Press conference

by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the Informal meeting with non-NATO KFOR contributing nations

JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER (NATO Secretary General): A very good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Let me indeed give you a short update on the first two meetings we have had today at this informal Defence Ministers' meeting.

As you know, we began with a working lunch on NATO's operations and missions. Special attention, you will not be surprised, for Afghanistan. And Defence Ministers I think did what they usually do - take stock of how things are going on the ground, how we are doing in force generation, and what more needs to be done.

Let me start by reading you the half of my newspaper I usually do not find on my doormat every morning, and that is that part of my newspaper which refers to the situation in Afghanistan in 2001 and the situation as we speak in 2008. and that is the situation where we see six million children go to school, one third of them girls; where we see 80 per cent, 82 per cent to be exact, of Afghans having access to health care; where we see the literacy rate going up enormously; where we see 4,000 kilometres of road being built, power stations being built; a democratically elected President, a Parliament, provincial councils.

In other words, a country in 2001 which was basically in the Middle Ages after the horrible Taliban regime, among the worst human rights violators, is well on its way on reconstruction and development. Unfortunately, there are still people who want to spoil that process, ruin it, and those are the people NATO has to fight from time to time. But I resist the picture I sometimes read "On the brink of failing", "Afghanistan becoming a failed state again". It is simply not true.

Yes indeed, I repeat, there are challenges. There is the narcotics problem. There are problems by spoilers in the south. Yes, there is a problem on the Afghani-Pakistani border. That is all true.

But let us also realize what has happened and let us as the international community—I am not only referring to NATO here; I am referring to the other important players as well—let us try to understand what patience means. Patience with a capital P. That does mean in this world, where sound bites are taking six or seven seconds, and if it is more you have to do it again for a television camera, let us understand what patience means.

We are well on our way. I am cautiously optimistic. The challenges remain. As far as force generation is concerned, we are not there yet. I do not deny that. But we have seen in the recent past new offers; new offers by Poland, Belgium coming in with F-16's and a training team. Other Allies might follow suit in providing forces for the volatile south. In other words, we are making progress, but you also know my mantra as a NATO Secretary General, that I want to see filled to the full 100 per cent what kind of forces we need and what the military advises that we should have. That is crystal clear. And we are not there yet and we have to do better.

And that is what Ministers discuss and have discussed, preferably in private. That is what these meetings are for. We have a public part and we have a private part. But I can tell you on the basis of the meeting we had that all Allies without exception, and they are all there in Afghanistan, were of the opinion that we are there having entered a long-term commitment.

Development and reconstruction takes a lot of time. That does not mean, it takes a generation one can say. This does not mean that we will be there militarily for a generation. I always say that we will be there for the foreseeable future.

What we should do and what we also should do better than we do is train and equip the Afghan National Army (ANA)—that is key, that is crucial—through the so-called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, the famous OMLTs. We saw some nations coming forward. We have to fill the shortage of these OMLTs.

So the picture leads me just to tell you that I am cautiously optimistic; that there are challenges, that indeed we need more forces; that Afghanistan means, and our presence in Afghanistan means, sharing responsibilities and also sharing risks. That is also I think something of importance; that flexibility is also an important word as far as Afghanistan is concerned.

And finally, on Afghanistan, ladies and gentlemen, NATO does not own Afghanistan. We do not own that country. We are glad that the large majority, a huge majority of Afghans support our presence, huge majority. But we do not own it. The Afghan people own their own nation and it is up to the Afghan government to be responsible for the fight against corruption, to play their role in the fight against narcotics, to fight for and to see that law and order is there in the full sense of the word. That is their responsibility and the international community, the international community, NATO and the other players, are collectively taking their responsibility. NATO has an ISAF mandate, NATO has a responsibility for security and stability, but in many other fields NATO is not a major player. NATO can support, NATO can help, in counter-narcotics. NATO can help in many other fields, but NATO has its own ISAF-United Nations security mandated role.

So this meeting is, as I see it, a stepping stone for the summit in Bucharest in the beginning of April and we go on and I will go on working and generating the forces we still need in Afghanistan. But we have seen, let me stress that once again, we have seen a very substantial increase. I think it is eighty-seven hundred, eight thousand seven hundred, over the past...

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Year.

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Year in Afghanistan. So you cannot say tha is a failure. That would be nonsense.

