Press briefing

by NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): I don't expect this to take too much of your time, but let me quickly run through a few issues and maybe make a clarification and then I'm happy to take your questions on any issues.

One, let me just look quickly back. I don't want to discuss the Defence Ministers' meeting in Seville any more. You're all very familiar with what came out of it. The Secretary General was, along with most of the security world in Munich on the weekend and gave a speech the transcript of which you can see on the web. I did want to clarify one point which has been picked up... two points actually, which have been, I think, slightly misinterpreted.

The first thing is in his speech he looked forward to 2009 and in it said that he expected that the back of the Taliban resistance would be broken. I'd like to stress that this was not a prediction, but an aim. In other words it was aspirational rather than predictive, because that has been slightly misinterpreted I think, in the press or  not clearly enough explained.

The other thing that was, I'd say, misinterpreted in some regional press, was that he had predicted that a number of countries would join the Alliance by 2009, Serbia or Georgia or Ukraine, where in all cases he had said he hoped that they would be closer to Euro-Atlantic institutions. And in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, specifically that they would be closer to meeting their...

APPATHURAI: Let me mention a few things. One is that today Prime Minister Gruevski of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia met the Secretary General, then briefed the Council and discussed with ambassadors his country's progress in moving closer to NATO and making the necessary reforms. Many of you were there at the point of presse so I don't want to take too much of your time on this, just to say the Secretary General conveyed to the Prime Minister the assessment that NATO's teams have made of real and substantial progress across really a broad range of areas in which the country is working to meet NATO standards, political, economic, and of course military.

There were words of concern about the current political stalemate that's taking place in the country. One party is boycotting the Parliament. The  Secretary General, both in private, and then publicly, again, urged all parties, and that included the party boycotting the Parliament, to resume the political dialogue. His view, and I think the view of every one of the NATO ambassadors, and therefore the nations they represent, was that boycotting Parliament and avoiding political dialogue is certainly no solution to the current... the current issues in the country.

But it was a very productive meeting, one in a long series of visits by senior representatives of the country which, of course, are all part of the preparations that the country is making to move closer to NATO. The Secretary General, of course, has stressed, and all the ambassadors stressed, that the three Membership Action Plan countries have come a long way towards qualifying for membership. Two thousand and nine is an important landmark because NATO nations agreed in Riga that those countries that meet NATO standards will be issued invitations, so it is absolutely an important moment, but that nothing is signed and sealed yet and they still need to continue to make reforms.

Second point, tomorrow the Secretary General will visit Kosovo. He will meet with COMKFOR. He will meet with the Unity Team. He will give a press conference at 12:20 in the... what's called the Hollywood Centre of KFOR Headquarters. He will then fly to a patrimonial site. I will not give the name of it now. And then will visit Mitrovica, where he will have a photo opportunity, as well as brief whatever press is there. He will meet with Kosovo Serb representatives of course, before coming back.

He has also publicly announced that in a couple of weeks he expects also to visit Belgrade, so I cannot give a date for that just yet because I don't think it's confirmed, but certainly these are to be seen as a package.

Second, Friday President Ahtisaari will brief the North Atlantic Council on a subject of which you are perfectly well aware, and then there will be a point de presse. It will be around noon. I don't have a precise time for it yet, but I will let you know as soon as possible. Nick probably knows the precise time, but I don't yet.

Today in the Council there were two main operational briefs, of course. One on what has happened in Kosovo and preparations for the coming days, weeks and months. I obviously cannot go too much into the detail of those briefings. Only to say, of course, the Secretary General will see for himself the state of KFOR preparations, but the clear message was KFOR is fully prepared and equipped to carry out its responsibilities to support the United Nations and the Kosovar authorities in maintaining peace and security, and continue to do that.

On Afghanistan, and again, I cannot give too much in the way of detail, but there was a briefing given to the Council on Operation New Year, Nowruz, N-O-W-R-U-Z, which is the main operational plan for the coming year. The intent of this operation is, of course, to dislocate, if you wish to use that word, insurgent offensive operations in order to support development and governance in key development zones and freedom of movement on the main highway, Highway 1.

This effort is being led by the Afghans. NATO ISAF is supporting it, but at all levels, from government of Afghanistan, through down to local governance and local communities, NATO will be supporting an overall Afghan effort.

