From the event

NATO HQ,
Brussels

28 Mar 2007

Press briefing

by NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): It's a beautiful day and I'm already surprised and grateful that you found the time. Let me really try to be brief. You have heard a lot of what I have to say already, so I'm going to do much of this in code.

First, to repeat for those of you who weren't at the press conference yesterday, we had a very successful meeting of political directors at NATO who discussed two main topics. One, Afghanistan of course. The second, also of course, Kosovo. The main conclusions which the Secretary General shared with many of you yesterday on the meeting on Afghanistan were a general sense that the atmosphere over Afghanistan has become I think more positive.

Political directors welcomed the significant increase in troops that are now available to Commander ISAF since the Riga Summit in late November; 7,000 troops… more than 7,000 troops have been provided to COMISAF, as well as significant pledges of financial assistance for Afghan capacity building. And when I say significant, I might cite for example the billions of dollars that the United States intends to provide; for example, supporting the Afghan National Security forces.

But many other countries are also making financial contributions. Many of the political directors have been recently and regularly to Afghanistan and all of them who spoke certainly sensed a more positive atmosphere, a sense of traction and progress this year as, for example, Operation Achilles goes forward.

They did of course, and there is no doubt, express concern about areas where we continue to need to make progress and that is in areas such as enhancing the co-operation between NATO and other civilian organizations. Further, providing further support for Afghan governance. In other words, building the institutions for the Afghan government to provide for their own security and their own development. The need to engage more and at a political level with Pakistan, and the Secretary General will go to relatively soon to Pakistan precisely in that spirit.

Let me see if there's anything I missed. Oh yes.

And there was a lot of concern ON narcotics. In that regard, the council received, the council in ISAF format - in other words the 37 countries represented in ISAF - received a briefing from two very senior counter-narcotics officials from two major NATO countries. I don't think I'm at liberty to give their names, so I won't, but I will give the countries - the United Kingdom and the United States - each of which in their own regard are heavily engaged in the counter-narcotics efforts. The U.K. as the lead nation in the G8 for counter-narcotics and the United States simply because it has a very, very important and impressive counter-narcotics effort in the country.

I will - and I have checked that this information is not classified - but I will give you a snapshot of the discussions. They are stark because the story on narcotics is a very serious one when it comes to Afghanistan. 92 percent of the world's opium comes from Afghanistan. The export value is $3.1 billion dollars per year. President Karzai has called it, along with terrorism, the greatest threat to Afghanistan's future. There is a dramatic increase in cultivation in the south, most of which is in Helmand province. Also, an increase in cultivation; in other words, the acreage under cultivation, again in the south. And there is, according to them and this we see of course in NATO as well, a growing link between drugs and  you can call it the insurgency, opposing militant forces. One example of that is that more heavy weapons are being found when drug busts are conducted. Sorry for the awkward language.

Now that's the big picture. There are elements that are positive and I think quite positive as well from the briefing that we got. One, that the north of the country, and you can quite almost clearly draw a line, the north of the country is now almost poppy-free. There has been a dramatic reduction in poppy-growing in the north. International officials hope that the north will be entirely poppy-free within two years.

It is the south that is seeing an increase which off-sets, indeed more than off-sets, the progress that has been made in the north despite that only 15 percent of Afghans are engaged in the poppy trade; 85 percent are engaged in legal trade and only 15 percent in the poppy trade. But very simply it is easy to grow poppy. They grow well, they grow easily. There are enormous efforts being made, and this briefing touched on all those, enormous efforts being made to clamp down on this.

The briefers were at pains to stress that this is an Afghan strategy and they put the Afghan strategy before us led by the Afghans. The Afghans have limits on their capacity to deliver on a comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy and these two countries and many others are investing in Afghan capacity to help them be more effective in delivering their strategy. Their strategy includes of course eradication, but, and again the briefers were at pains to stress this, eradication alone will simply not be sufficient. They had eight steps, but amongst them include eradication, but also targeting the traffickers, creating legal livelihoods, institution building and reducing transit and demand. I think that if you could put it into those four categories, you'd get the big picture.

