1. At their Third Meeting on 1 April 1950, the North Atlantic Defense Committee approved the recommendations in paragraph 6, pages 3 and 4, of D.C. 13 as the goal to be achieved, subject to the constitutional limitations of the Member Nations.

2. The directive in paragraph 6 c was forwarded to the Military Committee and the requests in paragraphs 6 d and e were forwarded to the North Atlantic Council on 10 April 1950.

3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of D.C. 13.

C.H. DONNELLY
Colonel, U.S.A.
Secretary
D.C. 13
28 March 1950

BECAUSE OF THE SECRECY OF THE CONTENTS
OF THIS DOCUMENT, IT IS BEING GIVEN A
SPECIALLY LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
1. In accordance with the directives of the Defense Committee D.C. 3 and D.C. 6/1, the Military Committee directed the preparation of an over-all North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense plan. This plan was prepared by the Regional Planning Groups in the light of the Strategic Guidance transmitted to the Regions by the Standing Group. The Standing Group specified a planning date of 1 July 1954. This date was selected as one which should provide time to implement a reasonable program for building up the over-all military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

2. The Regional Planning Groups submitted their plans to the Standing Group, who in turn integrated these plans into an over-all plan to be used as a basis for the development of military preparedness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Military Committee has approved the 1954 Defense Plan (Appendix "A"), as an initial working basis and expressed the common will of the Chiefs of Staff to build up these forces as quickly as possible. It is considered by the Standing Group that as future realistic analysis of the requirements continues, it might well indicate a need for some revision in the interest of economy of forces, particularly after an assessment of the various threats.
on the several fronts. It might then be evident that the
defensive efforts must be coordinated so as to obtain a maximum
efficiency, and that the employment of forces will have to be
contemplated with the greatest flexibility. Also, it is
possible that force requirements as stated have not been
integrated in regard to the potentialities or abilities of the
several nations to provide and to support such forces. Review
of the plan and of the size, composition and employment of the
forces therein, will be required from time to time, but the
initiation of increases in our combined military capabilities
cannot and should not await such action.

3. In order to assess the increase in armed forces necessary
to reach the 1954 objectives as established in the plan, the
Regional Planning Groups were requested to submit estimates of
major forces which could be made available by 1 July 1951.
These statements of force availabilities were, in most
instances, the forces already programmed for 1951 by each
nation. Although they were not derived directly from the 1954
objectives they are considered a vital first step toward their
achievement. They will also provide a standard measure of
allied capability which the North Atlantic Treaty organization
can then proceed to integrate into an effective, though as yet
quantitatively insufficient, defensive force.

4. The degree of expansion which is needed can readily be
computed by each Region—based on the difference between its 1951
programmed availability and its 1954 requirements, which
requirements are subject to constant revision as stated in
paragraph 2 above. However, the Military Committee considers
that acceptance by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nations of the fact that a major increase in their individual
and collective military establishments will be an essential prerequisite to the achievement of a reasonable degree of security. The Military Committee, therefore, recommends that this fact be brought to the attention of the North Atlantic Council.

5. The Military Committee is of the opinion that special emphasis must now be placed on the determination of the means, rate, and extent by which the armed forces of the treaty nations must be expanded. The achievement of the military requirements necessary for the common defense will require long-range planning to coordinate fiscal, economic, and industrial considerations with those of national and regional defense. To this end, it might be advisable to establish closer liaison between the permanent bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization responsible for these activities. In any event, the Military Committee considers that immediate determination should be made as a matter of urgency on the economic and financial capabilities of the treaty nations to increase their current military commitments.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. The Military Committee therefore recommends that the Defense Committee:


b. Approve as a first approximation the forces required to meet the plan (detailed in Appendix “A” to the plan) and accept these as the basis for a progressive build up of North Atlantic Defense forces.

c. Direct the Military Committee through the Standing Group to invite the Regions to proceed, as a matter of
first urgency, with the study of programs through which they contemplate, for the purpose of stressing their will to defend, to increase their forces in order to reach the objectives set forth in subparagraph b consistent with their capabilities and requirements.

d. Request the North Atlantic Council to agree to the immediate need for urgent national and allied action to insure the progressive build-up of forces in accordance with paragraph 6b above, and that an immediate determination should be made as a matter of urgency on the financial and economic potentialities of the Treaty nations, with a view to increasing the value of their present Military commitments, and to consider new adequate economic and financial dispositions, in particular for the implementation of an integrated armament program.

e. Request the North Atlantic Council to give instructions in order that a closer liaison be established between the permanent bodies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since a coordinated action of these bodies is an essential prerequisite to the organization efficiency.
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MEDIUM TERM DEFENSE PLAN

1 July 1954

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PART I – DEFENSE POLICY AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

I – INTRODUCTION

1. In the present state of capabilities of the NAT nations, one of their first objectives must be the development of adequate forces to ensure the common defense against aggression. This outline plan has therefore been prepared as a basis on which to determine the minimum forces required. In order to allow time for the development of the forces by a progressive programme of expansion a planning date of 1 July 1954 has been chosen.

II – DEFENSE POLICY

2. In peacetime the objectives of the defense policy of the North Atlantic Treaty powers are to convince the USSR that war does not pay, and, should war occur, to insure a successful defense of the North Atlantic area. This policy requires the development of an adequate military strength and a close coordination of the political, economic and psychological efforts of member nations. Plans for the implementation of that policy should adhere to the following principles:

a. To oppose, by all measures short of war any peacetime attempts by the USSR or her satellites to increase their threat against the Treaty nations, meanwhile initiating measures exploiting Soviet weaknesses.

b. To develop a balanced military force, bearing in mind the economic situation of each nation.

c. To maintain continuously this force at its maximum efficiency thru modernization of equipment and combined training.

d. To compensate for the numerical inferiority of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by
establishing and maintaining technical superiority, by developing and using modern combat methods, by providing training facilities capable of expansion, and by achieving close coordination of effort.

e. To provide mutual assistance through standardization of equipment and coordination of use of production capacity, and interchange of planning, intelligence and technical information.

3. In the event of aggression the North Atlantic Treaty nations will, by combined and coordinated action, defend their peoples, territories, war-making capacities against all forms of enemy attack. Special emphasis must be placed on the defense of Europe, since its loss might well be fatal to the defense of the North Atlantic territories as a whole. Concurrently, they will develop and mobilize their combined strength with the object of achieving the earliest defeat of the USSR and the attainment of allied war objectives, which latter will have to be decided by the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

III - ASSUMPTIONS

4. For planning purposes the following major assumptions are made:

a. That the USSR will attempt to defeat the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations and reach the Atlantic Seaboard, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

b. That the USSR will initiate air attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty nations in Europe and the Western hemisphere.

c. That the USSR will initiate naval and air action to sever essential Allied lines of sea communications; to establish submarine and mine blockade of important
Allied ports; and to control her own coastal waters.

d. That the Soviet Union will initiate subversive activities and sabotage against Allied interests in all parts of the world.

e. All types of weapons, without exception, might be used by either side.

f. The following countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union:

    Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia.

g. Communist China will deny the Soviet Union no facilities or resources, and for her own part will pursue an opportunist policy for further expansion.

h. It is at present impossible to forecast the alignment of Yugoslavia in the event of aggression. Unless the present regime has been overthrown the Soviet leaders will probably have to employ force to utilize Yugoslav territory.

i. The following countries together with their overseas possessions will be in alignment, from the outbreak of war, against the Soviet Union:

    United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal (allies under the North Atlantic Treaty), together with Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ceylon and Jordan.

j. India and Pakistan will favor the Allied cause against the Soviet Union, but may prefer to maintain nonbelligerent status.
k. Greece, Turkey, Iran, the other American Republics, Japan, and the Philippines will be favourably disposed toward the Allies and some of these countries (particularly those which have ratified the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) will be in active alliance with them.

l. The following countries are likely to be, in various degree, associated with or sympathetic towards the Allies, but their strategic or political situation will be so precarious that their resources may not be available to the Allies. Western Germany, Austria, Iraq, South Korea, and Indochina States of the French Union.

m. The Arab States in general are likely to be favourably disposed towards the Allies and will make available to them their economic resources and territories, although some of them may be reluctant to assist in any active cooperation.

n. The following countries are likely to be initially neutral, but the first five at least, and in particular Sweden and Switzerland, will probably resist if attacked by the Soviet Union:

   Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the Irish Republic
   Afghanistan, Finland, Burma, Siam, and Indonesia.

o. Israel will also endeavour to remain neutral. It will resist the Soviet Union if attacked and may consent under pressure to assist the Allies.

IV - OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

5. The overall strategic aim of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers, should be drawn into war, is, in collaboration with their Allies to destroy by a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia the will and capabilities of the USSR and her satellites to wage war. In the Far East the strategic policy will be defensive.
V - PHASED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

6. After the outbreak of hostilities, operations will fall into four main phases. These phases which will not be distinct and may vary in different areas, are as follows:

   PHASE 1 - D-Day to the stabilization of initial Soviet offensive, to include the initiation of the Allied air offensive.
   PHASE 2 - Stabilization of initial Soviet offensive to allied initiation of major offensive operations.
   PHASE 3 - Allied initiation of major offensive operations until Soviet capitulation is obtained.
   PHASE 4 - Final Achievement of Allied War Objectives.

