Weekly press briefing

by NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Friends, I'm starting two minutes earlier and it'll probably be over in two minutes so I'm sorry for the interns who have come all the way to see the almost-end-of-the-summer brief.

So I'm going to tell you two things, and then I'm happy to talk to you about whatever might interest you. I suspect letters CFE will come up, but I'll leave that to you.

First, let me give you a quick rundown on Belgrade. The Secretary General, as you know, was in Belgrade late last week. We, he, met with the president, with the prime minister, with the foreign and the defence ministers, and they discussed, of course, two main issues. One was the development of NATO's relationship with Serbia outside of the Kosovo context. In other words, we have now established a Partnership for Peace relationship. Belgrade is developing its plan. There's a structured plan on how this cooperation should go forward. We have a liaison mission now in Belgrade. So there was clearly a desire on both sides to deepen the practical relationship between Serbia and NATO when it comes in particular to defence reform and increasing interoperability outside of or beyond the immediate Kosovo context.

The rest of the discussions, as you can imagine, the majority of the discussions, were focused on Kosovo. There was a meeting of minds on some issues and not on others. Where there was a meeting of the minds was on the very basic principle that the long-term future and the long-term stability of the Balkan region depend on Euro-Atlantic integration and that really is, in the end, the ultimate solution to many of the challenges that we are currently facing.

Where there was not a meeting of the minds, you will not be surprised, was on the way forward, since the political process, which is now moving quite quickly. Neither NATO nor Belgrade sit on the Security Council, but we do know how this process is now moving forward, both in the Security Council, and, from what I understand, in other fora, potentially as well. NATO, or the Secretary General, committed to the authorities in Belgrade very clearly that KFOR would continue to play its role, protecting not only majority, but also minority communities, and patrimonial sites.

We have good relations between Commander KFOR and the commander of the Serb armed forces. The Serb Minister of Defence reiterated in private what he has said in public and that is that for him and for Serbia, Kosovo is not a military issues. It is a political issues and he does not intend for the armed forces of Serbia to be involved in this situation in any way. That is certainly something that NATO welcomed, and as I stress... as I mentioned, we've good relations between Commander KFOR and General Ponos, who is the Serbian Chief of Defence.

I think that, in essence, was the... sorry, and of course, where they don't agree is on the final outcome. The Secretary General reiterated the position of NATO allies that they believe that there should be a resolution as soon as possible based on the Ahtisaari proposals. Clearly the Serbian government does not share that view. They agreed to disagree on this.

But certainly both stressed, or all interlocutors stressed the larger context, and that is a good relationship between Serbia and NATO, a relationship that is getting better.

The only other element I wish to put on the table for you now is that the Secretary General will visit London on Monday. This is a long-planned visit to meet with Prime Minister Brown. I cannot yet tell you what press opportunities there are, if any, because the agenda is not firmed up. But I will put out a press release on Friday so that you know what it is. I can imagine that Afghanistan will be the first subject of discussion and a number of others may spring up as well.

That's really all I wanted to put on the table for you. I know it's a bit thin today, but I'm very happy to take your questions on any issue you may wish to raise.

Please.

Q: National News Agency of Ukraine. James, two questions in fact. Have not(?) NATO noticed the... such a case with Russia bombers approaching to British air space and what was the NATO reaction on that? And the second question now in Ukraine we have like a technological disaster with a leak of so-called yellow phosphorus. This is obviously not substance Ukraine have dealed before, so that my question does NATO(?) have some kind of expertise in that field and has Ukraine government officially requested assistance from NATO in that sense? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: Thank you. I have seen the same reports on the bombers but I have only seen reports I have not seen anything... I've only seen press reports, nothing official. I am not aware of any NATO involvement in this issue. I would suggest that you direct any further inquiries to the U.K. Ministry of Defence.

I also am not aware of any request for Ukraine for assistance from NATO in dealing with what is obviously a very serious situation. NATO countries clearly have expertise. I think there's no doubt about that. I suspect that the Ukrainian government has bilaterally engaged with countries, but I don't believe any request has been made to NATO.

