M.C. 14
28 March 1950

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE

DECISION ON M.C. 14

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR NORTH ATLANTIC REGIONAL PLANNING

Note by the Secretary

1. At their third meeting on 28 March 1950, the North Atlantic Military Committee approved M.C. 14.

2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of M.C. 14.

C.H. DONNELLY
Colonel, USA
Secretary
M.C. 14
3 March 1950
Pages 1 - 19, incl.

REPORT BY THE STANDING GROUP
to the
NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
on
STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR NORTH ATLANTIC REGIONAL PLANNING

1. At the Second Meeting of the Military Committee on 29 November 1949, it was agreed that the procedure for handling the paper on Strategic Guidance for North Atlantic Regional Planning would be as follows:

   a. The Standing Group would transmit its draft of the paper to the Military Representatives Accredited to the Standing Group.

   b. The comments of the Accredited Representatives or of their governments would be transmitted to the Standing Group where they would be incorporated into the Strategic Guidance paper, resolving any conflicts so far as possible.

   c. After incorporating the comments into the paper, having resolved the differences in views to the extent possible, the resulting paper would then be shown to the Accredited Representatives.

   d. The Strategic Guidance paper would then be transmitted to the Regional Planning Group.

2. The schedule in the preceding paragraph was carried out as agreed and the Strategic Guidance paper (S.G. 13/16) was transmitted to the Regional Planning Groups on 6 January 1950.
3. This procedure made it impossible to submit the paper to the Military Committee for approval before sending it to the Regional Planning Groups. They, therefore, directed that it be handled as set forth in paragraph 1, above, thereby ensuring that each member of the Military Committee would see the paper and have an opportunity of commenting on it before it was transmitted to the Regional Groups. Since S.G. 13/16 will continue to provide guidance for future planning, the Standing Group recommends that the Military Committee now give their formal approval to this paper, which is attached as Enclosure.
ENCLOSURE

DIRECTIVE BY THE STANDING GROUP

to the

REGIONAL PLANNING GROUPS

on

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR NORTH ATLANTIC REGIONAL PLANNING

1. The Appendix, which has been prepared by the Standing Group in accordance with instructions of the Military Committee at its second meeting on 29 November 1949, provides strategic guidance for Regional planning. It incorporates, to the greatest extent possible, the comments forwarded on the initial draft thereof by member nations through their Accredited Representatives. Attached to the Appendix, as an Annex, is a very broad estimate of enemy capabilities. It is provided in conjunction with the strategic guidance as a basis for initiating and coordinating the development of detailed intelligence by the Regional Planning Groups.

2. The Standing Group intentionally kept the strategic guidance and intelligence estimates in the broadest possible terms and has included only the minimum necessary for the initiation of coordinated plans. It is not the intent of the Appendix to provide either detailed planning information, detailed intelligence information, or to establish any arbitrary limits to the scope of regional planning. It is intended, however, to furnish a uniform basis for such regional planning in order to assure that these plans, when received by the Standing Group, will possess sufficient similarity to permit their ready integration into over-all defense plans for the North Atlantic Treaty area.

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M.C. 14

Enclosure
3. The Standing Group feel it desirable to emphasize that the North Atlantic Treaty nations should not be misled into planning in the frame of mind prevailing at the end of World War II, which was largely based on the enormous military power available to the Allies at that time. Similar forces could not be raised by the North Atlantic Treaty nations until many years of war had passed. On the other hand, the USSR has maintained, if not increased, her technical, military and economic capabilities. Planning must therefore be on a realistic basis so that the forces required, whilst not disproportionate to the probable threat, yet remain within the capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. It follows therefore that special emphasis must be laid on the necessity for developing methods to compensate for numerical inferiority.

