999, international organisations other than the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) were not in place in sufficient force and local authorities no longer existed. In this vacuum KFOR had no choice but to perform a number of civilian tasks, from policing duties to running electricity plants. These were then gradually transferred to either the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) or local authorities, although KFOR continues to support them as necessary.

In Afghanistan, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are good examples of NATO Allies’ support to stabilisation and reconstruction. PRTs assist the government of Afghanistan to extend its authority across the country and enable good governance, security sector reform and reconstruction efforts. Their activities are aligned with local requirements.

So support to stabilisation and reconstruction is not a new area for NATO; its role in this field has developed out of necessity and has been refined in practice. Taking account of this past experience and of likely future requirements, the Alliance has recognised that it needs to improve its ability to support stabilisation and reconstruction. The Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), endorsed at the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006, lists stabilisation and reconstruction among those areas where the Alliance needs to put a premium in order to better deal with the security challenges over the next 10 to 15 years. Stabilisation and reconstruction were also recognised as pillars of NATO’s comprehensive approach endorsed at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, which aims at effective co-ordination within NATO, and between NATO and other actors in order to complement and mutually reinforce each other’s efforts to achieve common goals.

Against this background, NATO initiated work on seeking the improvements in stabilisation and reconstruction required by the CPG. The first step was to establish a conceptual framework for NATO’s role in stabilisation and reconstruction. The framework that was put in place acknowledges, first, that stabilisation and reconstruction are essential parts of missions and that they need to be undertaken even while combat operations are underway, in non-permissive environments.
Second, the concept states that the primary responsibilities for stabilisation and reconstruction, and particularly reconstruction, normally lie with other actors, such as local authorities and international organisations or NGOs. However, in some cases these actors may not be present; unable to operate due to an insecure environment; or lack the necessary equipment, resources or expertise. In such circumstances NATO forces may need to bridge the gap or support the other actors.

Third, in the light of the implications of stabilisation and reconstruction for NATO’s roles and practices, the NATO Military Authorities and relevant NATO bodies are tasked to carry out a number of measures. These include considering stabilisation and reconstruction from the outset when planning for an operation, and striving to ensure closely coordinated civil-military planning; drawing the implications of stabilisation and reconstruction for existing and planned capabilities, especially those relevant to non-permissive environments; addressing such capabilities in the Alliance force planning process; incorporating stabilisation and reconstruction into Alliance doctrine, training programmes and exercises; and extracting appropriate lessons from our operations.

Work is now proceeding to put these measures into practice. Moreover, through its comprehensive approach to operations, NATO seeks to effectively coordinate its efforts with the contributions of other actors, such as the United Nations and the European Union, which provide essential civilian means required for stabilisation and reconstruction for example in Afghanistan and Kosovo.

At the same time, it is understood that the Allies individually and NATO collectively will continue to acquire experience in stabilisation and reconstruction and may need to revisit the issue as they do so. Indeed, there are certain questions that would benefit from further reflection. For example, should NATO’s role be limited to filling temporary gaps and supporting other actors until they are fully able to perform their tasks? Or should the Alliance make a broader contribution drawing on capabilities such as engineering and medical support, as well as non-military capabilities such as civil emergency planning, in close coordination with other actors?

Should NATO seek from the Allies non-military capabilities relevant to stabilisation and reconstruction as part of its planning for future operations? Should the Alliance adapt its command and control capabilities and procedures so that it can run operations involving stabilisation and reconstruction more effectively?

These are sensitive questions, touching on the responsibilities of other organisations involved in international crisis management, the understandable insistence of NGOs on their independence from military forces, and the civil-military practices and organisation in the Alliance. However, real life situations may require us to use any available means to provide a quick and effective solution to an immediate human need and to think creatively in preparing for such contingencies. It should be possible to do this without infringing upon others’ mandates or allowing abstract principles to stand in the way of providing urgently needed aid.
Stabilisation and Reconstruction -
A personal military view

The term stabilisation and reconstruction has become in vogue as a result of evolving experience in the type of operations that the Alliance has been involved in since the mid-1990s. Those experiences have led to the conclusion that there is no purely military solution to conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that the whole International Community must pull together in a ‘Comprehensive Approach’.