And there are a number of important development projects that are being supported by this effort. One of them is the reconstruction of the Kajaki dam in Helmand province. You may have seen some coverage of this, but for those of you who don't follow it, it is a major infrastructure project that will bring electricity to 1.8 million Afghans. It will provide 2,500 jobs for them, as well. It is exactly what we as NATO are there to help the international community and the Afghans to do.

Now, the Taliban does not want this dam to function. Precisely because it will bring so many benefits to the people and therefore demonstrate that the Afghan government is making their lives better. As a result they have continually and continued to try to attack those who are working on this dam, both military and civilian.

NATO is fully engaged in protecting the construction project to ensure that the construction can go forward. I might add that Afghan national security forces, both in this operation and in many others, are taking an important and increasingly lead. For example, an increasingly number of Afghan battalions, what we call Kandaks, and Afghan National Police, are being deployed to protect infrastructure and to conduct operations in support of them.

Musakala. There was a briefing on the situation in Musakala. There's not much I can tell you that you haven't probably already read. You know what the situation is. What I would like to stress is that even as NATO continues to follow an Afghan government lead, and that is the critical point here, the Afghan government and the Afghan authorities are taking the lead in dealing with this situation, and NATO is playing a supportive role and will play the supportive role it is asked to play as this goes forward. But this is one hundred percent an Afghan government lead.

Reconstruction and development projects in the Musakala region are going forward. For example—and I will name five—three mosques are being rebuilt at an estimated cost of $70,000 each; four schools being repaired for over $30,000; major road repair; battle damage repair. We are fixing the shops and houses that have been broken by operations at a cost of over $1 million. And the main mosque is being repaired at a cost of almost $200,000.

All this to day this reconstruction and development is currently ongoing.

Musakala. Musakala, which is in the press at times.  

Q: The main mosques is in addition to the three mosques.

APPATHURAI: Yes, it's in addition to the three mosques. I think that is all I wanted to say on that. The main point being...

Q:(inaudible)... destroyed by who?

APPATHURAI: I don't know. I don't know if you've been there, but if you drive around Afghanistan there's a lot of things that have been destroyed for a very long time, so it really would be impossible, at least for me, to say that it was current operations.

The main point I would like to make coming out of this briefing, and I think this is the main point being made by the briefer, and reflected by the ambassadors, is A) everything that's being done in Afghanistan is being done under Afghan lead, and that there should be no doubt about that.

Second, that Afghan national security forces, both army and police, are increasingly becoming effective. You've heard in the past few weeks and months that the United States in particular has gone to get, I think it's $8 billion for training and development of Afghan national security forces. Other countries have promised increases to their own training efforts, including operational mentoring and liaison teams. we're up to 26 of those that deploy with Afghan national security forces.

And final point, reconstruction and development is taking place now, even in the south, where things can be most difficult. So this was the message that came to me from that briefing and I wanted to pass it on to you.

That is all I have to say...

Q: Is dam repair and Musakala (inaudible)...

APPATHURAI: They're separate.

Q: That's separate from the Nowruz then.

APPATHURAI: Yeah, well, Nowruz in essence is attempting to protect these various development zones, and I think that the Kajaki dam, if I'm not wrong, is part of that project. I'm not sure Musakala is. I have to check on that.

Now we'll have questions on the very many interesting issues that have come over the past week.

Q: Just on this last point, this money you talked about in Musakala, whose money is that, and am I right, this is $200,000 on one mosque and then $70,000 on three other mosques, is that right?

APPATHURAI: Each, yeah.

Q: So you're spending eight times more on mosques than you are on schools?

APPATHURAI: Well, these are just examples that I've used. I wouldn't say that that was a broad sweep analysis of everything that's being spent. These are just illustrations that were briefed today.

Q: Now I'm just wondering whose money is that?

APPATHURAI: It is broken down... some of it is ISAF, some of it is international community, some of it is coming through the Afghan government. So it is coming from various sources. Some of it's ISAF, some of its Afghan government. Actually, quite a lot of it is being routed through the Afghan government, in particular the Policy Action Group.

Q: The decisions on how to use this money, that's taken by the Afghan government?

APPATHURAI: These are Afghan decisions, one hundred percent.

Q:  Kosovo. NATO has a security role in Kosovo right now.

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: NATO will have a security role in post-status Kosovo. I don't see what the need is for all of this planning. How is your role going to change? It's not. And why do you need to have months and months of planning that you can't tell us about when it concerns security, what you've been doing anyway?

