Friends, let me begin by wishing you a happy new year. I hope you had good holidays.
The schedule, at NATO anyway, is going to pick up relatively quickly, so I, at least, enjoyed my not-very-relaxing time off, and happy to be back here.
Let me quickly run through a few issues, including the schedule of events in the next year.
But let me run through the schedule of events at NATO, or around NATO for the next month, so you can do some planning. And then a couple of other issues that I wish to mention before, of course, taking your questions.
On Thursday, i.e. tomorrow, the Minister of Defence of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1), will visit NATO. This will be, of course, in the context of regular visits by officials from that country in the context of the Membership Action Plan. And he will, of course, visit with the Secretary General.
On Friday we will have what is something of an historic meeting for the Alliance, and that will be a visit by Japanese Prime Minister Abe. This is the first time that NATO has been visited at this level by such a senior Japanese politician.
The Prime Minister will first meet with the Secretary General at 9:30. He will then meet with the entire North Atlantic Council at 10:00 and then at 11:00—hopefully at 11:00—we will have a point de presse with the Secretary General and the Prime Minister.
I presume that the Secretary General and the Prime Minister, and then of course the Prime Minister with all of the ambassadors, wish to discuss the strategic relationship between Japan and NATO. We have had a long-standing series of high-level exchanges, I think on a biannual basis in Japan and then two years later here at NATO, since the mid-1990s. And of course, we work quite closely together in Afghanistan, for example, as Japan is one of the G8 lead nations for disarmament and reintegration of officials of Afghan militias.
All this to say the Japanese Prime Minister in the interviews that he has given in the run-up to this visit, he had made it clear that he hopes to see a deeper strategic relationship with NATO. I'm quite sure that that feeling is reciprocated on our side. So I look forward, and we certainly look forward to his visit.
On Monday the incoming U.S. Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, will be at NATO Headquarters at 10:30 and 11:15 we will have a point de presse with the Secretary General and the Defense Secretary. It will be no surprise to you that Afghanistan and Kosovo will be the main issues on the agenda.
On the 17th of January, i.e. a week today, I hope to see all of you at the Secretary General's New Year's Reception for the media, at 12:30. I intend to spend even more money on food than I did last year, which he protested, as I recall. But it was good. It will be better this year.
The Secretary General will use the opportunity to lay out his vision of the agenda for this year and we will certainly ensure that it has substance. So we do look forward to seeing you.
On the 22nd of January the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. d'Alema, will be visiting NATO Headquarters. On Tuesday the 23rd, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand, Mr. Goff, will be there.
The 26th—this is no longer any secret—there will be a meeting of Foreign Ministers at NATO Headquarters. The exact timings and exact representation is not yet confirmed, but it seems like it is going in the direction that there will first be a meeting of the 26 NATO Foreign Ministers to focus primarily on, again, Afghanistan and Kosovo. Then the meeting would expand to include troop-contributing nations, so up to 37 Foreign Ministers to discuss the NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan in a broader context, to bring in all the various countries that are contributing so much to the NATO-led operation.
This could include also, and I believe it will include, Finance Minister Spanta of Afghanistan, who will be receiving an invitation from the Secretary General to attend the meeting as well.
Of course, then there will be a press conference. I can't tell you the exact time, but I expect it to be around 1300. We'll certainly let you know what time that will be.
And then there is the possibility of a transatlantic lunch, or a transatlantic meeting of some kind; i.e. a meeting of NATO and EU Foreign Ministers. Again, to be confirmed... agenda to be confirmed, but could potentially, of course, include issues like Kosovo, where we have a shared interest between the two organizations to look forward as we get very close now to the Serb elections and then subsequent to that the publication... or the presentation of President Ahtisaari's report on status to the contact group through them to the UN.
Clearly Kosovo is going to be on the international, and certainly the Euro-Atlantic agenda, and that may well be a subject of discussion at a transatlantic lunch. Other issues may also come up beyond, if you will, the immediate NATO agenda, i.e. the broader Middle East, or other issues of interest to nations.
