

MC 48/3(Final)
8 December 1969

FINAL DECISION ON MC 48/3
MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT
FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA

1. The Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session by DPC/D(69)62 of 4 December 1969 adopted MC 48/3 as guidance for measures to implement the strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area.

2. This document supersedes MC 48/2(Final), 23 May 1957 which should be destroyed.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

N.G. PALAIOLOGOPOULOS
Lieutenant General, Hellenic Army
Director,
International Military Staff

NOTE: This Final Decision sheet now becomes a part of and shall be attached to MC48/3 as the top sheet. Page numbering of the complete document when this decision sheet is attached is as follows:

MC48/3(Final Decision) - page I
MC 48/3(Military Decision) - 26 pages
Total pages - 27

This document consists of one page

- I -

MC 48/3(Final)

MC 48/3(Military Decision)

6 May 1969

MILITARY DECISION ON MC 48/3

MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA

1. At their 44th Meeting on 6 May 1969, the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session approved MC 48/3 and hereby forwards this document to the Secretary General with the request that the Defence Planning Committee take note of this action and approve the document.

2. MC 48/2(Final), dated 23 May 1957, is superseded upon the Defence Planning Committee's approval of this document and issuance of the "Final Decision Sheet".

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

N.G. PALAIOLOGOPOULOS

Lieutenant General, Hellenic Army
Director, International Military Staff

This document consists of 26 pages

- 1 -

MC 48/3(Military Decision)

MC 48/3

ENCLOSURE 1

REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
to the
DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE
on
MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE STRATEGIC
CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NATO AREA

INTRODUCTION

1. In May 1967 the Defence Planning Committee in Ministerial Session issued guidance for the NATO Military Authorities(1). Based on this guidance, NATO's overall strategic concept was revised, and Ministers approved the revised concept at their meeting in December 1967(2).

2. The purpose of this paper is to establish measures necessary to implement the strategic concept so that Major NATO Commanders and the nations of NATO can formulate their plans and develop the pattern of their defence effort.

3. The guidance herein may be modified from time to time by the Military Committee, in conformance with specific guidance from and with the approval of the Defence Planning Committee, not only for peacetime planning but in the event of actual crisis.

OBJECTIVES

4. The basic guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty is that an armed attack against one or more members of the Alliance shall be considered an attack against them all. This guarantee, together with the strategic concept of MC 14/3, requires that NATO has a wide choice of action in the event of attack, and a full

(1) DPC/D(67)23, 11 May 67

(2) MC 14/3(Final), 16 Jan 68

spectrum of military capability. The basis of NATO's military planning must be to ensure security through credible deterrence; secondly, should aggression occur, to preserve or restore the integrity and security of the North Atlantic Treaty Area by employing such forces as may be necessary within the concept of forward defence.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

5. The strategic concept of MC 14/3 emphasises the following:
 - a. The need for close and continuing contact between NATO Military and Political Authorities in periods of tension and crisis to improve consultation and expedite collective decisions on build-up of forces and readiness and on political guidance to the NATO Military Authorities.
 - b. The requirement for adequate conventional forces and for improving capabilities for non-nuclear operations while maintaining NATO's nuclear capability. This should include achieving optimum dual capability, especially in air forces, and the flexibility to employ these forces in non-nuclear operations.
 - c. The need to utilize all available warning time to the maximum for the build-up of existing NATO forces, both by the rapid commitment, deployment and redeployment of active units and by quick mobilisation and deployment of well-trained and equipped reserve forces.
 - d. The concept of forward defence with echeloning in depth in suitable tactical locations and tactical mobility with effective forces-in-being.
 - e. The concept of flexibility in response to aggression, with provision for a variety of response options depending upon the size and scope of the aggression; namely, direct defence, deliberate escalation and general nuclear response, one or more of which should be used in any specific contingency.

- f. The requirement for a capability to conduct deliberate escalation.
- g. The policy that forces should not be reserved for hostilities following a general nuclear exchange though NATO requires a survival capability to accomplish the implementation of survival measures, the maintenance of law and order and control of land and sea areas.

DURATION OF OPERATIONS

6. The nature and duration of military operations cannot be precisely forecast. The lack of information on such factors as time of tension/warning, scale and type of aggression and the theatre of operations - the initial choice of which lies solely with the enemy - makes it difficult to forecast either a long, an intermediate or a short period of military action.

