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| Updated: 03-Nov-2006 | NATO Speeches |
NATO HQ, 2 Nov. 2006 |
Joint press point with the NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai, the NATO Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan, Ambassador Daan Everts, the Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Ambassador Chris Alexander and the World Bank Country Director for Afghanistan, Mr Alastair Mckechnie
JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Let me start while everyone's setting up. First, let me apologize for being late, but as you can imagine getting four bureaucracies together to have a meeting is never going to be quick, and it was not quick. But it was very interesting. This was what we would call an informal meeting. Those of you who follow our lingo know that that means no concrete decisions were expected, nor were any taken. But as you all know, for all of the organizations represented at this table, Afghanistan is not only a country in which we are all interested, but it is a country in which all of our organizations are investing very heavily in terms of manpower, in terms of money, in terms of energy, political energy. And it only makes sense for our organizations to speak to each other, not just on the ground, where of course they coordinate very carefully, but also at the strategic level. It is the first time that we have had this kind of meeting, not only with NATO and the UN represented by Chris Alexander, but also with the World Bank, that came here with the country officer for Afghanistan, Mr McKechnie All of whom spoke not only to the Council, but what we call also the non-NATO ISAF contributors. So all the countries contributing to the operation were around the table. Let me not take up any more of your time. What I will do is ask, first Ambassador Everts, our Senior Civilian Representative, then Ambassador Alexander from the UN and them Mr. McKechnie, each to give just a two minute snapshot of where they see the country from their own mandate, and then we'll be happy to take your questions. Ambassador Everts. DAAN EVERTS (Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan, NATO): Well, thank you very much. Good to see you. I hope you all come to Kabul very soon. I have to repeat this now. Thank you. Good to see you. Hope to see you frequently in Afghanistan and Kabul as well. I'm relatively new to the scene. But I've been in similar situations before. What puzzles me and surprises me with regard to the press, if I may be so free, is that the Afghanistan venture, which is an incredible, important, historical mission, unprecedented in terms of being undisputed and uncontroversial... because everyone wanted the change in 2001 and tried to get Afghanistan away from the dark ages and back into more modern times. That mission is a noble mission by par excellence, and yet we do not get the comprehensive and fair coverage that it, I would think, deserve. And I see, for instance in the last months or... this heavy emphasis on the military dimension of the international presence, while the non-military efforts are at least equally important and ultimately for stability and success getting Afghanistan back on its feet, decisive, more decisive than the military, in fact. So that's one. That's a cry from the heart, that please, look at the presence there as it operates vitally and broadly across the board. A more specific comment is that we are facing internationally, I think, in Afghanistan, a very critical juncture right now. That is usually said in any post conflict situation, but I think this time it's really rather critical. The government has to make some very, very difficult decisions in order to improve governance, in order to improve its credibility and legitimacy with the population and we have to support that. We have to partly prompt the government to be tougher on itself and on its decision making but we also have to be helpful there. And in our helpfulness we can be better organized, we can be better coordinated and we can also be more generous in terms of resources, both personnel and financial. Third point to make, and for the rest I will be glad to respond to any questions, I feel that one critical area where success is needed, and possible--it's well within reach--is what I would call the area of human security. This is not military security. This is security for people living in villages and in towns that they can rely on the police for the minimum of law and order, that they can go to a court to have recourse and see justice administered. That basic rule of law condition is not there and has to be created. And that requires, I think, top priority of both the government and of ourselves and hopeful... the good news here is that the government is newly aware of this need to provide more security at the individual level and there are new reforms about to happen or partly underway in the judiciary, in the police, that may be very critical for success of the overall venture. Q: Ambassador Alexander. CHRIS ALEXANDER (Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General): Thank you very much, James. We are all here today in our separate capacities because the challenge of coordination and concertation of what the international community is... of international engagement in Afghanistan is a constant one. And it absorbs us every day on the ground in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan. It is also a major constant theme in the lives of capitals and in the lives of international organizations, like this one, which are so heavily engaged in Afghanistan. There are 37 nations engaged in ISAF in Afghanistan, in stabilization and combat operations. A number that goes well beyond the membership of NATO itself, as you know. There are over 60 countries providing significant donor support for Afghanistan. And that includes not only many European countries, North American countries, but all of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan. Many countries from the Persian Gulf region and from Southwest Asia, as well as many other countries from Asia, and even Africa. But our engagement in Afghanistan today is facing new challenges. It is no secret that the insurgency which is concentrated in southern Afghanistan has struck with renewed intensity in 2006. The number of casualties, combatants killed, civilians killed, Afghan officials killed in violence this year, exceeds by several fold the numbers from 2005 and 2004. And the reasons for that renewed violence, the strategies for addressing that insurgency require the very closest discussion, scrutiny and consideration by all of us. The other major challenge Afghanistan is facing this year is a resurgent