Speech

by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Annual Session
Reykjavik, Iceland - 9 October 2007

Monsieur le Président,
Messieurs et Mesdames les parlementaires,
Chers amis,

C’est avec grand plaisir que je retrouve aujourd’hui l'Assemblée parlementaire de l'OTAN.  Mon illustre prédécesseur Lord Robertson a dit un jour que s’adresser à l’Assemblée revenait pour lui à « faire rapport à ses actionnaires”.  On ne pouvait mieux dire.  Les actionnaires contribuent de manière décisive à la bonne marche d’une entreprise.  Ils lui apportent leur soutien, et mobilisent les moyens nécessaires.  Pour cette raison, il convient de les  associer aux activités qu’elle mène, de les consulter - et surtout, d’écouter les avis qu'ils formulent en toute franchise.   De la même manière, nous sollicitons le soutien des parlementaires pour la quasi-totalité des activités que nous menons actuellement, qu’il s’agisse d’approuver nos opérations, de convaincre des collègues législateurs ou d’expliquer à nos opinions publiques la pertinence de l’OTAN.

C’est pourquoi je tiens avant tout à vous dire aujourd'hui que l'OTAN a plus que jamais besoin de votre soutien – car l’Alliance doit relever des défis comme elle n’en n’a jamais rencontré auparavant.  Avec plus de 55 000 hommes et femmes sous son commandement, l'Alliance participe à des tâches de maintien de la paix ainsi qu’à des opérations de combat en Afghanistan.  Nous maintenons également la paix au Kosovo ; contribuons au processus de réforme de la défense en Bosnie-Herzégovine ;  effectuons des patrouilles en Méditerranée dans le cadre d'une mission navale de lutte contre le terrorisme ; et acheminons par voie aérienne des troupes de l’Union africaine au Darfour.  Nous avons mené une opération de secours humanitaire au Pakistan.  Nous assurons la formation des forces de sécurité iraquiennes et afghanes et envisageons d'offrir nos compétences dans ce domaine à d'autres pays et organisations.  Et de nombreux pays ont formé le voeu de coopérer plus étroitement avec l'Alliance, voire de la rejoindre en tant que membres à part entière.

Bref, l’OTAN se trouve placée face à des sollicitations sans précédent, et l’on peut affirmer sans risque de se tromper que celles-ci iront s’accentuant.   Pourquoi  ?  Parce qu’il est certaines choses que seule l’OTAN peut réaliser.  Parce qu'il faut, dans les moments difficiles, que l'Amérique du Nord, le Canada et l'Europe agissent à l'unisson.   Et parce que ce n’est qu’au travers de l’OTAN que nous pouvons rassembler la volonté politique collective et la puissance militaire collective des deux côtés de l’Atlantique.  Voilà ce qui rend l’OTAN unique.  Et voilà aussi pourquoi nous ne connaîtrons pas de véritable répit !

Dès lors, la question est simple : pouvons-nous faire face à ces exigences croissantes ?  Je crois fermement que c’est le cas, à condition toutefois que nous nous employions à identifier les atouts propices à la réussite de nos entreprises, et que nous restions résolus – ensemble, en tant qu’Alliés – à réunir ces conditions tant politiques que militaires.

Les atouts qui nous permis de traverser sans encombre les années de Guerre froide sont également ceux qui doivent nous permettre de réussir dans un environnement de sécurité désormais fort différent :

 Il faut avant tout qu’en tant qu’Européens et Nord-Américains nous restions unis.   La voie que doit emprunter l'OTAN sera toujours pavée de difficultés et jalonnée de mises à l'épreuve.  Nous devrons donc nous armer de détermination. 

 Risques et responsabilités doivent être partagés de manière équitable -  et nos missions et opérations mettront cette solidarité à l’épreuve de manière cruciale.   Comme l’a dit un jour un SACEUR : “Ensemble, du début à la fin."

 Nous devons nous doter d’une stratégie politique viable assortie d’un objectif clairement défini, et pouvoir compter sur des forces militaires à la mesure des missions que nous entreprenons.
Enfin, nous devons veiller à ce que l’importance que nous attachons à nos actions soit partagée par nos opinions publiques.  Nos électeurs doivent savoir que notre objectif ne consiste pas seulement à aider l'Afghanistan, mais aussi à rendre ce pays plus sûr.  Mais aussi faire le combat contre le terrorisme.

Dans six mois à quelques jours près, nos chefs d’État et de gouvernement se retrouveront à Bucarest dans le cadre du prochain Sommet de l’OTAN.  Dès lors, ma présence à Reykjavik aujourd’hui constitue selon moi une excellente occasion non seulement de m’entretenir avec vous des divers sujets à envisager dans la perspective de cette rencontre, mais aussi de vous exhorter à maintenir votre engagement sur ces questions dans les semaines et les mois qui viennent.  Je compte mettre l’accent sur des questions déterminantes.  Certes, cela pourrait sembler quelque peu indigeste pour une seule allocution, mais il est vrai, par ailleurs, que le menu de nos activités est actuellement bien chargé.