That, I think, is what I want to mention in terms of agenda. Let me turn to a few political... or more political subjects, and then I'm happy to take your questions.
One is, and let me quickly mentioned this, to express NATO's interest in the political process in Albania, which is, of course, a country aspiring to NATO membership. They are engaged now, Albanian officials, are engaged now in developing arrangements for the proper organization of municipal elections.
NATO certainly holds all aspirant countries to the same democratic standard, and encourages them all to work to develop functioning democratic institutions that meet international standards. And this is something that has been addressed on many occasions in the context of our Membership Action Plan discussions during consultation between allies and all the MAP countries, and that includes Albania. And certainly NATO encourages all parties in Albania to work constructively towards free and fair elections, to the benefit of all citizens of Albania that are held according to, as I say, the highest international standards.
Let me mention two, if you will, somewhat administrative, but I think important events that took place today, and then turn to one last issue, and then I'm happy to take your questions.
One is the Secretary General presented the NATO Meritorious Service Medal to Mr. Edgars Rinkevics, I can spell it if you want. That's E-D-G-A-R-S R-I-N-K-E-V-I-C-S. He was the director of the Latvian Summit Task Force, and NATO wanted to express to him an appreciation for the enormous effort to arrange the summit that took place. It was flawless and we all know how incredibly complicated that is. So NATO certainly thanked him with that award.
Also, today, and this is not news to many of you, the North Atlantic Council, the 26 NATO nations, agreed to extend the Secretary General's tenure in office to enable him to precise over the events marking the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Alliance, i.e. through to a certain stage in 2009, still to be determined.
In essence that the allies asked him if he would be willing to stay on in his duties through that time period. He thanked them at the NAC table, and accepted their invitation.
So we were all very pleased with that.
Finally, I want to brief you on one other event that took place today, and that is that the North Atlantic Council was briefed by the NATO military authorities on the joint ISAF-ANA, Afghan National Army, report on the incident which took place around Zangi Abad village, Panjwayi area, about 34 kilometres from Kandahar in late October, 2006.
As you may recall, NATO coalition and ANA forces were involved in a joint operation against opposing militant forces, insurgents if you will. In that operation significant numbers of militants were killed. To NATO's deep regret, a number of civilians, principally nomads who were in the surrounding fields, were killed as well.
I cannot, for reasons of operational security, go into the details of the sequence of events or procedures. For the same reason, the report will not be made public.
That being said, the main conclusion of the report is that this tragic event took place primarily because communications between international forces and local authorities did not work well enough. In essence, while ISAF, NATO ISAF, made every effort to minimize the risk of unintended casualties, ISAF proved to have had inadequate measures for coordination with local authorities who might have known, and we believe did know, that the nomads had moved into the surrounding fields.
As a result of this report NATO ISAF has already taken steps to improve procedures, to ensure that the flow of critical information between international forces and with Afghan authorities, is as seamless and as timely as possible.
Again, and obviously I cannot give details on operational communications procedures, but I can tell you that they are better now than they were at the time of the incident. There should be no doubt that NATO ISAF takes every step possible to prevent civilian casualties during Operation Medusa.
Now, again, with Operation Oqab, and as part of that Baaz Tsuka, ISAF has moved deliberately, giving civilians warning and time to avoid being caught up in the fight against those who would undermine peace and development in Afghanistan.
President Karzai has just recently expressed his appreciation for NATO's efforts to avoid civilian casualties when he was briefed, in particular on Operation Baaz Tsuka.
That is pretty much all I can say on this subject, but I'm certainly happy to take your questions on this and on any other subject that you might find of interest.
Please.
Q: Hi James. Have you got some more information about possible involvement of Japanese troops in Afghanistan?
Appathurai: Of course, it is one hundred percent up to Japan, that goes without saying, to decide how it wishes to contribute to peace and security in Afghanistan. There should be, I think, no doubt of what their... of the value and importance of what they're already doing. What we call the DDR process, which is led by Japan, is already, I believe, one of the most successful pillars of the G8 effort, the G8 contribution in Japan... in Afghanistan.
