Sevilla, Spain

8 Feb. 2007

News conference

by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer following the Informal meeting of NATO Defence Ministers, and the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers with the Afghan Defence Minister

JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Secretary General of NATO): ...two meetings as you know, and as James Appathurai has, without any doubt, told you. We had one meeting on the most important operations being Afghanistan and Kosovo. We started with Kosovo this time and then Afghanistan. And then Minister Wardak, the Afghan Defence Minister, joined us to continue our discussion on Afghanistan.

Let me start where we started this afternoon and with Kosovo. If I have to sum up that discussion my conclusion is that there is, as there was, full support for the proposals as tabled by President Ahtisaari, including their prompt implementation.

There is a strong determination to maintain KFOR strength, the strength of KFOR, at the level which is necessary to meet its mandate, and future roles as foreseen in the proposals made by President Ahtisaari. I've told many of you before that KFOR is prepared for all eventualities.

I noticed strong support for deepening the technical and political cooperation with the European Union. You know that the European Union is going to play a very important role in Kosovo after hopefully a solution has been found for the status process.

NATO will be the international military presence, the AMP, as it is called, IMP, I should say, and it is crystal clear that we have to cooperate very closely in this regard.

Ministers also recognized the need to start preparing for NATO's expected post-settlement role. So in all a reconfirmation of the determination there is behind KFOR and there is behind the responsibility of KFOR for security and stability in the province now in the transition period, but certainly also after hopefully a status settlement will have been reached.

Then the second part of the meeting was devoted to Afghanistan to pre-empt questions some of you might have. It's an informal meeting. There are no formal decisions taken. It is also not a force generation meeting. So if you might ask me to do the numbers and where are you I'll make a few general remarks.

This was not force generation. Force generation is, as you know, a continuing and continuous process.

A few elements from that meeting.

One, and that is in line with the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Brussels two weeks ago, we must implement the so-called comprehensive approach, and that means,  you know, that we have to work closely with other international organizations and with the key donors, as you saw in practice in Brussels.

Point number two, we must further build the capacity and the capability of the Afghan government. They are in the lead. In this regard, I can tell you there was, of course, the strong plea by Minister Wardak in the last part of our meeting, that we have agreed to step up our efforts where it concerns the training and the equipping of the Afghan National Army. And as far as equipment is concerned, a lot has been done already, but we have agreed to do more. And that was, I can say again, the key in the intervention by Minister Wardak. Help us in training and equipping the Afghan National Army, to help ourselves.

The third element, of course, which is relevant, that if we discuss the comprehensive approach, if I repeat what I've said many times before, that the answer in the long run in Afghanistan is not a military one, and that the comprehensive approach is bringing together the civilian and the military, underpinning that comprehensive approach, of course, for underpinning that comprehensive approach, we need the right forces and the right mix of forces for ISAF to do the job.

And that is, again, force generation, and although, I repeat, this was not a force generation meeting, I think that we have seen some important developments between the summit in Riga, November last year, and the moment I speak to you. I think that in general one could say that we have about 5,000 new troops since Riga, and also this afternoon we saw some nations stepping up to the plate.

I'm not going into detail in this regard, because I think that's up to the nations, but I think as far as force generation is concerned we're doing relatively well. That does not mean that we're there, but we're doing relatively well and we're doing better than I had considered possible two weeks ago.

Then, I told you already as far as Minister Wardak's pleas were concerned, on a general political note I can add that Ministers looked ahead, of course, to 2007 and they did that, by the way, on the basis of a briefing which was given by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Craddock.

I think there was general agreement that the strategy is right, and it is working, and that the comprehensive approach, as I've mentioned a few times now, is of key and is of the essence.

So that is what I can tell you about the meetings of this afternoon. You know that tomorrow, but then I'll come back to you again, we'll have a meeting which will be devoted to a number of important elements of NATO's transformation. We'll have an important meeting with Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov and we'll end with a lunch, also, I think, noteworthy, with the colleagues of our partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue.

Let me leave it here for the moment and I'm open for your comments and questions.

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): First question.

Q: Thank you sir, a question from the New York Times. I well understand this is not a force generation conference, but we also understand that General Craddock has completed his assessment of what would be required in Afghanistan. Can you tell us how many more additional troops should be assigned to Afghanistan, how many more are you looking for, and what other capabilities as far as equipment and other military enablers? Thank you.

DE HOOP SCHEFFER:No, I'm not going to tell you the details of what we call in our jargon, the CJSOR, the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. It is clear that General Craddock has done a review, but you'll have to do with my general remark that we have made progress, we are making progress. You know about what has already been made public as far as the United States is concerned, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. You know about the decision by the German governments, not yet agreed by the German Bundestag, about the so-called reconnaissance Tornados.