 

We must see through our crucial role in assisting Afghanistan to become a stable, democratic, and properly governed nation that no longer exports terrorism, instability and crime to its neighbours, our nations and the rest of the world.  Contrary to what some want us to believe, this is not “mission impossible”. Indeed, there are many signs of progress, in a number of areas.  The challenge before us is to reinforce and sustain that progress.  And here again there is a vital role for Parliamentarians, and this Assembly, in making sure that we succeed.

Our ISAF mission in Afghanistan is a critical test of our solidarity as Allies.  In the run-up to Bucharest, we must show continued political commitment to our Afghanistan mission, but also underpin that commitment with sufficient resources.  The rotation of forces in the south of the country is a particularly pressing problem that I hope can be resolved soon.  We simply cannot expect Allies that have been active there to stay indefinitely.  They are doing a splendid job and achieving a lot, but should be able to count on other Allies to relief them at a certain stage.

We must, at the same time, continue to encourage greater Afghan ownership.  That ownership must be responsible, or it won’t be credible and sustainable.  And so we must also see a greater effort by the Afghan authorities, supported by us where appropriate, to clamp down on corruption, crime and the narcotics problem.  NATO has pledged to intensify its efforts to provide training and equipment support to the Afghan National Army, and we need fulfil that commitment because we are lagging behind.  Building up the Afghan National Police is another crucial priority that I hope, and expect, the European Union and other international organisations and nations will continue to commit to.

            Finally, although there has been some progress, I believe the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan still remains too compartmentalised.  And so I agree with those who have suggested that the UN Secretary General should appoint a strong, senior envoy to play a coordinating role first between the different international actors and also with, perhaps first and foremost the Afghan Government.. I do realise that there is not yet consensus on this but we could profit from such an envoy.

That really brings me to the second, broader issue that I wish to highlight: the need to turn the comprehensive approach from an attractive concept into established practice.  As I said, there has been some progress on the ground in Afghanistan, but there is still too little coordination, and sometimes also too little trust, between the various military and civilian actors.  As a result, our collective efforts are often not as effective as they could be.

I will be the last one to underestimate the difficulties of bringing different international actors together.  We are all attached to our own ways, and many civilian actors dread the very notion of working closely with the military.  It is their freedom to do so or not to do it. But the reality is that there is simply no alternative to a comprehensive approach.  We need it in Afghanistan, but we certainly also need it in Kosovo, in Darfur and future contingencies elsewhere.  And since you have a major influence on how your countries operate through international organisations, as well as how they coordinate the efforts of their own ministries internally, you are instrumental in making the comprehensive approach a reality.

A key element of a comprehensive approach is a strong partnership between NATO and the EU.  And let me tell you once again: we finally have to overcome the ambivalence in the NATO-EU relationship.  Most of our members are the same, but we are still very far removed from the strong, strategic partnership that we set out to achieve.  For a long time, we thought that this lack of institutional cooperation wasn’t such a big problem, since cooperation on the ground was going pretty well.  That may have been true in Bosnia and Herzegovina  – but less so in Kosovo, and certainly not in Afghanistan.  More and more, improving NATO-EU relations is becoming an urgent operational requirement, and vital to our fundamental security interests.

How can we break the logjam?  Clearly, it will require bold, strategic decisions in several key Allied and EU capitals.  The solution is in both NATO and EU capitals. We need a strong commitment at the highest political level to move this relationship forward.  And to move beyond the narrow cooperation of “Berlin Plus”.  But, as President Sarkozy has said, it makes no sense to pit the EU and NATO against each other.  And I hope that you, our Parliamentarians, will take that message to heart, and help to break the logjam.

What about our activities, NATO’s homework: we must maintain the momentum of military transformation.  You are all aware of the problems that have occurred in relation to the NATO Response Force, and we are working hard to solve these problems .  To me, only a symptom of a much more fundamental issue, which is the reluctance of many Allies to invest in the necessary capabilities.  Clearly, and the first one to realise not all security challenges require military solutions; but military    competence remains crucial for dealing with many of them.  And that is why we must maintain our military edge.

I am well aware, of course, that arguing in these terms may not make you terribly popular at home.  But we must do more to make the case for military capabilities.  We must make clear to our publics, how difficult that may be from time to time that the protection of their security involves measures on our streets and on our borders -- but that it sometimes also requires decisive action well away from those borders, and that we need the capabilities to be able to take that action.  I realise that money is short in all our countries, and that defence is not the most popular way to spend it.  I will continue to press for the benchmark of two per cent of GDP for each of the 26 NATO Allies.  But I add, let’s also be more creative in trying to get more out of the money we spend.  Let’s make greater use of multinational consortia to provide key enablers, as we are doing to meet our strategic lift requirements.  And let us think about other, new approaches to financing our capabilities and our operations.