The key in the south must be security. With security comes the opportunity to implement the steps that are required for an effective counter-narcotics strategy. That is why the success of NATO's operations in the south in support of the Afghans are absolutely essential not only to extend the governance, but also to have a very direct effect on reducing the provision of narcotics; A, the production of narcotics within Afghanistan; B, their transit; and C of course, their arrival here in Europe, which is where the heroin is being used in our schools and in our back alleys.

One other note of progress. Until last year there were no convictions of traffickers. They note that there have now been 350 in the past year. So there is progress being made on that front.

Next I move back to the political directors' discussion yesterday. You will have read I believe that they had an extended discussion about Kosovo, about the status of process that has now moved, as you well know, to the Security Council and there was an important change in the NATO policy and that is that instead of supporting the Ahtisaari process, the 26 countries agreed to support the Ahtisaari proposals. So bringing NATO in-line for example with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the German presidency which spoke for the EU, the 26 NATO countries agreed to support the proposals that President Ahtisaari had put to the Security Council.

This is a message that the entire North Atlantic Council will deliver on Monday because they will travel to Kosovo together. It is one of the regular trips that the North Atlantic Council takes, led of course by the Secretary General. The Supreme Allied Commander will also be of course part of this visit. They will meet with COMKFOR. They will meet with the leadership of the Serb community in Kosovo. They will then meet with the Kosovar-Albanian Unity Team and  

then they will split up to visit the various multi-national task forces. As you know we visit the, if possible, the soldiers that  their countries have deployed in theatre. And we'll see not only their soldiers, but in many cases patromonial sites that are being protected by NATO-KFOR soldiers and then return.

We're approaching the Easter holiday so I think there will be not much more for me to announce next week, at least I hope so. That is I think all that I wanted to mention to you. Yes it is. So I'm happy to open the floor to questions. Let's start with my Ukrainian friends.

Q: James a few questions about the famous missile defence. We have seen some kind of developments during last time and in particular United States declared that they will build up their own system irrespective of NATO. I'm just curious is that some kind of evidence of lack of confidence of the United States in NATO itself? And in what sense if NATO has no influence, no control on that system, how can NATO discuss the issue with other partners like Russia for example, particularly on 19th of April during NRC which will be held in Brussels?

And the second question concerning -

APPATHURAI: That was already three, but okay yes.

(LAUGHTER)

APPATHURAI: Second question!

Q: Yes. The fourth question is in what sense will NATO somehow react on the statement of the socialist group of European Parliament who rejected the plans to place in Europe American anti-missile systems and even addressed a request to American socialists to support them in that policy?

APPATHURAI: American socialists?

Q: I don't know, but they said so.

(LAUGHTER)

Q: Maybe socialist-oriented groups.

APPATHURAI: Okay. I grew up in Canada, so I'm not American, but I never spotted one of those.

(LAUGHTER)

APPATHURAI: First I think it's important on missile defence to be clear about the various tracks because I think part of the difficulty in the discussion is precisely because it's hard for everybody to separate out into their appropriate boxes if you will, appropriate lanes, the various discussions. The United States is having bilateral discussions as you know very well with the Czech Republic and Poland and I understand the Czech Cabinet has this morning decided to go forward with the discussions with the United States.

It is entirely within NATO practice and has always been for countries to engage in bilateral security arrangements separate from NATO, but they compliment NATO. Again, my own country has very profound security relations with the United States including aerospace defence which in no way were agreed at NATO, no way impinge on NATO, and nobody sees this as a lack of confidence in NATO. So I don't think anybody sees it that way. To be honest I think the United States has demonstrated its profound confidence in NATO for a very long time. So we're not too worried about that.

The separate track is what happens in NATO and NATO will have, I think, two opportunities; two ways in which it can positively influence this discussion. One is to provide a forum for discussion amongst allies and with the Russians about the U.S. plans and that has happened many times as you well know and we have used the NATO-Russia Council as an opportunity to speak to the Russians about this. So NATO as a platform for a discussion about the U.S. system is one track within NATO.