poppy crop, which exceeds last year's harvest by quite a wide margin, but where again, cultivation is concentrated in those provinces of the south most affected by insurgency. And so the solutions here for one major challenge go hand-in-hand with many of the solutions for others. And as several of our colleagues in today's discussion have emphasized, it is important not to paint Afghanistan in one colour. This is not a story of uniformly distributed violence from north to south and east to west. Development is taking place in Afghanistan, in spite of the best efforts of some insurgent groups to throw it off track. And indeed, our development colleagues will tell you that the indicators, the early signs of achievement from the past five years of engagement are extremely encouraging, based on record numbers of children in school, based on a basic package of health care that has been rolled out for 80 percent of the population, based on some very unusual achievements in the field of rural development which has reached... where some programs have reached over half of the villages across the length and breadth of Afghanistan. So the story we are facing today, the picture we are describing and analysing is one of major challenges, but combined with achievement and opportunity. And here the main areas of focus for us and for the Afghan government, as we hold these discussions today, are the following, as Ambassador Everts mentioned: The police, the ministry of interior of Afghanistan is at a crucial juncture. Its senior leadership has been reformed, selected on the basis of merit, but we are only now on the verge of being able to say that that ministry, which has existed for the past four or five years, is operating on a reformed basis. There is a huge effort under way to evaluate the performance of those leaders, to replace the middle ranks of the police on the basis of merit, all the colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors, and to find new sources of recruitment, above all for those areas most affected by the insurgency where police are so urgently needed. As Ambassador Everts mentioned, there is a unique opportunity before us today in the field of rule of law in Afghanistan. After decisions by the Afghan Parliament in the past few months, there is a new chief justice. Most of the supreme court has been renewed. There's a new prosecutor general. These are all for the first time reformists, with a modern, balanced, rich view of Sharia and Afghanistan's civil law tradition. And there is an opportunity to reinforce those institutions, to put them on a basis that will pull judges and prosecutors away from the temptation of corruption and literally allow them to deliver justice on a larger scale than has yet been seen. Finally, there is a challenge in the field of subnational governance. Institutions in Kabul are functioning. Ministries across the board have capacity; at least in Kabul and in some of the bigger provinces. But in the 34 provinces in which the bulk of the population lives, that is not always the case. And without governors and departments of ministries that are staffed by competent people, we cannot expect to meet the expectations of the Afghan population, so that is a focus of our effort today. All of this means a huge challenge of coordination. There is a joint coordination and monitoring board co-chaired by the Afghan government and UNAMA, which will meet on the 12th of November. It includes NATO, it includes all the principal players. There is a policy action group that has been addressing the crisis posed by the insurgency this year. There is coordination governing the work of PRTs, and indeed, regional coordination. A meeting later this month in Delhi will bring all the regional players together to discuss how regional economic links ought to be forged. But that coordination can always be done better. We're here to compare notes and improve concertation. There is a lot of work ahead in the field of private sector development, key to unlocking a sustainable prospect for Afghan institutions and for Afghan prosperity. There are major issues to address in the field of capacity building where we're still often lacking the expertise on the part of Afghans to do the jobs that need to be done. But all of these and many other issues are under discussion and solutions, in many cases, are in sight. Q: Mr. McKechnie. MCKECHNIE: Thank you very much. I think looking back over the past five years it's very easy to overlook what has been achieved. I mean, for those of us who went to Kabul immediately after the fall of the Taliban and go back today it's clear that a lot has changed. I mean, there've been successful elections, a Parliament is functioning, the Bonn political process was implemented without much delay. And that's a considerable achievement to start with. As Chris Alexander said, the school attendance has gone up dramatically. There are more girls going to school in Afghanistan today than at any time in the country's history. The provision of basic health care has also gone from an access of less than 10 percent of the population to more than 80 percent in a few years. And this represents tremendous success. A couple of weeks ago I visited one of these clinics with some colleagues who commented very favourably on how well it is being implemented compared to some other countries we work in. I think one of the greatest achievements has been the government's national solidarity program where 14,000 villages have had free secret ballots to elect development councils and to prepare their own development priorities. And these are being funded through block grants from the international community to the tune of about $11 million a month. And something like seven and a half thousand of these projects have been completed. They've done economic analysis of them. They have rates of return greater than 30 percent. And they cover things such as small irrigation works, improving access roads, erosion protection, watershed management, small hydropower, school buildings and so on. So this represents not only real progress, but progress that affects the whole country at the grassroots level. The main road network, major parts of it, have already been completed. We financed the road from Kabul through the Salang Tunnel to Tajikistan. That road is now rehabilitated and operating. There's been some private investment. Not as much as everybody would like, but I point out mobile phones now cover most parts of... the most populated parts of Afghanistan. And I remember in January 2002 the only way you could communicate with the outside world was by satellite phone. And the central bank had only one satellite phone, no electronic funds transfer, and employees