7. The duration of operations at the lower end of the spectrum of aggression will depend on a decision by either side whether or not the conflict should be terminated, extended or escalated. If the conflict initiated as, or developed into, a large-scale conventional attack, the length of time during which NATO could resist without recourse to nuclear weapons would depend on the area where the attack was delivered, the weight of attack, the adequacy and preparedness of NATO's conventional forces and the survival of nuclear strike forces.

8. While the possibility of escalation exists, the appropriate timely use of tactical nuclear weapons might stop the aggressor, thereby limiting further escalation. However, once nuclear weapons have been introduced, the conflict may be very difficult to control.

MEASURES REQUIRED

9. Intelligence, Situation Reporting, Early Warning, Command, Control and Communications. Military and political intelligence procedures must provide NATO promptly and continuously with the best possible analysis of Warsaw Pact (a) capabilities, (b) probable courses of action, and (c) operations. They must give NATO the maximum advance warning of the possibility of impending attack and must provide for the rapid dissemination and exchange of vital information between NATO nations and NATO political and military authorities. There must be an effective early warning system in continuous operation to provide warning of imminent air attack, and to support NATO operations during hostilities. Effective reconnaissance and security forces must be deployed to provide tactical warning of attack and to cover deployment of NATO forces. To avoid surprise attack by ships and submarines, and to give warning of the approach of hostilities, an effective maritime surveillance and warning system is also necessary. It is essential that surveillance and intelligence procedures be fully co-ordinated NATO-wide to provide the effective warning necessary. NATO's strategy emphasises a full spectrum of military capabilities ranging from conventional forces through tactical nuclear weapons to strategic nuclear forces. Accordingly, this requirement for flexibility and timeliness in response to rapidly moving situations necessitates a modern military command, control and communications system, largely oriented towards automation. Similarly, there is a requirement for linking National Authorities, NATO Political Authorities, and NATO Military Authorities with rapid, survivable, secure and reliable communications.

10. Prompt Co-ordinated Action during Warning Time. The NATO strategy recognises that the potential enemy aims continually to improve his capability to mount a surprise attack on a considerable scale. One of the bases for NATO's military planning should, therefore, be the hypothesis of an attack with little or

no strategic warning by some or all of the forces immediately available to the Warsaw Pact. For an attack directed exclusively or initially against a flank region, NATO's local military weaknesses would be particularly likely to influence an aggressor's choice of action in favour of surprise. The NATO strategy also recognises that it is probable that a period of increasing political tension (possibly of weeks, if not months) would precede aggression. The strategy is heavily dependent for both deterrent and operational success on NATO's maximum use of such warning time for rapid build-up of forward, ready forces which should be pre-planned as far as possible while maintaining flexibility. To be effective, the measures for a rapid build-up must be put in train early, possibly ahead of existing military alert stages. In this connection member nations should, in consultation with NATO if time permits, be prepared to undertake such immediate national measures as readying their assigned and earmarked forces as well as forces under national command which might be made available to NATO and reporting their actions to the NATO Political and Military Authorities.

11. Readiness. A high degree of effectiveness and mobility is required of NATO's active land, sea and air forces, and their means of support, to enable them to be brought to bear rapidly. Readiness of forces should be appropriate to the mission. Forces intended for early warning, immediate reaction, early employment, and rapid response must be in a constant state of high readiness. Exercises may be used as a pre-alert measure to improve NATO's military posture in times of crisis. Redeployment, reinforcement and mobilisable reserve forces, and their means of transport, reception and support, must be at readiness states which will enable NATO's build-up and reinforcement to respond effectively to Warsaw Pact initiatives and to enhance the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture.

12. Flexibility. To meet all possible aggressions and to prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO's specific response to aggression, NATO must develop the flexibility in its forces and its plans for their employment. Such flexibility depends on maximum mobility, the capacity for quick reaction, rapid response, sound reinforcement and logistic planning, political decision-making, and on a responsive military command, control and communications system. It also depends heavily on standardisation of equipment and procedures, to permit mutual support. Further, improving non-nuclear capabilities, while maintaining the capacity for an adequate nuclear response requires the ability to shift rapidly from the non-nuclear to the nuclear role and vice versa.

