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| Updated: 13-Feb-2001 | NATO Information |
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CISAM CENTRO INTERFORZE STUDI APPLICAZIONI MILITARI ISTITUTO AUTORIZZATOVERBALE
DI INTERVENTO
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INDEX 1.Introduction
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1. Introduction
1.1 Foreword
Following war events in Bosnia, CISAM's specialized personnel
was formally tasked, by disposition n. COI/J4L/28801 of
21 December 2000, to deploy preliminarily to Bosnia, joining
the Italian Forces operating in that area in order to
identify the radioprotection situation as related to the
military personnel operating in the theatre since December
1995 and to the troups that are now committed in the same
area. The preliminary inspection in Bosnia has been carried
out by Rear Admiral Francesco Andreuccetti, who has acted
in cooperation with Manager Dr. Vittorio Sabbatini, certified
expert, registered with n.5 on the list of the experts
holding 3rd level certification. Radiological checks have
been carried out on 23 December 2000 at Sarajevo and in
the area surrounding the city with the cooperation of
the Italian military personnel led by LTC Buschettari
and with the participation of NBC specialized personnel.
1.2 Aims of inspection
The mission, whose objective was to give a preliminary
evaluation of the radiological conditions consequential
to the utilization of DU ammunition by the NATO forces
in the Sarajevo area, pursues the following goals:
a) to evaluate eventuel residues of the above mentioned
amunition in the areas occupied by Italian troups since
1995 and in those which are now being used.
b) to provide SMD and COI with immediate input on the
inspected sites, on the basis of the first measurements
performed.
c) to draw environmental samples from the mentioned areas
which are to be submitted to lab tests in order to determine
the concentration of DU necessary to evaluate the doses
affecting personnel.
d) indicate protective measures to be adopted.
e) prepare for a successive, more complete radioprotection
investigative campaign.
All radiological checks have been carried out in compliance with the norms in force.
1.3 Directions to personnel
During the inspections, when the situation called for
it, the personnel has been duly informed on the identified,
specific risks and instructed on the protective measures
to be adopted.
2. Basic Information
Knowledge by the NATO forces of 10.800 shells equipped
with 300 gr DU piercing projectiles, but lack of detailed
information (coordinates and number of projectiles actually
utilized) on the areas and targets affected, and on the
weather conditions at the time of the explosions, left
us no alternative but that of acting on the basis of input
provided by the Italian Military Command represented by
Gen. Sanpaolo and Col. Beraldo. We have, thus, proceeded
with a preliminary inspection of the sited around Sarajevo,
where the Italian military presence has been and still
is concrete, and where the signs of ruin and machine-gunning
of various types and intensity are quite evident. Environmental
samples have been drawn from these areas where deemed
appropriate.
3. Areas subjected to radiological evaluation
Areas subjected to radiological evaluation and relative
geographic denominations are shown in the following chart:
Chart n. 1
Areas subjected to preliminary radiological evaluation
Areas subjected to preliminary radiological evaluation
City: Remarks:
"Tito Barracks", ex Yugoslavian Army Academy,
Battle Group HQS. Sarajevo City damaged, tottering, shut
down buil-dings, absence of hit tanks.
"Tito Barracks", ex Yugoslavian Army Academy,
area assigned to Task Force. Sarajevo City damaged, tottering,
shut down buildings, absence of hit tanks.
8th Regiments HQS and Italian Field Hospital from Dec
95 to June 97. Vogosca Area located between tottering
buildings, shut down premises, ab-sence of hit tanks.
Helicopter Squadron HQS and ex seat of Yugoslavian Air
Force Academy. Railovac Controlled by German and French
units, absence of hit tanks.
Brigade Command HQS from 12.95 to 15.3.2000 and ex Sarajevo
Pediatric Hospital. Sarajevo, Zetra Damaged, tottering,
shut down buildings, absence of hit tanks.
Carabinieri Installation close to Sara-jevo Airport Sarajevo,
Butmir New prefab buildings, reclamed land, absence of
hit tanks.
4. Measurement procedures
4.1 Measurement instrumentation utilized on site
The following portable monitors have been utilized to
assess the cardiological situation in the areassubjected
to inspection and listed on chart n.1.
· Air Kerma rateo monitor, Victoreen 290 SI with
G.M. beta-gamma 189-4 probe;
· ROTEM DA-3 with beta-gamma GM-10;
· Surface contaminometer, Contamat FHT 111M.
4.2 Formalities for the drawing of environmental samples.
Soil samples have been drawn from the areas subjected
to radioprotection tests for lab measurements to be carried
out in CISAM's Health Physics and Radioprotection departments
of the CISAM Nuclear Office.
The mentioned soil samples have been drawn in significan
areas, according to the procedures set by NATO SIRA (Standard
Identification of Radiological Agents).
While on site radiometric checks and sample drawings were
being carried ou, a search was conducted in the damaged
buildings and in the areas close to them for ammunition
residues showing radioactivity, particularly shells and
projectiles from 30 mm guns along with other residues.
Such search has given negative results.