Oh sorry.

Q: On CFE then, where does this leave NATO at this stage? I mean, the Russian announcement, what's your take on it and would it make a difference to the way NATO views the situation on the Russian border, for example? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: First I don't think we should overdramatize this situation. I don't think we should overdramatize the effects on European security. It is an important treaty, we believe, because it sets limits on tanks, heavy artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, so for that in terms of setting limits it's important, in terms of providing transparency it's important.

But I think we have to put it into a larger context in which NATO, NATO countries, and Russia are not enemies. We do not anticipate, and the Russians have been clear they do not intend to make major troop movements during this period of what they call suspension.

Second point, well, I think it's worth pointing out that the treaty does not provide for suspension. So what exactly this unilateral announcement means is to me still a bit of a mystery. I think to many in NATO it is still not quite clear. But NATO allies have made it very clear, in a formal statement, that they are open, and indeed wish for further discussion with the Russian Federation on this, including, if that is appropriate, in an extraordinary conference.

I have seen some comments from the Russian Federation on that, but the NATO point of view remains that we believe this treaty should be brought into force, that the steps necessary to allow that to happen lie in Russian hands, that they are quite achievable, that we regret the suspension, and I put that in quotes, that has been announced by the Russian Federation and that we are open to talks with Russia to address their concerns.

Q: (inaudible)... security (inaudible) Commitments?

APPATHURAI: The Istanbul Commitments, exactly. In essence, what am I talking about? There are two steps that need to be taken. One is the completion of a process that has already begun and begun well, and that is the withdrawal of Russian troops and ammunition from Georgia. That could be completed, I am told by experts, within weeks. And the more substantial challenge, and that is the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova. The Moldovan government wishes for those to be withdrawn.

There is a very basic principle in the treaty, the Adapted CFE Treaty and that is host nation support. Nations must give permission for the presence of foreign forces on their soil. If that is not there host nation support is not there.

Therefore, once that is addressed, and there have been a number of proposals put forward to address it, then the hurdles for entry into force of the treaty and therefore the participation of the Baltic states, and others that are not yet states party to the treaty, could immediately be addressed. And the states that are... all the NATO countries have made it very clear, A, they intend to participate in the treaty... sorry, to... hang on a second. Thank you.

The NATO countries have, A, always been in compliance with the existing CFE treaty. They are in compliance with the adapted CFE treaty limits, even though those have not been ratified, have not yet entered into a force. They intend to continue to comply with those. They intend to continue to comply with requests for and the provisions surrounding inspection.

So you will see NATO countries continue to meet their commitments under the treaty, even though they have not yet ratified it, even though it has not yet entered into force. And we would hope, certainly, that as quickly as possible, Russia would come back into the fold.

Please, I know it's a follow-up.

Q: And what about the... and what about amendment. What about a new treaty? Because the Russian generals declared the existing, even new treaty, even this treaty, existing treaty is already obsolete, and that Russia proposes to work on a new treaty that could meet the concerns of Russia.

APPATHURAI: Well, I must say I'm having trouble keeping up with the various Russian proposals. I... as I say from a personal point of view the Russian position is not fully clear to me. Both in terms of suspension, or in terms of what they want as a next step. What is exactly why the allies wish to discuss with the Russian Federation in more depth what it is exactly they mean, and why statements, for example, from General Buzhinsky, that he sees no reason to have talks, seem to me to be unhelpful.

Q: Yes, Brooks Tigner, Defense News. Change of subject, the EU is moving fairly quickly to approve a military force in Chad. UN peacekeeping officials are in town, NATO has been back-door consulted as well. What is NATO's link to all of this? Is it going to be a support role, or no role at all, standby or what?

APPATHURAI: For the moment I am not aware of any NATO role, in this context.

Q: James, there's a new U.S. intelligence report on al-Qaeda operations in Pakistan, which says that the activities of al-Qaeda are actually increasing and General Musharraf's been unable to curb them. What is NATO's impression, given the link with Afghanistan and the insurgency there, and how concerned are you about what's happening in Pakistan, and where are your plans for some kind of a stronger institutional relationship with Pakistan?