Much has been written about the changing nature of conflict from inter-state wars to wars amongst the people, where securing the support of the uncommitted majority of population (the people) will ultimately determine the outcome. If this thesis is correct, then he who can provide both stability and reconstruction stands a good chance of winning. It is this contention which is behind discussions of roles and responsibilities for stabilisation and reconstruction, particularly those of the military.

There can be little doubt that the military has a key role in stability; whether it is in war-fighting operations to enforce a peace or in more traditional peacekeeping in a post conflict scenario. The real debate is about a military role in reconstruction. In some developing national doctrines, stabilisation and reconstruction are being seen as hand in glove and simply as another type of military operation. From this viewpoint, in any particular ‘engagement space’, as the military call it, it is possible that offensive, defensive and stabilisation and reconstruction operations could be taking place in overlapping areas simultaneously.

As an Alliance, NATO views reconstruction as a separate activity and one that is foremost the responsibility of civil agencies. While it is acknowledged that the military might have a limited supporting role, the prevailing belief is that NATO has no requirement to develop separate capabilities strictly for civilian purposes. Nonetheless, many military capabilities can be used for reconstruction purposes, if so required. Aviation, transport, supply, engineering, medical and veterinary capabilities, let alone core command and control capabilities, could all be called on to support reconstruction efforts.

When then might it be reasonable to use military capabilities and resources for reconstruction purposes? Three sets of circumstances seem most appropriate. The first is set firmly in the ‘battle’ to win the people. In inflicting tactical defeat on opponents engaging in battle (be they regular or irregular militaries, such as the Taliban), there is inevitable damage to civil infrastructure. Within an overarching Comprehensive Approach, being able to repair that damage rapidly is a basis for ensuring gain at the campaign level, from tactical military victories. Following up tactical battles with immediate reconstruction efforts is a key ingredient for overall success. Failure to do so could result in losses in the campaign objectives by alienating the population we seek to influence. Second, much is made of the influence achieved in the first hundred days following the conclusion of a conflict. This critical period requires a rapid international response that the military can help provide, through relatively readily available standing forces. Third, during the course of an ongoing operation, when it is identified that a response beyond the ability of civil agencies to achieve in the time required is a condition for overall success, the military might be asked to step in.

All three sets of circumstances have been evidenced during Alliance operations in the last thirteen years. The first is critical in the struggle in Afghanistan and an area where there is much debate still to be had. Come what may, in wars amongst the people, stabilisation and reconstruction, however it is interpreted, is here to stay.
The backbone of Civil Emergency Planning at NATO is a network of over 350 civil experts drawn from industry, business, government and other public administrations drawn from across the Euro-Atlantic area. Experts such as Dr. Mo Salman, recently appointed by the Food and Agriculture Planning Committee (FAPC), can provide advice to NATO’s Military Authorities on the effective use of civilian resources during the planning and execution phases of a NATO operation. Experts can also provide advice to national authorities, in the event of a crisis, on issues including CBRN and consequence management.

Dr. Mo Salman - Animal Population Health Institute, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University

Dr. Mo Salman, is a Professor of the Animal Population Health Institute of College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences at Colorado State University. He holds appointments in the Department of Environmental Health and Department of Clinical Science. Professor Salman’s educational background is in veterinary medicine, preventive veterinary medicine, and comparative pathology. His veterinary degree was from University of Baghdad - Iraq, and his both MPVM and PhD were from University of California at Davis. He is a graduate of the American College of Veterinary Preventive Medicine (ACVPM) and a fellow of the American College of Epidemiology (ACE).

He is the author of over 220 refereed papers in scientific journals. He has participated in numerous conferences, and national and international meetings in over 25 years as a faculty member. He serves as associate editor on Journal of Preventive Veterinary Medicine and has served on the board of the American Journal of Veterinary Research. He is the section editor for the epidemiology section of Animal Health Review. He serves on several national and international professional and scientific committees in the animal health sectors. He was the chairman of the US Animal Health Committee on Foreign and Emerging Diseases. He is engaged in research and outreach projects in more than 15 countries across the world. Many of these projects are engaged in stabilization and reconstruction of national animal health programs in countries such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. Dr. Salman holds a position on the peer review of the European Union scientific review for the geographical assessment for BSE. He was elected to be on the European Food Safety Agency’s Panel for Animal Health and Welfare. Professor Salman is the chairman of the Continuing Education Committee of the Association for Veterinary Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine (AVEPM). He has served as a member and then chairman of the ACVPM of the examination committee.

