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| Updated: 20-Nov-2006 | NATO Speeches |
Brussels 8 Nov 2006 |
Press Briefing Weekly press briefing with the NATO Spokesman James Appathurai
JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): I don't want to take up too much of your time. I know you don't want too much of your time taken up and I have to get back for something at 3:00. So let me be quick. What I want to do is give you a little snapshot of where we are in terms of visits to the building, where the Secretary General is going and what he intends to discuss, and then a little operational update on Afghanistan and then I'm happy to take your questions. One is the state of progress in Azerbaijan's reforms, in particular in the context of the Individual Partnership Action Plan that we have with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is one of the most active members of our partnership. Their reform process is moving forward very well, and that was a sentiment reflected right around the table. They are also contributing and intending to contribute more to NATO-led operations, including in Afghanistan. There were, of course, questions on democratic reform, on military reform. For example, Azerbaijan's defence budget has gone up quite dramatically in recent years, particularly last year. It basically doubled. And there were questions as to where this money was being invested. President Aliyev pointed out that the Azeri budget overall has gone up year on year I believe he said... has gone up 400 percent in the last four years. I may have gotten that figure wrong, but it has gone up dramatically and he's put similar numbers into other areas of his budget including education and others. So he tried to put that in context. That was the kind of discussion on internal reform. On regional security of course the question of Nagorno Karabakh came up quite extensively. President Aliyev gave his viewpoint, his country's viewpoint on the issues; committed himself and his country to continuing the path of peaceful negotiation on the issue and he made it clear that he intended to pursue every diplomatic avenue to move forward on the Nagorno Karabakh issue. Finally there was a long and I have to say, from a personal standpoint, very interesting discussion of energy security and pipelines. Of course energy is an economic issue, but energy security is a political issue and there are a number of countries around the table who have very profound energy security interests directly related to oil and gas coming from that part of the world. So it was absolutely a very, very interesting and very positive discussion. In terms of further visits to the building today Prince Joachim of Denmark is coming. I don't think this is a visit that will have too much in the way of heavy political content, but he is a reasonably regular visitor to NATO and we are very happy to welcome him. On the 13th of November Minister Strøm of Norway, the Norwegian Minister of Defence, will come to visit. You will not be surprised that the discussion will focus on the defence elements of the Riga Summit and I'm happy to discuss that with you if you wish. Finally let me mention that the Amir of Qatar is coming on the 17th of November as well to meet with the Secretary General. This is in the context of course of our deepening relations with the Arab world. Let me mention a couple of trips that are coming up. One trip, which is on the 10th of November, that is this Friday, the Secretary General will visit both Lithuania and Estonia. In Lithuania he will meet the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister. He will then go to Estonia, again meet the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence. Again, pre-Riga preparations. He will go to Budapest on the 13th, which I believe is Monday; meet with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. And then on the 16th to Romania, where he will meet the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the new President. That is the visits. Each of these of course is Riga preparations. No surprises there. Let me finally give you a little update on Operation Eagle or Oqab; in apparently many languages that means eagle. To give you an example of where we are going: this is its second week; as you know it is an operation that is taking place throughout the country. It is an Afghan-led operation. It is designed to create the conditions for reconstruction and development. That is being done in different ways in different areas. In the capital this means working with the Afghan police to implement what is called the Comprehensive Kabul Joint Security Plan. The emphasis on this is to interdict insurgent attempts to move explosives into the capital. It also means a surge in development activity for the district east of Kabul along the Jalalabad Road that's called Surobi. Troops from NATO-ISAF have maintained a large presence there since May and we're starting to see it pay off. In the east, Operation Oqab is helping to support a push to extend government authority to the district level. That means construction of district centres, mentoring of district officials and it is prioritizing development efforts with both tribal elders and government officials. As part of that, Oqab troops, and that means mostly ANA, but with support from NATO-ISAF have moved into a valley called Kapisa, K-A-P-I-S-A, where a group of insurgents thought that they had established a safe haven. That safe haven is about 60 miles northeast of Kabul. That safe haven has been removed from insurgent control. In the north Oqab has meant a heavy increase in NATO-ISAF, ANA and ANP patrolling in the province of Samangan. We have no PRT there. It's S-A-M-A-N-G-A-N. But ISAF