APPATHURAI: Well, of course, security can take many forms. And I think you're quite right that there is no question that NATO will continue to have a security role. That's clear. And that... a common thread of that security role will be that NATO will have a fundamental role in backing up the other security structures, both international and local to ensure a safe and secure environment.

President Ahtisaari's proposals envision a different Kosovar security capability. And therefore the relationship between NATO and that Kosovar security capability will have to be defined. And second, that Kosovar security capability will have to be developed and there is certainly the idea that NATO would play a role I helping it to develop.

That's point one. The second is, of course, the UN is standing down and the EU is standing up a security force that will have slightly different roles and responsibilities. So NATO will also have to establish how it works with the new EU force and that is a very important and delicate discussion which I have to say is going reasonably well, to define who exactly does what, from protection of patrimonial sites, to arrangements for intelligence cooperation, to crowd and riot control. All of these things have to be defined, and not just in the abstract, but in very, very precise ways.

So these are the kinds of discussions that need to take place and are taking place.

Q: Yeah, I mean, this is more interesting when you get into concrete details; security capabilities that's abstract and jargoned. Do you mean that NATO is going to be tasked to train Kosovo army or police? Well, probably not the police, but the army, and if so, what? Helping reorganize the army, put it together? Can you please be more... less jargoned.

APPATHURAI: Well, less jargoning... No, I'm trying not to use jargon, as I try in general not to use jargon, but I'm using generic terms because that's the stage that we're at. And of course, all of these words are fraught with political meaning.

There is no discussion that I have seen in President Ahtisaari's proposals for the creation of a Kosovar army. What they do talk about is Kosovar security structures.

Now what does that mean in terms of jargon? That question you'll have to address to President Ahtisaari. The term we have been given is Kosovar security structures.

Now, does that mean training personnel on the ground? Possibly. Does that mean helping in the development of a—I'll use this word in quotes—"ministry" of some kind, to oversee the ongoing management of that kind of security force? Yes, I think those are the kinds of things that are being considered, but nothing has been first agreed in the Ahtisaari plan, and that's a very important point.

And second, NATO has not come to any decisions on what it will do, precisely because the negotiations between the parties I believe are to resume on the 21st. The plan could still change. It then has to go to the Security Council and only then will we know exactly what it is that NATO will be asked to do.

So, sorry to have been full of jargon.

Q: To follow on Kosovo. You said that discussions between the EU and NATO were going reasonably well...

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: ...but according to some medias there is no place for some... for discussions anywhere because there is no... right now, I don't now what, Berlin Plus and all that jargon, as would say our colleague...

APPATHURAI: Yeah.

Q: ...and Turkish and Cyprus and French, all meddling in order to prevent those two important organizations to discuss directly. So how come they discuss of anything and where?

APPATHURAI: The NATO and the EU have very regular and positive discussion and indeed, I would say even negotiations when it comes to this issue, at the technical level, but that includes at the highest technical level, including in our case, Ambassador Jim Pardew, who's the Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations, and his counterparts at the European Union.  We have a very good working relationship, I think, at all levels.

Where we have difficulty, and this is certainly no longer news to anyone, is at the highest political level, the very highest political level. There are political difficulties preventing the two councils from meeting and discussing Kosovo on a formal basis. The council meeting our North Atlantic Council, in the case of the EU, the PSC.

So we have regular discussion and clarity up to the point that we've come to now, and good clarity on who will be doing what at the technical level.

Q: Norway made a new contribution to ISAF yesterday. Have any other countries come up with something new the last days?

APPATHURAI: Well, thank you and I might add that not only the Secretary General, but a number of ambassadors thanked Ambassador Traavik at the North Atlantic Council for the contribution that Norway has decided to make.

Since the Riga Summit which I think is... as opposed to looking at the past days we can look at the past weeks, because it's really just a matter of eight or nine weeks, ISAF has grown by, I know General Craddock doesn't like to use figures, but it's grown by, I would say, almost 5,000 troops, with significant capabilities that will be able to deploy both to the east and into the south where theatre reserve capability is now provided.

More special forces have been provided, not just by Norway. We have heard offers of contributions of transport aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and some other technical capabilities.

So NATO ISAF today is significantly larger and significantly more capable than it was eight weeks ago. In fact, I continually hope that instead of seeing the headline, NATO will short of troops, I will see the headline, NATO ISAF grows again. But somehow I haven't convinced anyone to write that, even though it's one way, I would say, of looking at it.

Q: James, I have two questions. One on Kosovo and one on Macedonia.