13. Offensive Capability. NATO's overall posture remains entirely defensive, and NATO strategy calls for immediate direct defence against any aggression, i.e. for meeting it generally at the place, time, and intensity it is launched. However, when direct defence is not adequate, NATO strategy calls for deliberate escalation, which can take the form of increasing the intensity of operations or of broadening their scope and scale. The latter requires the capability to prosecute land, sea and air operations, both nuclear and non-nuclear, at NATO's initiative in place, time and nature. Nuclear forces of the Alliance must be adequate to fulfil the objective of the strategy ranging from nuclear deterrence to a general nuclear response.

14. Air Defence. The capacity of NATO's forces to survive and to retaliate, immediately and effectively, requires that NATO has a capability to oppose actively and passively a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack by air. NATO must, therefore, develop and maintain an effective air defence system. This system must provide for the co-ordination, and control as practicable, of all aircraft, guns and missiles associated with air defence. It should also include passive measures to insure the survival of forces, installations and resources.

15. Immediate Reaction and Reinforcement Forces. NATO requires immediately-available multi-national forces which can be deployed to demonstrate Alliance solidarity and thus enhance the deterrent. While these forces should be capable of fighting, their main role is one of demonstration. Reinforcement forces with a balanced fighting capability and which can be deployed in accordance with contingency plans are also required. It is desirable that these immediate reaction and reinforcement forces should be found from other than those with an EDP role.

16. Mobilisation and Force Expansion. While preserving the structure, effectiveness and combat readiness of the existing forces, there is a need to increase NATO's capacity to respond effectively to any Warsaw Pact build-up by improving the strength, training, equipping and readiness of NATO's ground, sea and air reserve forces. There is also a requirement to develop and maintain effective systems and procedures for quick mobilisation and force expansion.

17. Security of Rear Areas. The NATO nations have the responsibility to establish adequate civil defence and internal security organisations within their own resources and to enable NATO forces to have maximum freedom of action and secure lines of communications.

18. Logistics and Infrastructure. Logistic planning must take account not only of committed M-Day forces but also of all the forces which can be brought to bear in NATO operations. Logistic support should be de-centralised and protected to reduce vulnerability, designed to make independence and mobility of operations possible and standardised to permit flexible mutual support. War reserves must be acquired and pre-positioned for sustained operations at levels sufficient to carry out the strategy, and thus to make it credible. National and NATO resource planning should take into account the requirements of standardisation both for operational flexibility and for flexible resupply. NATO infrastructure, together with national installations, should be adequate to support NATO forces under the current strategy.

19. Training and Exercises. Opportunity should be taken in peacetime to train forces in Allied exercises and to test reactions and decision-making machinery which would be required during periods of tension or aggression.

CONCLUSIONS

20. In order to deter, and if deterrence fails, to counter aggression in accordance with the principle of forward defence, NATO nations should make available in peacetime the forces needed to provide a full spectrum of military capabilities. For a credible overall deterrence and in prosecution of the various measures, tasks and roles to implement the strategic concept, it is essential to maintain both conventional and nuclear forces. There is a need :

- a. To strengthen the conventional forces-in-being to insure credibility of the conventional option of the strategy.
- b. To have available reinforcement forces capable of rapidly augmenting threatened areas.
- c. To provide mobilisation and expansion forces to augment further NATO's defensive capabilities.

APPENDIX A - STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF NATO

APPENDIX B - ROLES AND TASKS FOR NATO FORCES BY COMMANDS AND GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS

APPENDIX ASTRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN
THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF NATOGENERAL

1. From the strategic point of view, the territory covered by the North Atlantic Treaty must be considered in relationship to its geographical setting. This setting comprises:

- a. The Northern Region of ACE.
- b. The Central Region of ACE.
- c. The Southern Region of ACE.
- d. The Maritime Areas.
- e. North America.

THE NORTHERN REGION OF ACEStrategic Importance

2. The Northern Region of ACE lies principally between the Barents and Norwegian Seas on the North and the Baltic Sea on the South. It thus borders one of the sea areas from which the Allies will most likely operate their sea-based nuclear striking power and control the Soviet access routes to the open oceans. The value of the Northern Region to the Allies stems from its favourable location for early warning facilities and the strategic cover it provides. Airfields in this region may be used for staging and recovering of strike aircraft. The loss of the Northern Region of ACE would greatly improve the Soviet capability to cut off the sea lines of communication to Western Europe, would substantially reduce Soviet transit times to operating areas, would increase their dispersal possibilities and would furthermore expose the northern sector of the Central Region of ACE.