has a presence there. Development initiatives, ongoing as part of this operation Oqab include 22 education projects, a hospital for Badakshan, a bridge in Bahlan(?) and deep wells for Mazar City, that deep wells being 120 metres plus. Finally in the west, well not finally, in the west the focus is on helping with the drought situation. As you know there is a drought. The UN has called for support. The food distribution is part of this NATO-ISAF Operation Oqab effort. All of ISAF PRTs in the west are helping the World Food Program with distribution. There is a quarter of a million dollars in irrigation projects with ISAF's PRT in Farah helped to form by ISAF's PRT in Farah and they are using local labour to do this. The ISAF PRT in Ghowr province has helped Afghan aid to finalize plans for two hydro power plants and there are road maintenance efforts etc. (LAUGHTER) APPATHURAI: I was giving an update on Operation Eagle in all the different regions, Oqab as it's called. I'm happy to go... I'll go over it again, if you wish. Finally in the south of course the focus is principally on security and to help develop the Kandahar districts of Panjwai and Pajmul(?). In Helmand with PRT assistance work on a school hospital, day-care centre, bridge and new prison continues. In Zabul they are focusing on extending the power grid and demining. If you want, for those of you who just arrived Paul, I can come back and give you more details afterwards as to what they are doing in different regions. To be honest, that's all I had to raise with you and I am happy to take your questions. Go ahead. Q: Yes. I've got a question concerning the PRT from New Zealand. APPATHURAI: Yes. Q: What's the situation... know that the former PRTs of Enduring Freedom have been or in the process of being integrated within ISAF? APPATHURAI: And it has been integrated into ISAF. That was easy. Q: James, recently the Russian-Georgian authorities they exchanged... exchange of some kind of harsh statements. So what is your current assessment, I mean NATO assessment of the situation in the region and does NATO keep staying out of the situation? Another question concerning the Afghanistan, that Operation Eagle. Is where those famous NATO design devices for detecting explosives used in the region? And the third question: Recently Secretary General said that the units deployed in the area of peacekeeping or NATO-led operations should be ready to full spectrum of operations from combat... from peacekeeping to combat without any kind of caveats and he is going to raise that issue in the Riga Summit. Does it mean that... let me say solve the border between the peacekeeping and combat operations in a NATO view just would be diminished. Thank you. APPATHURAI: Thank you. Sorry my memory isn't good enough to remember three questions so I have to write them all down. I think all the NATO allies look at the situation in the region of Georgia and relations between Georgia and Russia with concern. They want to see and have expressed their will to see the tensions reduced. The Secretary General has made it clear that NATO does not intend to play a direct role in mediating between the two parties. That's quite clear. But, that he does wish to see both parties de-escalate tensions. He has specifically said that he hopes that Russia can take steps to lift the punitive measures that it has taken against Georgia as quickly as possible. I don't think that position has changed. In terms of the ability to detect explosives, the experimental laser, because that's what you are referring to, which is a Spanish-led project in the context of defence against terrorism, it is simply not at the stage where you could deploy it. But it is being developed. On the other hand, what is happening is a very intensive program both in Afghanistan, but also at our strategic command devoted to transformation to help improve our techniques, our technology and our training against improvised explosive devices. I can tell you that is a heavy focus of activity and I've asked in fact the Allied Command Transformation to look at making a public presentation about what they are doing. This is of direct interest to all of our troops in all of our countries and not just in Afghanistan, but in Iraq and elsewhere. You raised a very good question - the combat to peacekeeping role and the caveats issued. The first principle, and those of you... I'm not sure any of you have worked in Defence Ministries or in the military, but there was and has been always a sort of ongoing discussion about whether you can have one set of troops to do peacekeeping and another set of troops to do the heavier combat. The consensus opinion amongst militaries and defence professionals is that you need one set of forces that can do it all because you can quickly find a security situation that starts out as peacekeeping but evolves. And while troops trained to the highest level can do things at a lower level, troops trained only to a lower level cannot move up if they have to. So it is a basic principle that forces should be able to do the full spectrum of missions potentially required of them because security situations can change. However, nobody had their eyes closed about Afghanistan. The operational plan and the rules of engagement have not changed because they still apply. Every one knew going into this operation that it was a big country with different regions, with different requirements. So the operational plan takes this into account and the rules of engagement are robust enough to allow NATO forces to do whatever they need to do in different regions depending on the security environment that they have. The caveats are in a sense an artificial constraint imposed by nations on the use of their