4. The Standing Group recognizes that the schedule of planning set forth in the Appendix is ambitious. In view of the threat, however, it is vital to expedite the development of a defense plan and the initiation of positive steps to build up our defense capabilities.
APPENDIX

STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR NORTH ATLANTIC REGIONAL PLANNING

I. INTRODUCTION

1. D.C. 6/1 (Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area) outlines the basic principles, objectives, and military measures for military planning by North Atlantic Treaty Regional Planning Groups. Because of the wide dissemination of D.C. 6/1, it was necessary, due to security considerations, to outline the over-all defensive concept for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in general terms only. Additional strategic guidance of a classified nature is provided herein to enable Regional Planning Groups to proceed with the development of detailed regional defense plans, which, after having been integrated by the Standing Group, will insure the unity of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

2. The approved defensive concept is flexible in that it is appropriate as a basis for short, medium or long-range planning. Because of the urgent need of the North Atlantic Treaty nations for coordinated defensive plans and a program which will produce a balanced military force, the strategic guidance provided herein is designed to meet the contingencies for the medium term objective.

3. The planning date chosen for the medium term plan is 1 July 1954. This date has been selected as one which should provide time to initiate and implement a reasonable program for building up the over-all military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty nations. It has no significance other than setting an initial objective for the development of
military capabilities. Further planning schedules will be issued as necessary. The Medium Term Plan should clearly state the requirements necessary at that time.

4. In addition, Regional Planning Groups should prepare a short-term plan to meet any act of aggression as defined by the North Atlantic Treaty. This plan should be revised annually.

II. CONTINGENT SITUATION

5. For planning purposes in the event of war, the following major assumptions are provided:

a. That the USSR will attempt to defeat the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations and reach the Atlantic Seaboard, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

b. That the USSR will initiate air attacks on the North Atlantic Treaty nations in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

c. That the USSR will initiate naval and air action to sever essential Allied lines of sea communication; to establish submarine and mine blockade of important Allied ports; and to control her own coastal waters.

d. That the Soviet Union will initiate subversive activities and sabotage against Allied interests in all parts of the world.

e. All types of weapons, without exception, might be used by either side.

f. The following countries will be aligned with the Soviet Union: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia.
g. **China.** Communist China will deny the Soviet Union no facilities or resources, and for her own part will pursue an opportunist policy for further expansion.

h. **Yugoslavia.** It is at present impossible to forecast the alignment of Yugoslavia in the event of war. Unless the present regime has been overthrown to Soviet leaders will probably have to employ force to utilize Yugoslav territory.

i. The following countries together with their overseas possessions will be in alignment, from the outbreak of war, against the Soviet Union:

United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Portugal (allies under the North Atlantic Treaty), together with Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ceylon and Jordan.

j. India and Pakistan will favour the Allied cause against the Soviet Union, but may prefer to maintain non-belligerent status.

k. Greece, Turkey, Iran, the other American Republics, Japan, and the Philippines will be favourably disposed toward the Allies and some of these countries (particularly those which have ratified the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) will be in active alliance with them.

l. The following countries are likely to be, in various degree, associated with or sympathetic towards the Allies, but their strategic or political situation will be precarious and their resources may not be available to the Allies:

Western Germany, Austria, Iraq, South Korea, and Indochina States of the French Union.
m. The Arab States in general are likely to be favourably disposed towards the Allies and will make available to them their economic resources and territories, although some of them may be reluctant to assist in any active cooperation.

n. The following countries are likely to be initially neutral, but the first five at least, and in particular Sweden and Switzerland, will probably resist if attacked by the Soviet Union:

Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the Irish Republic, Afghanistan, Finland, Burma, Siam, and Indonesia.

o. Israel will also endeavour to remain neutral. It will resist the Soviet Union if attacked and may consent under pressure to assist the Allies.

