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| Updated: 27-Sep-2006 | NATO Speeches |
NATO HQ 26 Sept. 2006 |
Press Briefing on the Defence Ministers meeting in Portoroz, Slovenia, 28-30 September, by the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, John Colston, and the NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai
JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Thank you for coming. We're actually going to start on time, which his a rare event for me, but it is in honour of John Colston. You're all, I think, very familiar with him. He is the Assistant Secretary General who is responsible for the Defence Ministers' meetings within our organization, and he has come down here to brief you. How are we going to attribute this? On or off background... on the record, unless you feel you want to go on background... COLSTON: Okay, that'll be fine (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Okay, John, over to you. COLSTON: James, thank you very much and a warm welcome from me to all of you this afternoon. Thanks very much for coming along and taking the opportunity just to hear a word or two from me about the meetings which will take place in Portoroz in Slovenia, on Thursday and Friday this week. As I'm sure most, if not all of you, are aware, the NATO Defence Ministers, the 26 Defence Ministers usually meet three times each year. They meet once formally in Brussels, usually in June and they meet twice informally. In February this year they met in Sicily, and this is their second informal meeting of the year. What does informal mean? It means there won't be a communiqué. It means there won't be formal decisions on a whole range of issues. This is really an opportunity for them to engage with the political dimension of the key issues at the top of NATO's agenda today. So what can we expect to be discussed in Portoroz? The meetings will start on the Thursday afternoon, and the ministers will have two long working sessions amongst themselves, amongst the 26 Allies. The first on the Thursday afternoon will be dedicated to operations. Clearly it makes sense. This is at the top of all our agendas, and that's what they're going to want to start with and this is what they're going to want to focus on. So the first session on operations will understandably concentrate on Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the Secretary General and the Ministers will want to reflect where we are and where we're going. The nature of the operations in which we're engaged in in Afghanistan are unprecedented in NATO's history. The scale of what we're doing is unprecedented in terms of operations, land operations, fighting on the ground. This is producing a range of challenges and they're a range of challenges to which fortunately NATO and the Allies are responding strongly. That does not mean that there is not still more to be done. That does not mean that there is still more to be debated. What are the kinds of things which we are going to need to discuss in Portoroz? Force generation, the identification of forces to make sure that we have a robust, effective force which is capable of operating well over the long term. The news over the past few weeks has been good. Nations are identifying contributions to complete the requirements necessary for Afghanistan. But there is still more to be done in terms of encouraging contributions, both of forces, and for supporting capabilities, and particularly aircraft and helicopters. We need also to do more to make sure that the forces which are deployed in Afghanistan are genuinely able to operate freely in terms of supporting each other, in terms of operating throughout the country. Ministers will reflect on the news from Afghanistan itself. Clearly, we continue to face casualties and the Ministers will want to pay tribute to the determination of all of the Allies and their militaries, who are showing such dedication and commitment. But, the news is good. We are achieving tactical victories on the ground. We are ensuring that aid is put into those areas as quickly as possible following on from the military operations. So progress is good and we will, I think, have a very forward-looking agenda in relation to Afghanistan in Portoroz. There will also be a reflection on the extent to which the whole of the international community needs to engage in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not a problem for NATO alone. And mustn't be seen as a problem for NATO alone. Nations individually and other international organizations have to engage, have to do their bit in support of what the Afghan government, in support of what President Karzai is doing. And that, I'm sure, will be a theme for our discussions as well. Let me say that there is one thing that we're not going to discuss, despite what I see has been some speculation. There has been no request to the Indian government for a contingent of Indian military to go to Afghanistan. Nor do we understand that the Indian government is considering one. What else on operations? Kosovo. The Ministers are going to want to review where we are in Kosovo at the moment, and I think in particular they will want to assure themselves that the preparations and the disposition of forces which we have in place throughout Kosovo, but perhaps particularly in the north, is effective, is robust, in view of potential sensitivities throughout the remainder of the year. I think the answer which they're going to give to that question is yes, they are satisfied. They will look at it seriously. I think it's also going to be an opportunity for them to start thinking about what happens in relation to the maintenance