"The New Strategic Scenario:
Challenges to Security"

Speech by Ambassador A. Minuto-Rizzo, NATO Deputy Secretary General, at the Summer Course on
“Spain’s 25 Years in NATO: Working together for Peace and Security”, Santander, 10 July 2007

Ladies and Gentlemen,       

I am both very honoured and pleased with the opportunity to speak at this important gathering, and I would like to thank the organisers for their kind invitation. 

Let me begin by congratulating Spain on its 25th anniversary in NATO.  I do not need to remind you that Spain’s path into NATO was a difficult one, with many twists and turns, and some serious obstacles that had to be negotiated.  At the end of the day, however, this episode can serve as a most telling example of how convincing arguments and skilful politics can win the day.

Today, membership in NATO is a strong symbol of Spain’s central role in the management of security in Europe and beyond.  Through its membership of the Alliance and the European Union, Spain managed to come off the sidelines of international relations to become an important player – a role which it plays with great skill and conviction and, equally importantly, with strong public support.

As I speak, Spain continues to make significant contributions to Alliance operations with 2000 troops deployed on three continents – in Europe, in the Balkans with KFOR and in the Mediterranean with Operation Active Endeavour; in Asia, in Afghanistan, with ISAF; and in Africa providing support to the African Union Mission in Sudan.  Your country also led the first deployment of the NATO Response Force when the Alliance deployed to bring humanitarian aid to the people of Pakistan following the earthquake in 2005.  A NATO headquarters stands on Spanish soil in Madrid, and former Secretary General Javier Solana provided the strong leadership the Alliance required to deal with the Kosovo crisis of 1999.  All these contributions have demonstrated Spain’s commitment to the Alliance.  Tragically though, that strong commitment to be engaged has also meant bearing the pain and suffering of lives lost – I clearly remember the awful day when so many of your brave soldiers lost their lives in the Yak 42 crash, and of course, only 2 weeks ago, further Spanish lives were lost, this time on the UN mission in Lebanon.  But these losses have not been in vain – they enable all of us to live in freedom.

            At the time Spain joined NATO as its 16th member in 1982, Europe was still divided, and our main concern was how to protect our countries from a military attack or political intimidation.  Today, the situation could not be more different.  The Cold War has disappeared.  Our populations and territories no longer face a clear and overwhelming threat.  But at the same time, we all have witnessed the emergence of an entirely new set of challenges to our security and to our shared values – challenges that require very different responses from those we were used to in the not so distant past.

The organisers of our meeting today have asked me to focus my remarks on these new challenges.  I will gladly do so – but I will also share with you my views on what we must do to meet these challenges.  In other words, rather than just list what could go wrong, I will also share with you my views on how we could set things right – by focussing on some of the key elements of an effective approach to manage security.

            Let me start, however, with a general observation.  Many people today – old and young – seem to be under the impression that our modern societies are overwhelmed by the powers that they themselves have unleashed: whether the issue is economic globalisation, genetic engineering, terrorism, computer viruses or regional conflicts.  And they consider themselves helpless victims of events that are beyond their control.

            I want to take issue with that rather pessimist view of the world.  Our societies can shape events and not be their victims.  We have learned from history.  We have created instruments that our predecessors lacked.  Above all, we have understood that, for security to last, we have to move from safeguarding it to actively promoting it.

            So what are the main security challenges in our increasingly globalised world?  And how can we meet them?

            The first challenge that comes to mind is the relentless spread of technology and information.  This is not negative in itself, as all of you who use the Internet know only too well.  But the World Wide Web can be misused as well, as we saw with the cyber-attacks against Estonia a few weeks ago.  And it brings the spectre of more countries and non-state actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, or the technology to produce them.

            Terrorism is another major threat.  Spain has suffered the tragic consequences of this scourge as much as any Ally, and is fully aware of the changing nature of this threat.  Today, we also face terrorists who organise themselves in international networks.  The damage they try to inflict is indiscriminate.  They oppose globalisation, but they are quite astute in using the means offered by globalisation to pursue their devious aims.  The image of Osama Bin Laden hiding in a cave and directing his people with a cell phone says it all.

            The 21st century also confronts us with more traditional challenges that did not, unfortunately, disappear along with the end of the Cold War.  And here, I am thinking in particular about regional conflicts.  Regional conflicts are to a large extent the result of a fundamental lack of democracy, of human rights, and of economic opportunities.  Moreover, most of these conflicts are within states rather than between them.  For our system of international law, which is based on sovereign nations, this creates numerous new challenges.