APPATHURAI: To answer the second question first, the relationship with Pakistan on the military side, as you know, is quite well developed and continues to develop. We have, alongside NATO officers, both Afghan and Pakistani intelligence officers in a joint intelligence centre in Kabul. We are cooperating when it comes to border control, when it comes to intelligence sharing. We have NATO allies working with the Pakistani government to assist when it comes to border control. You might have seen, for example, the United States, I believe, has earmarked some $350 million to give to the Pakistani government precisely to be able to conduct operations in the tribal areas which are obviously a great challenge for the Pakistani government.

There is no doubt that NATO and NATO allies would meet this kind of report with concern. It is concerning, it is of concern, to be told that al-Qaeda and the Taliban are getting stronger in an area across the border from Afghanistan. There is no doubt. It is important that we, that means NATO, has a good political relationship with the Pakistani government, which is obviously engaged in a significant effort to try to curb this kind of violent extremism in its own country, which has every danger of spilling over into Afghanistan.

So we have a clear interest, a clear concern in what happens with relation to  al-Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan. That is why we are developing our political relationship, why we are developing our military-to-military cooperation.

But I should be clear that NATO as an alliance will not play any kind of military role inside Pakistan.

.

Q: Just following up briefly on the Chad question, so there's been no question as far as you're aware of anybody invoking the Berlin Plus arrangements?

APPATHURAI: No.

Q: Okay. Since I have the mike, and since we're on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, you're probably aware of the House of Commons Defence Committee report...

APPATHURAI: Oh, I'm aware.

Q: (Laughs). Well basically it's faulting the other allies for not pulling their weight. Is that a view that the Secretary General shares, and what are you doing about it?

APPATHURAI: It's not a view the Secretary General shares. The Secretary General, I think, recognizes that there are 37 countries in Afghanistan, each of them doing... under ISAF, each of them doing a very important job. The Germans have a lead role in the north of the country, 3,500 troops, and it's an important role. The Italians and the Spanish in the west also have an important mission in a not particularly safe area. Kabul is also not safe. I think anyone who has just seen, for example, the suicide attack, I think it was on the Turkish convoy last night, can recognize that. France and Turkey have a very important role in what is a strategic centre of Afghanistan and that is the capital itself.

So everyone's got their job to do. All those jobs are important. Even Lithuania's PRT in Chagcharan up in the mountains has a critical role to play. I visited it myself, so just because you're a little country doing a little bit and you don't move doesn't mean there isn't something important being done.

However, the Secretary General does share the view that the caveats that are put on... the restrictions that are put on the use of NATO forces restrict the ability of the force commander to be as effective as he could be. We were happy when at Riga the allies agreed, or confirmed at least, that in an emergency situation any troops can go anywhere in the country to support other allied troops. We have seen that in action. I could unfortunately not give you too many examples which I cannot make public, one that I can make public which I've made before is that French fighter aircraft came in direct close air support of Canadian troops under fire in the south. So we have seen it in action. There are more examples.

So that was a step in the right direction. Would the Secretary General like to see more of those steps? Absolutely. Would he like to see the last elements of the statement of requirements filled? Of course. Helicopters, CF-30s, some more troops on the ground. But I think we also need to keep in context the troop levels  in Afghanistan. There are almost 40,000 NATO troops. There are some 15,000 coalition troops. There are almost 40,000 Afghan National Army. I'm not even counting the police.

So we have 90,000-plus fighting forces on the ground. The Afghan National Army will grow in the next two or three years by another 40,000. That is the aim and we are right on track. Not just growing, but well equipped because there was a lot of equipment going in from NATO countries to the Afghan National Army up to tanks.

So there is a point at which pouring endless numbers of forces into Afghanistan is not the point. The point is to create the conditions for reconstruction and development and to help the Afghans stand on their own feet. And from NATO's point of view that means very much training and equipping the Afghan National Army so that they can do what they need to do and what all of our armed forces do and that's provide security in their own country.