of security following any potential settlement this year. And I'm sure also that they will want to reflect on Sudan, on Darfur, and the potential for continuing to offer support to the African mission in Sudan following the extension of its mandate. They will want to reflect on what more NATO can do in its supporting role. That's going to be an ambitious agenda for the first day, but this is important business for NATO. It's worth reflecting that currently we have in excess of 35,000 troops engaged on operations. NATO troops. And over 3000 partner troops operating alongside them. That's a substantial number. Ninety percent of those 35,000 are European troops as well. All 26 allies are represented in one way or another in Afghanistan. Of the ten new members who joined since 1999, they at present have 7000 troops on operations. That's not bad going. Of the allies who joined in 2004, one of them within a year of membership had already assumed leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. So the direction is good, but there's still much to be done. On the Friday morning, the focus of the business will turn to the longer term. How we ensure that we have got the capabilities that we need to sustain our operational commitments in the future. And here the focus will be twofold. It will be to ensure that we have put in place, that we have implemented the decisions which were taken at the Prague and Istanbul Summits to transform our forces, and to make sure that we are continuing to do the things which are necessary to sustain our capability into the future. I expect there to be a particular focus on the NATO Response Force. NATO Response Force, as far as I'm concerned, as a defence planner, is a good news story. We have gone from having an idea on paper in Prague in 2004, to having an effective fighting force in 2006, and that's impressive progress. I was fortunate enough to see the major live exercise which we held in Cape Verde Islands in the summer, and there's no doubt that this is a real force, it's not just a paper tiger. And it's also been very pleasing to me to see the real practical effect that the NATO Response Force has on the way in which individual Allies, old and new, organize their forces. They have made them more capable, more deployable, more effective, in order to meet the standards of the NATO Response Force. We still have more to do. We still have more to do to ensure that we've got all of the capabilities that we need for the coming six month rotations of the NATO Response Force and we'll be pressing hard on that. It's a demanding task alongside that full range of operations which I was describing. Not only the NATO operations, but also operations in Iraq and in Africa and elsewhere. And we still have more to do in terms of ensuring that we've got our planning right, that we are making best use of NATO common funds to support the force. So we'll be looking at the NATO Response Force. We'll also be looking at the other elements of the Prague and Istanbul agendas, the Prague Capabilities Commitments, the new military command structure and so on, to ensure ourselves that we are really doing what we said we would do. And again there, I think the story is going to be positive. Looking forward, we will want to identify those things which at the Riga Summit, the summit in Riga in Latvia, which is only a couple of months away now, we are taking forward the right kinds of measures to keep up the process of transformation of our armed forces. The kinds of things we're going to be looking at there are strategic, lift capabilities, the big aircraft. We're going to be looking at the way in which we organize and equip our special operations forces. We're going to be looking at this issue of how civil and military elements of support to nations in need of stabilization can perhaps work better in the future. We're going to be looking at the way in which we work with our partners, particularly our partners in the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. The series of meetings will conclude with a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in Defence Ministers' session. So a meeting of the NATO Ministers with Minister Sergey Ivanov. Technically speaking this will be a formal meeting because we were not able to hold a formal meeting of the 27 ministers in June this year. But there will be, again, no statement, no formal decisions. The scope of the discussions is scheduled to include defence reform and cooperation. It's scheduled to include our cooperation in defence against terrorism, and it's scheduled to include the international security situation. So there will be an opportunity for ministers to discuss, for example, the very recent and very welcome deployment of a ship of the Russian Federation in support of NATO's Operation Active Endeavour, our anti-terrorism maritime operation in the Mediterranean. But there will also be an opportunity to exchange views on current security issues, current operations, Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. etc. Also will be an opportunity for Minister Ivanov to set out his views. I hope for a lively debate. One of the advantages of the NATO-Russia Council is it enables us to address issues on which we have a difference, as well as those where we agree. That takes you through a brief, but I hope helpful summary of the kinds of things which we're likely to be discussions and James, very happy to take any questions there may be. APPATHURAI: Questions? Q: Yes, sir, Paul Ames from the Associated Press. I have two questions. You mentioned that the Ministers will be looking at what more NATO can do to support the African Union