forces which prevent the operational commander from using effectively what he has or what he should have at his disposal. That's the first point. They also, of course, have a very direct effect on the perception of Alliance solidarity and so they have a political implication, as well as a military implication. And anyone who is curious about it can look, for example, at the many statements by Canadian politicians on this subject. So the Secretary General believes, he has made no secret of this, that they should be eliminated, that they should be reduced to a minimum or indeed eliminated altogether. He used in the International Herald Tribune the use... he used the word poison to describe them and I think that indicates how strongly he feels about it. Q: Yeah, Brooks Tigner, Defence News. Three questions if I may. Two minor and one more of substance. You mentioned Azerbaijan may be contributing more troops to... APPATHURAI: Yes it will. Q: ...I wasn't aware it had troops in Afghanistan. How many are there and how many does it intend to increase that by? One question. Second, just one date: when did the Eagle operation begin exactly? And third: Afghan and the Southern area, you said security, yes, NATO is trying to encourage more NGOs to go in there... What's the game plan from a mechanical point of view of actually providing security for those NGOs to move into the South? Thanks. APPATHURAI: You're not going to like the answers to the first two questions. I know it's the second week of the operation but I don't know the exact date; I'll ask my colleagues if they're listening now to see if they can find out exactly when it started and e-mail it to me or text it to me by the end of this briefing. Again to the first question it's either 30 or 70 but I'm not sure which is the answer to that either so I'll ask them to send that to me. In other words, how many troops Azerbaijan has in Afghanistan right now. The amount of the increase, I know it is under discussion in Baku. It is up to the Azeri government to announce when they make their final decision how many, but I do know they intend to increase their contribution. The question about the NGOs in the south is obviously a much more complicated one because many NGOs, of course, do not wish to be directly associated with NATO forces or any other forces. They wish to operate independently and to be seen to be operating independently. NATO of course is not going to seek to provide soldiers standing next to every civilian and NGOs; we have our provincial reconstruction teams, those are of course teams where the civilians work directly with the military but these are government officials, first and foremost. So the basic point was Operation Medusa was designed to push out the Taliban or at least prevent their attempts to establish control. That seems to have succeeded and despite, of course, continuing Taliban presence in the region, that could not be eliminated totally, I think, what we have seen is a significant diminishment in violence in the south from just a few weeks ago, the conditions are much better now for reconstruction and development. Our provincial reconstruction teams are already fully engaged in that, in support of the Afghans; I hope that the non-governmental organizations are also taking advantage of that improvement in the security environment to go forward with their efforts. APPATHURAI: Yeah. Yeah. Q: They must've laid out to you what their conditions are to protect, in terms of protection for their people before they go into the south. APPATHURAI: Yeah, absolutely. Q: Did they make that clear to NATO? APPATHURAI: Yeah yeah, absolutely, but I thought you were referring to NGOs; those are of course intergovernmental bodies. Q: (inaudible)... Yes, they have the same kind of fears that the NGOs do. APPATHURAI: They do. You're right. Well they have different fears, because the EU doesn't mind, for example, or the World Bank, as government officials, they don't have the same concerns about the perception of impartiality. They are there to carry out government goals, so I think they would actually be perfectly happy to work with... Ah! Twenty two Azeri personnel in Azerbaijan... Sorry, in ISAF, and 34 in KFOR. Thank you, Simone. So, do they have concerns about their.... the security of their personnel? Absolutely. The UN works according to its own security regulations. I prefer... I presume the EU does as well. But let there be no doubt NATO is always at the disposal or NATO will make every effort to provide security where it can for international officials, for UN personnel and others, and I expect, for example, that NATO will at least contribute to providing security when the UN Security Council visits, or members of the UN Security Council visit, in the coming... I imagine in the coming weeks, days or weeks to Afghanistan. Q: I'm sorry, my question will not be easy to answer probably but I just want you to explain to us what you mean by unofficial constraints. Because... APPATHURAI: Unofficial... sorry? Q: Constraints. When you say that caveats are unofficial constraints by nations on the use of their force, what do you mean by unofficial? Also I need to... APPATHURAI: I said artificial. Q: Ah, artificial! Okay, so it's even worse; so my question is even better. (LAUGHTER) Q: Sorry. In other words, is it artificial for a country, in NATO as it is, not to obey orders by commander-in-chief on the ground or is it allowed by the constitution of NATO, that is to say, for instance, German troops that have an caveat which name is Bundestag seems to be not allowed to go to combat without permission of their parliament or government. That is a difficult (inaudible), and maybe the word artificial is delicate. Another question. A