III. DEFENSE POLICY

6. In peacetime the objectives of the defense policy of the North Atlantic Treaty powers are to convince the USSR that war does not pay, and, should war occur, to insure a successful defense of the North Atlantic area. This policy requires the development of an adequate military strength and a close coordination of the political, economic and psychological efforts of member nations. Plans for the implementation of that policy should adhere to the following principles:

a. To oppose, by all measures short of war, any peacetime attempts by the USSR or her satellites to increase their threat against the Treaty nations, meanwhile initiating measures exploiting Soviet weaknesses.

b. To develop a balanced military force, bearing in mind the economic situation of each nation.
c. To maintain continuously this force at its maximum efficiency through modernization of equipment and combined training.

d. To compensate for the numerical inferiority of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by establishing and maintaining technical superiority, by developing and using modern combat methods, by providing training facilities capable of expansion, and by achieving close coordination of effort.

e. To provide mutual assistance through standardization of equipment and coordination of use of production capacity, and interchange of planning, intelligence and technical information.

7. In the event of war, the North Atlantic Treaty nations will, by combined and coordinated action, defend their peoples, territories, and war-making capacities against all forms of enemy attack. Special emphasis must be placed on the defense of Europe, since its loss might well be fatal to the defense of the North Atlantic territories as a whole. Concurrently, they will develop and mobilize their combined strength with the object of achieving the earliest defeat of the USSR and the attainment of allied war objectives, which later will have to be decided by the governments of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

8. The following major points should not be lost sight of:

a. The three European Regions must be considered as a whole, and in view of their geographical position constitute the "couverture", facing East, of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

b. The Canada-U.S. Group possesses the principal means of offensive, reinforcement, and productive potential.
c. The North Atlantic Ocean Group possesses the principal means of controlling and securing the ocean lines of communication.

IV. REGIONAL TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH BASIC UNDERTAKINGS AND COOPERATIVE MEASURES

9. Regional planning will be carried out in conformity with the guidance contained in the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area (D.C. 6/1), and in the light of the intelligence annex appended hereto. There are certain basic tasks which are common to all Regional Groups; other tasks are peculiar to particular Regional Groups.

10. Tasks common to all Regional Groups (not in order of priority) are:


b. Hold securely those base areas and control those sea areas essential for counter-offensive operations, including those required for launching and supporting air offensive operations.

c. Control regional sea and air lines of communication in coordination with adjacent regions.

d. Arrange for convoy control and routing.

e. Establish shipping requirements in support of regional defense plans for coordination by the Standing Group with the appropriate agency.

f. Defend coastal waters (including support of anti-submarine, mining and air defense operations).

g. Plan for providing for appropriate support to the strategic air offensive.
h. Initiate development of armed forces for such later operations as may be necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

i. Provide to the maximum extent practicable essential aid to other North Atlantic regions in support of efforts contributing directly to the attainment of the common objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty nations.

j. Insure that such guerrilla operations as are practicable in war, in the rear of the enemy, are planned.

k. Exploit the weaknesses of the USSR and its satellites by coordinated psychological operations.

l. Coordinate plans with other Regional Planning Groups.

11. Tasks peculiar to each Group or common to several Groups arise from their geographical location and/or their initial capabilities. Allocation of tasks to particular Regional Groups is in accord with the primary responsibilities as indicated in the basic undertakings of Section IV of the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area (D.C. 6/1). These tasks are:

a. Western European Regional Planning Group

(1) Hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible.

(2) Cooperate with the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group in the organization of the Western Mediterranean’s lines of communication between the Continent and North Africa in support of land operations planned by the Group.

b. Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group

(1) Hold the enemy as far to the east and north as possible.
(2) Organize the Western Mediterranean lines of communication:

(a) Between North Africa and France in support of Western European operations, taking into account that plans for this purpose have already been prepared by Western Union.

(b) In support of the campaign in Italy.

c. **Northern European Regional Planning Group**

(1) Hold the enemy outside a defensible area.

(2) Plan operations in the Baltic.

d. **Canada-United States Regional Planning Group**

(1) Plan for the expeditious reinforcement of regions which may be attacked.

(2) Support and prepare for, as appropriate, the execution of strategic air offensive operations assisted by other nations as practicable.

e. **North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group**

(1) Control trans-Atlantic lines of communication by the necessary counter-offensive and defensive measures.