The second one, which is of course flowing from the Riga Summit, is to have a discussion within NATO about missile defence more broadly. In other words, not a specific discussion about what the U.S. is intending to discuss with its Czech and Polish allies, but to have a broad discussion about what the threat might be and how we can look at missile defence. And I think of course we would have to now take into account what was not the case at Riga and that is the U.S. discussions.

The Secretary General has said for example that we would perhaps wish to consider the possibility of bolting on a NATO TND system (theatre missile defence system) to a possible U.S. system to provide coverage for those countries or areas that would not be covered by a NATO system. So that's a second track. By U.S. system, excuse me. So that's a second track that could be pursued in NATO and I expect that Oslo, the Ministerial in Oslo, will be precisely an opportunity to raise that.

But you're quite right. On the 19th of April, there will be what we call a reinforced North Atlantic Council meeting with experts, high-level experts, flown in to discuss precisely this. I have certainly no intention of responding to a statement I haven't seen first of all by the socialist group. And second, I'm not a spokesman for the United States government so I will just leave that.

Q: James can you confirm the information that during Oslo Ministerial also will take place a Commission Ukraine-NATO? And has the Secretary General got already a letter invitation to visit Kiev and not only him but also North Atlantic Council putting the 10th anniversary of special relations?

APPATHURAI: I can't formally confirm a NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting in Oslo, but I full expect it to happen. I think that it has not been sealed and stamped, but I do expect it will happen.

Secondly, the new Foreign Minister, as you well know, met with the Secretary General two days ago. Monday. And he told the Secretary General that he was expecting the letter to be signed. I understand from the press this morning and indeed from our own internal reporting that it was signed by both the President and the Prime Minister. This is a very important double signature because of course NATO's engagement with Ukraine is, as far as we are concerned, apolitical and we want to ensure that it remains apolitical. We do not want to be part of an internal political discussion. This way it is clear that there is full support from the full political spectrum for the North Atlantic Council to visit. The letter hadn't arrived by the time I left for this. Exactly. It hadn't arrived by the time I left for here, but we're certainly looking forward to it and I can say that the North Atlantic Council and the Secretary General are very much looking forward to coming.

Q:The NATO-Russia Council - will it be in Oslo too?

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: And what level of delegations of experts or political directors will be from NATO and from Russian side? Maybe names you know.

APPATHURAI: Well we don't know names yet. That's the point. These will be people who are experts in missile defence. So it will not necessarily be political directors… political directors of course from foreign ministries. So I do not know yet who will attend. I have not seen a list frankly of who will be coming, but it will be experts in missile defence at a high level.

Q: (Inaudible)…

APPATHURAI: And yes to an NRC in Oslo and probably I would say very likely NATO-Ukraine Commission.

Q: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Two questions on Afghanistan. Firstly, the counter-narcotics effort in the south. Do you have any suggestion of a timeline for it? And secondly, I think it's a little bit misleading to throw sort of pan-Afghan statistics at us when the problem as you say is focused concentrated in the south. I was wondering if you have any notion of what the percentage might be of the population there that's engaged in drug production related activities? Thank you.

Q: Well I was hoping not to be misleading and precisely to separate it out as much as I could. In terms of timeline, I do know that the Afghan effort has been stepped-up this year and I think if you go and look in the wires for example the last few days, you will see public reports of very active measures. Thousands of hectares of being eradicated as part of a larger strategy. So they are being very active and they are being very active in the south. That is where they are concentrating their efforts.

As to when this is going to be a success, I do not know. I think it is important to note that counter-narcotics efforts have been successful in a number of countries. They have been successful in South Asia; they have been successful in Turkey; they have been successful in Pakistan. I've used this number before, but I'll say it again. In the 1980's Pakistan was the world's biggest producer - 70 percent - producing 800 tonnes per year. By 1997 that was down to 24 tonnes and by 1999 down to two tonnes.

