Press briefing

by NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai
following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council
at the level of Foreign Ministers

Let me update you on the NATO-Russia Council meeting that has just concluded. As you can see, it went on quite long. It was a most lively and interesting discussion and that should not be a surprise, there were a number of important issues on the agenda: Kosovo with the Troika Report now with the United Nations, CFE with just five days before Russia is to, if it goes according to plan, unilaterally suspend its participation in the Treaty, and missile defence where, as you all know, all the NRC members do not see eye to eye.

Did we close the gaps? Very simply, no. On Kosovo there was a clear difference of views. NATO countries clearly believe that the time has come for a clear route forward and that we cannot afford to have this issue fester in the centre of Europe much longer. On CFE, Russia heard the NATO Countries express their clear desire to see the CFE Treaty ratified. They also expressed their concern about the unilateral steps Russia is taking which risk undermining the Treaty.

But let me also say this: all NATO Countries and Russia want to see this treaty to enter into force. There are serious talks underway to make that possible. Minister Lavrov indicated Russia's continuing interest in engaging in those talks in whatever fora is appropriate therefore we are not and we should not be too gloomy about the future of the CFE in the long term, no matter what Russia does on December 12th.

Finally on missile defence, there was clearly not a meeting of the minds, but there was a good airing of view; a very frank exchange of views on missile defence. The NRC has been a useful forum for dialogue and one clear positive theme out of this meeting was the strong desire of all members to continue to use the NRC as a platform for dialogue between 27 member states, not 26 plus one, but 27. Also a clear and expressed desire from around the table that all parties should avoid unhelpful rhetoric and concentrate on bridging the gaps that we have.

We should not forget, and Allies and Russia do not forget, what we are doing together which is positive. We have the joint counter-narcotics training for Afghanistan. You will have seen perhaps the exhibit that's just around the corner. We have a Russian ship sailing alongside NATO ships in Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. We have an upcoming theatre missile defence exercise in Germany. These are good examples of co-operation on issues that matter to all 27 countries and the NRC has proven to be a useful forum, A for co-operation and B for dialogue.

That was about it. It was a very substantive discussion. I am happy to take your questions and I think we'll take two right here and then come to the front. Well, we'll start here.

Q: Dutch Reform Daily. Has it been raised by any Minister that a missile defence shield in the eastern of Europe is not that necessary anymore after the most recent document by the American intelligence?

Appathurai: No, it has not and at least one reason for that is that NATO's assessment of the threats to Europe on which our missile defence work is based has been based on the missile threat and not on the nuclear or potential nuclear threat of Iran. As we all know, Iran continues to develop its missile capabilities - I'm using just the example of Iran - and has I think quite recently over the last few weeks tested medium range missiles.

All this to say there is a missile threat to Europe; that is the consensus NATO view. That is not affected by the national intelligence estimate of the United States.

Next question was there.

Q: My question is related to that. What was the Russian position to that? Could you be more specific on the exchange of views on the missile defence?

Appathurai: It's clearly not for me to characterize the individual positions of the individual nations as we know. More interestingly for you Minister Lavrov will, I believe, be following me to this podium. So he will, I'm quite sure, express the position.

But I want to stress the positive here. There are substantive discussions, substantive offers of discussion and proposals for ways forward both on missile defence and on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. On both of those tracks, there was a clear willingness, including the Russian Federation, to continue the talks. On the basis of the proposals that had been put forward, all parties may not be happy with exactly what's been put on paper until now, but that doesn't mean that they're not willing to talk. So I think that was a good platform to go forward.

Q: I'm from Danish Broadcasting. I would like to return to Afghanistan from this morning. When you look at the statistics, this year there was 121 ISAF soldiers killed in Afghanistan, the highest number since the operation started. Was this discussed this morning?

And I would also like to ask what can and will NATO do to improve security in Afghanistan?

Appathurai: Ministers didn't formally discuss casualty levels, but of course we have the same concerns that all of our citizens have, about A the security of our soldiers, and B the security situation in Afghanistan. What we need constantly to remind ourselves is that the result of NATO's expansion in Afghanistan and the forward posture that NATO-ISAF has taken to push into areas which had previously been ungoverned or governed by the Taliban has led to, in a very significant way, an increase in contact if you want to put it that way.