3. Control and surveillance of the Barents/Norwegian Seas exit routes to the North Atlantic is essential to the protection of NATO's sea lines of communication.

4. Allied control and surveillance of the Barents/Norwegian Sea areas could provide early warning of Soviet submarine deployments and facilitate denying them free access to the high seas. It would further facilitate Allied offensive operations in the northern flank region of the Alliance.

Strategic Importance of the Baltic Sea Areas

5. Control of the Baltic entrances, the Western Baltic and the adjacent areas of the Central Baltic is of major importance for the defence of South Norway, Denmark, North Germany, the North Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. This inhibits Warsaw Pact amphibious operations against adjacent Allied territories and facilitates Allied offensive operations in the Baltic Sea. Such control would prevent movement of Warsaw Pact naval forces through the Baltic Straits.

THE CENTRAL REGION OF ACE

Strategic Importance

6. The Central Region of ACE, with its population, resources and strategic position, constitutes the industrial and political heart of NATO Europe. It represents a front line of defence against the threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. The loss of this region to the Warsaw Pact would critically degrade the security of the rest of Europe and the North American Continent.

THE SOUTHERN REGION OF ACE

Strategic Importance

7. The Southern Region of ACE forms a barrier between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Mediterranean - Middle East regions in which the strategic resources and the security of the lines of communication are so important for the Alliance.

8. Greece and Turkey provide an obstacle to Warsaw Pact entrance into the Mediterranean and constitute an excellent base for operations against the southern flank of the enemy. Turkey also bars or flanks any direct Soviet advance to the Middle East.

Strategic Importance of the Mediterranean Sea

9. The Mediterranean Sea is the medium whereby an important part of the trade of Europe with the rest of the world is affected and the supporting potential of North America is transported to Southern Europe. Control of the Mediterranean Sea is essential to permit Allied naval forces to make use of their intrinsic flexibility.

10. The Mediterranean Sea skirts the Allied areas of Western and Southern Europe and the strategic areas of the Middle East and North Africa. Control of this area provides the only means by which three major land components in the Southern Region (Italy, Greece and Turkey) can be mutually supporting.

Strategic Importance of the Black Sea

11. The Black Sea, which provides substantial harbours, shipyards and base facilities for Warsaw Pact forces, is the principal source of the Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean. The Black Sea affords to the Warsaw Pact countries important lines of communications, the denial of which would impede the support of Warsaw Pact operations against Southern and Central Europe and prevent amphibious operations against NATO's Southern Flank.

THE MARITIME AREAS

Strategic Importance of the North Atlantic Ocean

12. The North Atlantic Ocean constitutes the most essential link between American and European members of the Alliance. It is a route whereby the Warsaw Pact can extend a political and military presence world-wide.

13. In times of increased tension or limited aggression, the North Atlantic Ocean is the medium whereby both the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact can effect force deployments, either overt or covert, in support of, or independent of, land area operations. Further, it is an area wherein naval probing actions could be undertaken with a reasonable degree of control.

14. In time of war the North Atlantic Ocean affords to the Alliance a medium in which the sea-based strategic deterrent can operate; and to the Warsaw Pact a medium from which to launch submarine nuclear missile attacks, to sever the NATO maritime lifeline and to counter the threat posed by NATO offensive naval forces.

Strategic Importance of the Island Commands

15. The Island Commands of the Atlantic occupy strategic positions at the major accesses to the North Atlantic Ocean and along the vital sea lines of communication. They variously provide bases for early warning, the operation of ASW forces, forward logistic support and air operations.

Strategic Importance of Portugal

16. Portugal, together with its Atlantic Islands, provides valuable bases for the defence of both the Atlantic lines of communication and of the Mediterranean approaches. In addition its relatively protected location confers on it the role of a support area for the Central Region of ACE.

Strategic Importance of Iceland

17. Iceland's geographical location facilitates operations against Soviet air and naval forces and provides NATO with a base for early warning, the operation of ASW forces, forward logistic support and air operations.

Strategic Importance of Greenland

18. Greenland borders the Denmark Strait, the western sea route by which the Soviet Northern Fleet can reach the Atlantic Ocean. It provides NATO with possibilities for early warning and air operations.

