Keynote address

by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
at the 54th Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

President Lello [Jose],
President-elect Tanner [John],
Distinguished Members of Parliament,
Dear Friends,

First of all, let me offer a word of thanks to José Lello for the excellent job that he has done as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. José, under your able stewardship the Parliamentary Assembly has flourished, and you can be extremely proud of your achievements. Thanks to your leadership, your successor will find this organisation in very good shape – and that is excellent news, because the Alliance needs a strong and healthy Parliamentary Assembly.

John, let me offer you my congratulations on your new assignment. We know each other for some time, and so I know that you will do an excellent job. You are an experienced “NATO hand”, and you are well-connected in the US political system – a perfect combination for the new President of the NATO PA.

La session annuelle de l’Assemblée parlementaire de l’OTAN se tient traditionnellement vers la fin d’année. Chaque fois, elle offre donc une bonne occasion de faire le bilan des développements intervenus dans le domaine de la sécurité pendant l’année écoulée, et d'en tirer des enseignements pour la voie à suivre. Compte tenu de l’évolution récente de l’environnement de sécurité au niveau international, je pense que vous conviendrez tous avec moi que cette année a été des plus mouvementées. En effet, en 2008, de nombreuses situations qui couvaient depuis longtemps ont basculé.

La crise qui s’est déclenchée en Géorgie au mois d’août montre bien que la Russie est «de retour», certainement pas en tant que menace militaire pour l’OTAN, mais en tant que pays qui remet ouvertement en cause ce qu’il perçoit comme étant un ordre à domination occidentale. Le conflit a également remis en cause les fondements mêmes des relations OTAN-Russie, de même que notre approche de l’élargissement comme moyen de consolider une Europe sans divisions.

Dans le même temps, nous avons été assaillis de mauvaises nouvelles en provenance d’Afghanistan et d’une nouvelle vague de terrorisme dans la région.

L’Iran s’approche d’un point de basculement dans le dossier nucléaire, tandis que la Corée du Nord entretient plus que jamais le secret autour de son programme nucléaire.

2008 est aussi l’année où certaines des incidences du changement climatique sur la sécurité au sens strict se sont manifestées, notamment dans le Grand Nord.

La piraterie – un fléau qui appartenait au passé – a atteint de nouveaux sommets.  D’après certaines estimations, depuis le début de l’année, les compagnies d’assurance ont déjà dû payer plus de 100 millions de dollars de rançon pour des détournements de navires, essentiellement au large des côtes de la Somalie.

Enfin, 2008 aura aussi été une année de fortes turbulences économiques et financières.  La première moitié de l’année a été dominée par la flambée des prix de l’énergie, la seconde par un quasi-effondrement de notre système financier, et nous sommes maintenant confrontés au spectre d’une récession.

Qu’est-ce que tout cela signifie ?  Les problèmes ont-ils pris une ampleur telle que nous ne soyons plus en mesure d’y remédier ?  Les défis de la mondialisation sont-ils finalement devenus trop importants pour que nous puissions les relever ?  Et pour ce qui est de l'OTAN, est-ce que nous surchargeons notre Alliance en lui demandant trop ?

Ma réponse sera claire : aussi colossaux que ces défis puissent paraître, il faut se garder de sombrer dans le pessimisme.  Tant qu'une relation transatlantique solide existera, et tant que les bases institutionnelles de cette relation resteront fortes, les perspectives de réussite continueront de l’emporter sur les risques.

Cela étant, l’instabilité de l’environnement actuel impose bel et bien de regarder la réalité en face. Elle nous force à réévaluer l’agenda de l’OTAN et à voir s’il est toujours en phase avec les nombreux défis auxquels nous sommes confrontés et s’il est nécessaire d’y apporter des modifications.

In my view, five areas require our particular attention.

The first is NATO enlargement and Russia. Ever since NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement process started in the 1990s, we have had our eyes on the bigger picture.  After all, NATO enlargement was never a goal in itself.  It was, and remains, a means to an end: a stable Europe at peace with itself; a Europe in which all countries feel at home and secure.  Achieving this end required a three-track strategy: a broad cooperative framework embracing virtually all the countries on our continent; a specific policy for those countries interested in joining NATO; and a determined attempt to draw Russia closer to the Alliance.

Developing such a multi-dimensional, big picture approach was challenging, but we succeeded.  We succeeded because this approach had its own powerful political logic – and because it had a powerful moral dimension as well.  And it succeeded because the NATO Parliamentary Assembly was such a staunch and convincing advocate of this approach – it championed Partnership for Peace and enlargement, and it also helped us to explain to a sceptical Russia that we viewed the country as an inherent part of this new Europe, and not as an outsider.

Has this successful approach now run its course?  Is Russia’s disproportionate use of force in the conflict with Georgia and its illegal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia the infamous “red line” on enlargement?  Do we have to choose from now on between good relations with Russia and further enlargement?

No, we won’t choose.  We will not sacrifice one for the other.  Because to do so would only mean drawing new dividing lines.  Trustful NATO-Russia relations are a strategic asset – a boon to European and indeed global security.  That is why the key tenets of our Russia policy – a policy of constructive engagement – will remain.  After the Caucasus conflict, there can be no business as usual with Russia, and we need to seriously review our relationship.  But “no business as usual” still means “business”.  The fact of the matter is that NATO and Russia continue to face a number of similar challenges – arms control, non-proliferation, and terrorism for example.  And these challenges will inevitably draw us back together, because we will both be much better off if we cooperate to face them.