Q: Pakistan pushed into Afghanistan (inaudible).

APPATHURAI: It's not a question of pushing. It's that the conditions were in place for counter-narcotics… for narcotics to be grown. But what is clear is you can have an effective counter-narcotics strategy, but it takes a long time and it has to be comprehensive.

What percentage of the population in the south is engaged in it? Well I can't narrow it down, but I think we can extrapolate a little bit as almost all of the narcotics or the poppy cultivation is taking place in the south and the number that I was given, that we were given today, was that 15 percent of the population of the country is engaged in this. I would suggest that the vast majority of that would be concentrated in the south. That's the most I can say. That's the most I know.

Q: Three short questions if I may, all on this poppy production and the Taliban. Can you give us any stats on how many drug busts in the last six months or a year have involved heavy weapons and what kind of weapons are we talking about?

Second, what are you doing with the confiscated weapons? Are they being destroyed or being handed over, for instance, to the Afghan Army so it can use them?

And third, from which direction or how are these weapons being smuggled into Afghanistan? Which border?

APPATHURAI: I answer as I can. I hoped to say heavier weapons, I don't mean cannons, but they showed for example a photo of mortars. Mortars and machine guns which were which were present when the drug busts were being made and in a way that they hadn't seen or in numbers that they hadn't seen previously. So that was the key connection they wanted to make.

It is not NATO that is making the drug busts and I think that is a critical point to make. It is the Afghans that are doing it. So what they do with the weapons that they are acquiring during these drug busts I don't know.

Q: Precisely. That's the issue.

APPATHURAI: Well if they were to use them… well, I'm not going to get into iffy questions. I don't know what they do with them.

Q: ISAF does not know what the native Afghan or police or intelligence forces which its training is doing with the weapons that it confiscates during drug busts?

APPATHURAI: No, I didn't say ISAF didn't know. I said I don't know. I'm quite sure ISAF knows what happening with these, but I would have to check on it. It simply wasn't briefed. And as to where they're coming from, that also was not briefed. So I don't know.

Q: Bulgarian Press Agency. Does NATO support as a whole the American notion of internationally controlled Kosovo independence? This is one question. And the other question is not long ago, I mean a month ago, quite separately the Bulgarian Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army said that one of the biggest problems to sending more troops, Bulgarian troops, to Afghanistan (and we are going to send some 354 more additional troops) is the state of the technical equipment.

APPATHURAI: NATO's or Bulgaria's?

Q: Bulgarian troops.

APPATHURAI: Okay.

Q: Is this question being discussed in NATO and has Bulgaria been offered some support to improve technical equipment of the troops sent to Afghanistan?

APPATHURAI: Thank you. NATO, as you well know, is simply an inter-governmental body. So the NATO nations yesterday agreed to support the proposals. That was exactly the way in which they agreed to agree and so that is the language I will use. They have agreed to support the proposals in President Ahtisaari's plan.

As to the state of the technical equipment, that would be a discussion I imagine which would be happening with the strategic headquarters, the military headquarters. I have not been informed of those discussions. I simply do not know, but I recommend that you give SHAPE a call and they will certainly tell you. Colonel Derek Crotts would be the person you're looking for. He will give you the answer.

Q: The European Weekly. You mentioned 15 percent of the total population. So what percentage of the total population is in south Afghanistan? That's one question. Second -

APPATHURAI: That's a good, but I don't know the answer. Yes?

Q: Second one is Ryan C. Crocker, the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, he's quoted as saying despite Musharaf being an army officer, there is no dictatorship in Pakistan. Would NATO like to comment on that? What is NATO's position on the subject?

And the third one. Any NATO comments on what's going on in Iran with respect to the 15 British soldiers?

APPATHURAI: I don't know, I'm sorry, the percentage of the population in the south. I apologize.

NATO is certainly not going to comment on the state of Pakistani democracy. I can tell you that we are working very closely with the Pakistani government. I've mentioned this before. Intend to continue to do that and to do it not just at the technical and military level, but at the political level.