country like France which has no such thing has parliamentary control whatsoever on his army, then it's another problem. It's a problem, an internal problem within NATO, which is not in my view yet to the situation when, for instance, the Allied forces in 1917 decided all of a sudden that the U.S. and British troops would be commanded by a French general, General Foch. But before that the two countries in question were absolutely full of caveats, meaning that we are not obeying either in times of war. So what do you mean by artificial? And is NATO an alliance where people should be from now on obeying orders from a unified command - which is a political problem not an artificial problem. APPATHURAI: There are a number of countries in Afghanistan now under NATO command who have put, in essence, no restrictions on the use of their forces. The force commander has at his disposal those forces to use where and how he feels it is necessary. That being said of course the capital is always consulted on the use of their forces on an absolute day-to-day basis. So there are no surprises to any NATO nation when their forces are used in any area and in any way, and that should be very clear. But that, of course, illustrates that it is possible for NATO nations to send troops to NATO operations and not put restrictions on their use and... either on the geographic use or the practical use of their forces. I understand and NATO understands, of course, it doesn't matter whether I understand but, the Secretary General certainly understands that the Bundestag plays a very important role in deciding the conditions on which German forces are used. I know, for example, that in another NATO country there are constitutional restrictions, for example, on the use of their forces for crowd and riot control for historical reasons, and as a result this is a caveat which cannot be overcome. Everybody understands this. NATO's point of view is relatively simple: that it is a demonstration of solidarity with other NATO allies who at one time or another will find themselves pressed and in need of support, to provide that support and to provide that support in the most flexible way in that--and the most logical way--and that is by allowing the force commander to make the necessary decision, always in full consultation with the NATO capital. And I think the final point to make here, though it's a relatively blunt point, is in any given period, for example, it is the Canadians now and the Dutch and the British who are calling for caveats to be lifted so that more support can be provided to them, but in this operation in the country, maybe in a little while, or in other operations in other countries, different NATO members may well also want support from other NATO nations. This is a... this is a two-way street or a 26-way street. And it's a principle which has obvious benefits for Alliance solidarity and that's why we will not lift the pedal on pressing for these caveats to be lifted, as I say, to the absolute maximum. Q: What's a caveat? APPATHURAI: Restriction. It is a restriction on the use of forces. I don't know where it comes from but it's... it's a term that we... Yeah, it's a NATO term, let's put it that way. (Laughs). (LAUGHTER) APPATHURAI: Exactly. So yes you can... for example, Country X sends its forces to a region of Afghanistan but says: yes, they can go there but they can't go out of that region, or they can't do crowd and riot control, or they can't do... well, those are two examples. The... Q: (inaudible)...restrictions (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Exactly. Exactly. Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: I think we'll go back. Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: A follow-up? Okay, we'll do a quick follow-up and then we'll go back... APPATHURAI: Um-mm. Q: So that if, for example there are some kind of riot units brought into combat they simply will be destroyed to the... to the... to the dust(?). APPATHURAI: Yeah. Q: So the question is: who is in charge, who is responsible in that sense for using all these units? As I understand it's... it should be the force commander. But still, whom he will report (inaudible)... analyze he's right or not right, if, for example, heavy losses some country suffered. Thank you. APPATHURAI: Two answers to that question. First, the national capitals have a heavy role to play in deciding the force package that they will send for... and if they need to make adjustments like in every military operation in the history of time, they make adjustments. So, the situation changes, troop-contributing members... troop-contributors change the force package that they're sending. The United Kingdom, I know, is adjusting what it's sending as well. So that being said and once it's there, sorry.... So the first point is, capitals. The second reviewing body for NATO is of course, not only the force commander, but the chain of command up through General Jones, who will provide his regular advice on this issue. And then the Military Committee, the 26 national military representatives around the table in NATO. So there are plenty of people looking at this carefully to provide the best possible advice, but in the end it is the nations who will decide what they send, and as I say, some nations, like my own, are significantly upgrading the armour that they have there precisely for the reason that you mentioned. Q: (inaudible)... setting tasks (inaudible)... for expeditionary operations. APPATHURAI: Indeed. And... Q: So that... it should be changed? APPATHURAI: Well mobility has been a principle in Afghanistan from the beginning to the end. Again, my own country, because it's easiest and safest for Canadians to talk about their own country, we