So I would say that there are some concerns in that report that are shared I NATO. But that we should put it into the broader context of what we see as a lot of progress in Afghanistan, and with troop levels that are really quite significant now.

Q: So you're saying that the balance of... while you share some of the concerns, the balance of the report is wrong.

APPATHURAI: Well, I've heard the report. I would say the balance of the reporting on the report is wrong. (Laughs).

Q: Would you like to comment on Afghan president's pardon for the boy who was supposedly a suicide bomber? That's one... first question.

APPATHURAI: Oh sorry, yes, I would, very briefly. Not on whether or not that was the right decision. That was his decision, but I think the use of a child as a suicide bomber—and it is not the only example—the use of a child to behead someone on video, which we also saw—I did not watch the video, happily—the use of children as shields or if shields is the wrong word, as hostages, the use of women as unwilling participants in combat operations, all of this is an indication of the kind of opponent that we face, that Afghans face every day in Afghanistan.

And I think all I would say on this issue is we should not forget that this is what is being done in Afghanistan and this is why we are fighting there.

Your second question?

Q: The second question is that yesterday Nicholas Burns, he said that whatever decision is taken about proposals from Russia about this radars, the U.S. is going to go ahead with Poland and Czech radars. He said, yes, we will. So will let... NATO will (inaudible), because then that means there is no diplomacy with Russia. And a few hours ago Interfax reported departmental head of Russian Defence Ministry saying the Adapted CFE Treaty is obsolete and no longer reflects the realities of today.

So what is the position of NATO and what's going on between this?

APPATHURAI: Thank you. First on the radars is not really for NATO to comment on the bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Czech Republic and Poland and whoever else they wish to talk to.

I can tell you though that the United States has been very forward-leading with the Russian Federation when it comes to missile defence. They have made an offer of cooperation in terms of basing this missile defence system, cooperation on missile defence, intelligence sharing and cooperation on development of a system, which goes far, far beyond anything that had been discussed in the past. And Secretary Gates made this offer personally, I know, in Moscow to his Russian counterparts.

So I don't think... and by the way, they have been very, very open when it comes to transparency in discussions with them on what is being discussed. I don't think it is fair to accuse the United States in any way of walking away from diplomacy on this issue. On the contrary, I think they have really made a significant effort to engage the Russians on this.

Sometimes you don't agree on everything. That's also part of diplomacy. But they have really tried. In the end sovereign decisions are sovereign decisions. NATO will have a discussion as to how this influences NATO missile defence plans. But in terms of diplomacy I think you can fairly say the Americans continue to have an open mind and an open hand.

On the treaty, yes, I had addressed that early. I personally am not exactly clear on what the Russian Federation wants. I think I'm not the only one. I think as a result the NATO offer to engage with the Russian Federation, to discuss what it is exactly that they want and how it is that we might go forward, is something that should be looked at carefully.

Q: On Macedonia here.

APPATHURAI: Ah surprise.

Q: Surprise. You know the Prime Minister was in Brussels yesterday. When he came back to Skopje the Albanian opposition party threatened again to leave the Parliament because the Albanians think that the Prime Minister does not respect what was discussed in the May agreement. You are aware of the May agreement, right?

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: Secretary General in Ohrid during the press conference clearly said that the May agreement, the implementation of the May agreement was a condition for an invitation in April. So what is the position of NATO on this agreement? Do you still want total implementation of this agreement? What if it's not implemented? And what if DUI boycotts the Parliament once again? What will happen when it comes to Macedonia's NATO aspirations?

APPATHURAI: The NATO position, and this is a position that has been expressed, not just to the government but to the opposition as well, is that while we do not comment on the day-to-day internal political movements within the country, and should not, that's not NATO's business, NATO does have its own standards in the context of membership, and those standards include a functioning, a properly functioning political system. I think I'm being...  A properly functioning political system. And that means that parties should play within the rules, participate within the structures. I am not ascribing guilt or innocent to any particular party. Nor does NATO. But certainly what we wish to see is a well-functioning political system. And that with an eye to, of course, enlargement.