On the Iranian, or on the U.K. soldiers; the Secretary General believes and the Secretary General joins the call for the immediate release of the U.K. Marines, Royal Marines. The situation has been discussed in the North Atlantic Council more than once brief by the U.K. Ambassador. This is a United Kingdom lead and as I said the Secretary General has joined the call by many for the immediate release of the sailors.

Q: You say you are dealing very closely with the Pakistani leadership on technical and on military. Isn't it surprising that you are dealing with a military man and will you NATO be dealing with the… in case similar things happen in Burma or something like that? Like you said there is no comment, but are you sure that you're dealing with a democracy or not? Just yes or no.

APPATHURAI: Thank you for the options, but we are dealing with the authorities in Pakistan, as I said on a military and technical level, precisely because Pakistan is critical to our success (and I include Pakistan in this), our success in Afghanistan, our shared success. There is no alternative to co-operation. Co-operation is going well. Prime Minister Aziz has been to visit the Secretary General here. So we have already had engagement at the political level as well, but we will raise our game soon with a visit by the Secretary General.

Q: I don't know if you have dealt with this question (inaudible) with Operation Achilles. We got the big news some three weeks ago and we haven't heard much about it ever since. Do you have news about how things are going now and any (inaudible) of things and this kind of stuff? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: Well you're going to regret that you asked that question because I have a long speech that I'm about to read now.

(LAUGHTER)

Well maybe I won't read the long speech. In essence, what I have in front of me is a long list of development activities that are being carried out in the context of operations frankly right around the country. We received a briefing on Operation Achilles. For example, this week the security framework of Operation Achilles has facilitated the transmission of electricity to Kandahar from the Kajakai Dam after two months of being completely reliant on USAID generators. The difference to quality of life has been immediate with central areas of the city now receiving power for most of the day. This project, one of many under Op Achilles, was the subject of discussion at a Shura attended by senior ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces representatives and local elders at Gorak. One of many in a series on planned consolations with local elders to ensure that ISAF efforts serve the local population in the best way possible.

Let me go on. Nearby the ISAF PRT has stepped up the fight against polio in Afghanistan by providing support to a program of vaccinations to children at the hospital in Kandahar city. This UNICEF campaign, funded in part by the Canadian International Development Agency, is focusing on some seven million children across Afghanistan under the age of five in an attempt to eradicate polio.

Would you like me to go on?

(LAUGHTER)

APPATHURAI: I saved it from you. So basically, in the context of Achilles I think the most important thing to point out is that the purpose of Achilles, one of the main efforts of Achilles was to allow for repair of the Kajakai Dam and that repair is going forward. The electricity is being provided to Kandahar city for the first time. Well not for the first time, but for the first time in a long time and people are getting power during the day, which will of course have a knock-on effect for their businesses as well. So it's achieving some success.

Q: On the first one, were the circumstances of liberation of Italian hostage in Afghanistan discussed at NAC? And how do the representatives of NATO member countries appreciate these circumstances? And the mood, general mood, in the civilian societies of NATO member countries on the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan?

APPATHURAI: Just in general?

Q: Just in general.

APPATHURAI: (Inaudible).

Q: (Laughs) And one more question. In Sevilla, the Secretary General said to me that in Sevilla they spoke with Mr. Ivanov on the proposals of logistic support by Russia to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. Is there some follow-up of these proposals?

APPATHURAI: The liberation of the Italian hostage, Mr. Mastrogiacomo, it was discussed yesterday at the level of political directors. I would say there were four elements of the discussion. First of course everybody welcomed his release. Second, there was a shared recognition that for any government faced with this kind of situation, they are put in a very difficult situation. Sorry, let me put that into English. Shared recognition that this is a very difficult situation for any government which has to deal with one or more of its nationals being abducted in these kinds of circumstances. Third, strong sentiment that the actions of one government in these circumstances do have implications for all of the governments that have personnel deployed into that theatre and therefore, it's the fourth point, that it would be appropriate to have a discussion amongst the NATO allies about these kinds of situations and what might be the best way forward. And that was the conclusion of that.