So with that as the baseline I'm sure that the Secretary General, the Prime Minister and the NAC, are going to want to discuss Afghanistan. Japan may well wish to discuss what else they might be able to do to provide further support.
I can't prejudge those discussions. It may involve military. It may not. It may involve support in many other ways we Japan has done in so many places, provided support in non-military ways.
So we will see. Whatever contribution that they can make will certainly be welcome for us, but I think you will want to wait till the point de press till we can get more precision on that.
Please.
Q: On Monday's meeting between Mr. Gates and the Secretary General. You said Afghanistan and Kosovo will be discussed. And what about Iraq, and maybe they'll touch on Iran?
And my second question is, since NATO is somehow involved in Iraq, what is your position on the execution of Saddam Hussein?
Appathurai: NATO has taken no position on the execution of Saddam Hussein, and will not take a position on the execution of Saddam Hussein.
Secretary Gates may well, I do not know, may well wish to brief on the latest developments in terms of the U.S. engagement in Iraq. I simply don't know. It is not on our agenda. It may well be on his agenda.
The NATO training mission will not be affected by the latest coalition decisions. It will continue, and we keep it under close advisement to see how it can be modified. I do not have any indication that Iran will be on the agenda.
Q: Yesterday the president of Albania (inaudible)... try to assist(?) all the parties the final arrangements for the elections and he failed, so the crisis continues. I just wanted to know what kind of impact the feeling of this electoral local elections could have on the membership of Albania? I mean, if the elections doesn't comply with international standards?
Appathurai: Well, you're quite right to see this in the context of the Membership Action Plan, because NATO certainly sees the electoral process in the larger sense as a critical test for membership in the Alliance. The democratic process must work properly to a NATO member. That is quite clear.
Now, it is one hundred percent within the purview of the Albanian authorities to work this out, and NATO is certainly not going to intervene in any way in the internal processes of the country. But certainly we, as an Alliance, stand for and preserve, certainly amongst our own members, the highest democratic standards, and we expect aspirants to work to meet those as well.
Q: On the Panjwayi incident, James, you said that various improvements have made since that incident happened. Could you explain what sort of things NATO has done to ensure this doesn't happen again? And did that result... was that the result of a kind of a local failing or more on systematic failing of communication between ISAF and the ANA?
Appathurai: I'm afraid I really can't. My lease is very short on giving details about what the shortfalls were and what the improvements have been. That's quite clear. But I think first we have to put things in context, and I'm offering no excuses of any kind, but this was a highly complex, very fast-moving operation involving a lot of moving parts. As I mentioned, ISAF, Afghan authorities, coalition and international forces, local authorities, so it was very complex.
What I understand is that measures have been taken to improve the systems, the procedures, which will be used, and indeed have been used already, because these improvements have already been made, to improve coordination and information flow between international forces. That means, within ISAF, between ISAF and the coalition, and between international forces and local national authorities at all levels to try to minimize, and if possible, prevent these kinds of problems in the future.
As I say, these measures are already in place, they are already working, and we're already seeing that in ongoing operations. I know, I'm sorry, I just have to say these things, but apparently I'm told they are, in fact... this is in fact the case. But I just cannot give you any more details on that.
I think...
Q: Sorry James, I missed the beginning. You may have touched on this. On the meeting between Abe and Mr. Scheffer, has NATO actually asked Japan to contribute soldiers or ... yeah, troops to Afghanistan? And the question of this global alliance, this partnership that was mooted in Riga, is that also on the agenda of the meeting on Friday?
Appathurai: NATO has not formally, as far as I know, nor even informally, asked specifically for troops from Japan. Japan is a partner with NATO in Afghanistan. It is not a country that is entirely disengaged from Afghanistan, and we're asking for the first time for them to step up. They are fully part of this. They are fully engaged. I know that there are a significant number of Japanese civilians there. Japan has invested millions and millions of dollars in Afghanistan, and as I mentioned, is leading this G8 pillar. So let there be no doubt that Japan is coming to have a conversation of equals with NATO on what we can do together, better.
If Japan wishes to make a contribution, of whatever form, to the overall NATO operations, then that is something that certainly NATO would welcome. But we will wait to see what Prime Minister Abe has in mind when he comes.