have light-armoured vehicles, the LAV-3s. Where we are short as an Alliance, and this is no secret to you, is helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. There air mobility, which is a significant asset in Afghanistan, particularly when winter comes, when the roads become much more difficult to use. It's something where we need to have more contributions from the NATO nations and there will be, soon, a meeting of the Chiefs of Defence in the run up to Riga and I think it's on the 20th, but I would have to check that as well, where they're again going to look at this issue of contributions and then, of course, we'll have the Riga Summit. Nick's been waiting quite patiently, so we'll come back. Q: A follow-up and then my own question. On this debate on general purpose... well the consensus the general purpose forces are the best peacekeepers, all the way up to war-fighting, I mean, I thought that was basically a consensus reached after the Balkan experience... APPATHURAI: Yeah, yeah. Q: ... so it's something that's existed for a long time, but... APPATHURAI: Not really (inaudible)... I'm talking more tactically, yeah. Q: But it seems as if one keeps on hearing the debate re-emerge and I don't know if that means whether there are some countries which are still doubting that. That's the first question, or the follow-up question. The second... my own question, and I don't know if I missed this maybe in the first ten minutes that I missed of your briefing, but the EU is responding to what SecGen said about calling for the EU, I guess, to lead a police mission in Afghanistan, by saying that they've already sent a team, I think, six weeks ago, something like that. They're investigating it, and I mean, I guess they would decide favourably only if there was added value. I mean, I'm presuming the SecGen thinks there is added value, but anyway, I wanted to ask you about that. APPATHURAI: Very quickly... The debate, I think, in professional circles really is dead, but it does come up again, I think you're right, about peacekeeping versus heavy, when countries look at their defence policy again. What we want to avoid, I think, from a NATO perspective is, that these kind of decisions are made for reasons of finance. In other words, it seems that there is a superficial advantage when it comes to money to going for lighter forces. It also implies that you leave the heavy lifting to other countries, and raises the potential of a division of labour where only the countries that spend a lot and have high-end capabilities do the fighting, and the others, who spend less, come in later and do the dishes, as the expression goes. That is something that we absolutely have to avoid because it will create strategic differences in assessments of the problem, of what the solution is, of what the costs are, and it will not be good for transatlantic or broader solidarity. Countries need to be able to do things together. That, very much, is a principle, for example, of the NATO Response Force. It encourages all NATO countries to have high-end capabilities, so that they're there at the pointy end as well and not in two stages or three stages. When it comes to the EU and police forces, NATO and the Secretary General of course recognize how much the EU has already done, but in particular how much EU countries have already done. Germany has played a very important role in police training. No one understates that. The challenge in Afghanistan, however, is very clear, and it is as much as anything else the challenge of governance. People need to have the presence of their national government in their towns and villages, and first and foremost that is going to be the presence of the Afghan police, not the Afghan army. It is an essential pillar of the extension of national governance throughout the country, and it also will provide people with the security and stability that they need, and which, by the way, is what the Taliban is selling as their calling card. They say well provide security because no one else is. We need to help the Afghan government have an Afghan police that works. Now, you all know there are many theological discussions about what NATO should do and what NATO shouldn't do. We have no such theological discussions, I think, within NATO. Certainly not in the Secretary General's mind. NATO is not about police training. NATO is about training the military and potentially... potentially... well, let's leave it at that. NATO is a political military organization. It should focus on what it does best. We're going to do more Afghan National Army training and more Afghan National Army equipping. But the other organizations that are civilian need to step up and help support this very essential pillar. And that is why he is encouraging, as much as he can, the European Union, which has this expertise and these capabilities to take a great role in doing it. APPATHURAI: Andijan. Q: ... in May this year Secretary General express his regrets that the investigation, transparent and national didn't take place. And now on the 13th of November, the Foreign Ministers, he and the Council will decide the (inaudible) of the sanctions, which obviously didn't work. And what is the position of NATO now towards the Andijan events and also the government? APPATHURAI: NATO's position on the Andijan events has not changed, precisely because, as you say, this impartial investigation has not been carried out. And that is where we stand. NATO still wants this investigation to take place. The government has virtually cut its relations with NATO, which is their decision to take, but the NATO position has not changed. Q: (inaudible)... cut the relationship... APPATHURAI: Yes, it has stopped. It has not formally cut