of the central bank had to go to Dubai and bring cash back in suitcases to keep the economy going. But then they went and did a currency reform and now you have the basis of a financial system, including a number of foreign banks. So I think while Afghanistan has got a long way to meet the expectations of the people I think it's also true to say that it's made a lot of progress in the last five years under extremely... extremely difficult conditions. Economic growth has been high. The incomes now are about 70 percent higher than they were in 2001, and this is a country where the legitimate economy has been growing in double digits, you know, greater than 10 percent per annum, which again, is an achievement considering the environment. A lot has to be done, particularly in public administration reform, and to help build the capacity so that Afghans can take charge of their future, because what we're really trying to do is help Afghans rebuild their state and I think critically important is the fact that they have to do it. We can help them but not do it for them, and essentially what the international community should be doing is empowering the Afghan authorities to create the modern, viable, prosperous state that we all want to see. Thank you very much. APPATHURAI: Let me just say one line in conclusion and then open it up for questions. I think the lesson that we heard around the table today, but I think is encapsulated also by this meeting, is that Afghanistan is not only a NATO story, it is also not only a NATO responsibility. It is first and foremost an Afghan government responsibility. And it is after that an international team effort in support of the Afghans. And that is the message we want to deliver by sitting here today, but it is also certainly the message we heard from all 37 of the ambassadors around the table, and the representatives of the international organizations here. But, let me now open the floor to any questions that you might have. We have two right there. Please identify yourselves. Q: (inaudible)... Pourquoi ici, c'est-à-dire pourquoi on a choisi cette place pour la conférence de reconstruction de l'Afghanistan en même temps où il y autant de critiques pour les erreurs des forces de l'OTAN pour tuer des civils dans l'Afghanistan? Est-ce que ce n'était pas mieux de choisir une autre place pour la conférence de reconstruction de l'Afghanistan? Deuxième question: Les forces de l'OTAN ne peuvent pas... on disait que les forces de l'OTAN ne peuvent pas et ne sont pas capables d'assurer la sécurité d'eux-mêmes, comment ils peuvent assurer la sécurité du peuple afghan? Merci. APPATHURAI: I think that one's for... do you want to go? UNIDENTIFIED: We'll take a few more, non. APPATHURAI: Well, we'll take a few and then we'll deal with them as we go. That's fair enough. Paul, do you want to go ahead. Q: Paul Ames from Associated Press. I just wonder if you could give us your assessment of the current security situation in the southern provinces? Are we in a situation now where reconstruction work can be carried out, and maybe the gentlemen from the United Nations and the World Bank can tell us what exactly you're doing, and how many personnel do you have in those regions, what are they doing? Maybe we know more about what NATO's doing there. Q: Yes, Brooks Tigner, Defense News. I notice the EU representative is absent. Why is that? And what, in fact, do each of you expect from the EU to do in Afghanistan? Thank you. APPATHURAI: I think we had a question over here. Ici. Please. Q: Paul Taylor, from Reuters. I was also going to ask whether the EU was invited to this meeting, and whether... how we should interpret its absence from the podium. And then secondly, we hear quite a lot of complaint around NATO about how NATO is doing its bit in Afghanistan, but development is not, as it were, following in its footsteps; that what... do you think that that complaint is justified, firstly, and secondly, what do you say today about how you could do it better? How you would coordinate better? APPATHURAI: Sir. Q: (inaudible)... Australia. The initiatives you've been mentioning, schools and judiciary and so on, we hear are being targeted now in the insurgency as principal avenue of destabilization. So what is the extent of your anxiety and what is being done for security of your personnel. APPATHURAI: Perhaps we'll take one more at the back. We'll take two and then we'll stop. Q: Yeah, I have a question for Mr. Everts. I would like to know how many more troops would you need in Afghanistan knowing that in Iraq now there's 135,000 and Afghanistan 41,000. How many more will you need knowing that the condition of the countries are completely different? And then second question: confirm that there is a change in strategy of the Taliban's... it seems that they're copying techniques from Iraq, if you can confirm this. And then a question for Mr. Alexander. You say development takes place despite insurgency, but how long time would it take, you think, to have control all over the country, the change of administration and the problem with the governors that you mentioned? And if there is, you know, a confusion between the reconstruction who's taking place by UN civilians and reconstruction by the military, does that make your work more complicated because there's a confusion. Thank you. APPATHURAI: Dernière question en arrière pour le moment. Q: L'Expression, journal algérien. Dans le cadre de la reconstruction de l'Afghanistan, il me semble évidemment que la priorité est donnée à la sécurité. On peut rien faire, ni avancer sans asseoir une sécurité minimale. Et dans ce cas-là, ma question est la suivante: "Quel est le rôle des chefs des tribus? Est-ce qu'il y a un contact, une concertation des organisations internationales particulièrement de l'OTAN, des forces de l'OTAN avec les chefs des tribus qui sont très influents qui peuvent éventuellement apporter une aide conséquente pour la paix. Voilà. APPATHURAI: Could we just start at the... does anyone want to go first in particular. Chris. Start at the end of the table. EVERTS: I could make a beginning, if you allow. And some of it is maybe more for my neighbours to answer. Let me start with the... the easiest one. About the EU. Not why they are not here. That is more for James to explain, but there's a very innocuous explanation, I know. But what do we expect? That is an important one, because generally we feel, (inaudible)... NATO, because we are so exposed, also by you in the press, as if it's all a military operation, which it isn't. It's basically non-military, with military assistance support. But what do we expect? We expect greater efforts and better coordinated efforts in theatre from all actors. This