Strategic Importance of the British Isles

19. The British Isles, by virtue of their location, industrial capability, ports and airfields, provide a valuable base for early warning and the operation of ASW forces, strategic counter-offensive forces and support of NATO forces in Europe.

Strategic Importance of the English Channel and the North Sea

20. The English Channel and North Sea cover the approaches to the coasts of the United Kingdom, Northern France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Southern Norway, with the major ports therein, several of which rank among the largest in the world. The intensive shipping activity in these areas constitutes the life blood of the economy and prosperity of the countries concerned.

NORTH AMERICAStrategic Importance of North America

21. North America possesses the principal bases for the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, which are the ultimate deterrent. North America could be the principal source of Allied production and support under circumstances wherein substantial damage is inflicted on the industrial capacity of Europe.

APPENDIX BROLES AND TASKS FOR NATO FORCES BY
COMMANDS AND GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS(1)1. General Guidance

- a. Peace. The forces of the Alliance demonstrate, in peacetime, NATO's solidarity and ability to respond effectively to Warsaw Pact initiatives. Their primary role of deterrence to aggression depends upon an adequate state of strength and readiness, a high standard of training, mobility, the possession of modern equipment, adequate logistic support, the capability for rapid mobilisation and force expansion, and the capability to employ nuclear weapons on a selective basis and within a general nuclear response if necessary. Deterrence can be further enhanced by the forward deployment of alert and ready forces-in-being together with the manifest determination and capability to employ and to reinforce them.

- b. Tension. In addition to the foregoing general guidance for peacetime, any warning time that a period of tension may provide should be used to bring NATO forces to a strength and state of combat readiness which are appropriate to the situation, together with preparations to implement contingency plans. The dispatch of immediate reaction forces and/or the rapid reinforcement of local forces may prevent a local situation of tension from developing into aggression by demonstrating the determination, strength and cohesion of the Alliance. Intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and security operations will require augmentation to provide maximum warning of the possibility of attack and to contribute to the protection of the nuclear capability of NATO and other key installations.

(1) The Roles and Tasks for NATO forces are further expanded in the following documents which should be read in conjunction with this document:

- a. MC 118 - 5 Aug 68 Roles and Tasks of NATO Naval Forces and their Relationship to other NATO Forces.
- b. MCM-23-68 - 16 Apr 68 A Concept for External Reinforcement of the Flanks.
- c. MCM-45-67(Rev) - 8 Dec 67 Standing Naval Force Atlantic.
- d. MCM-76-68 - 24 Sep 68 Maritime Contingency Forces Atlantic.
- e. MCM-88-68 - 31 Oct 68 A Study of the Consequences of the New Strategic Concept (MC 14/3) in the ACCHAN Area.

- c. War. In addition to the foregoing general guidance for peace and time of tension, the Major NATO Commanders should be prepared to engage their forces throughout their whole area of command and, depending upon the Warsaw Pact initiative, be ready to respond to aggression on any level.

2. Common Roles and Tasks.

The following roles and tasks are common to all forces in all regions of NATO:

- a. To provide a deterrent with a recognisable capability to respond promptly to any hostile action as an effective fighting force, thus obliging the enemy to choose between withdrawal and escalation.
- b. To conduct intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and security operations in order to provide maximum warning of the possibility of attack and early identification of the scope of aggression.
- c. To counter aggression wherever it may occur by applying force of the appropriate strength and kind including, as and when authorised, nuclear weapons to preserve or restore the integrity and security of the territory, sea area, air space, and forces of NATO.
- d. To conduct such offensive operations as necessary to gain the initiative.
- e. To maintain the capability to carry out selective or general nuclear response operations and, on order, to participate in such operations.
- f. To locate critical targets quickly and accurately in order to use nuclear weapons to the best advantage.
- g. To interdict enemy land, sea and air power.
- h. To prevent enemy amphibious operations.
- i. To take all practicable measures to ensure the survivability of forces, facilities, communications and supplies.