in Darfur. I wonder if you could give us some ideas on exactly what more NATO is considering for that operation. And secondly, is it conceivable that in Portoroz we will get an announcement that NATO is ready to start Stage 4 of the ISAF operation? COLSTON: Thank you very much. Firstly, in relation to Darfur. I think what I would hope that the discussion will do that is firstly, simply to sustain the things which we have been doing in the future, which is principally alongside our colleagues in the European Union, to make sure that there is scope for providing transport for the African Union contingents in and out of the area of operations. There may be other things which we can continue to do in terms of developing staff capacity for the African Union mission in Sudan, in which Allies have invested a lot of effort, and it may be that that can continue. And it may be we can offer some assistance too in helping the African Union to identify the operational lessons which they have gained from their experience in Sudan. But the main message, I think, from Portoroz will be one of openness to assist rather than agreement on very particular practical measures. APPATHURAI: Right. Can I jump in for a sec? COLSTON: Of course. APPATHURAI: Just because I was in New York with the Secretary General. The Secretary General met last week in New York with the Presidency and the Secretary General of the African Union. In other words, the president of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and President Konare. And the President of Congo specifically asked the Secretary General if NATO could extend its current support for the African Union to the end of the year, exactly as John had said, but I did want to point out that this is not simply an abstract NATO decision. This is at the specific request of the African Union, and we will now move forward with doing that. Of course, it is for Ministers to decide, but I have no doubt, and the Secretary General has no doubt that that will be granted. COLSTON: Thank you very much. As far as ISAF and Stage 4 is concerned, I remember being asked by a comparable audience before about when Stage 4 was going to come, and indicating that it was likely to come after Stage 3. That remains broadly the position. As I said, I think ministers in Portoroz will want to look forward and I'm sure that this is one of the issues with which they will wish to engage. As of today I don't think I can say very much more of that in terms of giving you an indication about when you might see this decision taken. Q: (inaudible) News Agency, (inaudible) Iran. I have actually two questions. Are you concerned that if NATO can... NATO engagement continues for a long period of time, and there are civilian casualties alongside, so that the public opinion might turn against the ISAF mission in Afghanistan? And my second question is, that you said NATO has not asked India to send any troops. On the other hand, you are calling for, if I understood correctly, more international community to engage. So why you are not calling on India to send troops? COLSTON: Thank you very much. In terms of the first question, in relation to public opinion, public opinion is, of course, very important to us. And it's very important that the people of Afghanistan understand that what we're doing is in support of them, and in support of their government. That is why the troops of ISAF work exceptionally closely with the Afghan authorities, with the Afghan National Army and with the Afghan police force. The kinds of operations which we have seen recently, in recent weeks in the south of Afghanistan, the operations against the Taliban, have been conducted jointly with the Afghan authorities. We hope this is the most practical and vivid demonstration of the fact that we're working on behalf of the Afghan people. We also, at the tactical level, at the operational level, are taking exceptional steps to try to ensure that civilian casualties, innocent casualties, are kept to the minimum, including by making provision for individuals to be temporary relocated whilst operations are going on and then helping them to move back in again. I think the final point that I would make, that I hinted at briefly in my introduction, is the importance of ensuring that once ISAF and the Afghan authorities have re-established security in a particular area, that we are able to facilitate the aid agencies, the civil agencies, moving very quickly into that area, and start demonstrating our commitment to reconstruction and stabilization. This has been very successfully achieved, I think, in recent days, and should be a very firm indication of the extent to which we're committed, not simply to ensuring security, but to ensuring that security leads to stable conditions in which reconstruction can prosper. APPATHURAI: May I jump in for a sec. Q: Please. APPATHURAI: Just to add to that, if you look back at Operation Medusa, NATO took the unusual step of advertising very clearly, by dropping pamphlets throughout the region, saying that the operation was coming, and warning civilians to leave the area. So the Taliban was perfectly well aware of what NATO was going to do, but this was done deliberately to ensure that the minimum level possible of civilian casualties was inflicted. And despite what was, I think you can safely say, the most intense ground battle in NATO's history, not least involving enormous amounts of munitions dropped from the air, I have yet to see, and I stand to be corrected, a single confirmed case of civilian casualties as a result of NATO's operations. Now that may well have happened, but as of yet, I have seen nothing confirmed. That