Public support of NATO is a huge topic and I won't spend too much time, except to say despite the ups and downs of polling date in NATO countries and in the non-NATO partners that are there, the eleven that are also with us in Afghanistan, everyone has stayed the course and the Italian government -

(BREAK IN TRANSMISSION)

… very hard and we certainly welcome the decision that was taken yesterday to approve funding for the mission. Everyone has stayed the course because it's a UN-mandated mission, because its' the right thing to do and because it's good for our security. We have a great challenge in NATO, but all of our governments have a great challenge to explain, always to continue explaining why we're there and why it's important and why we're succeeding. When we explain, the public responds to it. It's very clear.

When we lapse; when we lag in reminding people why we're still there five years ago and how much we've achieved, then it's true public support can wan. I personally am very aware of the need to step up our game when it comes to public diplomacy on this subject and we are in constant discussion of how to do that.

As to your third question, I have frankly no information. Our technical experts may well be in discussion. I believe they are, but I just have no update on that.

Q: About the north, you said that NATO hopes… NATO has no role in narco -

APPATHURAI: Yes, we do, but we'll come back to that.

Q: So is there anything new. I would be delighted to know if NATO has a role now, but you said - the experts in question said - they hope the north would be entirely poppy-free within two years. But what is the proportion again? Sorry to discuss figures again, but what is the proportion between north and south (inaudible) production and how come we have still poppy fields in a zone which is considered by many calm, quiet, without any problem? All the problems are in the south; how come there are still some poppy fields in the north? And why two years? And anything you say on the north would be of interest. And why is NATO having a role now, because I remember lately you said that NATO has no role?

APPATHURAI: NATO has no direct role. That is quite true. NATO has no lead role and no direct role. But, NATO has very clearly support roles that are set out in the operational plan. They include providing intelligence to Afghan counter-narcotics officials, providing training to Afghan counter-narcotics officials, but not just to Afghan counter-narcotic officials. Also the counter-narcotics officials in neighbouring countries and we do that in partnership with the Russian Federation. It includes providing, potentially providing, transport for Afghan counter-narcotics officials and certainly providing what we call in extremis support, emergency support for them if they get into a lot of trouble.

So those are all areas where NATO is mandated to act and does. You will have heard General Craddock say recently that he had directed ISAF Forces within the mandate that they have to do the maximum possible in this regard and they will do that.

Q: And the high level narcotics officials didn't brief the Ambassadors (inaudible) about what's being done with the weapons and where they're coming from?

APPATHURAI: We already addressed that.

Q: Well this seems like such a basic question. I mean if you're finding larger weapons coming into the country which is worrisome for the insurgency movement -

APPATHURAI: Well I'm not necessarily sure that these are larger weapons coming into the country. Maybe they were already there. The point is that they are now linked to the drug trade. That's the difference.

Q: Ah, okay. Fine.

APPATHURAI: I think Afghanistan is awash in old weapons.

On the north, I do not know… again, I don't know the differences in population, but the area I can tell you because I saw the line. It's about 50/50. It was about half/half in terms of the areas where there is a significant reduction and hopefully relatively soon an elimination in the north and south. Poppy reduction is extremely lucrative in the context of an Afghan farmer. This was explained to us in great detail. There is, from what we were told, virtually nothing that can provide to them equal amounts of income.

So to create incentives… so to convince farmers to switch away from poppy, even in the north, even in a more secure environment, requires much more than eradication. It requires, as I said, giving them alternative crops that can provide them an income. It means creating an effective set of disincentives. That means police force, justice system, prisons. And it means an effective information Campaign to explain to Afghans that this is an illegal crop; that as President Karzai has said, it is the will of the government, the democratically elected government, that this should be eliminated.

So this is not done overnight. I think it would be fair to say that we should see the north as a success. If it's going to take two more years, that's a remarkable achievement considering that the international community has only been in Afghanistan, at least most recently, since 2001. It has only engaged in this effort somewhat after that. So I would hope we would see this as a success story, at least in the north. Certainly not in the south. I'm not hiding anything. But in the north I think it would be a success story and to get it done in the next two years, it may be an ambitious target, I think it's something we should welcome.