is UN and it's EU. But particularly the EU seems to have a great opportunity now to make a significant and very timely difference in the area of the... of the judiciary and the police. It had the good instinct to send a mission a month or so ago. We all talk to them on the spot to look into the police and judiciary sectors. And they have just come out with a report, I understand that recommends a vastly stepped up effort by the EU in the area of judicial reform, meaning the courts, the physical infrastructure of the courts, but also salaries, training, mentoring, what have you. I like this question so much because I feel there is an open scoring challenge for the EU. The goal is wide open and they just have to kick the ball. And it is important because as I said earlier, having the justice system finally in place sends a tremendous signal of confidence to the population. So this is very, very critical. On the last question, I just take them haphazardly, at random, the role of the chiefs is, of course, still very prominent, certainly in the countryside. And we should never overlook the importance of these informal leaders, if you want to call them that. They are very much consulted. I think no operation is engaged without prior convening of a shura, local shura, consulting significant elders, getting their support, getting their advice, first of all. The only caveat here is that there is, of course, also now representative Parliament. So the parliamentarians sometimes have the feeling that they are not quite recognized in their right to represent also their districts. And they sometimes feel that going to the elders at the local village is somewhat bypassing them and that they should be more involved. I think this is a legitimate concern, and I do feel that we have to give better recognition to the role of the Parliament. This is the first representative Parliament that Afghanistan has--at least in recent times--and they are very courageous in trying to be real countervailing power in the total politics of the nation. And I think that role should be supported. We should invite them. We should expose them to parliamentary practices abroad. We should encourage parliamentary exchange, and I think it's in the making. But this is the comment to the general observation that elders at a local level are very much consulted, because we know that without them you lost half the battle. On the troops let me not be too specific, but I'm not the military side of NATO. I'm representing the civilian political side, as you well know. What I know of the situation, of course, and General Richards has been explaining this time and again, is not that more troops are desperately needed in order to do a job. He would be more comfortable in doing his job if he had a little more flexibility in deploying troops and if he had somewhat greater numbers. So the efficiency and the flexibility of operations would be enhanced with higher troop levels if the commitment were fully honoured. That's the military side of it. I, if I may make that comment, I would not like the discussion on our Afghan challenges to be overshadowed by constant reference to troops and levels of troop because it is basically... it is a military challenge up to a point. But the known military challenges are probably larger, looming larger and requiring at least equal attention. So what I find a bit distorting in the question--not intended, no doubt, but in the media general coverage--it is as if our presence hinges on the military performance. It doesn't. Military performance is only one aspect of the intervention. The others are as equally... at least of equal importance. And personally, if you ask me, I feel that the grey area between military security and economic security, development say, a grey area of policing and courts and prison systems, I think that is an area that requires now more attention than anything else. I personally feel, I don't know whether my colleagues agree, but here is the Achilles heel of the Afghan story, and of its potential success. If we create adequate security, soft security, if you wish, police, courts, then I think the battle will be more easily, quickly won, and over with. On the Taliban strategy, yes, we see certainly after a few major engagements, and I referred (inaudible) to Medusa, the Taliban has seen that it cannot challenge NATO in a conventional manner. In a classic battle they are completely no match. And NATO prevails and easily so. And hence we see a reverse in terms of tactics to asymmetrical methods, very cowardly methods, which victimize civilians even more than military, like suicide bombs and roadside bombs and what have you. You can interpret this also as a sign of weakness, if not desperation on the part of the enemy that they can't do it by classic military means, they can't do it by parliamentary means, they can't do it by democratic means, and so they go about it in a way of destabilizing and trying to distort any progress that would otherwise be made. This is, of course, if I may dwell a little bit on the Taliban's minds, what they can't have is that the Afghan government and the international presence succeed in delivering goods: roads, schools, courts, security. So what they are doing is systematically trying to distort... to undercut, or to sabotage. It's a very destructive policy. It's absolutely no alternative. They offer no future. They offer no alternative to the population. They just offer destruction. And this is a strategy which is very difficult to counter, as you know, because with very little means they can create great havoc and that's the name of the game right now. But hence all the more reason to solidify the popular support with the national and international efforts and that can be done by bringing faster the goods of development, of reconstruction and of investment in law and order and in justice. I'm sure I haven't answered enough, but we revert maybe later. APPATHURAI: Let me turn over to Chris, but before I do, give you two numbers, because I know journalists like numbers to supplement that Ambassador Everts has just said in terms of Taliban attacks and who suffers from them. Of the total number of IED attacks this year, 519 Afghans have been killed. That makes up 91 percent of the total that have been killed by Taliban IEDs. On the number of suicide attacks, of which there have been just over a 100, they have resulted in the deaths of 205 Afghans. That makes 93 percent of the total. So if we're going to talk about civilian casualties, which NATO makes ever effort to avoid, and you will see, for example, in a Telegraph... or was it a Times article... that interview that General Richards gave, a number of military operations are called