7. The concept of operations set forth in this plan considers only Phase 1 operations. Subsequent detailed planning may develop the operations necessary in Phases 2, 3, and 4.

VI - BASIC UNDERTAKINGS

8. Based on the over-all strategic concept the basic undertakings are to:

   a. Insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception.

   b. Arrest and counter as soon as practicable the enemy offensives against North Atlantic Treaty powers by all means available, including air, naval, land and psychological operations.

   c. Neutralize as soon as practicable enemy air operations against North Atlantic Treaty power.

   d. Secure and control sea and air lines of communication and ports and harbours, essential to be implementation of common defense plans.
e. Secure, maintain and defend such main support areas, air bases, naval bases and other facilities as are essential to the successful accomplishment of these basic undertakings.

f. Mobilize and expand the over-all power of the Treaty nations in accordance with their planned contribution to later offensive operations designed to maintain security of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

VII - TASKS

9. General Tasks, which are common to all regions and must be accomplished in furtherance of the basic undertakings, are as follows: (Not in order of priority)

a. Defend Regional Group territories covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, with special emphasis being given to the first phase defense of Continental Europe.

b. Hold securely those base areas and control those sea areas essential for counter-offensive operations, including those required for launching and supporting air offensive operations.

c. Control regional sea and air lines of communication in coordination with adjacent regions.

d. Arrange for convoy control and routing.

e. Establish shipping requirements in support of regional defense plans for coordination by the Standing Group with the appropriate agency.

f. Defend coastal waters (including support for anti-submarine, mining and air defense operations).

g. Plan for providing for appropriate support to the strategic air offensive.
h. Initiate development of armed forces for such later operations as may be necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

i. Provide to the maximum extent practicable essential aid to other North Atlantic regions in support of efforts contributing directly to the attainment of the common objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

j. Insure that such guerrilla operations as are practicable in war, in the rear of the enemy, are planned.

k. Exploit the weaknesses of the USSR and its satellites by coordinated psychological operations.

l. Coordinate plans with other regional Planning Groups.

10. Specific Tasks which have been Allocated to Regions are as follows:

   a. **Western European Region**
      (1) Hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible.
      (2) Cooperate with the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group in the organization of the Western Mediterranean’s lines of communication between the Continent and North Africa in support of land operations planned by the Group.

   b. **Southern European-Western Mediterranean Region**
      (1) Hold the enemy as far to the east and north as possible.
      (2) Organize the Western Mediterranean lines of communications:
           (a) Between North Africa and France in support of Western European operations, taking into account that plans for this purpose have already been prepared by Western Union.
           (b) In support of the campaign in Italy.
c. Northern European Region
   (1) Hold the enemy outside a defensible area.
   (2) Plan operations in the Baltic.

d. Canada-United Stated Region
   (1) Plan for the expeditious reinforcement of regions which may be attacked.
   (2) Support and prepare for, as appropriate, the execution of strategic air offensive operations assisted by other nations as practicable.

e. North Atlantic Ocean Region
   (1) Control trans-Atlantic lines of communication by the necessary counter-offensive and defensive measures.
   (2) Prepare plans for the defense of Continental Portugal and the Archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores, and also for the defense of Greenland, Iceland, Spitzbergen (to the extent practicable under treaty limitations) the Faeroes, and such other areas as may be decided within the North Atlantic Ocean Area.
PART II
ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Section I - Outbreak of War

1. In the event war should occur 1 July 1954, little or no warning would be received and therefore M- and D-day should, for Allied planning purposes, be considered the same.

Section II - Political Factors

Political Alignment (Also included as Paragraphs 4f to o of Part I).

Soviet Bloc

2. The following countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union:

   Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Korea and Outer Mongolia.

3. China. Before the end of 1950 the Chinese communists will have extended their military control over the whole of China excluding Hong Kong, and possibly Macao, Taiwan and some remote areas in the interior. Communist China will deny the Soviet Union no facilities or resources, and will pursue a policy aimed toward further expansion.

4. Yugoslavia. It is at present impossible to forecast the alignment of Yugoslavia in the event of war. Unless the present regime has been overthrown, the Soviet leaders will probably have to employ force to utilize Yugoslav territory.

Western Bloc

5. The following countries together with their overseas possessions will be in alignment, from the outbreak of war, against the Soviet Union:
United States, United Kingdom, France, The Benelux Countries, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Canada, Italy, and Portugal (Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty) together with Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ceylon, and Jordan.

6. India and Pakistan will favor the Allied cause against the Soviet Union, but may prefer to maintain a nonbelligerent status.

7. Greece, Turkey, Iran, the other American Republics, Japan and the Philippines will be favorably disposed toward the Allies and some of these countries (particularly those which have ratified the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) will be in active alliance with certain of the Allies.

8. The following countries are likely to be, in various degrees, associated with or sympathetic toward the Allies, but their strategic or political situation will be so precarious that their resources may not be available to the Allies:

- Western Germany, Austria, Iraq, South Korea, and Indo-China States of the French Union.

9. The Arab States are likely to be favorably disposed toward the Allies and will make available to them their economic resources and territories, although some of them may be reluctant to afford active cooperation.

Nations Initially Neutral

10. The following countries are likely to be initially neutral but the first five, at least, and in particular Sweden and Switzerland will probably resist if attacked by the Soviet Union:

- Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the Irish Republic, Afghanistan, Finland, Burma, Siam, and Indonesia.
Israel will also endeavor to remain neutral. It will resist the Soviet Union if attacked and may consent under pressure to assist the Western Powers.

**Political Aims and Objectives**

11. **Soviet Union.** The rulers of the Soviet Union have as their ultimate objective a communist world order under their own domination. The role of the Soviet Union in the attainment of this objective is to provide a secure base and powerful support for the international communist movement. Until such time as the Soviet regime considers that it possesses an adequate military capability (atomic as well as conventional) as compared with the Allies, it is improbable that the Soviets would deliberately venture any action which would involve them in an open war. If, however, the Soviet leaders decide to resort to war, it will be because they have assessed it would be to their advantage to initiate military action against the Allies.

12. The immediate Soviet political objectives in resorting to war, therefore, would be to destroy the alliance of the West and to subject Europe and the Near and Middle East to Soviet domination. A corollary objective would be to convert the resources of the conquered areas to Soviet use, greatly enhancing the potential strength of the Soviet Union in relation to that of the surviving noncommunist states. It might also be hoped that the strain of war and shock of defeat would hasten the expected collapse of anticommunism throughout the world.

13. **Satellite States.** In general, the government of the satellite states, being completely under Soviet domination and control, will have no political aims or objectives distinguishable from those of the Soviet Union.
Method of Furthering Political Aims

14. Soviet Union. The Soviet Union may be expected to further its political aims by all of the measures implied in the term “cold war”, i.e., threat of military aggression, political and economic warfare, propaganda, subversion, sabotage and other clandestine activities. It may be expected that these methods will be developed to a degree without precedent in history. They particularly belong to a conflict which is envisaged by the Soviet Union as a revolution in which the communist movement, an international political movement with a long tradition of subversion and clandestine resistance to authority, will be fundamentally engaged.

15. Satellite States. The methods and trends employed by the satellite states in the pursuit of the communist objectives will in most cases be identical with those of the Soviet Union. In addition, however, they may be expected to seek to exploit, for purposes of sabotage, espionage and propaganda, satellite national elements residing abroad, especially in the Western Hemisphere, through patriotic, religious and cultural appeals.

Attitude and Morale

16. Soviet Union. An important general factor is Soviet national morale in a future war, and this is most difficult to assess in advance. It will depend to some extent upon the circumstances in which war with the Western Powers breaks out. If, on the one hand, the war could be successfully interpreted by the Soviet leaders to the Russian people as another case of imperialistic aggression against the “Soviet Fatherland”, it is considered that Soviet morale and will to fight would be as high as in the war of 1941-5 and on the occasion of previous invasions of Russia. If, on the other hand, it were possible for the Western Powers in the years before the outbreak of war to deny to the Soviet leaders the appeal to Russian patriotism, and
to contrive to persuade the Russian people that Western armed action was aimed against communist totalitarianism and not against the Russian people themselves, it is considered that the morale of the Soviet armed forces might be somewhat reduced. While certain elements of the Soviet population, particularly ethnic groups in the Baltic States, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia, are dissatisfied with Soviet rule and hostile to domination by the Great Russians, the Soviet Government, through its efficient security police network, would be able to keep these groups under effective control in the early stages of the war. The more protracted the war the more chance there would be for these subversive influences, already present in the Soviet Union, to manifest themselves and take an active part in interfering with the Soviet war effort. Effective resistance or uprisings could be expected to occur only when the Western Allies are able to give material support and leadership, and assure the dissident elements liberation.

17. Although the people of the Soviet Union have not recovered from the privations of the last war they can be expected to endure additional hardships in the initial stages of a new war. Soviet patriotism while less ardent in support of a foreign war then in defense of home territory, would not be greatly shaken as long as military victories and war booty were forthcoming. As hostilities progressed, however, and if Soviet military reverses became known within the Soviet Union the increased hardships and suffering would magnify existing popular dissatisfaction with the regime.