As a result we have seen higher levels of violence in some parts of the country precisely because we have dramatically expanded our operations in the last 18 months and unfortunately that has led to an increase in the number of NATO-ISAF soldiers who have lost their lives on this mission. Also of course because there has been an increase in the number of improvised explosive device attacks and suicide bombs. Again, it is worth noting that the Taliban cannot hold and does not hold territory where the Afghan government is strong or where NATO and Afghan security forces decide that they wish to take control. They cannot hold territory against international or Afghan forces. They have therefore resorted to an increased use in exactly these kinds of attacks which do of course have a great public relations effect, do kill a number of civilians and do occasionally kill our soldiers as well. But the strategic significance of those in terms of holding territory shouldn't be exaggerated.

What do we intend to do to improve security? We could have a long discussion about this. The essence of it is improving the Afghan government's ability to provide security and governance for its own people. That is the long term solution we discussed today - increasing training and other opportunities and other support for the Afghans.

Second track is providing much greater co-ordination and investment on the civilian side, in particular of the overall international effort in Afghanistan, police training being one obvious example where A we need much more investment, and B we need a much more coordinated international effort so that we have one model and it's invested in properly and in a co-ordinated way.

I'd say those are the two major tracks that need to be followed and will be followed.

Q: Czech Radio. First on missile defence, you mentioned unhelpful rhetoric. So far we've heard the strongest rhetoric, to use the term, coming from Moscow. Do I read it well that this was a kind of approach, a try to get Moscow kind of lower down their rhetoric a little bit?

And then second on Kosovo. Is there a clear vision in the NRC of what happens next after the 10th of December, next Monday? I mean, where is the discussion going to take place and in what format? Is it only going to be the Security Council?

Appathurai: I would answer your first question very simply. I think that was the idea. In particular, yes, I think the rhetoric coming from Moscow was seen as unwelcome by many NATO nations. Is there a clear vision from an NRC context? No, I don't think you could say that there's a shared view now of how the process of status should go forward. There was a very strong view on one side that... no sorry, there was a very strong view amongst many members - please do not use on one side, I shouldn't have said it - for many, in fact the majority of NRC members, that the Troika process which has now concluded, or is about to conclude, had demonstrated that there was no further room for movement in terms of bringing Pristina and Belgrade together on the fundamentals of a status.

As a result, there was no point in pursing another round or further round of discussion. Clearly the Russian position is different. The Russian position has been, it is no secret, and remains that they can agree to anything the Pristina and Belgrade can agree to. But there is therefore no meeting of minds in the NRC about how to take forward now the process. Uh... no, that's it.

Shall we come there and then we'll come back?

Q: New Europe. You just mentioned this difference of views in words. How will they transform into actions? Can you say something... on Kosovo?

Appathurai: It’s not for NATO to decide how this is going to go forward as I mentioned earlier. There is a Troika process. Now the UN Secretary General will receive the report from the Troika. I imagine there will be a discussion in the United Nations and then we will see where it goes. But the NATO point of view - now I'm not going to speak for the NRC, but for NATO - the NATO point of view is that the process should now move. That there needs to be a movement towards resolution and secondly that it should be a managed and controlled process.

Q: Just a follow-up. Will you confirm that NATO Forces are preparing for the worst?

Appathurai: I will confirm that NATO Forces are prepared for any eventuality, yes.

Q: I have a question on the Mediterranean Dialogue. The meeting is really going on now, but -

Appathurai: Yes.

Q: ... for quite some time Algeria and Morocco are negotiating with NATO to participate in the Active Endeavour Operation and for more than one year the agreement is not finalized yet. Can you explain the nature of the political and technical difficulties you are facing with both countries or they are facing with NATO?

Appathurai: I really can't, but I will go and check. I'm sorry; I'm not familiar with this.