off at all times to prevent civilian casualties. Civilians are, in fact, the primary victims of Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. Chris. ALEXANDER: Thanks James. Obviously we all agree that success in Afghanistan will not involve military means alone. It will involve a whole variety of strategies. Some military, yes, including very robustly so. But international diplomacy has its role to play, political outreach, development, reconstruction and a whole range of other subjects, which is why we're here together for consultations such as these. Pourquoi la réunion a eu lieu ici à Bruxelles? Bien, c'est à l'invitation du Conseil de l'OTAN qui a eu cette session qui comprenait tous les membres de la FIAS, non seulement les membres de l'OTAN et où la nécessité de concerter ces actions surtout militaire mais aussi dans le domaine politique avec les autres organisations internationales avaient été senties par tous les membres. Donc, ce n'est pas une conférence sur la reconstruction qui a eu lieu ici. C'est une consultation normale telle qu'on les connaît à New-York sous l'égide des Nations-Unis sur l'Afghanistan telle que la conférence qui aura lieu plus tard, ce mois, à Delhi, sur la coopération régionale et telle que les dialogues et les échanges qui ont lieu à tous les jours entre nous du côté de UNAMA et tous les principaux partenaires de l'Afghanistan y compris l'Iran. On se rend assez souvent à Téhéran pour cette fin précise. Comment l'OTAN peut prétendre à protéger la population afghane? Mais l'apport, la contribution de l'OTAN est assez tangible dans la mesure où l'appui pour la mission de la FIAS de la part de la population afghane reste assez forte et assez visible. La population dans toutes les provinces du pays est assez claire à exprimer sa volonté que la FIAS reste en Afghanistan et que les nombres, le chiffre de personnel militaire, le poids de la FIAS s'accroîe même en Afghanistan. C'est une mission bien sûr autorisée par le Conseil de sécurité avec un mandat renouvelé à tous les ans, mais la mission jouit d'une grande popularité du côté de la population afghane qui se sent, pour des raisons très évidentes, encore vulnérable. One more point on NATO's role and ISAF's role and the confidence that that has engendered on the part of the Afghanistan population. Ambassador Everts mentioned Operation Medusa, the largest scale NATO-led operation to take place this year in southern Afghanistan in Kandahar province. The success of that operation injected an enormous element of confidence into the population of southern Afghanistan. In the early months of this year it's no secret to anyone that there was a sense of vulnerability, there was a sense that the Taliban were more numerous. But through this operation, in which active Taliban fighters in large numbers were targeted, and many were captured, not only killed, and where civilian casualties were deliberately avoided at all costs, and where UN and other agencies are agreed the number was relatively low, a sense of confidence returned to parts of Kandahar province, Helmand, Oruzgan, that had started to fray at the edges, shall we say, earlier this year. And so that sort of contribution, that sort of demonstration of will on the part of NATO has been a success, and of benefit to the whole development process in Afghanistan today. Because it shows that the Afghan government, with its international supporters, will be able to stand against these insurgents, the Taliban and other insurgent groups, even in the circumstances of this year, where the security situation was quite acute. What is the UN doing? We have a mission across Afghanistan in 12 offices, which has been there for five years. Our mandate under the Bonn agreement was to lead the international effort to achieve that agenda, adoption of a constitution, establishment of a new government, the holding of two sets of elections. Today, under the Afghanistan Compact there are four focuses. One is coordination of international efforts to implement the Afghanistan Compact. Secondly, is a good offices role, both inside Afghanistan and in the region, to ensure that political problems are resolved, that rivalries, confrontations, don't turn into violence. Thirdly, we have a special role on certain complicated political tasks, such as disarmament, such as the disbandment of illegal armed groups, which we hope one day will include the disbandment of the Taliban, as an armed group in Afghanistan, though obviously that day is far off for the time being. And fourthly, we have a human rights role, monitoring and measuring and indeed, trying to influence respect for human rights, and indeed human security in Afghanistan. That means that those are above all roles for UNAMA as a political mission, but it's also an integrated mission which brings together the effort of dozens of UN programs, funds and agencies. And together those agencies, over 20 of them, have delivered probably 20 percent of the international assistance that has gone to Afghanistan over the past five years. Both through holding of elections and through large scale humanitarian and development programs, such as those of the World Food Program, to take one example. Is development not following military action? Certainly there have been some voices making that claim. I would simply add that many development players are saying we cannot work here because there's not enough security. Quite frankly, it's an unpromising conversation. The bottom line is that we all have a great deal of work to do. Security players, above all, the Afghan government itself, have to do more work and better work to bring about real security at village level for the population. Development players in the circumstances of today's Afghanistan need to be innovative about how we deliver on basic humanitarian and development needs across the country. And to do that we need to work together. We need to understand each other's agenda, agendas, each other's operating procedures and make the necessary compromises to be able to work together and that's been a feature of our discussion today. Schools are being targeted. Does that create anxiety? Obviously. It also points up the nihilism that underlies the Taliban's agenda. The burning of schools in Afghanistan does not make them, as a movement, any more popular, and quite frankly, in the past month or two the number of schools being burned has tailed off, as public outrage, that such acts should be perpetrated continues to grow. And we all stand with Afghans who do want to improve the literacy of their population, who do want education, that reflects their traditions, in helping them to rebuild those schools. And I'm quite confident in telling you that the pace of opening of