18. **Satellite States.** The majority of the populations in the satellite countries are intensely nationalistic and resent the domination of the Kremlin and the present communist governments with which they are burdened. This attitude, although a potential source of weakness to the Soviet bloc if skilfully exploited
by the Western Powers, would not give rise to effective resistance to the Soviet war effort in the early stages of hostilities. The prevailing attitude of the satellite populations would be one of noncooperation and passive resistance towards their communist masters. Their economic and military contribution would be consequently diminished. Resistance in the form of sabotage and guerrilla activity, might develop spontaneously but this would be militarily significant only if guided and supported by the Allies.

Section III - Economic Factors

Soviet Union and Satellites

19. Industrial Potential. It is the declared Soviet intention that, by the end of the current plan in 1950, industry shall have been restored to the prewar level and in some respects shall have exceeded this level. Even if the planned development of Soviet and satellite industrial production should continue through 1954, it would still be far less than that of the Western Powers. However, the Soviets are and will continue to be able to devote a relatively much larger proportion of their industrial effort to the production of military items than the Western Powers. Soviet and satellite industrial development is retarded by shortages of machine tools, precision instruments, certain types of ball and roller bearings, certain ferro alloys and ferrous metals, and industrial diamonds. There is, in addition, a shortage of skilled personnel, both technical and managerial. There is a lack of production potential for high octane combat aviation fuel, lubricants, and certain types of finished steel. While the outbreak of hostilities would find the Soviet armed forces generally well-provided with standard equipment, it is difficult to predict accurately how long Soviet and satellite industries could meet the requirements of a major war.

20. Strategic Materials. The vast continental area controlled by the Soviet Union is relatively invulnerable to blockade, but
some natural rubber, industrial diamonds, wolfram, tin cobalt molybdenum must be imported. These deficiencies may be covered to some extent by stockpiling. In the event of a long war these deficiencies might become serious.

21. Agricultural Production. It is considered that the Soviet orbit, as a whole, will be self-sufficient in foodstuffs provided that low standards of domestic and animal consumption are assumed and harvests are normal.

Transport

22. Railroads. For some years to come the Soviets will depend principally on the railroads, which now carry a very high percentage of all inland freight traffic. The railroad capacity is barely adequate to meet present industrial needs, and is unlikely to increase at a greater rate than the requirements of an expanding industry. This lack of reserve capacity would be a handicap in supporting large armies operating for long periods at great distances from war production centers. The shift of Soviet industry eastward for greater security actually aggravates this problem. There is also the handicap of transshipment required by gauge differences between the Soviet Union and the satellite countries.

23. Motor Transport. Motor transport is used mainly for short freight hauls from farms and industrial plants to railway stations ports and airports. It is believed that the road system and the general level of the motor transport will be continually improved. However, in the event of hostilities during the next few years the road transport systems will not afford much relief to an already overburdened railway system.

24. Civil Air Transport. Civil air routes are of some importance to the Soviet economy, especially in the west and south-west, although the volume of freight carried is relatively very small. Efforts are being made to increase still further the already
considerable volume of air traffic. The almost complete lack of
developed land communications in large areas of Siberia and Central
Asia make air transportation essential.

25. **Inland Waterways.** It is estimated that inland water transport
presently handles a very small percentage of the total inland freight.
No appreciable increase is expected in the amount of freight carried
by the inland waterways because of the low priority on improvements,
and wartime damage to the river fleet and to port facilities.

26. **Coastal Shipping.** As the territories of the Soviet Union are
developed, the importance of coastal shipping routes as a necessary
adjunct to the inland waterways, railways and air transport is
growing. Considerable reliance is placed on the Black Sea tanker
fleet to transport oil from the Caucasus to the Balkan countries and
Soviet ports on the north Black Sea coast. The principal importance
of the Soviet merchant fleet is for coastal and inland sea transport.
It is not engaged in overseas traffic to anything like the extent of
the merchant fleets of other maritime nations.

27. **Significance of the Soviet Economic Position.** By 1951 the
industrial and agricultural capacity of the Soviet Union will be
considerably in excess of the level reached before World War II, but
even in 1954 she will still be weak in certain commodities and her
transportation system will be inadequate for her economy. Her
economic weaknesses will lie within her own borders rather than on her
dependence on outside resources since, if cut off from outside
supplies entirely, her war effort would not be immediately or
critically affected. If the Soviet Union wished to go to war between
1951 and 1954, economic considerations would not in themselves be
enough to prevent her from doing so if she felt competent of attaining
her primary objectives within a reasonably short space of time.
Section IV - Military Factors

Soviet and Satellite Armed Forces

28. General. It is estimated that the armed forces of the Soviet Union total about 4,000,000 men and it is unlikely that this total will be altered appreciably during the next few years. Primary sources of Soviet combat power in 1954 will be important ground forces supported by a numerically strong tactical air arm, a small surface fleet and a strong submarine arm, and, by that time, a Long Range Air Force capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

Ground Forces

29. Soviet Union. The Soviet Army is a powerful and effective military establishment. During the next few years it may be expected that the general size and composition will remain approximately the same, although improvements in present weapons and the possible addition of new weapons may give it increased combat efficiency.

30. Satellites. The Bulgarian Army has been improved during the past two years but cannot be considered a formidable fighting machine. Both the Rumanian and Hungarian Armies are being expanded and strengthened, but neither will be effective for combat within the next few years. Continuing purges in the Czechoslovakian and Polish Armies have helped to aggravate the general disorganization, low morale and inefficiency. There is, however, evidence which might indicate that this trend may be reversing itself at the present time, and it is expected that by 1954 they will have sufficient combat divisions to make a contribution to the Soviet offensive power.

Naval Forces

31. It is considered that any new construction effort will be directed in the main toward the following categories: heavy
cruisers, destroyers, escorts and submarines. Annual production thereafter cannot be accurately predicted, but the present trend is toward continued expansion. The ocean-going submarines will be of improved underwater performance. In addition, the Soviets have the capacity for adding large numbers of coastal submarines, minor combatant craft and small auxiliary craft.

32. It is expected that the over-all personnel strength of the Soviet Navy will remain approximately the same as the present.

33. It is expected that the Soviet fleets will continue to be deployed, on a regional basis, in strengths commensurate with the anticipated requirements in each region. The peculiar geographic position of the Soviet Union makes movement of naval forces from one sea area to another particularly difficult and dangerous, and for that reason, no extensive wartime changes in disposition are anticipated.

34. The Soviet concept for the employment of the surface fleets and naval air arm calls primarily for the protection of the seaward flanks of the Soviet Army. Secondarily, the fleets are to secure local control of definitely limited sea areas. Considering the over-all weakness of the Soviet fleets, their lack of carriers, and wide separation of their operating areas, this concept is based on reality. The numerically strong submarine arm presents a definite threat to Allied sea communications as does the Soviet mining capability.

35. Naval Air Force. The Soviet Naval Air Force is organized into the air forces of various fleets. However, apart from having the use of two or three catapult ships, it is entirely land based. It is an effective coastal adjunct to the Soviet Air Forces and could be used in direct support of the ground forces. A considerable degree of coordination between the Naval Air
Force and submarine and surface forces has been demonstrated in peacetime training operations. The Naval Air Force has certain transport regiments which might be made available for airlift purposes if required.

36. **Combat Efficiency.** Material maintenance and operational efficiency are considered to be relatively low in the Soviet Navy. There are tactical deficiencies resulting largely from limited training and experience. These are handicaps which the Soviet Navy recognizes and will strive to overcome.

37. **Satellites.** These forces are negligible and are not considered a pertinent factor. The main naval contribution of the satellites will be bases.

**Air Forces**

38. **Soviet Union.** It is estimated that the over-all size of the Air Forces will remain about the same for the next few years but the composition could be changed somewhat and the combat efficiency and range improved by modernization.

39. **The Military Air Force.** The main task of the Military Air Force is the close support of the land forces. It is estimated that by 1954 the percentage of jet aircraft will be greatly increased. The Military Air Force is divided into tactical air armies. It has a number of transport regiments, the main task of which is to insure rapid communication and mobility. These might be concentrated to augment the scale of airlift for particularly vital airborne operations. It is considered that the Soviets will be capable of planning and executing airborne operations on a large scale. They are likely to be well trained, well equipped and well led.

40. **The Fighter Defense Force** is the air arm of the Antiaircraft Defense Force (PVO) which also includes antiaircraft units.
and early warning systems. It is estimated that by 1954 all of these aircraft could be jet types.

41. **The Long Range Air Force.** The Long Range Air Force is at present organized under centralized control and by 1954 it is expected that increased numbers of present long-range types, and possibly some new types of improved performance, will be available. Performance sufficient for the delivery of atomic weapons is expected. In addition it is estimated that heavy bombers may have appeared in operational units by 1954.

42. **Civil Air Fleet.** In addition to the Air Forces discussed above, there is a semi-military air organization, the Civil Air Fleet. The Civil Air Fleet employs medium transports on scheduled and nonscheduled operations. A large number of these could be made available for military purposes. The present twin-engine medium transports will probably be gradually replaced by four-engine transports. Airfields, navigation aids, and other aviation facilities will be gradually improved.

43. **Trends.** It is believed that future development of the Soviet Air Forces will be geared closely to the over-all military and economic programs of the Soviet Union. A major portion of the Soviet air arm probably will still be devoted to close cooperation with the Soviet Ground Forces; however, current indications are that the Soviets are emphasizing the development of a more balanced modern air force. Specifically, the Soviet Union is emphasizing: production and operational use of jet aircraft and long-range bomber aircraft, research and development in the field of electronics; and a training program devised to increase the skill and efficiency of all personnel in the Soviet air Forces and in the aeronautical industries.