We've heard more offers this afternoon. If you ask me that's what I can tell what is, but again, also in this regard we heard some nations stepping up to the plate this afternoon. What is key, that is in the enabling sphere, enablers, and you know what enablers are, and we're discussing transport aircraft and fixed wing and helicopters. And that is certainly still something we have to work on, but let me say again that we have made progress and we have made better progress than I had expected two weeks ago. But I say again, we are not there yet. And the force generation process, which is a process and not an event like a ministerial meeting, will go on.

Q: Amir Oren of the Israeli paper Ha'aretz. Does NATO have a position on what the United States perceives as a growing Iranian threat? There seems to be almost diametrically opposed position between major member countries, such as the United States and France. Can you reach a consensus on Iran and is there already a position which NATO as a whole has accepted?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: My answer would be, sir, that there is no need for a consensus, stricto sensu as the Romans said. There is no need for a consensus in NATO on Iran because NATO does not play a role as an Alliance in the problems surrounding the Iranian dossier.

That does not mean that NATO... that what happens in and around Iran is irrelevant for the Alliance. But the Alliance as such does not consider itself as playing a role. We leave that to other nations and to other groups of nations like the EU3 or the European Union more in general, the United States of America.

So there's no need for a consensus. It is politically relevant. It is clear—and that's the way you started your question—that since there are many allies, members of more than one international organization, and that the NATO membership overlaps to a large extent the European Union membership, it's crystal clear that the allies are very worried about what is happening in the framework of Iran's nuclear ambitions. That's crystal clear. But let me also make very clear that NATO is not seeking a role in this regard, this respect.

APPATHURAI: Laurent.

Q: Une question en français, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, s'agissant de l'Afghanistan il y a un langage diplomatique très correct qui consiste à dire que le Pakistan est un excellent allié, à la fois de l'Afghanistan et de l'OTAN. Et puis il y a un langage un petit moins diplomatique qu'empruntent les responsables américains et le gouvernement afghan depuis quelques temps qui consiste à dire que le Pakistan sert de sanctuaire, notamment dans la ville de Quetta aux Talibans et qu'il mène une politique absolument désastreuse notamment dans le Waziristan.

Alors, les responsables américains tiennent ce langage. Le président Karzai commence à tenir ce langage. Est-ce que le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN va bientôt tenir ce langage et dire... appeler un chat un chat et dire que la politique que mène le Pakistan n'est pas conforme à ce qu'elle devrait être?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Vous m'accordez de choisir mes mots à moi, mes propres mots. Alors, ce que je peux vous dire, c'est que... Il y a 10 jours que le premier ministre pakistanais est venu à l'OTAN. Il a parlé avec le Conseil Atlantique Nord. C'était une visite, je crois, très constructive. Après cette visite, le premier ministre et moi on a parlé avec vous, avec la presse. Et on a conclu qu'il nous faut tous, tous de faire un effort d'extra pour trouver une solution pour les problèmes. Et nous tous, ça veut dire l'Afghanistan, le Pakistan, l'OTAN... y inclus l'OTAN. 

Deuxième remarque, on a des contacts militaires très bien et je crois fructueux avec le Pakistan. Ce que j'ai dit cet après-midi pendant mon introduction de la discussion sur l'Afghanistan c'est que je crois, et le premier ministre Pakistanais l'a confirmé aussi. Il m'a invité de venir visiter Islamabad, ce que je ferai, de construire un dialogue parallèle au dialogue militaire qu'on a avec le Pakistan.

Finalement, je ne crois pas et je ne vois pas un seul élément positif de... comment dirais-je d'entrer dans une rhétorique publique sur ces sujets qui sont vraiment très compliqués. La frontière est très compliquée. Les camps de réfugiés, c'est une question très compliquée. Responsabilité des Nations-Unies etc. 

J'ai aussi dit que je ne considère pas fructueux ou "helpful" pour le dire en bon français qu'on engage dans une rhétorique pas positive ou bien entre les organisations internationales et le Pakistan ou bien entre le Pakistan et l'Afghanistan, pour l'OTAN, et je parle pour l'OTAN il est nécessaire et il sera très utile. Et c'est pour cette raison que je me rendrai à Islamabad, que le dialogue militaire sera fait... le dialogue politique pourra être fait en complémentarité avec le dialogue militaire.

C'est ma réponse. Et je ne crois pas utile du tout d'utiliser les mots qui, eux-mêmes, pourront causer une autre polémique. Il faut trouver des solutions pour un problème qui est... qui est sérieux.

APPATHURAI: Next question's already there.