            In some parts of the world, we see conflicts arising from unfinished nation-building and the pressures brought about by modernisation.  In many states in Asia, for example, economic development goes much faster than societal change – which may cause tensions and occasionally violence. 

All over the world we are confronted with the phenomenon of “failed states” – states where a central authority is absent, and where lawlessness and violence reign free.  From Somalia to Afghanistan, we can observe how a power vacuum is quickly filled by warlords or religious fundamentalists of all kind.  And worse of all, as we have seen in Afghanistan, terrorists are also keen to exploit such failed states as their training ground.

            This is already a long list, but there is more.  As we move further into this century, I predict that the increasing competition for resources will also become a security challenge in its own right.  Our own increasing consumption, coupled with the economic growth of countries such as China and India, is already putting pressure on the world’s oil reserves.  Competition for scarce drinking water is likely to increase significantly as well.  In the future, large cross-border projects such as pipelines or dams will acquire more and more economic – and thus political – significance.

            Finally, a word on migration.  It is clear that an economic downswing in a country or an entire region, an environmental disaster such as Chernobyl 21 years ago, or a regional conflict, can turn migration into an entirely new challenge.  The Bosnian war and Kosovo conflict, for example, caused millions of people to leave their homes.  On Europe’s Southern periphery, just a few kilometres away from Spain, high birth rates and a lack of economic opportunities could lead to even higher numbers of people looking for a brighter future elsewhere – first and foremost here in Europe.  This will put all our countries to the test – both in terms of securing our borders, promoting tolerance among our populations, and integrating acceptable numbers of refugees and immigrants into our societies and economies.

            Now that I have enumerated some of globalisation’s challenges, I guess I owe you some answers as to how we should meet them.

            It is obvious to me that the breadth and diversity of the challenges before us can only be addressed properly if we adopt a broad concept of security, a concept that moves beyond military matters alone and includes political, economic, and social elements.  Without such a broad approach, we would never be able to move beyond dealing with the symptoms.

            So what are the elements of such a comprehensive approach? 

The overriding element is democracy.  Because Immanuel Kant was right: democracies are less prone to violence.  Indeed, most of the conflicts we see today are between or within states that lack the fundamentals of democratic societies or statehood.

            Democracies are far better equipped to deal with the challenges of modernisation and globalisation.  Their economies and social systems are better geared to handle the stress of rapidly changing markets.  Indeed, I would argue that modernisation and democracy go hand in hand.  Open societies are geared towards change and towards pragmatic problem-solving.  Open and free media are the best insurance against any tendencies to replace historical facts with irrational ideas.  And I am firmly convinced that open, multi-cultural societies are the best insurance against excesses of the kind that we have seen in the Balkans or elsewhere.

            And so, ensuring that democracy and open society are able to take root and flourish across – and beyond – the Euro-Atlantic area is the single most important response to the challenges of the 21st century.  It is the best possible investment that we can make into our future.

            Economics are another key element of a broad security approach.  In the era of globalisation all countries become each other’s neighbours.  And there is thus some truth in the saying that economic support for our neighbours is our first line of defence.  This holds true for Russia and Ukraine, for the countries in the Caucasus and those in Central Asia, who are all struggling with daunting challenges of political and economic reform.  It clearly also holds true for our neighbours across the Mediterranean, some of whom have yet to find the right balance between valued tradition and the imperatives of modernisation.

            To state that political and economic instruments must be given renewed emphasis does not diminish the relevance of effective military instruments.  After all, true security cannot be built on long-term political and economic strategies alone.  It also requires means to cope with immediate problems – including military problems.  Even if many security challenges might be non-military in nature, like economic crises or drug trafficking, others, such as such as regional conflicts or international terrorism, may require the use of force. 

            Indeed, we have seen in Bosnia and Afghanistan that the use of economic sanctions or moral condemnation helped us little without the backing of concrete, visible military power.  You cannot have development without security.  Viewing “political” and “military” approaches as irreconcilable opposites simply misses the point.  The ability to apply force remains a precondition for safeguarding our security in an age of globalisation.

What has changed, of course, is the actual way in which we use military force.  As I already pointed out, regional conflicts have replaced the large-scale scenarios of the Cold War.  And this means that a strictly territorial understanding of security is no longer viable.  Instead of the heavy, relatively static forces of the past, we now need smaller, flexible, and more mobile military forces.  Forces that are able to perform a variety of roles, from combat to peacekeeping, in faraway places, and that are trained to cooperate with civilian institutions.