44. **Combat Efficiency.** Current effective operational strength is believed to be affected in part by a shortage of qualified
personnel, especially technicians. Gradual improvement can be expected and it is likely that personnel deficiencies will have been eliminated for the most part by 1954. Air crew proficiency and standards of maintenance and training will steadily improve.

45. **Satellites.** The ability of the satellite nations to improve their present low air potential is dependent entirely upon the amount of equipment furnished by the Soviet Union. It is probable that for the next few years the replacement program undertaken by the Soviet Union for their own forces will prevent any significant increase in the air potential of the satellite countries.

**Development of New Weapons**

46. **Atomic Bombs.** It is estimated that an appreciable atomic bomb stockpile will be accumulated over the next few years.

47. **Biological Warfare (BW).** It is estimated that the Soviets are now capable of producing BW agents in sufficient quantities for covert use and possibly open warfare. It is considered that methods of maximum production of BW agents can be developed by the Soviet Union with the means for their dissemination within two or three years sufficient for the support of large-scale overt biological warfare.

48. **Chemical Warfare (CW).** The Soviet Union is believed to be capable of large-scale production and employment of the well-known chemical agents. Suitable means of dissemination could readily be developed.

49. **Guided Missiles.** The demands of other high priority projects may limit the availability of such items as gyros, servos, electronic equipment and technical personnel to be allotted in the immediate future to the development and production of guided missiles.
Summary of Soviet Military Strengths and Weaknesses

50. **Strengths.** At the close of World War II the Soviet armed forces were not demobilized to the same extent as were those of the Western Powers. Instead, a considerable program of reorganization and training was initiated. As a result, the Soviet Union now has in being a powerful military machine. These forces in contrast to the combined forces of the Western Powers, are controlled by a unified command and a single staff system. Industrial support has been sufficient to maintain these forces, to proceed with their re-equipment, and to build up reserve stocks of certain items of military equipment. Primary sources of Soviet combat power in 1954 will be important ground forces supported by a numerically strong tactical air arm, a small surface fleet and a strong submarine arm, and, by that time, a Long Range Air Force capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. In whatever manner war were to break out, the line taken by communist parties in each of the Western countries would be that the conflict was an example of imperialist aggression against the progressive countries, whose champion is the Soviet Union. The hard core of these parties (those party members and sympathizers who remained staunch in their support of the Soviet regime despite any conflict set up by motives of national loyalty and patriotism) would form a fifth column whose task would be to hinder the war effort in their countries. They would hope to effect their purpose by any, or all, of the following methods: the refusal of mobilization; anti-war propaganda invoking the union of the workers of the world, strikes, riots and demonstrations; intimidation and assassination of national leaders; incitement to mutiny and desertion; espionage, sabotage and paramilitary operations; and the seizure by force of vulnerable points. Where possible, special operations of this fifth column will be coordinated in advance with the planned moves of Soviet forces, particularly airborne forces.
51. **Weaknesses.** The main military shortcomings of the Soviet Union will be the comparative weaknesses of the surface fleet and its lack of strategic mobility, and the fact that the Long Range Air Force will have had little combat experience. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will continue to be short of electronic equipment and modern fire control devices. The mobility of Soviet military forces is particularly dependent upon rail transportation. In countries already controlled by the Soviet Union and in any areas of Western Europe overrun by Soviet forces, the Soviet leaders will be aware of resistance movements of some value to the Western Powers. They will know also that such movements would take time to develop and that their military operations will not be hindered in any serious manner during the early stages. They are therefore unlikely to have to divert field forces, at least in the opening months of the campaign, against the threat of subversive attacks, although they may expect this threat to increase later. Much will depend, however, upon the outcome of the present rift with Yugoslavia, but as long as it is not settled, the Soviet Union will be extremely apprehensive of the effect of war upon the peoples of the other satellite states.
Section V - Strategic Intentions of the Soviet Union

52. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the establishment of communism, directed from Moscow, throughout the world. The Soviet leaders will appreciate that this objective can only be attained through the collapse of the main bastions of democratic power. The Soviet leaders will not hesitate to attack the NATO countries at such time as it appears profitable for them to do so. They will appreciate, however, that despite their considerably improved military capabilities, a major military action in 1954 against the NATO countries would entail considerable risk. Achievement of their objectives through military action would contemplate an attempt to complete the domination of Europe and Asia, and defeat the United Kingdom, as well as a large-scale air attack against North America. This would be followed by integration of the economic and industrial resources of the Eurasian land mass, to place the Soviet Union in a position from which North America could be weakened by communist infiltration and economic exhaustion.

53. In determining their initial strategy, the Soviet leaders will be influenced by the following major factors:

a. The initial superiority of their own ground forces and the initial strength of the air forces.

b. Allied strategic air strength.

c. The Allied dependence upon strategic bombing with weapons of mass destruction as their main initial offensive.

d. The importance of denying to the Allies a base in Western Europe which, if retained, would permit the eventual exploitation of the superior long-term war potential of the Western Powers.

e. The naval strength of the Western Powers.

f. The dependence of Western Powers upon sea communications.

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54. It follows from these factors that the Soviets must attempt to deny to the Western Powers any base area from which the Soviet Union could be threatened. The principal means of achieving this would be by the occupation of these areas by the Soviet Army. It also follows that a strategic defense of the Soviet Union would have to be initiated in order to minimize the magnitude and intensity of Allied strategic bombing attacks. The Soviet leaders would not wish to launch more full-scale offensives than would be necessary to achieve their objectives. They would realize, however, that the Western Powers would not permit areas to be overrun singly but, regarding the conflict as world-wide, would attack the Soviet Union from wherever possible. The Soviet leaders therefore would probably decide to launch full scale offensives in a number of areas simultaneously.

55. The greatest immediate strategic advantage accruing to the Soviet Union from the possession of the atomic bomb is the threat of this weapon as a retaliatory measure against Allied use of atomic warfare. At such time as the Soviets have accumulated what, in their opinion, is a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons, they will consider themselves in a position to attack directly the United States. In determining their strategy for such attack the Soviet Union will be influenced by the factors outlined in paragraph 53 above and the desire to cripple American offensive capabilities. They will be further influenced by the realization that such an attack could disrupt the flow of essential American military aid to Europe and result in maldeployment of U.S. defense forces.

56. The increase in the Soviet long-range air capabilities by 1954 against the NATO regions diminishes neither the vital importance of Western Europe to Soviet aims nor the threat of attack to this area.
Relative Importance of Campaigns

57. The Soviet leaders will wish to complete a campaign against Western Europe as early as possible. However, the Soviets may first attempt a psychological neutralization of Western Europe by threat of atomic attack. They will combine a heavy aerial bombardment, including atomic attack, minelaying and submarine operations against the British Isles with their drive in Western Europe.

58. The Soviet leaders will appreciate that the Near and Middle East oil resources are a valuable part of the Allied war potential. Moreover, they will appreciate that their own oil areas in the Caucasus and Rumania, as well as a large part of their industries, would be susceptible to attack from airbases in the Near and Middle East. They will conclude, therefore, that in the absence of effective opposition by Arab countries and of adequate Allied forces in the Near and Middle East, a campaign there, if successful, would give them very great strategic gains in comparison with the effort expended. Offensives against Turkey and Greece would form part of a campaign in the Near and Middle East.

59. A successful campaign in Italy, Sicily and Yugoslavia would protect the flanks of forces operating in Western Europe and the Balkans and would provide important sea and air bases for attacks on Allied lines of communications in the Mediterranean.

60. A campaign against Scandinavia would have the objectives of securing complete control of the Baltic to provide naval and air bases for operations against trade routes and Allied bases in the North Atlantic, to add depth to the air defense of the Soviet Union, and to deny the use of air and naval bases to the Allied Powers.
61. A campaign against Western Europe, if successful, would permit an attack against Spain. Control of the Iberian Peninsula would provide the most certain means of severing Allied sea lines of communications into the Mediterranean. In addition, while providing a base for the Soviet Union it would also deny one to the Allies. On the other hand, complete occupation of Spain and Portugal would be a difficult task and Spanish forces deployed along the Pyrenees would form some deterrent, particularly to an army operating at the end of lengthy communications. The Iberian campaign would be undertaken only if it did not jeopardize the success of the offensive against the British Isles.

62. The Soviets initially may respect Swiss neutrality; however, assurance of this is lacking. It is further estimated that the Swiss will resist if attacked and possess the capability of holding the Soviet forces in the initial stages of the war.

63. An attack on Pakistan and India would be of a purely preventive nature and would be unlikely unless the Soviet Union were convinced of the Allied intention of using bases in those countries. Owing to the logistical difficulties of land attack, military measures would probably be limited to air attacks on those bases being used by the Allies. These attacks could only be delivered by the Long Range Air Force, at the expense of high priority operations elsewhere.

64. The Soviet Union is likely to utilize forces in the Far East to attempt to neutralize U.S. advance bases and to contain as large an Allied force as possible in the Far East theater. The Soviet Union, however, is unlikely to allocate any additional forces to the Far East, although bases in this theater might be used on occasion by the Long Range Air Force.
65. Concurrently with or immediately prior to military action in Europe, the Soviet Union would undertake attacks against key targets in North America with the objectives of disrupting the war effort of Canada and the United States, and causing the maldeployment of U.S. military forces during the initial stages of mobilization.