Q: (inaudible)...
Appathurai: Oh sorry, yeah. NATO, as you quite rightly point out, believes that the Alliance should have.. .that the Alliance should not be a global Alliance, but should have global partners, and that Japan is certainly a country, for all the reasons that just mentioned, with whom or with which, we would like to see ties deepened. No new structures. I think that is something that everybody can agreed on. But in fact, as I mentioned, we have a long-standing relationship with Japan, so it's not putting something in place for the first time. We have had these high level exchanges for years.
Should this relationship be deepened? I think NATO would like to see it deepen. I believe that the Japanese Prime Minister, based on the press comments that I've seen, would also like to see it deepened, so I think there's a meeting of minds here. And it will not be a question of whether we want to have a deeper relationship, but how to deepen that will be discussed on Friday.
Q: Thanks James. Happy new year.
Appathurai: Thank you.
Q: And... do you know the position of NATO with Iran, troop of Iranian people in Afghanistan?
Appathurai: Des troupes iraniennes in Afghanistan? My understanding is that the existing policy is that no neighbouring countries have troops inside Afghanistan. I do believe that that is the existing standard, and I see every reason to continue that, at least for the moment.
Did you... no? Okay. Brooks.
Q: Concretely, what are the first... what are NATO's criticisms of Serbia in terms of defence reform, and what, under PfP, are the first things you expect Serbia to do.
And secondly, NATO made a lot of noises about security of supply last year. That seems to have died down, although...
Appathurai: Of energy.
Q: Yeah, security of supply, energy supply. Is this fading away or if not, what are the concrete... I emphasize concrete, measures that NATO is looking at?
Appathurai: In terms of PfP and Serbia we're just now out to the starting gate.
So the first steps are for the government of Serbia to engage with the Alliance. This has already happened, along a whole range of fronts. Serbia is not, and Serbia and NATO hare now beginning discussions. But then, of course, we need to move to the next stage, which is to discuss where we might, together, have a meeting of minds. Where we might to be able to offer to the Serbian government expertise, of which they could take advantage.
But we really are so... this is so new and there was the Christmas break in the middle, that my feeling is that we are really only at the very initial stages, and I don't have... certainly I don't have, and I don't believe anyone yet has a perfectly clear idea of how in the precise PfP structure NATO and Serbia are going to work together.
In terms of energy security, we have not moved much beyond the last time that you and I and the rest of us discussed this. Except that, at the Riga Summit and in the Riga Summit declaration, I do believe, energy is mentioned, as an issue of security interest.
The areas in which there have... around which there have been discussion, there has been discussion, has been, and you are well aware of this, not NATO duplicating, for example, what the EU or the IAE... IEA is doing, but looking more at the possibility of using NATO assets, for example, to protect sea lanes, to protect choke points, potentially critical infrastructure protection. These, to me, seem to be the three ideas that have the most traction within the Alliance, and there are people working on these ideas. But in terms of actual deployed forces certainly no forces have been deployed as far as I'm aware, in that context until now.
Q: James, questions on three jobs. Japan, I think yesterday or the day before upgraded what was a defence agency to a full defence ministry. I just wondered what... whether that's something NATO sees as a good step and whether it's something that would facilitate the contacts with Japan under the global partnership.
That's the first question. Secondly, the meeting on the 26th, I think it was, or the 25th, the Foreign Ministers' meeting, there was talk at some point of having a meeting in Paris to discuss Lebanon at which NATO and EU ministers maybe would sit together. Has this now replaced that meeting or... or is that meeting now dropped.
And thirdly, Somalia, there's a lot of talk about an African Union force maybe going in to Somalia and doing something... is there any possibility of NATO doing something similar for that force as it's doing in Darfur...
Appathurai: In Darfur.
Q: ...providing logistical support? Is that something's being discussed at the moment?
Appathurai: This is going to be a pretty quick set of answers. In terms of the change from a defence agency to a defence ministry, I have not heard any discussion that this would have any effect one way or the other on NATO's relations with Japan. I think this is an internal Japanese issue. But certainly our relations are not affected by that change.