Q: ...Los Angeles Times. Staying with Afghanistan, you said in your opening remarks today, and also here from this podium, that you do believe there needs to be more troops in Afghanistan. We've heard on the sidelines from some... particularly from the continental European allies, there's a lot of scepticism there, whether that's needed. I wonder if you can give us some idea of whether that scepticism was raised in the meeting today by some of the continental European allies, and are you concerned at all that those troops levels would not be met because of some of the hesitation by the allies there?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: No, that is not a correct assumption, I think. First of all, I have not heard, I have not been in the corridors this afternoon, but before we met here I have neither in the corridors nor in meetings heard this kind of scepticism. I said quite deliberately in my introductory words, there is agreement that we have chosen the correct strategy. So it is simply not true, and incorrect that  nations or allies would say we do not need the forces our military advisors ask from us. There is definite agreement that the military advice we are getting from General Craddock and from our other military advisor is the correct military advice.

We are not entirely there yet as far as force generation is concerned but I say again, we have made good progress, but in my opinion one should not make the link between we don't need more forces because our strategy is wrong, or we should adapt our strategy. That's definitely not the case. And I think we have gained a lot of ground, quite honestly, on the basis of this strategy. There's not the slightest reason for doom and gloom in Afghanistan, I think.

APPATHURAI: Next question. Sorry.

Q: Force generation is one, but I will come back—Martinez de Rituerto with El País—to a previous... You said that from Riga to now there are 5,000 more soldiers on the field.

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: About, yeah.

Q: More or less, yes. And... but we've been, the press, has been talking all the time, following what is being said at your home, at your place, that there are around 32,000, 33,000 soldiers. So where are these 5,000 coming from, and have we been wrong all the time, all along?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: No, you have not been wrong, but if I say that the grand total, as we speak, is about 35,000-plus then you have, if you calculate correctly and if I did my school work correctly when I was still young, then you can see that roughly between where we were and where we are now, you see 5,000-plus. And if I say 5,000-plus, that, of course, includes boots on the ground and that includes those people who are organizing the boots on the ground, if you see what I mean.

If the German Bundestag would decide to send Tornados, it is not only a number of aircraft, but it is also supporting staff. So... But I think I have my calculations right, give or take a few, I admit.

APPATHURAI: Next question's up there.

Q: Good evening, (inaudible)... Telecinco. What do you think about the Spanish position that it's not going to send more Spanish military forces to Afghanistan?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Well, Spain is, as I've discussed with Minister Alonso this afternoon, Spain is an important contributor to the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan and I think that's a qualification I can give to Spain.

My general answer to your question, of course, would be, but that is not specifically focused on Spain, that if I say in answering one of your colleague's questions that we are not here yet, the Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander will go on in asking nations to see if they can do more. But that is a message for the Alliance and for the 26 allies, and there, of course, Spain is not excluded.

APPATHURAI: Sorry, there's only time for one more. It's over here.

Q: Secretary General, Dan Dombey, Financial Times. I'd just like, if I may, just to ask you a little bit about the message of consensus that you gave earlier, that the agreement that extra forces were necessary. How do you reckon some of that really with the German Defence Minister's comments that he didn't really see the point at this time for talking about more and more military means since a 100,000 troops weren't enough to win Afghanistan for the Soviets, a very provocative comparison, one that he made himself, and one that doesn't seem to kind of signify much unity. And how do you reconcile that with Madame Alliot-Marie's comments in the meeting itself, that the military chiefs have not, so far, adequately justified the extra forces and that it would be worth coming back to the NAC again over that?

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Well, I... as far as I can remember I was presiding the meeting. What did... what did Minister Jung underline in the meeting, as he had done publicly as well, by the way. He has underlined, as I've done in my introductory words, that if you discuss a comprehensive strategy you should really implement a comprehensive strategy and that you should also very strongly focus on the civilian part of the comprehensive strategy.

But he also realizes, and otherwise, in another circumstance if he would be as critical as you think he is, I quite honestly have the honour to disagree with you here, why would then Minister Franz Josef Jung have embarked upon the discussion to agree in the government to send the Tornados to Afghanistan? I don't think you're right there.

And my second answer would be, that I have not heard or noticed any Minister questioning the military advice. Madame Alliot-Marie has spoken, as she has spoken extensively about the way France is contributing in the Afghanistan operation, but I say again, if the result of all this would be that one picks up noises or sound that the strategy is incorrect - I quite honestly don't think so - I haven't heard it. But I was only presiding over the meeting.

APPATHURAI: I'm afraid that's all we have time for.

Q: (inaudible)...

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: There is, what we're looking forward tomorrow, Madam, tomorrow over lunch. And I'll speak to you again of course...

Q: (inaudible)...

DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Well, this is... but again, come back to that tomorrow. This is an important venue because NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue partners are represented at the political level and what will we be discussing tomorrow? That is the wide range of options and opportunities there are for the many forms of practical cooperation existing in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue and how we can make better use of what exists already.

I'm afraid I have to leave it here. Thank you very much.