            These, in my view, are some of the key underlying principles for a strategy for security in the 21st century.  I believe they explain why NATO is in such strong demand, and why this Alliance is so busy.  Because NATO is able to make a unique contribution to such a broad strategy of engagement – not as a “global policeman”, of course, but by making available certain political and military assets in ways that no other international institution can.

            One very strong asset is our membership.  NATO brings together North America and much of Europe.  This is the strongest community of like-minded nations – the nexus of democracy, pluralism, market economy, and technological innovation.  Above all, this community shares a unique sense of solidarity – an awareness that we are bound together not only by a common past, but also by a common future.

            In NATO, 26 of the world’s foremost democracies sit around the same table, as equal members, building consensus and developing common approaches.  Of course, this does not rule out occasional disagreements.  But in the end, the culture of compromise, and the habits of cooperation that have developed between us, always prove stronger than our differences of view. 

            This deep-rooted sense of common purpose has enabled NATO to engage in some of the most demanding operations, and to carry on even if the obstacles seemed insurmountable at times.  This unique staying power is something that only a permanent Alliance can give you.  It is a tremendous political asset – and something that we must preserve.

            Another major asset of NATO is its military competence.  NATO has a multinational military structure that allows us to translate political decisions by our 26 member states into concrete military action.  Whether the decision is about deploying peacekeepers or addressing a humanitarian disaster, NATO is always able to count on a well-trained, creative and flexible military. 

            Indeed, over the last few years, we have asked a lot of our men and women in uniform.  Today, NATO’s forces are engaged in demanding operations, from the Balkans to the Hindukush.  We are conducting an anti-terrorist naval operation in the Mediterranean, and we have a training mission in Iraq.  We are supporting the African Union in the Darfur crisis.  And we have been providing humanitarian aid to Pakistan.  This is a tall order.  You have to have a well-oiled military machinery to do all that.  Above all, you have to be working in a team of likeminded nations, a team in which risks and costs are shared.

            A third and final asset of NATO is its vast network of partnerships.  Over the past 15 years, NATO has developed political and military relations with dozens of countries in Europe and well beyond.  In many operations, forces of our partner countries deploy alongside those of NATO.  These partnerships have thus created a cooperative momentum – and a true Euro-Atlantic security culture -- that have never before existed on this continent.

            We are now broadening this network of partnerships.  With strong Spanish support, we are enhancing our cooperation with countries from Northern Africa and the Middle East.  We are also building new ties with countries from the Gulf region.  And we are responding to the interests voiced by other important players, such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan, to establish closer relations.  In a nutshell, a NATO without partners has become indispensable.

            The next big challenge ahead of us is to build more structured relationships with other international organisations.  Here, too, we have already made considerable strides.  We are about to open a new chapter in our relationship with the United Nations.  We are also cooperating with the OSCE and the African Union.

            Above all, however, we need to build a true strategic partnership with the European Union.  We need to aim for a relationship that allows NATO and the EU to discuss and coordinate their approaches not only with respect to the Balkans, but across the full spectrum of today’s security challenges.  Unfortunately, we have not yet achieved such a comprehensive strategic partnership.  But I firmly believe that the logic of institutional cooperation in the quest for security is simply too compelling to allow for NATO and the EU to continue to act in “splendid isolation” from each other much longer.

            These are some of the principles of a strategy for security in the 21st century, and how we seek to apply these principles through NATO’s political and military agenda.  Let me stress that, in giving you this overview, I did not want to create a false impression of self-confidence.  In a dynamic environment, security policy will, by definition, remain a work in progress.

If I nevertheless remain optimistic about our ability to cope, it is because of the strong common bond that holds the Allies together.  And this, in closing, brings me back to Spain’s role in NATO.

I believe that one key reason for Spain's success over the past 25 years is that it has not been content with being just an effective political or economic player.  Nor has it been content with simply being a respected moral voice.  The real reason for Spain's high international standing lies elsewhere.  It lies in the willingness to act.  In the willingness to uphold its values, and to preserve its interests whenever and wherever necessary, even in the face of adversity. 

In other words, Spain's success is so tangible because it is based on real resources, genuine commitment, and hard work.  And because Spain has understood that, by acting collectively with its NATO Allies, it can magnify its influence – for its own benefit, for the benefit of the Alliance, and for the benefit of the wider international community.

Thank you.