I cannot prejudge what NATO nations will do when it comes to a decision for membership, but I can say quite clearly that when the Prime Minister was here and other senior ministers have been at NATO Headquarters, the Secretary General and the ambassadors have all expressed that concern as being one of the issues they will be looking at closely as we come closer to membership.

Q: This agreement was signed or not signed, whatever, in presence of members of the international community. How important to the international community, including NATO, is the use of languages, the use of Albanian language in the Parliament, in the government, in the official communications?

APPATHURAI: I think now we stray beyond what I could usefully answer here. So let me go and check with my experts and we'll talk afterwards, because I'm not quite confident of the ice I'm on to speak as a Canadian. Let's go right to the back and then we'll come up.

Q: (inaudible)...Aftenposten Oslo. You have (inaudible) before, but could you more directly describe what is the relationship between Russia and NATO today?

APPATHURAI: Well, I hate to sound like a diplomat, but mixed.

APPATHURAI: I think we should always keep in mind the context. The context from 17 years ago to now is a massive transition from what we had, which everybody knows, to a situation in which we have a council at which Russia sits as an equal member, not on the opposite side of the table, but in alphabetical order, where discussions and decisions on Russia include Russia from the beginning, not just at the end; where we have Russian military vessels sailing alongside NATO military vessels in one of our most important Article 5 missions in the Mediterranean; we exchange intelligence; we exchange information on air space to ensure that there are no—apparently with some exceptions—no misunderstandings; and where we have joint work on missile defence. For all that we have disagreements on it, we also have joint work on it.

That's the good side. And I think it's good enough that as you can see in Russian comments, even on issues like strategic missile defence, which are extremely tense, obviously, they will say, the Russian leadership will say, we don't like, and have said, we don't necessarily like the U.S. missile defence plans. We want discussions in the NATO-Russia Council. This is a forum they trust, they believe in and believe can carry the weight of this agreement, which in the past was not the case. You remember over Kosovo in 1999 we broke... Russia broke off relations with (inaudible). Now, even though we have serious issues and disagreements, the Russians turn, as we do, to the NATO-Russia Council.

So I think, and this isn't just spin, I think it is important to note that there is a solid foundation there.

On the other hand, there are a host of issues—now certainly three—where there really is not a meeting of minds; on Kosovo, on CFE and on missile defence. What can we say? We can say that we should continue to discuss it. Not obviously everything. Kosovo is not for NATO to decide. But on CFE, and to a certain extent on missile defence, NATO has an opportunity to be a useful forum for discussion.

So the record is mixed, but I think we shouldn't let the negative headlines distract us from the more solid foundation that's there.

Do you have a follow-up?

Q: But okay that was a lot of word(?), but could you more exact say is it very much worse than it was a year ago, or...?

APPATHURAI: Some of the temperature has gone up on these two or three issues. Is it very much worse? I don't think so.  I think we have quite a lot that we still do together. I forgot to mention, quite a lot of cooperation, which we're stepping up and extending in terms of time when it comes to countering narcotics coming out of Afghanistan.

So the practical work is fine and it is going forward properly. And are we having discussions? Yes, well, that's okay. We're having discussions.

So no, I wouldn't say it was worse, but certainly the temperature has gone up on a couple of important issues.

Q: (inaudible)... Je change de sujet un peu. J'aimerais savoir... il y a au moins 10 pays de l'Europe, de la Méditerranée qui ont parlé de reprendre un rôle, ou qui ont repris le débat sur un rôle potentiel de l'OTAN peut-être au Proche-Orient. Je ne sais pas si tu as vu, il y a une lettre publiée que oui que c'était avec Kouchner, le ministre espagnol etc. Et j'aimerais savoir, il y en a longtemps qu'on en avait parlé, est-ce que vous serez prêt à reprendre ce débat, le cas échéant, est-ce que c'est une option potentielle comment ça serait passé?  Ça c'est une question.