schools and of training of teachers, is greater than the pace of burning of schools. And I'm sure James has some statistics to cite for us on that front. Now is there confusion between the UN and military objectives? Not really. Of course, there are times when communication is imperfect and where we need to consult at provincial level, at local level or at national level. But by and large there is quite a uniquely profitable collaborative atmosphere inside Afghanistan. As James said, it is team work. It can only be team work. The Afghans are in charge, but all the rest of us have very important supporting roles t play. And in speaking to tribes and tribal groups, clearly this is sine qua non, as I think Daan implied. You have to consult communities in Afghanistan. You have to listen to communities if you want development strategies to work. And to the extent that we do that, through the National Solidarity Program, through the PRTs, we are generally... we, the partners of Afghanistan, are generally effective. President Karzai wants to do this on a slightly grander scale by holding a jurga, and eventually a jurga in Pakistan as well, that would bring together civil society, tribal elders, and elected representatives to discuss security in the south of Afghanistan. And that is an initiative all of us are actually supporting. APPATHURAI: Before I turn over to Mr. McKechnie a couple of numbers on education. Somebody doesn't want me to talk. Four bullets. First, you've already heard this: About six million Afghan children are in school. This is up six times over 2001. Thirty-seven percent are girls. A third of the teachers are women. Enrolment in higher education has increased from 4,000 to over 40,000 today. That's a ten times increase, of which 19 percent are women. There are now around 45,000 trained teachers in Afghanistan. And despite a 62 percent increase in the tax on schools over 2005 there has been an increase of approximately 1,000 schools built or simply opened this year. So these attacks are not succeeding. UNIDENTIFIED: Can I just ask you to answer the EU question about whether they were invited? APPATHURAI: Oh certainly. I was going to turn over to Mr. McKechnie first, but to answer that question, the EU was, of course, invited. Both the Commission and Council were represented at the table. It is an EU holiday today, so it was very nice of them to show up, but for personal reasons they didn't have time to stay for this meeting, and as you know the press... or the council itself stretched overtime. So they were simply unable to stay for this part. Mr. McKechnie, excuse me. MCKECHNIE: Thanks very much. I think there were two questions directed at me, you know, why is the World Bank here, and what's the purpose of this meeting? And the second one... a set of questions concerns implementation of development in an environment of insecurity with some special reference to education. On the question of why is the World Bank here, I mean, we're an organization that as a matter of constitution never finances military equipment. But we do believe that development, security, good governance, rule of law, are critically important to the rebuilding of the Afghanistan state, and this was a meeting which brings together these three or so threads, which of course, are enshrined in the Afghanistan compact signed in January in London earlier this year. And as you've probably noticed we all bring slightly different perspectives, different ways of seeing the same problem. But in the end this is a very high degree of consensus among the political security and development actors in Afghanistan. On the issue related to questions related to security and development, I think it's important to note that most of the fighting has taken place in four southern provinces. There are 32 provinces in Afghanistan and while there are a number of other provinces that are affected by conflict, there is still larger amounts, more than half the country, where normal in the Afghan context, development activity takes place. As far as the World Bank is concerned, we do not implement projects directly. We're a financing agency, and indeed, we think it's very important that it's the Afghan state, the government, that is implementing, or at least responsible for development programs at the local level. Because that is the way institutional capacity is built, by doing things and it's also the way in which the government achieves credibility in the eyes of its people through being able to deliver services to them. And we will continue to finance programs anywhere in Afghanistan so long as those implementing those programs are willing and able to work there. And I think it's important to note that there is very strong Afghan tradition of hospitality and protection to people who are invited to their villages. If you connect to the local communities and we are working closely with them, and helping them meet their priorities, then they provide protection. And it's interesting to note that, I was meeting with the education minister a few weeks ago. He was telling me about the schools that are built under the National Solidarity Program. That's where the elected village committee decide to build a school, they put in some of their own resources, and they get a block grant, just essentially international money flowing through the government. And where the local community has a stake in the school, where it's their school, their own resources, then they have tended to protect those schools and I think that's an important point to note. And as, I think someone else mentioned, the demand for education in Afghanistan is enormous. If one looks at surveys of Afghans, one of their highest priorities is for education. And I think the burning of schools is something that I think is very counterproductive from the Taliban's point of view, because it really is going against the wishes of the people. Thank you. APPATHURAI: I think, do we have time for follow-up's folks? Yeah, okay. Well, we have three... one, two, three, four. Well, let's start over here. Brooks. Q: Yes, I was just wondering, did you discuss ideas about how to guarantee the security of NGOs working in development in southern provinces? And if so, what were some of those ideas? For instance, if Medusa is as successful as you say it is, does... will this free up NATO troops to do some of that duty, some of that security duty. Thank you. APPATHURAI: (inaudible)...ici. Q: So yes, I had a question for Mr. Alexander. I would like to know how you measure this popularity, what is the measurement of the popularity of NATO and UN in Afghanistan, and if it's also this measurement correct in the region where NATO soldier have been doing mistakes, killing