I've also heard no discussion in NATO, until now, of possible support for a possible AU force in Somalia. We are continuing, as you know, our support for the African Union in Darfur. If and when the UN begins to play a more robust role NATO has already made clear its willingness to extend its support of course, to the United Nations as well.
I had heard also of this Paris meeting, but our meeting, being NATO, and slightly more than NATO meeting, to my mind is not related to this. I certainly don't expect Lebanon to be one of the principal subjects of discussion.
Q: James, I have two questions. One is on Kosovo. The meeting of the ministers coincides with a meting of contact groups, same day...
Appathurai: Yes.
Q: ...where Ahtisaari might present his proposal to the contact group. Do you have any indication how will NATO members and NATO receive his package with the proposals, because it will affect your actual role in Kosovo and future role as well.
And second question is on Albania. During the summit in Riga NATO said that it's going to invite to join NATO, in that summit, it's going to issue invitation to those countries who are ready, who fulfil the criteria and are ready to contribute. It's about one year until the next summit of NATO. If Albania continues to contribute with soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan without any problem, but fail to organize even local elections, will this push NATO to exclude Albania from the package that might be invited, so to invite them, Croatia, and probably Macedonia.
Appathurai: To answer the first question I have heard the same, if you will, rumoured scheduled that President Ahtisaari will present on the same day. NATO's position has been, I think, quite consistent on the Ahtisaari proposals. And that is... the Ahtisaari process, and that is, we support it, and we support it not just intellectually or politically, but very practically with political and military personnel who can provide input into this thinking and support to him. And that has happened.
The... so certainly he is very well aware of what NATO's views are as he takes his own thinking forward. But the process is his to lead. NATO has also made it clear that it will maintain a presence in Kosovo, a robust presence up to, through and beyond the immediate status process. And I might add, and COMKFOR said this, I think, quite clearly just a couple of days ago, the Alliance is absolutely prepared to take whatever measures are necessary to maintain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo through the political process and not allow violence to derail that process.
President Ahtisaari has made it clear that he wants to see the process move quickly and not be delayed. He has made that point to the Secretary General just a few days ago, again, in a telephone conversation and NATO and the Secretary General, as we have always done, support President Ahtisaari in the way in which he wishes to handle this process.
On Albania, NATO has always said that MAP... sorry, not MAP, membership, is a performance-based process. And there are no blank cheques and no guarantees at this stage for invitation. All three of the countries that are in the Membership Action Plan will have to continue to work to meet the standards that NATO has, and yes, to continue to make contributions to overall NATO operations and missions.
It will be a political decisions. You know this as well as I do. When in 2008 at the summit, the location of which is yet to be, I think, finalized, but at the summit in 2008, as you quite rightly point out, invitations will be issued to countries that meet the standards, that continue to make contributions. Until we get there there are no guarantees.
Q: Just a follow-up on the Kosovo question. President Tadic said last week that Ahtisaari should perhaps delay the paper until the Serb government has had time to form, a coalition to be formed correctly. How does NATO view such a delay?
And secondly, on Afghanistan, how does NATO view the prospects of moves to mine the border in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Appathurai: Thank you. NATO's position is to support President Ahtisaari. President Ahtisaari wants this process to move forward quickly and he does not want extended delays. We would certainly not want to see a situation where tension in Kosovo undermine the political process, and it is certainly... certainly President Ahtisaari's view that the best way forward is not to move forward with presenting the report and dealing with its conclusions. NATO, as I say, has always supported President Ahtisaari and will continue to do that, including on this issue.
There is, I would say, deep concern within NATO, and certainly amongst many allies, about the prospect of mining the border. As you know, almost all, 25 of the 26 NATO allies, are signatories to the Ottawa Convention, which would make it very difficult indeed for them to support this kind of proposal.
The United Nations has been extremely blunt in opposing this as well. With that in mind NATO is looking... or listening carefully and looking carefully at this issue, but I would say with deep concern and strong reservations.