- j. To maintain the capability to employ passive defensive measures against chemical and biological warfare and, on order, to employ effectively lethal chemical warfare agents in retaliation, on a limited scale.
- k. To implement survival measures, to control vital areas, to assist national authorities in maintaining law and order after a major nuclear exchange, and in emergency to take direct action to control civilian population movements.
- l. To defend NATO installations in rear areas in co-operation with national authorities.
- m. To conduct such tasks as required for reorganisation, re-supply, and the accomplishment of necessary military tasks leading to the conclusion of the war.
- n. To conduct electronic warfare.
- o. To conduct psychological warfare.
- p. On order, to receive, support, and/or employ Redeployed Forces, Immediate Reaction Forces, External Reinforcement Forces and Mobilised Forces.
- q. To co-ordinate operations with adjacent commanders and to support their operations.
- r. In the event that a neutral or formerly hostile state should align itself with NATO, to establish liaison with their armed forces and conduct operations in conjunction with these forces or otherwise utilise their military capability.
- s. In the event that a neutral or formerly friendly state should align itself with the enemy, to conduct operations to contain or neutralise their military capability.
- t. To participate in NATO exercises for the purpose of training and testing of command control, communications, equipment, alert procedures and combat efficiency.

- u. To co-operate with French forces, as appropriate.

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE (ACE)

3. Significant Factors affecting Roles and Tasks of ACE

a. Northern Region

Norway borders the Soviet approach route around the North Cape to the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. She is favourably located for air operations over the Baltic, White and Barents Seas. Denmark is a key to operations in the Western Baltic and dominates the sea passages between the Baltic and the Atlantic. The defence of the Northern Region is likely to be greatly affected by operations in the adjacent sea areas and the Central Region of ACE. As contact with the Central European forces operating in Northern Germany may be interrupted, defence must be planned to meet this contingency. The present policies of Denmark and Norway do not permit the permanent stationing in their countries in peacetime of Allied forces or nuclear weapons. The forces maintained by these countries in peacetime are relatively small. This region will therefore have to rely heavily on rapid external reinforcement if aggression occurs.

b. Central Region

A large portion of the Central Region adjoins Warsaw Pact territory and is within easy striking distance of Warsaw Pact forces. The strategic situation of this region is adversely affected by its relatively limited depth, inter alia, resulting in an undesirable concentration of ACE air forces which adds to their vulnerability. The area contains several major avenues of approach from Eastern Europe - the North German Plain, the Eisenach/Frankfurt axis and the Munich/Augsburg axis. The North German Plain is particularly favourable for the enemy to make maximum use of armoured and mechanised units.

c. Southern Region

Italy has no frontiers with the Warsaw Pact. An attack against her is likely only through Austria or Yugoslavia into the Northern Italian Plain or across the Adriatic Sea. The coastal zone of Eastern Greece and Turkish Thrace offers the physical possibility of linking the defences of Greece with those of Turkey for their mutual support. Turkey is the only NATO target for a possible Soviet amphibious threat in the Black Sea. Both Greece and Turkey will have to rely heavily on rapid external reinforcement of their forces should aggression occur on their territories.

d. France

The territory and airspace of France lie immediately to the rear of the vital Central and Southern Regions of ACE. They are of great strategic importance to the alliance from both operational and logistical aspects. Any decision or move to restrict further or permanently deny French territory, territorial waters or airspace will adversely influence the defence of the Central and Southern Regions of ACE.

4. Roles and Tasks of ACE Forces

The following roles and tasks of ACE forces by type are supplementary to, or in elaboration of, those outlined in paragraph 2 above.

a. Land Forces

- (1) To defend NATO's territories as far forward as possible.
- (2) To ensure the integrity of land lines of communication.
- (3) To control the land borders of the Baltic Straits.
- (4) To control the land borders of the Turkish Straits and to deny the exit of enemy forces to the Mediterranean.

- (5) To implement plans for defensive works, barriers, and demolitions in order to increase the defensive capabilities of combat forces and support the defence in depth.

b. Naval Forces

- (1) To provide, in order to discourage and counter Soviet maritime activities that appear to threaten the political, economic or military interest of the Alliance, a continuous and visible evidence of the solidarity and unit of NATO by upholding the principles of freedom of the sea and international laws.
- (2) To conduct maritime operations, as necessary, in order to maintain firm control of the sea areas, including continental waters, keep open sea lines of communication, destroy or disrupt enemy merchant shipping, and protect Allied shipping with emphasis on protecting movements of troops and logistic support from South Norway to North Norway and on defending sea lines of communication in the German North Sea area, the Baltic Approaches and in the Mediterranean.
- (3) To conduct all appropriate types of naval operations in the sea areas adjacent to North Norway (in co-operation with SACLANT), the Western Baltic Sea and adjacent areas of the Central Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. In the Eastern and Northern Baltic Sea, to conduct air and submarine operations.
- (4) To support the land/air campaign with all types of naval, naval air and amphibious operations.
- (5) To contain and destroy enemy naval forces in the enclosed sea areas where possible and to prevent the passage of these forces to the open seas by conducting anti-transit operations, particularly in the Baltic and Black Sea exits and in the Strait of Gibraltar.