We will work on Afghanistan to the Bucharest Summit. The second meeting as you know was a meeting with all the KFOR contributors, the NATO Allies, the non-NATO Allies who are participating, in KFOR in Kosovo. I think it was an important moment that we had this meeting here in Vilnius. Let me, for all the Lithuanians in the room, say how thrilled I am and how happy we are to be in Vilnius and how wonderfully and flawlessly our friends, our Lithuanian friends, have organized this meeting. I think they are doing and they have done a great job in doing this.

The KFOR meeting was important because of the moment the meeting takes place here and I think the result of that meeting was that all the KFOR participants showed commitment for KFOR. For this very important role, for this very important mission, KFOR has to protect the majority and the minority alike, all Kosovar citizens without exception, and create a climate of security and stability in these difficult times in the region given the status process where NATO doesn't play a direct role as you all know.

KFOR has its mandate. KFOR will work together with the Kosovo Police. KFOR will have to work together with UNMIK and UNMIK Police more specifically as the political process unfolds. I say again NATO has no direct role in that political process. So it was important that we had the non-NATO partners supporting KFOR with us this afternoon.

You know what is going to follow. What is going to follow in a moment is a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission with the new Ukrainian Defence Minister Yekhanurov and tomorrow then we will have a second session. I will brief you on NATO's transformation, on the threats and challenges of the 21st century, and we will have of course a meeting, large meeting, on ISAF, on Afghanistan again, with the European Union, with the UN, with the World Bank, with all the non-NATO partners who are contributing to ISAF—it is a huge group, a coalition of almost 40 nations—to continue our discussion on Afghanistan. And last but certainly not least, we will end the day tomorrow with a working lunch with our Russian colleague Defence Minister Serdyukov.

This was what I had to tell you at this very moment. I'm open for your questions.

Thank you.

APPATHURAI: There's two here. Here and there.

Q: Chris Dickson for Agence Europe. Secretary General, you speak about the attitude of the Afghan people towards the NATO and ISAF troops over there. Do you have any more detailed information on that, perhaps facts, figures? I am aware that these things are difficult to measure, but do you have any of the details on that?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: I can simply refer to the many, many polls having been done over the past period. Most recently one in Berlin. That was a poll mentioned by Minister Jung, indicating that there is still huge support for the foreign military presence in Afghanistan.

So I think without running too big a risk I can say, and I can reconfirm that what I said about the support by the Afghan people for the NATO presence in Afghanistan.

APPATHURAI: If I may, Sec Gen, it is 80 per cent was what Minister Jung said, and all the polls are consistent at that 80 percent, just to provide the figure.

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Thank you, James, where would I be without you?

APPATHURAI: Please, back there. Is there a microphone? Oh you have it. Oh okay, well, we will go here and then we will go out there.

Q:  The Canadian people who have paid per capita the highest price in blood are waiting or they are looking to this meeting and the meetings to follow to understand whether Canada will have to endure being the first country remove itself from Afghanistan or whether another scenario will prevail.

What would your message be to the Canadian people today?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Let me, before answering your question, say that I spoke extensively with your Prime Minister Harper, of course with Defence Minister MacKay, who is here today. My message—and I spoke to the Manley panel—my message to the Canadian people is that I do sincerely hope, of course, as Secretary General, you' will not be surprised, that Canada, doing such very important work in Kandahar I have been there fairly recently at the Canadian PRT, the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, that Canada as a very important link in that coalition of almost 40 nations will be able to continue the important work in Afghanistan.

I do know, of course, and I realize that the Canadian government, embracing the recommendations of the Manley panel, has said that more should be done for their support in Afghanistan. And I consider that, and I think the allies consider that as part of their homework. I consider that as part of my homework, as I told Prime Minister Harper, a few days ago, when I had him on the phone.

And that homework is being done with  the other homework, which is, as I said, look at the statement of requirements, we need the military advice, seeing that statement of requirements, the military requirements are for 100 per cent filled, and we will have to find a way, and I will be instrumental for that. That is why I get paid by the allies, I think, to see that we find the possibility for support in Canada.

On the other hand I cannot, and I will not, and I should not, influence the debate, which is going to take place in the Canadian Parliament, if my understanding is correct, sometime towards the end of March. I will do my utmost.

Q: Mark John from Reuters. Secretary General, a question on Kosovo. Is it the understanding of Ministers that the 1244 mandate provides the basis for any type of NATO intervention in Kosovo for security after independence, and can I ask also, was there discussion today of a possible NATO role in training a future Kosovo army?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Answering your first question, as you might remember the NATO Foreign Ministers, when they met in Brussels last December, reached consensus on the important principle that the NATO position is that Resolution 1244 will be, and will stay the basis for the military presence in Kosovo, unless and until the Security Council might come to concluding another resolution.