should give you the scale, I think it should help us to understand the effort the NATO forces have gone to to avoid civilian casualties. I just want to use that illustration. COLSTON: Thank you very much. And very briefly, as far as India is concerned, then clearly NATO, in its contacts with potential contributors, does try to take account of regional sensitivities, genuine regional sensitivities, and we would not ask a government to do something which we could quite clearly see would create potential difficulties for that in terms of the politics of the region. Q: Thank you. (inaudible)... Russia. You said just now that the progress in Afghanistan is good. Could you reveal the source of your optimism, because there is unprecedented loss of human life there. COLSTON: It's quite true that the level of casualties to NATO forces, to Afghan forces, and of course to the opposing militias, and particularly the Taliban, has been on a very significant scale. When NATO started Stage 3, when we moved into the south of Afghanistan, we knew that we were going to be challenged. We were moving a substantial security force, which was committed to reinforcing the authority of the government in Kabul, of reinforcing the authority of President Karzai and we knew that there was a range of people who did not want that to happen. So we knew that this was not going to be easy. But I think I would... I would very much counter the suggestion that this represents a negative trend, that it suggests that we have not calculated correctly. What we have been doing in Afghanistan is seeing through the policy which the Allies adopted in support of the Karzai government from the outside. There have been, in cases, been greater challenges than we anticipated. The willingness of the Taliban to stand and fight has been greater than anticipated. But it's quite clear to me, from the basis of what I see and hear from the theatre, what I see and hear from our military commanders, that we are achieving success. I don't want to give the impression that there are going to be no further difficulties. Of course there are. This is going to remain tough. And it's going to remain demanding for all the nations who are contributing. But I do think that NATO is continuing effectively to discharge the policy that it established at the outset. APPATHURAI: Sorry to do ping pong, but before we go to Mark, just to add the civilian casualties question. I think it's worth reporting, if we're going to talk about civilian casualties, that 17 civilians were killed today by suicide bombers. They were killed by the Taliban. I don't know how many children were killed a few days ago by a suicide bomber attacking NATO forces. They killed all the kids getting their school books. So if we're going to write on civilian casualties, I would help that we will be balanced as to who is actually causing the most civilian casualties, and that is, of course, the Taliban. Mark. Q: Mark John from Reuters. The Secretary General has, I think, said before that he would like to encourage Poland to speed up the deployment it's talked about before, and in particular for it to be used a kind of reserve battalion able to move around the country. And I wondered if there'd been any development in that, whether indeed Warsaw had given any indications that this might happen. And secondly, commanders have said that after Medusa was over and we go into the winter months then it would be logical to assume a lull in fighting, simply because of climatic conditions, for one thing. Is that still the advice that you're hearing at NATO HQ here? COLSTON: Thank you very much. In terms of your questions about the Polish forces, I think the answer is a straight forward yes. APPATHURAI: To both. COLSTON: In terms of a lull, we have seen lulls in Taliban and other militant activity in previous winters. And this is something for which we and our military commanders continue to watch. I would not want, however, to say, yes, there will be a lull. Because some of the things that we have seen this year, for example, the willingness of the Taliban to stand and fight rather than simply to engage in... in public attacks or suicide attacks or whatever, has represented a development in the situation. So yes, if we saw a lull this winter it would not be surprising. But I don't think you will find our military commanders are basing their plans on the presumption that there will definitely be a downturn in activity. Q: (inaudible)...question, which I understand the answer means that yes, indeed, Warsaw is prepared for it to be... to act as a reserve battalion across the country. When will those troops actually be there and able to do that role? APPATHURAI: The Polish forces, if I understand correctly, it is for Poland, of course, to time the deployment of their own forces, but if I understand the initial elements of that battalion will be going in relatively soon and will continue to flow into the country until early next year when they will be fully formed and have their full operational capability. But the initial elements will be much earlier than obviously than previously planned. And yes, the Polish government has agreed that this battalion can be used in an uncaveated way. In other words, without geographic restrictions and therefore can be used where necessary by the commander as a reserve in the country. Which as you understand, from following our debates here, goes a significant way to meeting the requirements that SACEUR has put forward for COMISAF. Brooks. Q: Yes, Brooks Tigner, Defense News. Two unrelated questions, if I may. Defence... or force generation... force generation is linked... still linked to