66. In view of the dependence of the Allies on sea communications, the Soviet Union would attack Allied shipping and ports throughout the world wherever possible.

67. Communists and their sympathizers throughout the world would conduct sabotage and subversive activities against Allied interests.

68. In the event of their decision, to wage war in 1954, the Soviet plan would probably include the following operations:

a. (1) Subversive activity and sabotage against Allied interests in all parts of the world.
   (2) A sea and air offensive against Allied sea communications.
   (3) A campaign against Western Europe, which will remain their primary land objective.
   (4) An aerial bombardment against the British Isles.
   (5) Campaigns against the Near and Middle East.
   (6) A campaign against Yugoslavia and Italy.
   (7) Attacks against key targets in Canada, the United States and Alaska.
   (8) Campaigns with limited objectives in the Far East.

b. A campaign against Scandinavia.

c. If possible, a campaign to overrun the Iberian Peninsula and secure the Straits of Gibraltar.

d. Air attacks against Allied bases.
69. It is believed that the Soviet Union would have sufficient armed forces to undertake all the campaigns listed above and still have adequate reserves.

70. Chinese communist forces may undertake campaigns against neighboring countries in Southeast Asia.
Section VI - Soviet Campaigns

THIS ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET UNION’S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE PROBABLE CAMPAIGNS, IN 1954, DOES NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION OPPOSITION BY ANY FORCES IN POSITION AND OPERATIONAL

Against North Atlantic Treaty Organization Areas

71. Western European Region

a. Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Western Germany, Netherlands, France.

(1) Soviet operations in Western Europe would involve nearly simultaneous attacks against Western Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Denmark, and air action against the United Kingdom and its sea approaches. It is considered therefore that only one course is open to the Soviet Union with regard to the direction of her attack; to advance to the Rhine between the coast and the Swiss frontier and after forcing a crossing to continue to the Channel, the Atlantic coast and the Pyrenees. This would be combined with an invasion of Denmark.

(2) The main thrust of a Soviet attack on Western Europe would in all probability develop through the North German Plain, secure the Channel port areas, and thence proceed down the western coast of France to the Pyrenees. Secondary attacks would probably develop across southern Germany and thence through the Lorraine and Belfort Gaps into central and southern France. A simultaneous thrust would be launched into Denmark.

b. United Kingdom. In the initial stages of hostilities an air offensive would be directed against the United Kingdom. The objectives of such an offensive would be the destruction of British war potential and the denial to the Allies of the
British Isles as a base. Atomic bombs, if used, and available in limited quantities only, would be employed primarily against governmental, industrial and population centers and major ports.

72. **Southern European-Western Mediterranean Region**

a. **Italy.** The Soviet Union will be unable to attack Italy effectively until or unless the northern area of Yugoslavia should be open to them, permitting Soviet lines of communication to be developed, or until Austria is overrun. It is believed that the most likely major thrust will develop from northern Yugoslavia with the objective of overrunning the Po Valley as rapidly as possible. Having secured the Po Valley, Soviet columns may be expected to strike south along both coastal routes down the length of the peninsula. With the Italian peninsula secured, Sicily may be threatened by a small Soviet amphibious force.

b. **Mediterranean Sea Communications**

(1) The threat on the Southern European and Western Mediterranean sea area will depend upon the progress made in the land war. As far as air attack is concerned, the intensity of the threat will depend upon the availability of air bases, although units of the Long Range Air Force could operate from bases under Soviet control on D-day. For submarine attack the crucial factors will be:

(a) Whether the Dardanelles are open to the Soviets or not.

(b) Antisubmarine measures taken to deny the passage of the Sicilian Channel and the Straits of Messina to submarines.

(c) The capture of suitable bases in the Aegean.

(2) The threat from surface ships is considered as negligible in all cases, owing to the great preponderance of the Allied Fleets in surface crafts of all classes.
c. **Northwest Africa.** Soviet attacks against Northwest Africa by long-range aircraft are possible. Other Soviet threats are considered negligible during the initial phases.

73. **Northern European Region**

a. **Scandinavia**

(1) It is considered that there are two main courses of action open to the Soviet Union against Scandinavia, both assumed to coincide with the opening of a Western European campaign:

(a) To attack Denmark and Norway exploiting surprise, but by-passing Sweden in order to try to ensure the initial neutrality of Sweden.

(b) To attack Scandinavia as a whole, including Sweden.

(2) It is at present difficult to estimate which course of action the Soviet Union might adopt in 1954. It is considered that the Soviets would derive considerable advantages if they could quickly encircle Sweden by over-running Denmark and Norway as did the Germans in 1940. However, the likelihood of a successful conduct of a surprise campaign will diminish as the military preparedness of Denmark and Norway increases. It should also be borne in mind that the Soviet Union must in their planning take into consideration the possibility that Sweden may not remain inactive while her encirclement is being completed. For Sweden, this encirclement would have grave implications.

If, therefore, the military strength of Denmark and Norway is increased as now anticipated, the Soviets may consider that they are unlikely to succeed in luring Sweden into encirclement, and may consider it prudent to attack Sweden simultaneously with the attack on Denmark and Norway.

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(a) **Denmark and Norway**

(i) The attack on Denmark will be carried out by land operations against Jutland through Northern Germany coordinated with the attack on Western Europe and accompanied by air and seaborne operations against the Danish Isles, especially Zealand. Based on the estimate that the Soviets have the capability to mine the Skagerrak and Kattegat, and that Sweden will remain neutral, the U.S.S.R. is expected to attack Norway simultaneously with the attack on Denmark. The main effort would probably be an amphibious and airborne operation striking at the Norwegian Skagerrak coast and the Oslo area initially and extending mainly along the railroads and highways leading to Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger.

(ii) A secondary and probably simultaneous operation is likely to be mounted from Murmansk and strike towards Narvik from the sea, combined with crossing of the Northern frontiers by road. The force landing at Narvik will strike south as far as the nature of the country and logistic conditions permit.

(b) **Denmark, Norway and Sweden**

In the event that the U.S.S.R. should decide to attack Scandinavia as a whole, the main Soviet effort will still be mounted from the South, with a secondary effort being made in the North as under (a)(ii), and through Finland. However, simultaneously with the attack on Denmark the enemy is likely to try to exploit the element of surprise by launching a number of small scale attacks against key points and installations in Sweden and Southern Norway in order to disorganise the Norwegian and the Swedish Forces.

b. **United Kingdom**

(See paragraph 71 b).
74. **Canadian - United States Region.**

Prior to or simultaneous with major Soviet military action elsewhere in the world, attacks may be undertaken against the United States and Canada using atomic and conventional type bombs with the objective of destroying the American will to fight, blunting the retaliatory capabilities of the United States, damaging its war-making potential in general, and jeopardizing the adequate deployment of their forces. By 1954, Soviet long-range aircraft will have sufficient range to reach any important target in Canada and the United States.

The Soviet Union might attack, by airborne operations, U.S. installations in Alaska and the Aleutians within radius of bases in Northeast Siberia. They could utilize captured installations to a limited extent for operations against Canada and the United States. Fighters and light and medium bombers would probably attack targets in Alaska. Small naval raiding parties could operate against isolated and lightly-held areas.

75. **North Atlantic Ocean Area**

a. Isolation of Allied forces in combat and base areas from overseas support would be the primary goal of the USSR in attempting to interdict sea lines of communication in the North Atlantic Ocean area. An additional objective would be to reduce the war-making potential and the amount of essential material, including food and oil, from reaching the main support areas and reduce the standard of living in countries outside the combat zone.
b. **Iceland.** The Soviets will appreciate the importance of Iceland to the Allied powers and will probably exert strong efforts to gain control of that island or deny its use to the Western Powers, using any means available to them including political subversion and sabotage. Submarine attacks against our sea LOC’s in the area of Iceland and mining of Icelandic ports is likely. The Soviets are capable of both airborne and naval operations against Iceland and/or of landing small assault or sabotage forces from cargo vessels in Icelandic waters on D-day, although logistic support of these forces would be difficult.

c. **Spitzbergen.** It appears probable that the Soviets will attempt to seize Spitzbergen on the outbreak of hostilities for use as an air base, radar and weather station. Once seized by the Soviets, its recapture will be a difficult operation.

d. **Continental Portugal.** Control of the Iberian Peninsula would provide the most certain means of severing Allied sea lines of communication into the Mediterranean. In addition, while providing a base area for the USSR, it would also deny one to the Allies. However, for the Soviets to mount a campaign against the Iberian Peninsula, they must first subjugate and occupy all of France. It, therefore, is considered that the Soviets cannot initially launch a land offensive against Portugal but will confine their attacks on that country to sporadic air raids, submarine bombardment, mining of port areas and the landing of sabotage and espionage parties from submarines.

e. **The Faroes, Jan Mayen, Azores, Madeira, Bermuda and Greenland.** Soviet capabilities against these areas would consist primarily of submarine attacks against sea lines of communication, limited air attacks and subversive and sabotage activities.