Our approach to enlargement will not change fundamentally either.  The emergence of independent states within the former Soviet space is a reality.  The ability of these states to determine their own future is a litmus test for the new Europe that is emerging.  That is why we cannot hold that future hostage to outdated notions of spheres of influence.  It is why NATO will continue to work with all countries that aspire to join our Alliance – in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and in the Caucasus.  And why we will continue to support them on their difficult path, and to help them to meet the performance based standards that we expect – we will not lower the bar nor deviate from the criteria we have set.

The second area which merits a fresh look is our military posture.  Inevitably, the Caucasus conflict has raised the question whether we have the right balance between territorial defence at home and expeditionary missions abroad.  Some observers have framed it as a choice between emphasising one at the expense of the other.  I disagree.  If this debate demonstrates anything, it is that we must accelerate NATO’s military transformation.  Because this transformation will provide us with forces that are capable of performing both traditional and expeditionary missions. 

In concrete terms, we need to continue to review our force planning and force generation procedures. We need to continue to look closely at our funding arrangements.  We need to continue to promote multinational solutions through joint funding and the pooling of vital assets.  And we need to continue to focus on capabilities that are relevant to the new security environment: strategic and tactical airlift, modern command and control systems, NBC defence – to name but a few. 

NATO’s rapid response to the emerging challenge of piracy is a good example of our ability to deal with new risks and threats promptly and effectively, in close cooperation with other nations and institutions.  The challenge of piracy also reinforces my belief that we will see an increasing role for our navies, and that we have to re-establish maritime security as one of the core functions of NATO.  But it is an ability that doesn’t come for free.  At a time of financial crisis, I realise this is not a very popular message.  But security challenges have the nasty habit of not caring about our financial predicaments.  They simply arise – and we must be able to deal with them.

This brings me to the third area that requires both intensified efforts and increased engagement – Afghanistan. Given the negative news stories of the past few months, it is perhaps understandable if some commentators show signs of a failure of nerve, and others question our strategy.  Whatever discussion we might have about strategy, no strategy will work if it is not matched by the right resources.  I welcome President–elect Obama’s commitment to review troop levels. But increased US troop levels are not enough.  All of us – international organisations as well as the Afghan Government – need to make greater efforts in areas such as political, military, civilian, and economic development.  And we all need to keep our nerves. 

Our job is to help ensure that this country will never again be a safe haven for terrorists, and we must do what it takes to achieve this: We must redouble our successful efforts to train the Afghan National Army; we must support the Afghan authorities in critical areas such as extending good governance and combating drugs and corruption; we must ensure that all of Afghanistan’s neighbours, play their full part in supporting stability in Afghanistan and the region. It is positive to see the Government of Pakistan act against against the extremists trying to destabilise Pakistan, the very same people by the way, who are killing and maiming so many innocent Afghan civilians

Above all, however, we must continue to push for a truly Comprehensive Approach. We need better coordination of civilian and military efforts – both in-theatre and at the institutional level. Last September, UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and I signed a joint UN-NATO Declaration which I believe is a huge step forward. With NATO and the UN acknowledging the need for closer cooperation, the stage is set for further progress – and not just in Afghanistan. It should also help to build stronger ties between NATO and the African Union, the Arab League, and other important regional and national actors. My conversations with many leaders from Africa and the Middle East have shown that they want to reach out to NATO – and we should respond. Closer cooperation between NATO and other nations and institutions will be a permanent feature of the international security environment – and I know that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is also a strong advocate of such relationships. You know that I am a great advocate of stronger NATO-EU co-operation.

The fourth area that requires a fresh look is NATO’s role in meeting new security challenges. Piracy may be the most immediate one, but there are others looming on the horizon: energy security; proliferation and cyber attacks, to name but a few. 

Let me be clear: We are not focussing on these issues out of a false belief that NATO can handle everything. Quite the opposite. In a sense, these issues have chosen us. We need to develop a common transatlantic approach on how to deal with these challenges. And there is simply no better venue for developing such a common approach than NATO, supported by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  I also want to mention Kosovo, an other important NATO operation. KFOR is going to stay in Kosovo as long as necessary to protect minority and majority alike.

 

Ladies and Gentlemen,

 

NATO enlargement and Russia, our military transformation, Afghanistan, and responding to new threats – these are the key areas where NATO needs to re-align its agenda with the changing realities. As I have pointed out, much of this re-alignment is already underway – and is proceeding successfully. But responding quickly and effectively to challenges is only one half of the story. A successful institution must also have an idea about its longer term future.

 

Hence, the fifth and final area that requires our collective attention is a conceptual one. In a volatile world, with a host of new challenges, and with NATO increasingly acting in concert with other countries and institutions, it has become much harder for our publics to understand what NATO is all about. But we need that understanding – and the support of our publics for what we are doing. And so I believe -- even more strongly than when I last appeared before this Assembly -- that we need a single, consolidated document to explain where we are, and where we are going.  And why NATO remains essential to the security of all our nations.

 

The time has come to prepare the ground for such a document at our next NATO Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl.  A “Declaration on Alliance Security”, as tasked by the Heads of State and Government in Bucharest at the NATO Summit, will strengthen our sense of common purpose and will form the basis for a new Strategic Concept. It will also help to focus the new US Administration on NATO early on in its tenure.  And it will help to bring – and to keep – our publics on board. 

 

Clearly, this will mean some serious work – work that will benefit a lot from support by the NATO PA.  I know, and very much appreciate, that Jan Petersen is already preparing your input, and I see this as an important role for the NATO PA.  I hope, and indeed expect, that we can continue to rely on your thoughtful observations, your constructive criticism and your imaginative suggestions.  This Alliance is worth the effort, and it will be even stronger for it.

 

Thank you.