Professor Salman’s research interests are on the methodology of surveillance and survey for animal diseases with emphasis on infectious diseases. He has published as the editor of a book entitled «Animal Disease Surveillance and Survey Systems: Methods and Applications». 
NATO’s actions in the field of stabilisation and reconstruction will always require close coordination with other international organisations such as the UN and its agencies. Teamwork between all relevant international actors is of the essence. Close international cooperation is of paramount importance and a principle to which NATO accords top priority.

Rising Food Prices and Social Turmoil

For many of the 850 million people who are already affected by chronic hunger, the effect of sharply increasing food prices can be devastating. The FAO reports that during the first three months of 2008, international nominal prices of all major food commodities reached their highest levels in nearly 50 years. Not surprisingly, World Bank President Robert Zoellick recently warned that at least 33 countries face social unrest as a result of world food prices rising 80% over the past three years.

The FAO predicts that countries who are most vulnerable to price hikes are those who have chronically high levels of undernourishment (over 30%) while being highly dependent on imports of petroleum products and staple grains (rice, wheat, maize) for domestic consumption. The same report shows that the countries with the highest level of these three risk factors are Eritrea, Niger, Comoros, Botswana, Haiti and Liberia.

The crisis has been especially hard for net consumers of food and the poorest who already spend 70 - 80% of their income on food. The price increases have especially affected staple foods such as rice, wheat and maize which are the mainstays of poor people’s diets. Furthermore, the crisis is spreading to include groups of people who although vulnerable, were generally food secure.

Ironically, there is often enough food available to feed the hungry. Josette Sheeran of WFP recently said that, «We are seeing food on the shelves but people being unable to buy it.» Furthermore, the frustration of seeing food available, but not being able to buy it, is already causing citizens to protest against - often already unstable - governments who are not doing enough to deal with the crisis. In desperate situations, looting may occur. Indeed, the IMF remarks that many countries have reached the «tipping point» and that if prices continue rising, many governments will not be able to feed their people and maintain stable economies.

Unfortunately, the FAO predicts that food prices will remain high in the coming years. Rising fuel prices are also keeping the price of agricultural inputs like fertilizer very high. Immediate and longer term action is urgent to make sure that the crisis does not escalate further. Some recommendations which have come up are enhancing social safety nets to immediately deal with short term effects and greatly increasing investment in agriculture to deal with longer term causes of the crisis. The effects of the rising demand for bio-fuels and the damage caused by climate change also need to be addressed.

3 see footnote 1
The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

The Euro Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a Partnership body where Partners and Allies are equal stakeholders. The EADRCC’s field exercise programme is among the finest in the world. These exercises are among the biggest international civilian protection training opportunities and bring together teams from across the Euro-Atlantic area.

The latest EADRCC consequence management exercise took place in Finland from 1 to 5 June 2008. «Uusimaa 2008» was the ninth large scale EADRCC field exercise since 2000. Not surprisingly, these events are becoming ever more popular and attract participants from many EAPC nations. For Uusimaa 2008, 20 EAPC nations deployed intervention teams and/or nominated more than 120 staff officers and experts to work in staff positions in different command elements such as the Directing Staff, the On-site Operation and Coordination Centre and the Assessors Team. UN-OCHA also participated in the exercise. In addition to the civilian rescue units, two nations Finland and Belgium deployed military units during the exercise. The number of participants exceeded 1100 making Uusimaa 2008 one of the biggest exercises of this kind.

Why are these events so popular? Why do nations invest a lot of money and resources to take part in these exercises and show their capabilities and skills? The answer is rather simple. NATO is the only international organisation which offers nations the opportunity to work together in a large scale field exercise with a demanding and complex scenario during which participating teams can exchange best practices and improve procedures for co-operating with other international teams. Also very important is that during these events civilian teams have the possibility to act together with military units in consequence management operations.

The scenario for Uusimaa 2008 was based on a storm-induced flood in the bay of Helsinki. The high water levels affected critical infrastructure elements of the capital and posed chemical and biological threats. Intervention teams had to carry out search and rescue activities in normal and contaminated environments by land and sea at seven main exercise sites and several sub-sites. The exercise scenario also included a biological incident for the deployed field laboratories. According to first assessments, the scenario and the exercise sites provided participating teams with demanding tasks to fulfill their objectives.