Et après, j'aimerais savoir ce débat qu'il y a aux États-Unis sur un potentiel retrait d'une certaine façon échelonné ou non des troupes américaines en Irak, est-ce que vous avez étudié si ça peut avoir une répercussion potentielle sur l'Afghanistan dans ce moment et quelle serait?

APPATHURAI: Merci. Première question, je n'ai entendu aucune discussion au sein de l'OTAN au sujet d'un rôle de l'OTAN au Moyen-Orient jusqu'à présent. Il n'y a eu aucune demande officielle, aucune discussion officielle ou même informelle au sein de l'OTAN. Alors, pour le moment, ce n'est pas sur la table. 

Et pour répondre à votre deuxième question.  Non, il n'y a eu aucune étude dont je suis conscient au sujet des effets d'un retrait potentiel. Rien du tout.  Désolé.  Go ahead.

Q: Coming back to the missile defence. We have this close relationship with the Russians and we are asking them, or we are offering this idea of having a conference, a new international conference. Have you checked with them if this is something that they will be pleased to do or will you know whether they are thinking about... if they think it's possible and they like the idea enough.

Q: Before writing these last lines, have we made some contacts with them about it?

APPATHURAI: The states party to the CFE meet regularly in Vienna and the Russian Federation called precisely for an extraordinary meeting on the 13th to the 15th of June and of course all the other states party, NATO countries included, went to this meeting.

I do not know when the next regular meeting would be held in Vienna. I think they meet on a relatively regular basis. But this was an expression of willingness and of open-mindedness and an open hand for discussion that basically the allies are ready to meet whenever and wherever with the Russian Federation to address their concerns, and that they believe discussion is appropriate because Russia clearly has concerns.

So there's an expression of intent. I think that's the best way to characterize it.

Q: (inaudible)... Do we know if they are...

APPATHURAI: Well...

Q: (inaudible)...what they think about it?

APPATHURAI: well, I read a quote from Interfax quoting the head of the Russian Defence Ministry's International Agreement Department. This is in Reuters. I don't see any big reason to have such a conference as the position of NATO on CFE has not changed. So that may be the answer you're looking for.

Q: Je voudrais changer un peu de sujet. C'est maintenant sur les affirmations répétées par M. Dick Marty qui a dit devant les commissions du Parlement réunies qu'il soutient toujours le fait que l'OTAN a publié le document en huit points, mais qu'il y a une autre partie... une autre partie opérationnelle sur laquelle se sont basés d'autres accords, accords bilatéraux entre les Américains et les pays européens. Est-ce que vous pouvez confirmer ou non ce type d'informations?

APPATHURAI: Bien, je... évidemment, je ne vais pas discuter des documents non publiés de l'OTAN. Ce que je peux dire, c'est que les documents de l'OTAN privés, confidentiels et publics en ce qui concerne les réponses aux attaques du 11 septembre étaient dessinés clairement avec un langage clair et une intention claire du soutien militaire aux opérations militaires en réponse des attaques terroristes du 11 septembre.

Alors, il n'y a eu aucune intention, ni une porte ouverte sur la base des documents de l'OTAN pour quoi que ce soit au-delà de ce que j'ai décrit y compris les allégations de M. Marty.

Oui, vas-y.

Q:  Une deuxième question toujours dans ce même cadre. Les hauts responsables roumains qui ont été nominalisés dans le second rapport de Dick Marty ont dit que voilà: "Nous avons signé l'accord avec l'OTAN parce que nous avons compris, nous avons cru, senti que c'était comme une précondition de l'entrée de notre pays dans l'OTAN."  Qu'est-ce que vous avez à commenter sur cet...?

APPATHURAI:  Bien, je n'ai rien à commenter. Je n'ai pas entendu ça. Et je ne vais pas faire de commentaire.  Aucun commentaire.