- (6) To implement defensive operations in connection with merchant shipping, by:
 - (a) Dispersal and re-routing to safe areas;
 - (b) Establishment of Naval Control of Shipping;
 - (c) Sailing in groups or convoys; and
 - (d) Providing the maximum protection practicable.
- (7) To conduct mine countermeasures to provide for the safe passage of NATO shipping in established routes through shallow waters and approaches to ports and anchorages.
- (8) To defend NATO territories and island bases against seaborne attacks and to provide air defence from seaward.
- (9) To conduct amphibious operations in order to secure or re-capture positions of military importance.
- (10) To respond to Warsaw Pact harassment by applying pressures at sea against Pact merchant ships, fishing fleets or oceanographic ships, as appropriate, within NATO established political guidelines, and to resist similar actions by the Warsaw Pact.
- (11) To provide sea-based logistic support and an administrative lift capability for land-based forces to areas where other means are inadequate.

c. Air Forces

- (1) To gain and maintain air superiority.
- (2) To provide air defence capabilities and operations for the protection of forces, facilities and of the civilian population; and to defend their respective Air Defence Regions, co-ordinating the air defence requirements and capabilities of land and naval forces and of adjacent and national commands, and organising, operating, and co-ordinating early warning facilities and communications.

- (3) To conduct strategic and tactical air operations in support of the overall land, sea and air battle for Europe; and to co-ordinate or control, as appropriate, such sorties as may be made available by naval forces, adjacent commands, or external air forces.
- (4) To provide, through co-ordination with national meteorological services, as necessary, meteorological services to support land, sea and air operations.
- (5) To co-ordinate search and rescue services.
- (6) To conduct aerial mine laying.
- (7) To carry out operations against enemy forces, lines of communication, and ports in and around the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas, and, in conjunction with ACLANT commands, in the sea areas adjacent to North Norway.

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC (ACLANT)

5. Significant Factors affecting Roles and Tasks of ACLANT

Control of the North Atlantic is essential for the survival of the European members of the Alliance. Furthermore, it would permit offensive action against the enemy missile submarine threat and distribution of residual resources in the event of a strategic nuclear exchange. Allied naval superiority would permit naval task forces and ballistic missile submarines to attack enemy military bases and war-making potential.

6. Roles and Tasks of ACLANT Forces

Since the Warsaw Pact is capable of initiating and conducting a wide range of actions affecting the ACLANT area, it is not practicable to define roles and tasks of ACLANT forces by specific geographic areas. These roles and tasks may change for each specific area of operations, and implementation of some of the tasks may not be required at all. Nevertheless, it is possible to define overall

roles and tasks for ACLANT maritime forces, the implementation of which will depend on the type of aggression, the area of operations and other circumstances prevailing at the time. These roles and tasks, which are supplementary to, or in elaboration of, those outlined in paragraph 2 above, are as follows:

- a. To provide, in order to discourage and counter Soviet maritime activities that appear to threaten the political, economic or military interest of the Alliance, a continuous and visible evidence of the solidarity and unity of NATO by upholding the principles of freedom of the sea and international laws.
- b. To conduct maritime operations, as necessary, in order to maintain firm control of the sea areas including continental waters, keep open sea lines of communication, destroy or disrupt enemy merchant shipping and protect Allied shipping.
- c. To support operations on land contiguous to the ACLANT sea areas, particularly on the Northern Flank of ACE, by providing:
 - (1) An amphibious assault, administrative lift and logistic support capability.
 - (2) Gunfire, missile, carrier and maritime air support and mine countermeasures.
- d. To prevent the passage of enemy surface and sub-surface forces to the open seas by conducting anti-transit operations and to deploy ASW forces to contain Warsaw Pact submarines already at large in the open seas.
- e. To implement defensive operations in connection with merchant shipping, which will run subsequent to, or in concert with, the offensive operations phase, depending on the availability of ships consisting of:
 - (1) Dispersal and re-routing to safe areas;
 - (2) Establishment of Naval Control of Shipping;