It goes without saying that the success of these exercises very much depends on the host nations. There was unanimous agreement among all exercise participants and observers that Finland was an excellent host.

As the Head of Directing Staff, I would like to take the opportunity to express my sincere thanks to all participants and supporters who have made the Exercise Uusimaa 2008 a great success. Well done and Thank you!
On 28/29 May, senior representatives from national civil emergency planning authorities, SCEPC permanent representatives, Chairs of the Planning Boards and Committees (PB&Cs), representatives from NATO’s Military Authorities (NMAs) and CEP met at NATO HQ to discuss topical issues in Civil Emergency Planning. The Plenary was chaired by Mr. Martin HOWARD - the Assistant Secretary General for Operations.

Following the Bucharest Summit, where the civil dimension of current and future NATO activities was recognised, the SCEPC Plenary provided the opportunity to discuss CEP-related tasks and provided guidance for their implementation.

CEP focuses on how better to support national civil authorities and, where possible, NATO’s military authorities. In particular, the plenary examined how better to support national authorities in the event of natural disasters; with recent experiences underlining the challenge in preparing for and dealing with such events. In this context, the work of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) was considered as well as the United Nations and the World Food Programme both of whom briefed the Plenary on current activities.

The plenary also reviewed the status of implementation of the various activities and policy initiatives undertaken by SCEPC as well as the PB&Cs, including activities supporting nations with their level of preparedness to deal with CBRN incidents. The exchange of experience in the areas of training and exercises continues to be an important element.

**In Memoriam**

Dr. Edita STOK  
20 March 1960 - 11 July 2008  
Chair NATO Joint Medical Committee

It is with great sadness and regret that we inform you of the death of Dr. Edita Stok. As Chair of the Joint Medical Committee, Edita was a pillar of the NATO CEP and Medical communities. She made a huge contribution to improving coordinated medical support to civilians in emergencies and crises. She will be remembered as an exemplary colleague full of commitment, energy and determination.
As NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning activities do not take place in a vacuum, this table provides an overview of useful links to other organisations also active in the field of Civil Emergency Planning.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>WEB SITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil">http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil</a></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/terrorism/dg_terrorism_en.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/justice_home/terrorism/dg_terrorism_en.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)</td>
<td><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mic.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mic.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Commission Human Aid Office (ECHO)</td>
<td><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm">http://ec.europa.eu/echo/index_en.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)</td>
<td><a href="http://osce.org">http://osce.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)</td>
<td><a href="http://iaea.org">http://iaea.org</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/incident-emergency-centre.htm">http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/emergency/incident-emergency-centre.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.opcw.org">http://www.opcw.org</a></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**CEP EVENTS**

Below is a list of upcoming events in other international organisations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Rescue Services Agency</td>
<td>Information Management in</td>
<td>11-19 Sept 2008</td>
<td>Tbd, Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency Response Operations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Swedish Rescue Services Agency</td>
<td>Staff Training for International</td>
<td>7-15 October 2008</td>
<td>Tbd, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>22nd Fusion Energy Conference</td>
<td>13-18 October 2008</td>
<td>Geneva, CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO School</td>
<td>NATO CEP Course</td>
<td>10-15 Nov 2008</td>
<td>Oberammergau, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO School</td>
<td>NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Staff Course</td>
<td>1-5 December 2008</td>
<td>Oberammergau, Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Assistance and Protection Course</td>
<td>8-12 Sept 2008</td>
<td>Kuopio, Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCW</td>
<td>Course on Analysis of Chemicals</td>
<td>8-26 Sept 2008</td>
<td>Helsinki, Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundeswehr Medical Academy</td>
<td>Emergency Medicine Course</td>
<td>29 Sept-18 Oct 2008</td>
<td>Munich, Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swedish National Defence College</td>
<td>Senior Course on CEP and Crisis</td>
<td>1-5 December 2008</td>
<td>Stockholm, Sweden</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Management</td>
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Further information is available on e- Prime, the Partnership Real-time Information Management and Exchange System.

If you would like to contribute to “perCEPtions”, the CEP newsletter, please contact Clare Roberts, CEP, NATO HQ cepd@hq.nato.int