civilians or doing weird pictures, for example? And then... and a question to Mr. Everts. I agree with you, we always talk about military point of view in Afghanistan, but it's because there's his confusion. I would like to understand when General Richards say he needs more troops, is it for only security reason and fighting the Taliban or counterterrorism? Or is it also for the PRT, the reconstruction program? I think there's a confusion also in your way of answering the question. Thank you. APPATHURAI: Une question... Q: This is a question for Ambassador Alexander. You have just said that is far away, the day in which the Taliban will be disbanded, so how far away is it, and how can we, the international community, fight against he Taliban without... if we are not doing anything in Pakistan? Thank you. APPATHURAI: Last one is here. Q: Je voulais seulement poser la question aux trois participants, leur demander si une réunion à l'OTAN comme celle-là va devenir régulière. Je répète la question: Est-ce que ce genre de réunions à l'OTAN va devenir régulier? Est-ce qu'au fait c'est simplement la démonstration par l'OTAN qu'il y a une collaboration avec les organismes? Ou est-ce que c'est que c'est qu'on considère normal que l'OTAN, organisation politico-militaire demande aux organisations civiles de venir à son siège pour discuter de questions de gestion d'un pays et d'organisation de la vie civile? Ce sont des questions qui sont peut-être théologiques pour certains mais qui sont aussi des questions pratiques. Au fond, est-ce que vous avez ces réunions tous les jours à Kaboul? Et est-ce que c'est simplement pour des raisons de démonstration qu'on fait exceptionnellement à Bruxelles? Ou est-ce que ça va devenir régulier? APPATHURAI: Daan, please. EVERTS: Were they all for me? I don't know. Let's start with the NGOs. They have a very important role to play and that's... an obvious statement. But the good thing is that there's also more of Afghan NGOs now entering the scene and taking charge of development in various sectors. Their work is critically dependent on secure conditions. They can't operate if there is war-like situations and hostilities. That is also obvious. And so there is a natural affinity, unlike we have seen elsewhere or in the past, between the security presence and the NGO community. And in fact, I myself am involved in brainstorming with the local NGOs, the most active ones, next week in order to see how we best can support each other. Very practically speaking we know we have these Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They are to provide military presence that makes possible reconstruction and development efforts. Not only by the military themselves, which they are engaged in, for good reasons, but also to make it possible for the NGOs to work. So we see, to our pleasant surprise much more recognition on the part of the NGOs to work together, and the need also to work together with the military presence. And in fact, we are receiving requests to expand a network of PRTs, these reconstruction teams, to provinces where they are currently not yet, in order to facilitate the possibility for NGOs to work. So there is this direct link, which is not mutually recognized. And for instance, I think someone mentioned Medusa. One reason why the NGOs would not immediately follow up on military operations there, because the security on the ground was not yet all that secure. And this is an issue that was discussed today again that if there is a military operation we have to make sure that we also plan for the aftermath and that there'll be adequate local security arrangements in place to make sure that the development and reconstruction work can start. This is not necessarily for a military presence. It's more ideally this would be Afghan national security forces and particularly police. So here this reinforces my earlier point that we have to be more serious and more aggressive in building up good quality people friendly police forces, because that, again, will improve rural security militias, which again, will facilitate NGO work and general reconstruction and development. On the... General Richards troop comments, what he refers to is basically that NATO member states honour their commitment to provide adequate level of troops that can be flexibly deployed and he is referring them to the operational reserve, which makes it possible to move troops around as the need arises. So this is more in terms of combat capacities, not so much PRTs. On the PRTs we are also actively promoting the idea because it's... it works. It's a formula that works. And there are some excellent PRT experiences which we are right now sharing and making more broadly known, and there are some countries, new countries, in fact, that have expressed interest in... to, first of all, to support maybe existing PRTs, or start PRTs themselves. I can mention one interesting example because it's by now public. With Kazakhstan(?) they are actively exploring the possibility of deploying a PRT in Afghanistan. It's interesting because it's from a Central Asian country with very good cultural and religious affinity to Afghanistan. So that would be a very interesting development. But some other countries also from different areas, NATO members, have expressed similar interests. Lastly on the nature of this meeting here, I think it's perfectly fitting in the felt need all around that we should combine efforts, that the efficiency of our respective efforts will be enhanced by pulling together and by coordination. So coordination is being sought at various levels. Certainly in Kabul where there is already a lot going on, but some improvement is still possible. But we feel that also at the level of headquarters of multilateral organizations and major capitals of nation... of member states, coordination should be encouraged, so as to have more unified signals sent out to Afghanistan, but also to the neighbouring countries, for instance, where there is need for more consultation and joint policy statements and efforts. So the meeting of today, as an informal consultation, is surely to be followed by more at different places, New York, Brussels... APPATHURAI: Washington. EVERTS: Washington. Of course, Washington. And Kabul, not to forget. ALEXANDER: Thank you. On the NGOs in the south and how... what the implications of an operation like Medusa are for them, clearly the south is still a very difficult place to operate, for all civilians. For the Afghan government, for UN agencies, for private sector companies and for NGOs. We have to be very frank about that. And the UN accessibility map for Afghanistan very much reflects that. At the same time there is enormous... a remarkable amount of work