them, but we do not, for example, see high-level officials coming from there to NATO meetings to discuss with them, and that is something that NATO ambassadors would welcome an opportunity to discuss with them. Q: (inaudible)... Partnership for Peace with... APPATHURAI: We do have a Partnership for Peace, but they are not participating at any high level in Partnership for Peace activities, meetings in NATO. Q: It's their decision. APPATHURAI: It's their decision, not ours. Q: (inaudible)...about energy security. The Secretary General said he had discussed this issue with the President of Azerbaijan this morning. Could you give us some more details about in what way that question was handled in that discussion? And where do things stand with regard to Riga on that issue? Will energy security be discussed at Riga? Will there be some sort of declaration on that taken at the Riga Summit? APPATHURAI: Good question. Obviously there are limits to how many details I can give from a North Atlantic Council meeting. What I can tell you is that President Aliyev discussed at some length his own initiatives to develop Azerbaijan's role as an energy supplier in the region. For example, including to Georgia. But also to Western Europe. And the obvious, I think, advantages that that has from... certainly from his perspective when it comes to diversifying the possibilities for countries that are purchasing and depending on energy supplies from that region. That is probably as far as I can go on that subject. Riga... my own feeling is that the discussions within NATO on energy security are going quite well. I do expect it to come up at Riga. I'm speaking on a personal basis now, but... because there's no consensus yet. But it seems to me that this will be an issue at Riga. Q: Why is there no consensus on that in NATO? It seems like.. The questions that are under discussion now are the modalities. What is the framework? Where can NATO add value? Where can NATO play a role that does not stray into what other organizations quite legitimately do, like the International Energy Agency, like the EU and individual countries have for internal security? Where can NATO supplement that, or whether it should not? That... so it's a question of the details, but not of the principle. Q: Yeah, follow-up question on Riga. At the NATO global conference on Monday, the SecGen addressed, several of the speakers, the experts and some or the officials called for a redefinition of... open up the Pandora's box of redefining NATO's Strategic Concept. I don't recall the SecGen actually addressed that. But is this starting to circulate as an idea, for one? And secondly, I can never remember the name of that generic political initiative, global political guidance or what's it called. APPATHURAI: Comprehensive Political Guidance. Q: It's so generic I can't remember the name of it. Is this... what's the purpose of this thing? Is it going to in any way lay the groundwork for a re-examination of the NATO Strategic Concept, for instance? APPATHURAI: Well I'm glad you raised this, because it's a good way for me to close this press conference... this press discussion. Ever since I joined NATO, and actually when I was it the Defence Department, somebody has brought up the idea of redoing the Strategic Concept. So that will come up again and again. There will have to be a political discussion at some stage. I have heard, for example, say well, the 60th anniversary of NATO was a good time because... in 2009. So we will see. But there has certainly been no discussion formally or informally in the context which you all know, amongst ambassadors of any opening up of the Strategic Concept. So, that's the first point. The Comprehensive Political Guidance is seen by some as a... almost an intermediate step, which updates the political... well, exactly, the political guidance for how NATO should plan or prepare for its role in the 21st Century. For example, the number of conflicts for which it should prepare, and how it should do that. The Comprehensive Political Guidance will be made public at the Riga Summit. Q: That sounds like a Strategic Concept to me. APPATHURAI: It's not... it's not as binding, and it is not as comprehensive. (Laughs). Even though it has that in the title. (LAUGHTER) Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: As the Strategic Concept. No... sorry, to get to the... to cut to the chase I have asked John Colston just this morning, who is the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning, in the run-up to Riga, and I'll give you a date for it, to come and brief you exclusively on the Comprehensive Political Guidance; tell you what it is, what it means. He's better at it than I am. And you'll be prepared to write about this by the time Riga comes. I hope, to the extent possible, to get embargoed copies to you as well, so you can actually see it and prepare properly. I've also asked him for some briefing notes on it for myself, because as you've gleaned from this conversation... (Laughs)... I'm a little big in the dark too. Okay, last question, and then I gotta really run. Q: During his speech, or maybe during the Q&As the SecGen on Monday called for the ratification of the SOFA... the Status of Forces Agreement with Russia. Who hasn't ratified? Is it just the Duma or is it...? APPATHURAI: It's the Duma. Q: Okay. APPATHURAI: The Duma has to ratify. Q: So it's been signed and everything. It's just a matter of (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Yes. It's a political process in Russia that has to be completed, and we would like... we think it would facilitate our cooperation with Russia if they would do it as quickly as possible. Thank you.
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