How will NATO respond to the potential recast(?) of Kosovo authorities in a post-status Kosovo for PfP relations with NATO, considering that the Serbia membership with the PfP have exempted Kosovo?

And second, how... what was the message of the Secretary General to the Macedonian Prime Minister on the latest dispute between the government and the opposition? How will this affect the... Macedonia's path toward NATO membership.

APPATHURAI: On the first issue, you've heard me say this before, the Secretary General has taught-slash-instructed me not to answer questions that begin with "if" or "in case", so I'm not going to. Let's not put the cart before the horse. Let us see how the status process goes and when it has reached a next step and if Kosovo were in a position to apply for Partnership for Peace, well, then let's deal with that when that situation... we'll cross that bridge when we come to it, as we say.

Macedonia. The Secretary General, and he was not the only one, made it very clear to the Prime Minister that it doesn't look good. I think that's the basic point. It does not look good to have this long paralysis within the government. The lack of dialogue between opposition and government.

And I must stress that he was certainly not casting blame on one side or the other. But he stressed, and I think he might have even stressed this at the press conference, that the image it gives is not positive, and of course, both NATO and the EU are looking at the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia very much in the context of potential membership.

So this is a very important moment. The spotlight is shining very clearly on the country, and these issues, of course, if resolved, would certainly remove what is at least an unfortunate image about the political situation in the country.

Q: I have two questions on Macedonia. First one, some media has raised concern these days about armed forces on the border between Kosovo and Macedonia. Do you have any information on that?

And second, during the meetings with the ambassadors the question of the name, was it raised at all?

APPATHURAI: I can give you good, short answers to both of those questions. A) I have no information or have I heard anything, I say very openly, even in private fora about that, about armed forces on the border. Never seen anything about it.

And second, the issue of the name simply did not come up. At any time.

Q: Will the troops that the Norwegians replace in Kabul be sent to the south?

APPATHURAI: I have asked myself that... I have myself asked that question. I'm not sure if they replace anyone, so I just don't know the answer of whether they are freeing up forces to go elsewhere or not. I simply have not got a good answer to that. You probably know, but I don't.

Q: This one coming to Afghanistan and Musakala (inaudible)...

has this agreement and subsequent filler(?) of the agreement been discussed and any lessons being taken and any strategy decided for the future as something you cannot do, we have to try to do somewhere else, or... (inaudible)...?

APPATHURAI: The situation in Musakala was discussed extensively  today and NATO's viewpoint on this I think is quite clear. The arrangement that was made in Musakala was made between the Afghan government and the local leaders, local elders. It is still their discussion to have; the Afghan government and the local elders.

The governor, Governor Wafa, is taking a very active and I think —everyone agrees—a very positive role in dealing with this situation. NATO was never part of the deal, nor was the Taliban part of the deal. That is a misapprehension, I think, on the part of many. And NATO does not want to now begin being party to the negotiation process. This is an Afghan lead.

So when the Afghan government chooses to take action, if and when to take action, NATO will support them. That's our position.

Q: I think the last time Norwegian special forces were involved in Afghanistan was as part of a U.S. special forces task force, or just part of Operation Enduring Freedom, but these special forces are part of ISAF, first question?

Second, that special forces task force, is that still part of Operation Enduring Freedom, or is it part of ISAF? Do you...

I'm presuming it is still is, Operation Enduring Freedom, but I don't know if you've seen anything.

APPATHURAI: I have no information on the special forces task force. I probably wouldn't discuss it even if I did. But the Norwegian special forces will be part of ISAF.

Q: And then the French special forces, which were withdrawn... they were withdrawn completely out of the country, they weren't transferred to ISAF by any chance?

APPATHURAI: That's a question for... transferred to ISAF?

Q: Yeah.

APPATHURAI: No, not that I'm aware of.

Q: Okay. And then finally just on Kosovo, is that an accurate description of the status of Kosovo and PfP that it's out... that Ekrem gave, that Kosovo is... I mean, is not part of the...

APPATHURAI: At present...

Q: ...PfP...

APPATHURAI: At present Kosovo is part of Serbia, according to the current status in which we find ourselves, so under current arrangements I don't see any way in which, right now,  Kosovo could apply for Partnership for Peace. Once the status process runs its course we'll be obviously in a different situation. I don't know if that will mean... I don't know what that will mean. But I think we'll have to wait and see. That's the point. I really don't know what it'll mean.

Q: But it's not NATO excluding Kosovo from PfP.