NATO's force planning and force generation cycles, which to a certain extent are still very slow, of the collective effort. Who are you going to get around this in the future when you need to generate troops quickly for tough situations like we're seeing in Afghanistan? That's one question. And the second has nothing to do with it. NATO has given a signal to Georgia about prospects for membership. I'm just wondering how to place this into NATO-Russia relations, which are in a lamentable state, regardless of what you may tell us. Military to military contacts have declined. The Russian ship was sent over after two years of participation for a couple of days, and left. I wouldn't exactly call that a glorious achievement of NATO-Russia relations. So I'm wondering what has been the response of Russia to this prospect of Georgia, no matter how long it will take, to join the Alliance? And whether that's going to have any impact on the timing of Georgia's membership? Thank you. COLSTON: Thank you very much. The relationship between force generation and force planning, I will resist studiously the temptation to give you the full answer to that or you'll be here all afternoon. But essentially what we've got is two processes. The first is the operational commander finding the forces he needs for a particular operation and that's force generation. And then we've got force planning, which is NATO and the NATO nations working together to see how they're going to develop their forces in the longer term. How they're going to structure their forces, what capabilities are they going to invest in and so on and so forth. There's an overlap between the two because we have one database where we gather information from nations which services both functions. And because in some cases it makes sense to think of what a nation is going to commit, for example, to the NATO Response Force in four years time within that longer force planning timescale. But the two processes are separate and are both necessary for their own purposes. One to find us the forces for the operations, one to make sure that nations are developing the forces which are going to meet the needs of operations in the distant future. Georgia. I think first of all it's worth saying that the challenges which we face in our practical relations with Russia can be overstated. Yes, the Pitliviy was only actively engaged in support for Operation Active Endeavour for a week, but the processes of preparation of that ship, what we had to do to make that possible, that degree of cooperation is very significant and that will be something that stays with us. It's also significant, we hope we'll be talking to Minister Ivanov about this, that the Russians had personnel from other navy vessels onboard the Pitliviy, which we understand is in preparation for further such contributions to Active Endeavour in the future And there are a number of other areas where actually NATO-Russia cooperation in a low-profile way, has made significant steps forward. I'm sure that we will find that Minister Ivanov will talk about Georgia in Russia. At the moment I have to say I've seen no more than the press reports of his own comments, which seem to be suggesting that this was not something which should worry Russia. Certainly from our perspective, from my perspective it should not worry Russia. The prospect of bringing Georgia within the Euro-Atlantic group of nations represents absolutely no threat or challenge to Russia at all. And in my view the Russian Federation should, indeed, benefit from the expansion of the area of stability within Europe that that represents. But no doubt that will be a subject for discussion with Minister Ivanov at the meeting. Q: (inaudible)... I have a question on capabilities which means also, of course, equipment. The EU is undertaking to foster cooperation, also to make more of limited defence budgets, the IDA, the Code of Conduct, you know about all this. Is this something that NATO watches very closely and which is seen as a favourable also for NATO, or doesn't it make any difference for NATO capabilities? COLSTON: Let me just offer a comment in relation to defence spending. When we are talking to nations who are seeking to join the NATO Alliance, typically we require of them that they spend or have the plans to increase their defence spending to at least two percent of GDP. We do find that there are a lot of Allies who are not living up to that benchmark. Now levels of defence spending are not the only means by which the contribution which any one nation is making to shared efforts within the Alliance should be measured. But it is a significant factor. Your ability to maintain forces and to invest in new equipment is in large part a function of how much money you're spending. This is of concern to me as a defence planner. I know it's of concern to the Secretary General that we do try to encourage nations to recognize that the kinds of things that we're doing today, the range of operations which we're facing today, with more of our soldiers engaged on operations than has been the case for decades, does require robust levels of defence spending. And he'll be encouraging Defence Ministers to think about this in Portoroz. Q: Shada Islam from the German News Agency, DPA. Will ministers have a wider political discussion of what's happening in Afghanistan? I'm asking this because you've said you're surprised at the tenacity of the Taliban, and Musharraf, the Pakistani president, argues that's because they have popular support in Afghanistan and because the political situation doesn't allow for Pashtun representation at high enough levels within the central authority. So