Q: James, you said that you cannot say “one side”, but “many member states”. Does it mean that some NATO member states have the same view or a similar view with the Russian ones on the Troika and the process? Because you started to say that from one side it was clear that the Troika couldn't produce a result to agree Pristina and Belgrade, while Russian position, at least public, until now was that Troika was a success, so they should continue negotiations. Does it mean that not all NATO member states think that there should be no more negotiations?

Appathurai: That's certainly not what I was saying nor trying to imply.

Q: Oh.

(LAUGHTER)

Q: James the communiqué here says that NATO urges both parties in Kosovo to refrain from making acts or statements that could undermine the security situation in Kosovo. Would a unilateral declaration to change the status of Kosovo fall under that category?

Appathurai: Sorry, can you read the sentence again?

Q: "We urge both parties to refrain from making acts or statements that could undermine the security situation in Kosovo." And my question is would a unilateral declaration to change the status of Kosovo fall under that category?

Appathurai: I think what NATO nations are trying to say is that there is a status process that needs to be taken forward and that is a political reality from the point of view of the NATO nations. And I think any discussions of declarations of independence or at least a status process that moves forward in a managed and controlled way fall into that track. There is a separate track which relates to rhetoric and incitement to violence or taking steps that could lead to violence. And there is an important point to make here I think on Kosovo and that is that KFOR is not to be seen as the alibi or the excuse for the actions of others. In other words, all parties, and that means in Kosovo and in the region, bear responsibility for anything that flows from the words or actions that they... the words that they say, the actions that they take. In other words, if there as an incitement to violence and there is violence, KFOR will respond to it, but no one should see that as an excuse to engage recklessly in rhetoric that could lead to it.

I hope that was clear. Go ahead. Yes?

Q: This is Mustafa Samih of the Middle East News Agency of Egypt. I'll take you back to the Mediterranean Dialogue. What are the practical steps that NATO is taking to help Egypt draw maps of the mines in Alamain and in Sinai? You are just... I know you are just discussing this now, but I know that you are aware of the practical steps.

Thank you.

Appathurai: I am aware, but we have a press conference by the Secretary General that is devoted to this and I don't want to speak to this meeting before it takes place because there might actually be something coming from the meeting which will be more relevant on Mediterranean Dialogue issues. So let's wait until the meeting is done and I'll come back and brief you.

Q: Chris Dickson, Agence Europe. My understanding is that the missile defence shield could be defined as two projects - a more American one and a NATO one - and that they're made of different things, they're at different stages and they're pointed at different things as well and protecting different groups. Which one is the Russian position most firmly opposed to? And also leading on to that, how does NATO feel about being placed as mediator in a conflict which it perhaps didn't initiate?

Appathurai: Which is missile defence you mean?

Q: Yes.

Appathurai: First, to be clear... well first I'm not the Russian government spokesman and their most effective spokesman will be here in a moment. So I don't want to try to characterize the Russian position, but you're quite right that there are series of bilateral discussions going on on the U.S. plans to put a third site, as they call it here in Europe, and that is not a NATO project. I don't need to speak to that project.

However, there is also a theatre missile defence effort within NATO in which the Russians participate and there will be soon in Germany a theatre missile defence exercise, tabletop exercise, precisely on that subject. So we have a good track of co-operation with the Russians.

Now where does this get a little bit complicated? It gets a little bit complicated because we have within NATO a discussion on missile defence beyond theatre missile defence which could potentially, and that decision has not been taken at NATO, could potentially be bolted on to a potential U.S. third site to provide coverage to countries that wouldn't be covered by the U.S. third site, in order to ensure the principle of the indivisibility of security within NATO. In other words, nobody should be in... half in, half out, 80 percent in, 20 percent out. That is a principle within NATO that we cannot abide.

So these discussions on theatre missile defence do in a sense compliment or potentially compliment the U.S. third site discussions, but the Russian difficulties with U.S. third site discussions are issues that I think you might want to raise with Minister Lavrov.

I think that's all we have time for because I also am supposed to go to the lunch. Thank you all for coming. The Secretary General, as I say, promises to come for the next one.

Thanks.