**Against Other Than North Atlantic Treaty Organization Areas**

76. **Greece.** The Soviets would conduct operations in Greece simultaneously with their offensives in Western Europe and the Near and Middle East. The task of clearing southeastern Yugoslavia against regular and guerrilla forces would involve a prolonged and difficult campaign. This would take longer than the period
necessary to build up forces in northern Greece prior to an attack on the Metaxus line. Unless the Soviet Union had obtained control of Yugoslavia before the outbreak of war, it is considered the campaign against Greece would be launched from bases in Albania and Bulgaria. Operations against Crete might be undertaken, depending upon the tactical situation and availability of air and sea lift.

77. **Turkey.** The Soviets will consider it necessary to attack Turkey simultaneously with their offensives in Western Europe and the Near and Middle East in order to gain possession of the Straits and vital lines of communications into the Near and Middle East area.

78. **The Near and Middle East (Excluding Turkey).** The main thrust in the Near and Middle East would be directed against Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Near and Middle East base areas, and against lines of communication terminating in the Suez Canal area. The latter thrust, however, would be dependent upon the opening of an all-weather north-south supply route through Turkey before the onset of winter. The operations would be conducted simultaneously with those in Western Europe, Greece and Turkey.

79. **Iberian Peninsula.** Soviet operations against the Iberian Peninsula would involve an attack across the Pyrenees to secure the Gibraltar area. It is estimated that at least 40 days would be required to stockpile munitions and to re-group forces, if the campaign in Western Europe were successful and after the Pyrenees were reached, before the campaign could be started.

80. **Far East.** In conducting offensive operations in the Far East, the Soviet Union would attempt to neutralize base areas from which Allied air and sea power could strike at vital areas of the Soviet Union; destroy or neutralize forces in position to threaten the Soviet Union; contain significant numbers of Allied forces; and to interfere with Allied sea lines of communication in the Pacific. Such operations would not be of sufficient magnitude to prejudice the principal Soviet campaigns.
PART III

CONSOLIDATED REGIONAL ESTIMATES

SECTION I

REGIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION

1. The defense concept and objectives of each region must take into account the strategic importance of the region and its component parts, and factors which affect the strategy of the region. These are considered below.

Western European Region

Strategic Importance of the Western European Region

2. Because of its material resources, dense population, high industrial potential, and the strategic value of its central geographical position, the conquest of the Western European Region by the enemy would represent a major and perhaps decisive victory. The strategic advantages which would accrue to the enemy for the further conduct of the war would be almost overwhelming.

3. Conversely the retention of Western Europe by the Atlantic Treaty Powers presents them with the best available facilities in the way of ports, communications, air-fields, skilled man-power, etc., for offensive operations against the enemy. Its defence therefore is of overriding importance, and it must not be forgotten that its defence would cost less than its reconquest.

Factors affecting the Strategy

4. The Western European Regional strategy must be based on the following factors arising from the considerations set out above.

a. The importance to the Soviet Union of the Western European Region is such that it will be their primary objective in war.
b. The defence of the Region will be assisted by the successful
defence of Norway and Denmark, and especially of Italy.
However, the loss of these countries would not make the
defence of Western Europe impossible.

c. The successful defence of Norway, Denmark and Italy would be
seriously jeopardised in the event of the Western European
Region being over-run.

d. The Western European Region is largely dependent for its
existence on overseas resources, and its sea communications.

e. The Western European Region must be held not only to protect
its own territories from invasion but also to enable counter
offensive operations, envisaged by North Atlantic Treaty
strategy, to be developed.

5. The only major natural obstacles to the passage of land forces
into Western Europe from the east are the River Elbe from the Bohemian
border and the River Rhine from Switzerland to the North Sea. Between
these two rivers there are a number of minor obstacles which could be
used for delaying an enemy advance. It is not considered that the
construction of an artificial defense line across Germany is either
practical or desirable, but considerable advantage may be gained by
the improvement of natural obstacles by artificial means.

The Strategic Concept and Objectives for the Western European Region

6. The strategic concept is to hold the enemy as far to the east
in Germany as possible, and by using all offensive and defensive means
available, to deny them freedom of action, in order to cover the
mobilization and concentration of Regional and Allied military
potential required to reinforce the defence forces and assume the
offensive.
7. It is evident that it is strategically desirable to push the line of defense as far to the east as possible.

a. To cover the whole of the Netherlands, Italy and Denmark and assist the demands of the other European Regions.

b. To retain the considerable potential of Western Germany.

c. To deny the enemy the use of bases on the North Sea Coast and to give us the opportunity to act offensively in the Baltic.

d. To give depth to the ground and air demands of Western Europe.

8. The most efficient offensive means, likely to be available at the outbreak of the war, is the employment of Airpower, both Tactical and Strategical. In addition to destroying the enemy war potential, these Air Forces have the capability, if vigorously engaged against the enemy’s Ground Forces, his lines of communication and his rear areas, of slowing down and contributing to the halting of the offensive.
Southern European-Western Mediterranean Region

Strategic Importance of the SEWM Region

9. The SEWM regional area comprises a number of countries, seas and islands tightly bound together by the Western Mediterranean. With the exclusion of the Alpine belt, these territories have certain common geographical characteristics which make it possible to consider them as a whole. The area is important in that it embraces:

a. The Southern part of the European defence position, namely, the Alpine Rampart.

b. North Africa which is an essential support base.

c. The Western Mediterranean LOC’s which are vital for supporting SEWM operations and Western Europe.

d. A part of the LOC from Gibraltar to the Near East.

e. The Italian Peninsula and Islands which, if occupied by the enemy, would expose the right flank of Western Europe and jeopardize b, c and d above.

Factors Affecting the Strategy

10. The following factors have been taken into account when considering the strategy of Southern European/Western Mediterranean Region:

a. The SEWM region borders on Neutral Switzerland who if attacked would resist the enemy and thus cover the area from the Lake of Geneva to the Austrian-Swiss frontier.

b. The situation in Austria cannot be foreseen but her defence capabilities would in any case be very small.

c. If the present regime continues Yugoslavia should offer resistance but does not appear capable of effective opposition against a powerful Soviet offensive in the direction of Italy via the Jave-Venezia Julia corridor.

d. The location of the Trieste Territory on the North-eastern border of the region.

e. The Soviets will endeavour to gain access to Albania through Yugoslavia and Greece in order to utilize Albanian bases on the Adriatic.
f. The present regime in Greece, which is opposed to the Soviet, is likely to be attacked by the U.S.S.R., whose aim would be to acquire for her use the Naval and Air bases on the shores of the Adriatic and the Aegean Sea.

11. The Julien Alps, the Po plain, and part of Southern France are favourable for large scale land operations and the deployment of mechanized formations. The remainder of the area is, however, unfavorable for large scale operations and favors a succession of actions employing mountain forces.

Strategic Concept and Objectives of the Region

12. The strategic concept and objectives of the region are:

a. Acting in liaison with the Western European Group and relying on the support of Switzerland to insure the integrity of the European area of SEWM, by holding at least the Italo-Austrian Alps and in concert with the forces of Western Europe in Germany later to advance the line of defence up to the Bavarian Alps and the Haue Tauern mountains, thus to ensure the possibility of a future offensive against the left flank of the Soviet forces engaged in central Europe.

b. To support the possible Yugoslavia resistance against the Soviet so as to withhold the Soviet forces as far as possible to the East.

c. To dispose of reserve forces in order to stem a possible overrunning of the main group of the Alps.

d. To launch, with the air forces at our disposal, an air counter-offensive to stop an initial advance of the USSR forces.

e. To support the action of ground forces with adequate sea and air forces.
f. To protect the territories of the Group as a whole against naval and airborne landings with special reference to the Adriatic coast.

g. To protect the territories of the Group as a whole against air bombardments, subversive activities, and naval or parachuted commandoes by adequate air and surface defence applied to vital points and especially to the essential port areas and air bases of Southern France, Italy, and North Africa.

h. To insure at all time the security of the air and shipping lines of communication between North Africa, France and Italy, and cover the East-West lines of communication of the Western Mediterranean.

i. To exploit to the limit, by political, psychological and economic means, all inherent weaknesses of the Soviet Union and her satellites.
Northern European Region

Strategic Importance of the Region:

13. The importance which is attached to the defence of the Northern Region must not be under-rated in assessing the defence of Europe as a whole.

14. Denmark not only stands at the passage from the Baltic to Southern Norway, the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean, but she is also an important bridge for a Soviet attack on Sweden, a keystone for operations in the Baltic, and a part of Continental Western Europe. Norway and the United Kingdom command the North Sea and the approach routes into the North Atlantic Ocean, routes essential not only to the countries of the Northern Region, but also needed for the maintenance and support of countries in the Western European Region.

15. Apart from its value to the North Atlantic Treaty nations as a whole for the purpose of counter-offensive operations, the occupation of Scandinavia would greatly assist the Soviet Union in the development of operations by submarine, surface craft and air attack against the sea communications in the North Atlantic Ocean and in Air operations against Allied strategic air bases, particularly in the United Kingdom. Air defence of Soviet territory and bases against an Allied air offensive could, by the establishment of an air warning organization in these areas, be greatly enhanced.

16. Sweden, by reason of her economic, industrial and military strength, is a factor of considerable importance in any regional defence planning, but at present she is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty. The full cooperation of Sweden, at some later date, would greatly enhance the defensive strength of the Northern European Region.
Factors affecting the Strategy:

17. Areas essential for support from other elements of the North Atlantic Treaty and for the development of general counter-offensive operations must be held securely. The Regional strategy in war will be vitally affected by the strategy adopted in other regions, particularly in the Western European Region and the Atlantic Ocean Region, and the success with which it can be developed. The military situation in North West Germany is of particular importance in this respect.