(2) Prepare plans for the defense of Continental Portugal and the Archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores, and also for the defense of Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroes, and such other areas as may be decided within the North Atlantic Ocean Area.

V. **REGIONAL BOUNDARIES**

12. The Regional Groups will determine by mutual agreement the detailed definition of boundaries between groups. It is recognised that these may overlap functionally. In the event that Regional Groups are unable to reach agreement, the problems should be referred, as a matter of urgency, to the Standing Group for reference to the Military Committee. The following
general guidance is provided to assist in the detailed definition of the boundaries by Regional Groups:

a. Limit between “North Atlantic Ocean” and “Northern European” Groups: a line running approximately from the Shetland Islands to the North Cape.

b. Limit between “Northern European” and “Western European” Groups: a line approximately latitude 55° North, in the North Sea.

c. Limit between “Western European” and “Southern European-Western Mediterranean” Groups: a line running approximately from Geneva to Vienna.

d. Limit between “Southern European-Western Mediterranean” and “North Atlantic Ocean” Groups: a line no further east than Gibraltar.

It must be recognized that the above regional boundaries apply solely(*) to planning responsibilities, and in no way prejudice any decisions on the boundaries or establishment of operational theaters which will be determined as and when necessary.

VI. SCHEDULE FOR PREPARATION OF PLANS

13. In the present state of capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, one of their first planning objectives must be the development of adequate forces to insure common defense. Concurrently, plans must be developed for effective utilization of existing forces in the event of an emergency. The achievement of these objectives requires careful study of current capabilities, of measures taken to improve these capabilities, and the establishment of a time-phased program to develop the forces. Each Regional Planning Group will submit the following planning documents to the Standing Group in accordance with the time schedule indicated.

* Underlined for emphasis

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a. Medium Term Planning

(1) A strategic concept and defense plan using a planning date of 1 July 1954 for the defense of its regional area on an appreciation of the Soviet threat against that area. Included in that plan will be a reasonable estimate of military requirements for the defense of its regional area. (To be submitted by 15 February 1950.)

(2) A time-phased program starting 1 July 1950 designed to increase, by yearly increments, the military strength of each region to meet those requirements. This program must take full cognizance of the effects of self-help and mutual assistance within each Regional Group and between Regional Groups. The requirements at the end of the first phase of the program (1 July 1951) showing net deficiencies are to be submitted to the Standing Group by 15 February 1950.

b. Short-Term Planning

A plan for the defense of the regional area with the forces likely to be available on 1 September 1950. (To be submitted 1 September 1950).
ANNEX

INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR NORTH ATLANTIC REGIONAL PLANNING

THE PROBLEM

1. To prepare intelligence guidance suitable for use by the Regional Planning Groups of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in preparing defense plans in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

2. If war occurs, little or no warning may be received, and therefore M and D-Day should for Allied planning purposes be considered the same.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3. See paragraph 5 of the Enclosure.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

4. The Soviet economic position will be delicately balanced in some respects, but economic factors alone would not render the Soviet Union incapable of waging a major war. The length of time that the Soviet economy could sustain a major war cannot be predicted with accuracy and it would be dangerous to count on a rapid diminution of the Soviet war effort on purely economic grounds.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

5. At the close of World War II Soviet forces were not demobilized to the same extent as were those of the Western Powers. Instead, a considerable programme of reorganization and training was initiated. As a result, the Soviet Union now has in being a powerful military machine. These forces, in contrast to the combined forces of the Western Powers, are controlled by a unified command and a single staff system. Industrial support
has been sufficient to maintain these forces, to proceed with their re-equipment and to build up reserve stocks of items of military equipment. The primary sources of Soviet combat power, for some time to come, will be the army, supported by a numerically strong tactical air arm. The submarine fleet, although its training and materiel will not be as good as those of the Western Powers, will be the largest national fleet in the world. A steadily improving Long Range Air Force will be an additional source of combat power.