Q: Do you have any data on how much money of this $3.1 billion dollars a year in export value goes to the Taliban for -

APPATHURAI: No, that wasn't provided to us.

Q: If I can bore everyone with one last clarification on this weapons because it's still not clear in my mind. I'm just trying to understand if what they're finding - these drugs and weapons next to one another - is indicative of greater exchange of drugs for weapons or the fact that smugglers are using bigger weapons to protect their drug trade? That's what I want to know.

APPATHURAI: It's a good question. The way in which they expressed it… let me see if I can find the exact language. The way they said it: it was an increasing confluence between insurgents and narco-traffickers. That's exactly the words that they use.

Q: That can easily be interpreted as more drugs for weapons trade.

APPATHURAI: It could be interpreted that way. It could. But the larger sense, the general sense that I have had not just from this briefing but from other briefings, is that increasingly the Taliban is protecting the trade, taking a cut like any mafia and using it to fund the insurgency. And that was certainly not just the briefing that we go today, but many, many other sources of information I have. SO I think I can be quite confident about this.

Q: Broader discussions on missile defence mean that… can I consider it will be a part of integration to review of the doctrine that you are maybe going to adapt to next summit 2008? And the other thing is about Pakistan trip; does the agenda include energy security? And if so, in which way?

APPATHURAI: Is what included?

Q: Energy security.

APPATHURAI: The doctrine… is that what you were saying?

Q: Doctrine is one thing and second is the visit to Pakistan if I understand. What type of agenda and -

APPATHURAI: The visit to Pakistan?

Q: Right.

APPATHURAI: Okay. What kind of agenda? Would energy be on the agenda of a visit to Pakistan? I would be surprised frankly. There is no formal process now for a review of the NATO doctrine. There may well be or may not be for the next summit. That's something the Ambassadors still have to begin discussing. So I simply can't speak to that, though I do take very much your question as a good one, but they simply have not started a discussion now on whether or not there should be a fundamental review for 2008, for 2009, who knows.

The agenda for the visit to Pakistan. Certainly there's nothing formally agreed yet and it's up to the Secretary General to decide what he wants to do, but I'm quite certain that he will have two main interests. One is to step-up and broaden the political relationship that we have with Pakistan, we as NATO have with Pakistan. Prime Minister Aziz was quite clear that he was supportive of that. And so to set-up at the highest level this political dialogue between NATO and Pakistan I am quite sure that will be one of his two main aims.

The second one will be to have very practical discussions about how we can, as partners, Pakistan and NATO and Afghanistan, do what is necessary to diminish as much as possible the flow of support for opposing militant forces, Taliban and others, inside Afghanistan which poses obviously a direct and immediate threat to our soldiers, but also to the way in which they are carrying out their operation. So that will be the two tracks.

Q: According to the media reports, two former Prime Ministers of Pakistan are trying to go back to Pakistan and they are planning to land in airports which will be… where they will not be arrested. So does it say something about the country's law and order situation where President Musharaf's army cannot arrest them because there will be so much protest?

And you are talking about political relationship; how deep is this relationship going to be with what's going on? Like is NATO trying to avoid looking at it or doesn't want to comment on it?

APPATHURAI: Well certainly I don't want to comment on it. It is far beyond my mandate to comment on the state of Pakistan's democracy. You'll understand that. I do know that NATO and Pakistan not only must be partners, but must also have a political relationship. That is inevitable. It is also the right thing from NATO's perspective to step-up the political relationship. But the alliance… well let me put it this way, but I certainly as NATO's spokesman have no mandate to comment on the state of Pakistan's democracy. I apologize, but that's… my lease does not go that far.

Colleagues, one last one.

Q: When can we expect an official decision about commission…? I mean Ukraine-NATO in -

APPATHURAI: I expect within a day or two.

Q: Thank you.