My next point: NATO enlargement.  We have committed at Riga to issue invitations at Bucharest to aspirant countries that meet our performance-based standards, and that are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security.  We have been working hard in the context of the Membership Action Plan to assist Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹ with their preparations for membership.  As in previous rounds of enlargement, the Bucharest decision will ultimately be a political one.  And there is a clear role, and indeed a responsibility, for you Parliamentarians in that process.  But I am sure that an enlargement decision in Bucharest will not be the end of NATO enlargement – we also need to consider possible next steps and your input into that discussion is vital too.

In the framework of our political agenda: we must move the NATO-Russia relationship forward.  After a decade of slow but solid progress, we seem to have arrived on a plateau.  We cannot remain stuck there.  Yes, we all know that Russia is in an important election period, and some of the recent assertive rhetoric might be explained by this.  But if President Putin has concluded that a more critical stance towards NATO is preferable over emphasising the need for continued cooperation, then something is wrong in the NATO-Russia relationship.

In a recent speech, Foreign Minister Lavrov asked for “a new definition of Atlanticism” that would also include Russia.  This is an interesting statement.  We should make it clear that we are ready and willing to take Russia’s desire for more inclusion seriously – but at the same time we should make clear that Atlanticism in the sense Sergey Lavrov has referred to is not about drawing “red lines”.  For us, the NATO-Russia relationship does not have a switch where you can put it “on” or “off” at your convenience.  For us, this relationship was, is, and remains “on” – it is a long-term investment in European and indeed global security.

And when I speak about global security: we must further strengthen NATO’s relations with countries such as Australia, Japan and New Zealand.  I am aware that some remain hesitant about these new relationships, and NATO’s role as a hub of global coalitions.  Some are concerned that it might dilute the unique transatlantic character of NATO.  Others fear that it may undermine the central role of the United Nations.  In my view, such fears are unfounded.

I repeat:  a NATO with global partners is not the same as a “global NATO”, or a “gendarme du monde”.  In terms of membership, NATO will essentially remain a transatlantic affair.  It will simply create more opportunities for non-members to be involved.  And rather than undermining the United Nations, I see an overtaxed UN increasingly looking for NATO support, and the two organisations are in the process of developing much more structured cooperation.

Almost finally : we need to take a much more serious look at what I call “21st century security issues”.  And the first one that comes to mind here is missile defence.  Given the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, missile defence deserves a fresh, unbiased evaluation.  NATO Allies have a few days ago agreed on a threat assessment, and by the time of our Bucharest Summit, we should aim to have a clear consensus on the way ahead.

We must also engage in a much more thorough discussion on energy security.  We have started to look at where NATO could “add value” to other efforts by the international community in this area.  And I believe that could include the protection of critical energy infrastructure; training, exercises and the sharing of risk assessments; and enhanced “maritime domain awareness” by employing multinational maritime task forces. And I am intending to bring a discussion on the Nordic dimension to the NATO table.

Another “21st century challenge” is cyber defence.  The cyber attacks on Estonia a few months ago showed what many experts have told us for a long time: that cyberspace has become a kind of peacetime battleground.  In the case of Estonia, all we could do was to send some experts to the country.  But what would we do if an attack like this happened on a bigger scale?  What if it would involve not just one, but several of our countries?  I can’t give you the exact answer, but we should collectively be looking for one.

Finally : public diplomacy.  Clearly, NATO has become a multi-purpose institution that simply can no longer be explained with a single slogan.  But with NATO’s operational spectrum ranging from combat to training to humanitarian relief, and with our ever closer cooperation with partner countries and other institutions, it is becoming both more difficult, and more important, for our publics to understand why NATO is unique – and vital to their security.

To my mind, getting this message across to our publics will be a key public diplomacy challenge in the coming years.  It will be particularly important to manage the public’s expectations about our operations – to explain the dangers involved; the long-term character of many of our engagements; and the benchmarks for defining success.  And there is a very important role for Parliamentarians to play in this effort.

As you know, I have spoken on a number of occasions about the need to revisit NATO’s Strategic Concept.  Apart from other benefits, our public diplomacy work would certainly benefit from a fresh explanation of why NATO is unique; why and where it is transforming; and how it plans to tackle the core security challenges of today and tomorrow.  I do not know whether we will be in a position to set this work in train at Bucharest next year, but I do feel that the time has come to start preparing the ground for a tasking at the next Summit, in 2009.  And we will need your support on this issue as well as the others that I have raised.

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Friends,

I have given you a rather extensive list of areas where we need to make progress – both with a view to Bucharest, and beyond.  It is an ambitious agenda, to be sure.  It will require all the Allies to demonstrate a clear sense of purpose, not least vis-à-vis our publics.  And that is why, as I said in the beginning, you are all shareholders in this Alliance – not just with the right to comment and give advice, but also with the responsibility to move our agenda forward.  You all have a vital role to play in maintaining its cohesion and effectiveness - and in preserving its credibility.  It is our strongest asset in dealing with the security challenges of a globalised world. I cannot leave this podium without giving words of thanks to Simon Lunn. I want to pay tribute to Simon as Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, your experience and advise has been and will be invaluable for the Parliemantary Assembly  and for NATO as a whole.

Many thanks. And Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your attention.