Q: So what is the kind of the format for raising these objections and trying to make sure it doesn't happen, if that's indeed what you want not to happen.
Appathurai: Well, for the moment we're at concern and reservations, but we do have a tripartite commission which brings together very senior, depending at what level it meets. It will meet soon at a very high level. Commission, the tripartite commission, which brings together Afghan, Pakistani and NATO officials, both military and civilian. This issue will certainly be discussed at the next meeting, which I believe is in the next couple of weeks.
Q: And where?
Appathurai: I don't know where this one will be, to be honest. It will be in the region, but I don't know exactly where, I'm sorry.
Q: Follow-up, if NATO think that that's not a good idea to postpone Ahtisaari's proposals until the Serbian government will be formed, do you think that the result of the Serbian election and after, of course, new government, would have some impact on the process of Kosovo's status?
Appathurai: On the process of status. What do you mean?
Q: If democratic forces will win in election to form stable democratic government, and on the other side maybe happen something opposite.
Appathurai: I think it certainly would not be for me to judge. And if I have learned something from the Secretary General, and of course, I've learned many things, because he may be listening to this right now in the headquarters...
He has taught me not to answer questions that have a lot of ifs in them, and certainly it is not for me, I think, to make these... certainly not for me to speculate. President Ahtisaari's in the lead. He will decide when he wishes to submit his report and NATO will stand by and we will assure his process in the field with, as I say, troops that are... and forces that are very well prepared, both in terms of training, in terms of numbers, and in terms of readiness to move, to ensure a safe and secure environment for this political process to go forward.
Q: Hi James. Two questions. First was you mentioned that a transatlantic lunch... yeah, this is... what kind of expectation would that... it could be more friendly environment for the allies, or like a new... some closer cooperation between NATO and the EU?
Secondly, about Abe's visit to NATO. You mentioned that a strategic relationship with Japan, you think this is quite a new concept or you could word it a strategic relation, or you mentioned that a deepening. How deep is it? Well, what do you mean... how you understand the deepening of this relation? Thank you.
Appathurai: Ah... sorry, I have a short memory, so I write these things down. The transatlantic lunches are very... or transatlantic meetings, however they are, around whatever table they take place, are very important to NATO; certainly I think to the EU as well, precisely because they are at a high level. They're always at ministerial level.
They allow for a very free exchange of views amongst, of course, close allies of whatever organization, but also because, as I'm sure you know, we have some difficulties in the formal NATO-EU relationship, which restrict, for example, the agenda of issues which can be discussed formally by ambassadors around an official NATO-EU meeting. These transatlantic lunches, or transatlantic meetings, have offered a real opportunity to get around these political or bureaucratic constraints and have a good exchange between the two organizations.
We have, as a group of countries, a whole host of fundamental issues where the two organizations are engaged, but certainly where all the countries are engaged. Afghanistan is one of them. So in the strict and formal NATO-EU context, we can't have that discussion amongst ambassadors for the bureaucratic and political reasons you know. But they can have it at the lunch... or at this meeting.
The Middle East is of interest to all the ministers around the table and their countries are all engaged, one way or the other, even if NATO has a relatively limited engagement in the region. So it's a good opportunity to share views. Secretary Rice will be here, amongst others, and she and many of her colleagues, will wish to discuss this issue.
So it's an opportunity to share views amongst the countries that are, in many ways, politically and militarily and economically engaged in a whole host of areas, where in the very strict NATO-EU context we cannot have, of the strict and formal NATO-EU context, we cannot have those discussions. So it's important.
What does deepening mean, in terms of the Japan-NATO relationship? Again, I don't want to prejudge now what the discussions will be, but what we have now is practical cooperation on the ground in Afghanistan, though more side-by-side than together, because Japan is doing slightly different things than NATO at present. And... though complementary, let there be no doubt. And relatively infrequent, but high level political contacts.
Can those political contacts be made more frequent, more regular, deeper? That's certainly possible. Can we have a closer practical cooperation in Afghanistan? I think that's probably an issue to be discussed as well.
So these are probably... and now I'm speculating, the directions in which the discussions will go between the NATO members and Prime Minister Abe.