18. The forces maintained by Denmark and Norway in peacetime are small. Furthermore, it will be difficult for reasons of topography to achieve the rapid transfer of units and formations from one part of the country to another, or across the sea. Any warning which might be given to the two countries to increase their preparedness will therefore be of decisive importance.

19. In emphasizing the great importance of obtaining an early warning, it must on the other hand be expected that the Soviet attack will aim at surprise. The forces will therefore need to be deployed initially with this in view. At the same time, they must be capable of redeployment in order to concentrate against the enemy attack, and thereby avoid defeat in detail.

20. It is therefore essential that planning should be based on the necessity for the utmost flexibility so that any surprise attack by the Russians may be dealt with effectively before it can be reinforced. The defence of the region must therefore be considered as a whole with the object of achieving one integrated and coordinated plan.
21. The defence of Norway and Denmark must take account of the situation of Sweden which lies in the path of any attack against Scandinavia, from the East. On account of her economic, industrial and military strength, considerable benefits would derive if she were allied to us in war.

22. Apart from the land approach into Northern Sweden, an attack against Sweden must take the form of a sea and airborne assault. Only in the South could an assault be provided with land based air cover. In the interior, communications are very limited, and operations against Norway would be restricted to the routes leading toward Oslo and Trondheim.

23. Moreover, the Russians cannot ignore the possibility of Sweden joining the Northern Allies when Norway is attacked.

Strategic Concept and Objectives of the Northern European Region

24. Strategic objectives will involve:

a. The defence of regional territory.

b. Within this general defended area, to hold securely vital areas in each country.

25. Offensive operations in the Northern European area, including the Baltic, will be conducted primarily with the object of interrupting the Soviet air operations and sea communications, by employment of submarines and other naval craft, by air bombing of her bases, airfields, ships and transports, and by minelaying by sea and air.
**North Atlantic Ocean Region**

**Strategic Importance of the Region**

26. The achievement of the objectives of the NATO Powers will depend in large measure on the success of the Allies in protecting the Sea and Air LOCs in this Region.

**Defense of Territories**

27. Apart from the primary reason for defending Continental Portugal as a home territory it is important as a base for forces operating in the protection of Sea LOC’s and as a continental terminal on the Trans Ocean Air LOC’s.

28. The importance of the Azores lies in the fact that they provide:

   a. An essential airbase for the protection of LOC’s and for the staging of aircraft across the Atlantic.

   b. Secondary Naval bases.

29. The importance of Greenland lies in that:

   a. It constitutes a base along the northern air route to Western Europe.

   b. Radar and meteorological stations on Greenland provide important warning facilities, navigational aids, and weather data.

   c. The mining of Cryolite is of some importance.

   d. Airbases suitable for use as alternate bases in support of the strategic air offensive and as bases in defending the North Atlantic LOC’s exist.

30. Iceland is an essential base in the North Atlantic area for:

   a. Air operations to include the staging of aircraft to Europe, and the support of strategic air operations.
b. Naval operations, essential to the protection of sea lines of communications.

Factors Affecting the Strategy

31. The U.S.S.R. is largely self-contained and self-supporting whereas the sea and air LOC’s within the N.A.O. Region are vital to the NATO powers.

32. That enemy submarine bases will initially be restricted to Northern Russia including the White Sea and to the Baltic.

33. Iceland has no organized military forces of its own.

34. Under the terms of the 1920 treaty it is not possible to establish in Spitzbergen any fortifications which may be used for war-like purposes.

Strategic Concept and Objectives of the Region

35. The Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Ocean Region is to establish and maintain maritime control of the North Atlantic Ocean and to defend home territories and essential base areas in support of over-all strategy.

36. In the control of sea communications the Allied maritime aims are to ensure that:

a. Allied shipping can be sailed safely and regularly between such ports and bases and through such waters as the Allied over-all strategy requires.

b. Wherever practicable, the enemy is denied the safe use of the sea routes and ports necessary to his strategy.

c. Neutral shipping can only sail under conditions which will insure contraband not reaching the enemy.

37. Bases necessary for air LOC’s, which will be in the same general area as those for the sea LOC’s, will require air defence and special installations for the handling,
control and logistic support of the large volume of air traffic.

38. Plans for the defense of regional territories are based upon the following strategic considerations:

a. Defense of home territories which includes:
   Continental Portugal
   Archipelagos of the Azores and Madeira
   Iceland

b. Defense of areas essential as bases for:
   (1) Control of Sea and Air LOC’s
       Greenland
       Iceland
       Azores
       Continental Portugal
       Bermuda

   (2) Support of the Strategic Air Offensive:
       Greenland
       Iceland
       Azores

c. Defense of areas which if not denied to the enemy might be exploited by him to the significant disadvantage of the Allies:
   Faroes
   Spitzbergen
   Jan Mayen
Canada - U.S. Region

Strategic importance of the Region

39. The importance of the North American Region lies in the fact that it possesses the principal Allied production and offensive capacity and by its geographical position can provide some of the bases necessary for control of the essential LOC’s between the main support areas and Western Europe. In addition, it provides the main base for the strategic air offensive.

Strategic Concept and Objectives of the Region

40. The concept for defense of the Canada-United States region is founded on the principle that, in case of war, the allied war objectives can be gained only by employment of the main allied war effort offensively against the enemy. In order to make available the maximum force for offensive employment, we will devote to defensive purposes, only that portion of our total force which is necessary to provide a reasonable degree of protection for the essential elements of our war-making capacity.

41. In consonance with the above Concept, it is intended that, in order to make available the maximum forces for offensive operations, and the reinforcement of other areas, the Canada-United States Regional Area will employ only those forces for the defense of their area which are necessary to provide the minimum acceptable degree of protection against the estimated forms and scales of attack.

42. Inasmuch as the Canada-United States Regional Area possesses the principal Allied productive and offensive capacity, the first call on forces for defense within this area must be for protection of that war-making capacity. On the basis of the best estimates of current and prospective
enemy capabilities, the region will accept the risk involved in not providing specifically for defense against those forms and scales of attack which will not materially detract from the region’s war-making capacity.

**CONCLUSIONS**

43. Taking into consideration the foregoing Regional estimates it is apparent that:

a. The three European Regions must be considered collectively, and in view of their geographical position constitute the “couverture”, facing East, of the North Atlantic Treaty area. In consequence, special importance will apply to the early reinforcement of these regions.

b. The Canada-U.S. Group possesses the principal means of offensive, reinforcement, and productive potential, and

c. The North Atlantic Ocean Group possesses the principal means of controlling and securing the ocean lines of communication.
SECTION II

OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE DEFENSE OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AREA

General

44. Considering only phase I operations the primary allied effort must be aimed at arresting the Soviet advance while concurrently taking such offensive action as possible. In general, planning for this phase of operations is considered under three broad categories, set forth above.

The Defense of Europe

45. The three European Regions are considered collectively since they constitute the "couverture" facing east of the North Atlantic Treaty Area. The primary task of these regions as set forth in their detailed plans is to delay and arrest the enemy advance. Allied operations toward this end will be conditioned by the situation existing at the beginning of the war. The Soviet capabilities will initially place the European regions generally on the defensive for the purpose of protecting their territories, defending their war-making potential, and generating sufficient forces to stabilize the Soviet offensive.

46. The European Regions must arrest the enemy advance as far to the East as possible. Their defense should be conducted in an active manner making full use of mobility and offensive action whenever opportunity offers. As the northern and southern part of the defense line rests on sea flanks, protection of these flanks will require the provision of suitable naval forces. Some additional delay may be achieved by sabotage and subversive action provided suitable advance planning has been accomplished to assure that maximum effectiveness will be derived from all of these special measures.
Also the maximum support should be given to such psychological measures as might be taken against the enemy. In this way the forces which constitute the major element of the “couverture” for the North Atlantic Treaty Area will gain time for reinforcements to arrive and for cumulative effect of the strategic air offensive to be felt.

47. Forces will be deployed in the most efficient manner for the defense of the region and will attempt to defend vital areas to the greatest extent possible. Soviet capabilities will initially be such that the regional areas will be in grave danger from air, guided missile and possibly airborne attacks during this phase of operations. Provision will therefore be made for the protection of major centers of industry and population and lines of communication since the loss of any of these to the enemy would not only be a serious blow to the defense of the area but would subsequently increase Soviet capabilities against the remaining portions of the North Atlantic Treaty Area.

48. The detailed plans of the European Regions have made provision for:

a. The defense of the Region against over-running by Soviet armed forces.

b. Protection of the Regions from air and airborne attack.

c. Protection of the internal air, sea and ground communications of the region.

Operations on Land

49. The defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area along its eastern front will be accomplished by engaging the enemy in active defensive-offensive operations from those positions.
in each region which will absorb the maximum enemy capabilities and blunt his initial offensive. Such defense will necessitate the use of a variety of obstacles, and should take into account any existing fixed defensive positions which would aid allied forces initially in offsetting the numerical superiority of the Soviet. In this connection, the development of modern anti-tank equipment should be given high priority as the availability of such equipment is likely to change materially the nature of the defensive battle.