going on. Construction of the highway from Kandahar to Herat through the southwestern quarter of Afghanistan never stopped, despite a very difficult period of insurgency. A big dam in Kajaki in the north of Helmand province, a mega project by any standards, damn rehabilitation in this case, is still under way. And schools, district administration buildings and so forth, are still being built. So the challenge isn't so much to protect NGOs, as to strategize with them on access can be gained. Through whom can you work? Which tribal elders, shuras, jurgas, can you negotiate with to ensure the security of those who will be opening a clinic, or inoculating children against polio or training teachers in some part of rural southern Afghanistan. And here, yes, there are projects valued in the tens of millions of dollars, maybe hundreds of millions of dollars, that have been slowed, or even stopped in some cases, by violence, by the insurgency. But there is also a lot of ingenuity being applied to unlocking those projects, to getting the National Solidarity Program, for example, reactivated in all the parts of the south where it has had to stop. And we mustn't underestimate the amount that has been dispersed and achieved even in southern Afghanistan. I think in the context of this policy action group which President Karzai leads, we studied these numbers and it was something in the order of $700 to $800 million that have been dispersed in the four provinces of southern Afghanistan. Now current projects, some of them are suspended and we're working to overcome those blockages. But clearly insecurity makes the price of implementation higher, both in terms of risk and security arrangements. Comment est-ce on fait pour mesurer la popularité? How do we decide that NATO is popular? Well, certainly there isn't sophisticated nation-wide polling data, but there is public opinion research and all of it points to some quite remarkable results. Remarkable in that I think most people would not expect them. In many parts of the country the most popular partner of Afghanistan is the United States. I'm quoting to you public opinion research. And some of the most popular countries, the ones with the best image in the eyes of the population are prominent NATO member states. The United Nations, the World Bank, UNHCR enjoy very high approval ratings in Afghanistan. And in debates in the Parliament, in both houses of Parliament it's been very clear that both the members of Parliament and their constituents want the NATO mission, UN-mandated, NATO-led ISAF mission to continue. And I think one of the clearest ways of measuring this popularity is by taking note of the fact that there isn't really a voice or a political force in Afghanistan that openly opposes the presence of NATO. There is no such movement. There may be at some point. No legal movement. And indeed, NATO owes a lot of its popularity to the fact that people consider the Taliban threat a live threat, a threat to their life and limb, to their livelihoods. And that, I think, will extend the legitimacy of an international military presence until the Taliban is subdued as a military force. But here I have to say the anecdotal, statistical and political evidence available to us is quite overwhelmingly supportive of overall international engagement, but including an international military presence. Q: Même dans la région où il y a eu des erreurs commises? ALEXANDER: Je devais commencer par cette remarque. Il n'y a personne en Afghanistan qui acceptera que les militaires étrangers ou que qui que ce soit... participent à des violations des droits de la personne, y compris dans des situations de combat ou des opérations militaires mènent sans que ça soit l'objectif cherché bien sûr à des pertes parmi la population civile. Les Nations-Unies sont très préoccupées par ces incidents lorsqu'ils se passent. Nous, nous prononçons là-dessus. Et nous attendons de nos collègues de l'OTAN qu'ils fassent autant d'attention que possible. Et le Parlement afghan, l'opinion publique en Afghanistan va rester très sensible à cette dimension des choses. Mais ceci ne nie pas du tout l'importance qui est rattachée à la présence des forces militaires internationales qui est considérée comme étant essentielle dans cette conjoncture politique actuelle. How long will we be dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan? That would probably be... have to be the subject of a separate conference and set of consultations. Clearly they have been in Afghanistan as a movement for 12 years. And the lifetimes of insurgencies around the world as we know them, say since World War II run into many years. So we can't predict how long this will last. We do know that the commitments that are required are multi-year commitments. Is cooperation required from Pakistan to overcome the threat from the Taliban? Obviously. The president of Pakistan himself has indicated as much. All of us who are engaged in regional diplomacy raised these issues. Economic cooperation is on the table with Pakistan, where there are enormous benefits to be gained. Refugee issues are on the table because there is overlap between those issues and the roots of the insurgency. But the sources of insecurity and the nature and location of Taliban leadership networks are obviously regional questions that need to be addressed by more than one country. And it will be very important for Afghanistan and Pakistan to come to a shared understanding of what a counterinsurgency strategy should look like. With the support, obviously, of a very wide variety of international partners. Est-ce que la concertation doit se passer ici à Bruxelles ou à d'autres endroits? Elle doit se passer comme mes collègues ont déjà évoqué régulièrement et dans toutes les capitales, toutes les villes où sont basées les organisations internationales qui s'occupent de l'Afghanistan. L'investissement, la contribution de l'OTAN en Afghanistan est très importante. Et nous reconnaissons le besoin de se concerter avec l'OTAN par notre présence aussi. Pour les Nations-Unies, l'Afghanistan reste une question très, très importante aussi. Donc, il y aura sans doute d'autres réunions à New-York, à Washington, à d'autres endroits tels qu'on a connu, la Conférence de Londres, au mois de janvier février de cette année, à Londres pour annoncer et s'accorder sur la prochaine étape d'engagement international en Afghanistan. Donc, ça fait partie de nos vies. On ne peut jamais être aussi concertés qu'on devrait. Et le travail, le défi reste toujours à cet égard à relever. APPATHURAI: I'm afraid that's all we have time for. Let me thank all the participants. Thank you for coming. And good night.
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