- (3) Sailing in groups or convoys; and
- (4) Providing the maximum protection practicable.
- f. To conduct mine countermeasures to provide for the safe passage of NATO shipping in established routes through shallow waters and approaches to ports and anchorages.
- g. To conduct minelaying operations, as required.
- h. To seek out and destroy enemy forces at sea with special attention to likely submarine ballistic-missile launching areas and to destroy enemy naval and air bases and other shore-based facilities.
- i. To establish a forward defence at sea against incursion by enemy air, surface and submarine units and to defend NATO territories and island bases against sea-borne attacks.
- j. To provide air defence from seaward for land-based forces and to conduct amphibious operations in order to secure or re-capture strategic positions.
- k. To respond to Warsaw Pact harassment by applying pressures at sea against Pact merchant ships, fishing fleets or oceanographic ships, as appropriate, within NATO established political guidelines, and to resist similar actions by the Warsaw Pact.
- l. To provide sea-based logistic support and an administrative lift capability for land-based forces to areas where other means are inadequate.

ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL (ACCHAN)

7. Significant Factors affecting Roles and Tasks of ACCHAN

The ports and bases concentrated in the territories bordering the confined waters of the English Channel and the North Sea makes them and the many ships using the area particularly vulnerable to air attack. The shallowness of these

waters makes them, in general, hazardous for submarine warfare but they are eminently suitable for mine warfare.

8. Roles and Tasks of ACCHAN Forces

As a maritime commander, CINCHAN's forces would be faced with much the same threat as those of SACLANT. In the ACCHAN area, too, the priority of tasks will depend on the Warsaw Pact initiative, and, as indicated in the General Guidance in paragraph 1, above, the implementation of individual measures will be conditioned by the aggression encountered. CINCHAN's broad roles and tasks, which are supplementary to, or in elaboration of, those outlined in paragraph 2 above, are as follows:

- a. To provide, in order to discourage and counter Soviet maritime activities that appear to threaten the political, economic or military interest of the Alliance, a continuous and visible evidence of the solidarity and unity of NATO by upholding the principles of freedom of the sea and international laws.
- b. To conduct maritime operations, as necessary, in order to maintain firm control of the sea areas including continental waters, keep open sea lines of communication, destroy or disrupt enemy merchant shipping, protect Allied shipping and to maintain the supplies to Europe and SACEUR.
- c. To conduct ASW operations by surface forces and Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
- d. To implement defensive operations in connection with merchant shipping, consisting of:
 - (1) Dispersal and re-routing to safe areas;
 - (2) Establishment of Naval Control of Shipping;
 - (3) Sailing in groups or convoys; and
 - (4) Providing the maximum protection practicable.

- e. To conduct mine countermeasures to provide for the safe passage of NATO shipping in established routes through shallow waters and approaches to ports and anchorages.
- f. To defend NATO territories against seaborne attacks and to provide air defence from seaward.
- g. To respond to Warsaw Pact harassment by applying pressure at sea against Warsaw Pact merchant ships, fishing fleets or oceanographic ships, as appropriate, within NATO established political guidelines, and to assist SACLANT in countering Warsaw Pact harassment in the Atlantic.

NORTH AMERICAN AREA

9. The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) is a planning agency only and therefore differs in this respect from Major NATO Military Commands. There is no overall NATO Commander for the region and detailed defence plans are developed nationally or bilaterally in consonance with CUSRPG EDPs and other Allied strategic plans.

10. The mission of land, sea and air forces of Canada and the United States assigned to fulfil a CUSRPG role is to maintain the security of the Canada-United States region against attack. Tasks in discharging this mission, through the co-ordinated employment of Canadian and United States forces, will incorporate:

- a. Air defence of those areas and installations which comprise the essential elements of the nuclear retaliatory forces, other military resources and the industrial and mobilisation capacity of North America.
- b. Maintenance of sea communications and defence against attack from the sea through control of sea areas essential to the defence of the Canada-United States region.
- c. Defence against airborne and amphibious operations, commando type attacks and lodgements and any operations resulting therefrom.
- d. Assistance to civilian authorities in accordance with national civil defence policies.