Operations in the Air

50. The general plan for the employment of air forces in support of the objectives of the European Regions will aim at:

a. The achievement of air superiority. The primary task in this respect will be to obtain air superiority over the regional areas in order to assure the defense of friendly forces, vital centers, and lines of communication. By air superiority is meant sufficient mastery over the enemy air force to allow the allied armies, fleets, industries and civilian populations to perform their tasks without undue interference from enemy air attack.

b. The battle for air superiority will inevitably be protracted and continuous. If we are to win the battle it is essential that our strategy should be offensive from the outset. The air war must be carried into enemy territory by:

(1) Attacks on enemy air fields and aircraft on the ground.
(2) Attacks on fuel installations, aircraft, storage depots and any targets within range, attacks on which will contribute to reducing the enemy’s air power.
(3) Intruder operations.
c. An effective air action will be required to assure of land forces and the protection of lines of communication and vital administrative centers and centers of population. This will be provided by a day and night interceptor fighter force to be closely integrated with the tactical air forces supporting the front, and provided with necessary anti-aircraft defenses and radar warning and control facilities to assure that a maximum of effectiveness can be obtained with a minimum of forces. In any event, in the employment of air forces, to include strategic air resources, due consideration must be paid to giving aid to the land battle.

Operations at Sea

51. The flanks of the European regions rests on ocean areas, and as such the direct support of naval forces will be required to assure their security. In accomplishing this task, naval forces will be employed as follows:

a. Defensive

(1) Protection of shipping along regional lines of communication, including essential ports and bases within the regional areas. In this regard, the lines of communication linking Metropolitan and North African territories of France, the control for which France is primarily responsible, are vital to the prosecution of operations by the Western and Southern European regions.

(2) Defense of coastal waters, straits, and air-sea approaches along the ocean frontiers of Europe from Scandinavia to Sicily.

(3) Minesweeping, defense against seaborne invasion, and defensive minelaying.

(4) Operations, as necessary, to seal off areas from which enemy submarine or surface forces might otherwise operate.
b. **Offensive**

(1) The destruction of enemy shipping, naval forces, facilities and lines of communication.

(2) The support of land forces engaged in the defense of the Eastern front along coastal areas by naval, air, and surface forces.

(3) The carrying out of limited commando-type operations, where appropriate, against enemy submarine bases, facilities, or coastal installations threatening the NATO area.

c. **Convoys**

Plans provide for a convoy system to be established in waters under regional cognizance with special emphasis as indicated in a above on Western Mediterranean lines of communication. In this vital area, a major effort will be required to assure the protection of regional and through-shipping which will necessitate the allocation of land-based and carrier-based air elements to cover convoys operating within range of enemy air forces.

d. In addition to direct escort of convoys, it will be necessary to provide anti-submarine forces and forces to strike in focal areas. The over-all anti-submarine effort will be closely coordinated between European Regions, and with those being planned by the North Atlantic Ocean Region in connection with the destruction of the over-all Soviet submarine threat. Emphasis will be placed on protection against mining, especially in the approaches to ports along critical coastal routes. In addition, offensive minelaying should be undertaken in all major enemy bases and ports within range of regional striking forces, both sea and air.
Operations in North Africa

52. The protection of the North African area, the ports of Southern France and Corsica is included in the whole defense plan of Metropolitan France.

Summary

53. In summary, the three European Regions will devote their primary effort during the first phase of operations to the arresting of enemy advances through the exploitation of all possible geographical, and other advantages which might offset the anticipated numerical superiority of Soviet D-Day forces. While pursuing this objective, they will mobilize to the maximum extent possible, and defend those areas and lines of communication essential to the deployment and support of reinforcements from other regional areas and to the support of their own forces.

54. For the defense of Western Europe, and particularly Continental Europe, it will be necessary to make a maximum initial effort with all available resources even though it may not be possible to sustain this effort, provided, by so doing, sufficient delay may be achieved to allow for reinforcement, and for the strategic air offensive to take effect.
North American Area

55. The outline plan for the Canada-U.S. Region covers three principal activities: (1) Defence security, (2) Support of strategic air offensive, and (3) Reinforcement of other regions. As set forth in paragraph 43, this Region possesses the principal means of offensive reinforcement and productive potential; and in view of this fact, emphasis in the regional plan has been laid on these activities.

56. It is intended to meet the problem of defending the vital elements of industry, government and armed forces against an attack with weapons of mass destruction however delivered but expected principally by air, by means of a system of coordinated fighter, anti-aircraft and guided missile units and early warning and control installations supported by all practicable means of passive defense. Defense against weapons of mass destruction delivered overtly by sea or subversively will be dealt with in the tasks described in subsequent paragraphs.

57. The defense of harbors, their approaches, and the defense of coastal sea lines of communication is an important commitment of this region since certain ports and harbors are vital to all regions in that they are points of departure of most reinforcements and materials of war destined overseas. The estimate of naval forces required for the protection of shipping which plies coastal waters between ports of Canada and the United States is being undertaken by C-U.S.R.P.G., the planning for operational control and employment of all maritime forces is the responsibility of NAORPG. Defenses include minesweeping forces, patrol craft, harbor defense nets, controlled mine fields, underwater detection systems, radar and shore-based weapons.
58. Any enemy airborne or amphibious action to neutralize or seize bases or to conduct commando-type raids against base installations, will in general be guarded against by limited on-site garrisons. These garrisons will be supported as required by a small, highly mobile force drawn from the strategic reserve of all arms which will be located principally in North America and in some cases from forces normally employed on other tasks.

59. An initial basic undertaking is to initiate the strategic air offensive against the enemy at the outset of hostilities. The portion of this air offensive originating in the C-US Regional area will require appropriate support both in this and other regions. Where possible existing facilities and installations will be used. The majority of these must of necessity be in existence at the outset of hostilities and the defense plans of regions must provide accordingly.

60. It will be the aim of this region to contribute as much as possible to the reinforcement of other regional areas. In addition to the Strategic Air Forces there will be some Naval forces immediately available for eastward deployment and as high a number as possible of tactical air and air defense units.

Defense of Essential Sea and Air Lines of Communication

61. This plan provides for protection of the vital sea and air lines of communication between the Main Support Areas and the combat zones, which is primarily a responsibility of NAORPG.

Ocean Lines of Communication

62. Insofar as the protection of ocean lines of communication are concerned the following methods will be employed:
a. Attack at Source.

b. Offensive Control.

c. Defensive Control.

63. **Attack at Sources**

Attack at source will be directed against enemy submarines, their bases, submarine building yards and supporting industrial centers by the following methods:

a. Submarine operations.

b. Minelaying.

c. Amphibious raiding.

d. Bombardment by surface forces.

e. Air attack.

64. **Offensive Control**

Offensive control will be carried out by submarine operations, minelaying, operations conducted by surface forces and by shore based or carrier borne aircraft directed against enemy surface forces and shipping. Offensive operations against submarines will be carried out by shore based aircraft and hunter/killer groups.

65. **Defensive Control**

The following defensive measures will be taken to counter the enemy’s threat to sea LOC’s:

a. **Naval Control of Shipping**

   On the outbreak of war movements of all allied merchant ships will be subjected to Naval Control.

b. **Ocean Convoys**

   On the assumption that the enemy submarine threat will develop as anticipated an ocean convoy system will be put into effect in the North Atlantic.
Direct protection for these convoys will be provided by:

(1) Surface escort in proportion to the expected submarine and/or air threat will be provided on all convoy routes, being supplemented as necessary in particularly threatened areas.

(2) Air cover by shore-based and carrier borne aircraft both for A.S.W. and protection against air attack.

(3) Surface cover against surface attack.

c. **Feeder Convoys**

   Arrangements have been made for shipping from the Western European Region, Portugal and North West Africa to join or be detached from the Main Ocean convoy system.

d. **Ocean Shipping Whose Terminal Ports are in Northern or Western Europe**

   Shipping bound to or from ports in Northern or Western Europe will proceed by coastal and local convoys.

66. **Defense of Territories**

   It is planned to provide defenses for the following territories and islands:

   a. Continental Portugal.

   b. Archipelagos of Madeira and Azores.

   c. Greenland.

   d. Iceland.

   e. Faroes.

   f. Jan Mayen.

   g. Spitzbergen (to the extent practicable under treaty limitations).

   **Force Requirements**

67. The regional estimates of major forces considered necessary to the implementation of their plans have been consolidated and are attached as Appendix "A".
## APPENDIX "A"

### REQUIREMENTS TO MEET 1954 DEFENSE PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAJOR ITEMS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL FORCES</strong></td>
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<td>Battleships</td>
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<td>Cruisers</td>
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<td>Fleet Carriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Escort Carriers</td>
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<td>Destroyers &amp; Larger Escorts</td>
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<td>Fast Minelayers</td>
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<td>Minesweepers</td>
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<td>Amphibious Lift Craft</td>
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<td>Maritime Aircraft: Carrier Aircraft</td>
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<td>Coast Artillery: Batteries</td>
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<td><strong>LAND FORCES</strong></td>
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<td>Field Forces: Armoured Divisions</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Airborne Divisions</td>
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<td><strong>AIR FORCES</strong></td>
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<td>Transport Aircraft</td>
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Notes:  
1. Totals do not include land forces required for the Zone of Interior defense.  
2. For security reasons force totals only are shown on this chart. The detailed breakdown by regions will be distributed at the Military Committee meeting at which time the Committee will be requested to decide whether it is desirable to substitute a detailed chart for this one.