APPATHURAI: No.

Q: It's the Serbs that are excluding Kosovo from PfP I suppose.

APPATHURAI: Well... right now NATO doesn't do PfP with components of countries, and while Kosovo certainly has a very autonomous status and being run by the United Nations, it is still, in a legal sense, part of Serbia. So that's where we are.

Yeah, yeah, I figured out I was getting in trouble there.

Q: (inaudible)...

(LAUGHTER)

Q: Legally the UN resolution (inaudible), which has Kosovo as part of Serbia or former... union.

Q: The resolution gives... authorizes NATO to be in Kosovo.

Q: The next resolution is most likely, I will not say a hundred percent, will also authorize NATO stay in Kosovo, and secondly, authorize NATO to help build the security force or whatever it will be.

APPATHURAI: Yeah.

Q: Now, if you are authorized to do...

APPATHURAI: There's that word. (Laughs).

Q: ...both those things, why you are so resisting on respond to the question, will it be ready for a second type of nation, or formal relation with Kosovo in a post-status?

APPATHURAI: Second kind of mission.

Q: A third... a third one. And... on...

APPATHURAI: Sorry, I'm missing the question. What am I trying to not answer?

Q: If the new resolution will invite NATO to stay in Kosovo...

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: ...and invite NATO to help build the security forces of...

APPATHURAI: Yes.

Q: ...Kosovo, why will not then NATO be ready to conclude a formal relationship with Kosovo and bring all these together in PfP thing?

APPATHURAI: (Laughs). As I said...

Q: Legally there is no obstacle of that.

APPATHURAI: If, if and if, you mean after the three ifs?

Q: Well, at least if I might quite... probably yes.

APPATHURAI: Let's wait and see what the Security Council decides for status, including all of the issues relating to Kosovo and international organizations. I know PfP is not an organization. And what legal status, rights, responsibilities, freedoms and others it will have. Until that point is reached it is impossible, you will understand, for me, and I think for NATO, to speculate on PfP membership. Let's take one thing at a time.

The negotiation process is in a critical phase, changes are still possible. President Ahtisaari has said that himself. So let us not get a head of ourselves.

Q: On Kosovo, has there been any discussion within the NAC of the risk of possible partition of the northern enclave of Kosovo? Discussion. No conclusion.

APPATHURAI: Yeah.

Q: No decisions, just discussion.

APPATHURAI: The NAC does not discuss the political status of Kosovo and how it should be put in place. All of those decisions are being taken elsewhere, and certainly the NAC is very careful not to tread, even with the door closed, to tread into that area.

But of course, our business is first and foremost maintaining a safe and secure environment. And so anything that might undermine that safe and secure environment is of fundamental interest to the ambassadors.

Now my understanding is that partition is not what is being proposed by President Ahtisaari. NATO has, from the beginning, and to this day, and will continue to support him and the process that he has put forward. The negotiation process will result in what it results in.

One thing that is sure that NATO is prepared for any eventuality, and when I mean any eventuality... when I say it I mean any eventuality. So NATO's planning covers the full range of options.

Q: Full range of contingencies.

APPATHURAI: Contingencies, exactly. Full range of contingencies.

Q: I just wanted... you know, there was a panel of the Canadian Senate a couple of days ago which said...

APPATHURAI: I read that this morning

Q: ...Canada should consider pulling its troops out if it doesn't get... if they don't get more supply from the allies. Did that factor in to the discussions in the NAC at all today?

And just a second question on a completely different subject, there were reports in the Russian media today about some joint exercise, Russian-NATO exercise being postponed.  Can you confirm that and explain why they're being postponed?

APPATHURAI: There was no discussion today in the NAC of the Canadian Senate report, which I read myself. And no, there was no discussion there, and I think everyone expects Canada to continue playing the very important role it plays in the south, and I would certainly draw the attention of anyone who wonders if Canada is alone to the six other countries that are contributing significant amounts of forces to operations in the south.

I read the same report. On the Russian exercise, or the NATO-Russia exercise. There is a very simple reason why we have some difficulty in moving forward in NATO-Russia exercises on Russian territory and that is that we have not yet concluded a Status of Forces agreement with the Russian Federation. That, I believe, will be soon, moving to the Russian Duma, so from the government to the Parliament, and we would hope that the Duma could soon ratify it, approve it, and therefore that we would have the necessary legal and financial arrangements in place for NATO troops to conduct exercises on or near Russian territory.