4.3 Measurements
The rateo dose density measurements (Kerma rateo in air)
taken from numerous traces left on buildings and roads
by projectiles of different types, have shown levels undistinguishable
from those found in the natural environment (not superior
to 0.5 microGy/h).
Further, on site measurements, taken from the ground surface and from the buildings, have failed to show levels of superficial contamination and dose intensity distinguishable from those present in the natural environment. The drawn samples are expected to undergo lab measurements which, being characterized by higher sensitivity, will allow an evaluation of eventual traces of DU and of other radiosotopes.
5. Radiological evaluations
Depleted Uranium, which by law decree n. 230/95 is classified
as lo toxicity, radioactive material, is made of 99.7%
uranium 238 (U238), 03% U235 and traces of U234.
Uranium 238 is the founder of the natural uranium family,
while Uranium 235 is the founder of the Actinium-Uranium
natural family. The two radioisotopes, whose balance is
characterized by alpha, beta and gamma emission descendants,
have halving times of respectively 4.5 billion and 0.7
billion years. Such isotopes, which are generally known
to exist in low concentration, are naturally present in
the earth waters and soils.
The use of depleted uranium in perforating projectiles
causes the following two problems of radioprotection nature:
a) risk from external irradiation in proximity of DU shells
or consistent parts of them.
b) risk of DU incorporation from inhalation or swallowing
As for the first possibility, we must remember that the
measurements taken during the Kosovo campaigns from an
integral projectile have shown, upon contact, a dose intensity
of about 200 microGy/h which has gradually decreased as
the distance from it increased, until becoming undistinguishable
from the density level present in the natural environment.
For what concerns the second possibility, the experience
acquired during the Kosovo environmental campaigns in
areas hit by numerous armor piercing projectiles, has
shown that the highest risk comes from swallowing, associated
with the careless and extended handling of DU shells.
As far as Bosnia and Kosovo, incorporation by direct inhalation
of DU fumes produced by the projectile-target impact must
be excluded, owing to the time lapsed between the end
of the war activities (September 1995) and the arrival
of the Italian force in the theatre (20.12.95).
Finally, the risk from inhalation associated with re-suspension,
which may be determined by lifting dust from the contaminated
soil, must be deemed negligible and technically justifiable,
given the physical characteristics of uranium, and on
the basis of the results obtained from the specific measurements
taken.
The on site measurements taken in the checked areas and
those previously taken in areas hit by DU shells in Kosovo,
reveal that the external irradiation risk is negligible,
while it leads us to conclude that the exposure level
affecting the personnel operating in the mentioned areas
is below the safety limits expected for the general public.
6. Recommended precaution measures
Precaution and conservative measures recommended for implementation in order to reduce the risks from ionizing radiations generated by the presence of DU are listed below:
a) request from the competent authorities a detailed
list of the sites in Bosnia where DU shells have been
utilized, along with coordinates and number of exploded
shells.
b) demand that NBC personnel conduct preventive inspections
of the areas where DU ammunitions are admittedly used,
while reducing the permanence of other personnel in the
concerned areas to the bare minimum necessary;
c) personnel operating in these areas must be equiped
with anti-dust masks and disposable gloves, and must be
escorted by NBC personnel carrying revelation instruments;
d) under the supervision of NBC personnel and complying
with given instructions, all identified, exploded ammunition,
shells and other material must be collected and stored
in two distinct metal containers equipped with lids, one
for DU projectiles and fragments, the other for contaminated
materials. These containers must be stocked in warehouses
located in guarded, assigned areas, while no one must
be allowed to get closer to them than 5 meters.
e) Personnel must be warned about the areas affected by
DU ammunition and informed about the characteristics of
the same, while solicited to contact NBC personnel immediately
upon identification of such ammunition.
f) Warn the company and platoon Commanders of the importance
to ensure that their personnel, acting contrary to the
given instructions, have not picked and kept suspicious
objects that have not been checked by NBC personnel.
7. Conclusive remarks
The instruments utilized by the CISAM personnel in the
areas subjected to radiological checks have revealed absence
of DU shelling traces and verified a subsequent absence
of risk associated with the presence of DU.
In order to obtain more precise evaluations and more effective
protective measures for the operating personnel and the
population at large, while at the same time providing
a complete picture of the radioprotection situation in
Bosnia, more environmental checks must be carried out
in the areas where Italian personnel has been and is now
engaged. Thanks to the specialistic activities conducted
in Kosovo and to the experience gained from them, we are
now in a position to evaluate, among the possible risks
that may affect (and may have affected) the people involved,
that of irradiation from integral projectiles and that
of internal contamination resulting from swallowing and
caused by the careless handling of exploded DU shells.
The same experience leads us to classify as negligible
the risks from irradiatin caused by shells on the ground
and risks of internal contamination caused by inhalation
of re-suspension dust.
The implementation of the protective measures suggested,
allows the reduction to negligible levels of the risks
for the personnel operating in Bosnia.
The preliminary results of the inspections have been conveyed
to the Italian Command in Bosnia. The drawn environmental
samples are now being examined in the CISAM's Health-Physics
and Radioprotection labs. The lab results will be the
subject of a further report.