Q: James, after Russia and Belgrade declared the Ahtisaari plan, like unacceptable for them, (inaudible)... let me say so in some part of the world to the east of Brussels if it's speculations that NATO could act exactly like it did in 1999? I mean, in Kosovo. And declare unilaterally the independence of the region?

So that I understand that you are not going to comment on speculations, but Canadian you clarify what is NATO is going to do if the concern on the resolution on Kosovo will not be reached in the Security Council? And...

APPATHURAI: Ah... Yes, yes, go ahead. 

Q: Just to finalize my question.

APPATHURAI: Sorry.

Q: Have NATO some kind of Plan B for that case? And finally, why NATO decided to advertise the Nagorno-Karabakh elections?

APPATHURAI: To advertise them?

Q: No, no, what you think about them?

APPATHURAI:

To answer the first question on Kosovo. NATO, as far as I understand it, does not have the legal status to recognize a state. It is simply not with NATO's powers to do that. So we would not... NATO would not.

NATO's status in Kosovo is very clear. It is 1244. If you go back and read 1244, which I have done recently, it is very well crafted, and provides the legal basis, through a number of scenarios, for the Alliance, for KFOR, to remain and to do its job.

So if 1244 is superseded I am 100 percent confident that any such Security Council resolution would provide a foundation for KFOR to remain. If 1244 is not superseded KFOR will remain under 1244.

On Nagorno-Karabakh we are aware that so-called presidential elections will be held on the 19th. That's tomorrow. Like other international organizations and institutions NATO does not recognize the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh elections, nor any elections that will be conducted there.

Q: Just a clarification...

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: NATO is a military alliance and you just said with respect to (inaudible), I think, that what you are aiming for is a well-functioning political system. So that's... is it correct that NATO believes in democracy, first question? Second, will you like to comment on following—active military democracy in Pakistan and passive military democracy in Turkey.

APPATHURAI: First, I wouldn't qualify NATO as a military alliance, but as a political military alliance. Second, we believe in democracy, yes. And that was actually the easiest question I've gotten in three and a half years as spokesman. But more seriously, it is very much enshrined, that concept is enshrined in NATO's most founding documents and most fundamental beliefs. So yes.

Will I comment on the state of democracy in countries? No, that's not my job.

I think I have time for one more. Unfortunately from the easiest question to what will likely be one of the more difficult ones.

Q: You got that right.

(LAUGHTER)

Q: I want to come back to NATO-Russia relations. I mean, exchanges of intel. I'm not aware that that's very deep. Information on air, pictures is very limited for a very specific purpose. I won't go into the technical details. And on missile defence, that's for a very different kind of purpose than what the U.S. is discussing with the Czech Republic and Poland. So that's the substance side.

But on the negative side we have CFE and missile defence, energy as a foreign policy stick, which Russia is using, Kosovo, Lithuania, the cyber attacks on Estonia, you have Georgia, NATO-aspiring country Georgia, who has immense problems with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and then Russia's intransigence on Transnistria. I would argue that these are all the questions of substance and the other there that you cited are fairly light.

So do you really want to say that this is a rollicking relationship that NATO has with Russia?

APPATHURAI: Rollicking is not a word I would use. No, that's true. And you left out, for example, counter-narcotics cooperation in Afghanistan, which is not insubstantial or unsubstantial. But I take your point. There are a number of issues at great... some of which are NATO issues, some of which are less NATO issues, but which have an influence on Euro-Atlantic security.

The key point is this: We can look for drama and dredge up concepts or phrase like Cold War, but they are not appropriate today. They don't reflect the reality. You, again, left our Active Endeavour. Again, small, but politically significant. But politically significant.

So let us not overdramatize this. Let us have sober discussions about issues that on which we do not agree, but let's also not be... what's the word I'm looking for?

Let us not overdramatize the situation to the point where we start throwing the baby out with the bathwater. That doesn't reflect the reality. We have an important partnership. It's a real one. And we need to have it. So let's continue to engage and invest in each other, even where it's not interesting... sorry, not easy. That is the NATO view. I believe it is also the Russia Federation's view and that is why, for example, on CFE NATO has been very clear...