As we know, up till now that has not happened. In other words, I can answer the first part of your question, yes, 1244 is the basis and will remain the basis for the NATO presence, the presence of NATO KFOR in Kosovo.

On your second question, that is basically of course related to my remarks that NATO does not have a leading role in the status process. We do know that at the moment that there is a status, a final status decision for Kosovo in plans which have been tabled before. There is a role for NATO. And there is a role for NATO, as you indicate, in assisting in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps, the KPC, and the setting of the KSF, a Kosovo Security Force.  

But my answer to you would be, let us look at these elements and things step-by-step. And given the fact that NATO is not seeking a leading role in the process. NATO will certainly have responsibilities after we have status for Kosovo. We do not yet have status for Kosovo so I would be a bit reticent to go into any further detail, but yes, there is a responsibility for NATO, definitely.

Q: Thank you, sir. I am Thom Shanker with the New York Times. I wanted to ask about the Alliance strategy review on Afghanistan that you're directing, which is due by the meeting in Bucharest. What exactly does that strategy statement say? Will it in any way refocus or redefine the mission, and if not then what is the purpose of this undertaking? Thank you.

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: What it will exactly say, in all honesty I have to say I don't know yet, because we are discussing basically two documents. One is, and that was a result of the Defence Minister's meeting in Noordwijk, in my home country, The Netherlands, in the fall of last year.

What we are discussing between the ambassadors—and that needs, of course, a political blessing at a certain stage—is a document. I would not consider that document as a change of strategy, but it is a document on what we call a comprehensive political-military strategy—and I say political-military because I said NATO is not there all by itself; I mean, there are other important international organizations working there—to answer for ourselves a number of fundamental questions. To see if we can create benchmarks, answering the question how do we see NATO's presence and NATO's role in Afghanistan now, but also for a longer period.

We do that, of course, do not forget that, and that's why I'm saying this is not a fundamental change of strategy, we do that no the basis of NATO's operational plan, our OPLAN, and we do that, last, but not least, on the basis of the Afghan Compact, signed by many, many nations and many international organizations.

So it's not that we are going to throw away everything we have because our operational plan is valid. The Compact, by definition, is a valid document. That is what we are doing at the moment. I hope, I hope that on top of that the NATO Heads of State and Government in Bucharest in April, will also say something about Afghanistan publicly, because the document I've discussed up till now, in answering your question, is not a public document. But I hope there will also be a public document where the NATO Heads of State and Government can say something about Afghanistan. I've given you a number of the elements. What that something exactly is, of course, a matter for discussion in the NATO framework.

APPATHURAI: The last question's up there.

Q: Mr. Secretary General, Al Pessin from Voice of America.  The comments you made about the Afghan government needing to address corruption and other issues, was that based on particular concerns? You made quite a strong statement. Was it based on concerns you heard today from the Ministers, and how important do you think those Afghan government actions are in helping you with your force generation?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: My answer to the first part of your question is negative. It is not based on concerns. It is based on what I said about each and others individual responsibility in Afghanistan. And NATO has a responsibility, the United Nations has an important responsibility, so has the European Union, so have the major donors, but first and foremost, it is their country. And if we talk about the rule of law, fighting corruption, and also to a certain extent, fighting narcotics, it is a responsibility of the Afghan government. I'm not saying this because I'm concerned. I'm saying this because I indicated the division of responsibility we have.

Afghanistan is not the Balkans. There is no (inaudible) in Afghanistan. There is a sovereign government, with a democratically elected president. I respect President Karzai. A Parliament, as I said. What I was trying to indicate was that NATO does not quote/unquote own Afghanistan, and that you cannot look at NATO for everything and it's hugely complex. I say again, 2001 Taliban regime, ruined... a ruined nation, a failed state, a failed state, an exporter of terrorism. That is a hugely complex process, hugely complex, and we need patience, again, with a capital P. And in that complex process NATO, admittedly, plays a vital and very important role. But so do other actors and so does the Afghanistan government. But if you read concern between the lines, no. I say this because I would like to indicate that it is a collective responsibility, first and foremost also for the Afghanistan government.

Q: And (inaudible) force generation?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: I do not see a direct relationship between these remarks and force generation. Force generation is important, will always be important. We have a force generation process in NATO. I think we should do better. I have indicated that I think I can be cautiously optimistic. I think we have seen a lot of results, but I am not going to tell you that we do not need more and in certain areas we should need do better. I mentioned the OMLTs, the training. I mentioned other elements. But this has no direct relationship with the force generation process as such.