6. The main military shortcomings of the Soviet Union will be the comparative weakness of the surface fleet and its lack of strategic mobility, and the fact that the Long Range Air Force will have had little combat experience. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will continue to be short of high octane fuel, electronic equipment and modern fire control devices. Finally, the mobility of the Soviet military forces will be almost wholly dependent upon rail transportation which is limited in capacity and therefore vulnerable. Moral failure, should it develop, would be an additional military shortcoming, but cannot be considered, for the purposes of this paper, as better than a remote possibility in the initial stages under present Soviet controls.

PROBABLE STRATEGIC INTENTIONS

7. Precise Soviet intentions are not known and cannot be predicted with reliable accuracy. For military planning purposes, however, it is essential to consider maximum intentions and capabilities. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy is the establishment of Communist regimes, directed from Moscow, throughout the world. The Soviet leaders will appreciate that this objective can only be attained through the collapse of the main bastions of democratic power. The Soviet
leaders would appreciate that a major military action against the continental United States would be impossible until they believed that they had accumulated a decisive stockpile of weapons of mass destruction. They will, therefore, probably realize that until then the attainment of their objective would only be achieved in phases. The USSR would seek first to complete the domination of Europe and Asia and to defeat the United Kingdom followed by the integration of the economic and industrial resources of the Eurasian land mass, so as to place the Soviet Union in an impregnable position, from which North America could be attacked ultimately by military forces.

8. Soviet strategy for the first stage will be influenced by the following major factors:

a. The initial overwhelming strength of their own ground and supporting air forces.

b. Allied strategic air strength.

c. The Allied dependence upon strategic bombing as their main initial offensive.

d. The importance of denying to the Allies the capability of exploitation from Western Europe of the superior long-term war potential of the Western Powers.

e. The naval strength of the Western Powers.

f. The dependence of Western Powers upon sea communications.

9. The study of these factors would impel the Soviets rapidly to take control of, or neutralize, the territories or bases from which effective action against them could be taken. This might take the form of political action or actual warfare. The allied strategic air threat would be their principal immediate concern. However, they would realize that the Western Powers would not permit significant areas to be overrun singly but, regarding the conflict as world-wide, would probably attack the Soviet Union from
wherever possible. The Soviet’s leaders therefore would probably decide to launch fullscale offensives in a number of areas concurrently.

10. At such time as the Soviets have accumulated what, in their opinion, is a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons, they may decide to attack directly the United States hoping to cripple her offensive capabilities, to disrupt the flow of reinforcements to Europe and to cause maldeployment of U.S. forces.

11. In the event of their decision, in light of the foregoing factors, to wage war, the Soviet plan would probably include the following operations:

   a. (1) Subversive activity and sabotage against Allied interests in all parts of the world.

   (2) A sea and air offensive against Allied sea communications.

   (3) A campaign against Western Europe, an objective which would appear to be the easiest to attain.

   (4) An aerial bombardment against the British Isles.

   (5) Campaigns against the Near and Middle East.

   (6) A campaign against Yugoslavia and Italy.

   (7) Attacks against key installations in Canada, the United States and Alaska.

   (8) Campaigns with limited objectives in the Far East.

   b. If essential to Soviet plans, a campaign against Scandinavia.

   c. If possible, a campaign to overrun the Iberian Peninsula and secure the Straits of Gibraltar.

   d. Air attacks against Allied bases.
12. It is believed that the Soviet Union, subject to economic calculations and limitations and to the morale of its population, would have sufficient armed forces to undertake all the campaigns listed above and still have adequate reserves. It is probable, however, that the bulk of the Soviet ground forces immediately available would be launched at Western Europe.

13. Chinese Communist forces may undertake campaigns against neighbouring countries in South East Asia.

14. The abovementioned considerations have no other aim than to provide the Regional Planning Groups with a broad framework which would enable them to prepare their own intelligence estimates. Should a Group feel that information available to them lacks important factors, requests should be made by them to the Standing Group.