Two more and then I'll come back.
Q: James, do you do the same relation with China?
Appathurai: With China NATO has a much more informal, and I would say, frankly, lower level relationship. NATO officials and Chinese officials have had some contacts. They've been very good and very open contacts. The Secretary General, I know, has met with the Chinese ambassador to Belgium at least twice. I had the privilege of accompanying him to have certainly what I consider to be the finest Chinese dinner I have had in Belgium at the Chinese ambassador's house, so I was very happy to go along.
But these are very ad hoc, informal relations. They're good, but we have no structural relationship. And I think it is deepening at its own pace, but without a strong imperative... So it is what it is, and it's just fine for both China and NATO, and if either side wishes it to be deeper I think that will be fine too.
Please.
Q: James, I would like to ask about Turkmenistan. After the death of President Niyazov, do you consider, do you see, new perspective in relationship with that country? Especially in the context of Afghanistan operations of NATO? Have you contacted already the current leadership? Thank you.
Appathurai: It's a good question. Certainly Turkmenistan is a partner of NATO in Partnership for Peace, and NATO has had regular, if relatively low-level contacts, I'd say in the context of PfP with Turkmenistan. I think there was a hope that a more democratic process could be put in place for the people of Turkmenistan. That may or may not be the case, but certainly within PfP this relationship continues. And if we can deepen our cooperation in the context of Afghanistan, well, that remains to be seen.
I think Paul, you had one. No? I don't want to force it on you because... trust me.
Q: I will not start with (inaudible), but with one. When Ahtisaari present his proposal for the status is NATO going to support politically his proposal, which is because you say always that NATO is also political Alliance and we have some NATO member states like U.K., Germany, Italy, saying publicly that the solution will be kind of independence for Kosovo. So... when there is a need for this proposal to be adopted in Security Council as well. What is going to be the political position of NATO regarding Ahtisaari's proposal?
Appathurai: An excellent question, as they say. Until this point, and I have every confidence that... until this point, NATO has supported the process. It is, of course, up to allies, and I cannot speak now for the allies, how they wish to respond to President Ahtisaari's report. I have no doubt that they will continue to support him, but I do not want to prejudge. I cannot prejudge what their reaction will be. I just can't do it.
Sorry, one last, last, last one.
Nobody asked about Scaramella. I expected some Italians to be interested in this issue. And don't ask, please, that's okay.
Q: Has Mr. Ahtisaari already made his minds what he's going to propose? Not about status, but... security expressing(?) of the north of Kosovo? As several times, I mean, here in Pristina, people of the Alliance expressed concerns about potential security problems. And what updates since last time you have sent reinforcement there and reopening a small barrack(?) down there, or up there.
Appathurai: I absolutely did not understand that question. I'm so sorry.
Q: The second part of it, or the whole of it?
Appathurai: Pretty much all of it.
Q: Okay...
(LAUGHTER)
Appathurai: I'm sorry, I really am sorry.
Q: What are the rearrangements of the ... between NATO and... which should be concluded... included in Mr. Ahtisaari's proposal for the security aspects on the... in the northern part of Kosovo?
Appathurai: In the northern part of Kosovo?
Q: Yes. Mitrovica.
Appathurai: What will be in... I see what you're saying. Well, this...
Q: What... you always said as(?) we are waiting for his proposal, what he wants from us, but I mean, it's the story has been trying to be found for last three or four months and (inaudible)... is now the time, but probably next month he will propose something.
Appathurai: Indeed... as I said...
Q: (inaudible)... going to propose the whole package about the whole (inaudible).
Appathurai: As I said, we have had staff working with him in support of him, both military and political since he began his process, and that is a direct linking to our headquarters. Also Ambassador James Pardue has been participating in the contact group meetings on a regular basis, where he also has an opportunity to express NATO's view.
So President Ahtisaari knows and has had input from NATO as to what NATO's views are on the issues relevant to us. So there will be no surprises to the Alliance when President Ahtisaari presents his report, and he will have certainly been made well aware of what NATO's views are on those issues.
Certainly I cannot go beyond...