will that kind of issue be discussed by ministers as well? COLSTON: Yeah, thank you very much. I'm sure Ministers will want to have a political debate. But I'm sure as well they will acknowledge what I said earlier, that the solution to the challenges which Afghanistan faces cannot be wholly military and they are certainly not wholly the responsibility of defence ministers. So although defence ministers may well debate the broader political context, and it's important that they should because the coordination and cohesion of effort between our armed forces and the civilian agencies, is absolutely key to the way ahead in Afghanistan. I think the issues you're describing are much more the kinds of issues which NATO's Foreign Ministers were discussing last week in New York, which are being discussed in other fora as well. So I wouldn't expect it to be the primary focus of the discussions. Q: Just to follow that on, you seem to reflect a little bit what President Musharraf said when he was here, it's time for brains and not brawn so much and he's made this agreement in North Waziristan, perhaps two to three weeks ago. I wonder if you'd just give me an idea of the state of thinking about that agreement, and whether there's been enough time to see any effects in the south? COLSTON: I don't think I can comment on the operational position. And again, as with the previous question, I think this is a thing which Ministers, Defence Ministers may well wish to address in terms of their appreciation of the context within which their armed forces are fighting. But otherwise, this is principally an issue for Foreign Ministers. Q: Frederick Bonnart. Just in connection with that and the point you made of cleared areas, or being highly successfully converted now to normal civilian administration, does this apply to any area in the south? COLSTON: I mean, as I understood it, the question was, does our ability to put aid and reconstruction efforts... Q: You mentioned that one scenario... COLSTON: Yeah. Q: ...was organized that the other side, the non-military side is able to move in and continue and that had been very successful. COLSTON: Yeah. Q: Has such successes been achieved in the south? This is what... the north and the west one knows. COLSTON: Yes. Yes, this is happening in the south today. This is what we are seeing happen in the wake of the tactical successes which ISAF has been achieving in the south. As I say, it is very important that we're able to demonstrate that we can do this. Because ISAF is there primarily to assist creating the environment within which stabilization and reconstruction can take place. Q: (inaudible)... News Agency of Ukraine. Back to Russia, if possible. Do you expect Minister Ivanov will inform you about the military doctrine of Russia should be adopted by the first of October of the current year. And particularly according to the information released in Russia, the draft proposals mentioned NATO as potential enemy of Russia, alongside with U.S. and international terrorism. What could be (inaudible)... direction on that? Thank you. COLSTON: Thank you very much. I've certainly seen those reports too. I think I would prefer to wait, and I'm sure Defence Ministers would prefer to wait to see what Minister Ivanov himself has got to say on this subject, rather than base our reactions on reports that we've seen in the media. But of course, let there be no doubt that as far as NATO is concerned, we do not consider ourselves to be a threat to anybody. And equally, we believe that in today's environment the threat of large scale war fighting in Europe is so remote that it can be discounted. But, that means that we have the ability to reconfigure our forces, to deal with the kinds of threats terrorism, proliferation etc., which we're facing today and prepare for the kinds of operations, as in the Balkans and Afghanistan, that we're undertaking today. Q: I just want to follow up the question on the timing of Stage 4 earlier. Is it possible to move on to Stage 4 when you have this situation of underresourcing still with Stage 3, and the jury still being out on whether reconstruction development aid will get in sufficiently. Or on the contrary, are these issues, in fact, arguments for wanting to speed up Stage 4 by creating a kind of a seamless environment for them to operate in? COLSTON: As I said earlier, I'm not going to talk anymore about the timing, but just on a technical basis, of course, Stage 4 brings its own forces with it. We would expect it to bring about 10,000 forces into the ISAF force, and some capabilities, notably airlift, which would be useful to the force as a whole. So, just to clear up that point of debate, no, if we still have some shortfalls with which we're concerned in relation to Stage 3 and on which we're continuing to work, that in itself would not be a reason for precluding a move to Stage 4. Q: Ingrid Klintborn from the Spanish News Agency EFE. About shortfalls. Once you have this Polish battalion how many forces would still be needed and how do you expect more contribution to be made in Portoroz? Or are you going to focus more... is NATO going to focus more on other countries lifting caveats and giving more flexibility to their troops? COLSTON: The Secretary General, I'm sure, will want to do both. He will want to encourage nations to continue to contribute forces, combat forces, helicopters, aircraft, etc. etc. And he will want to encourage nations to remove any remaining caveats. ISAF is operating effectively today as we are seeing on the ground, but it is, in the interests of all Allies, and it's in the interests of the success of the operation that we continue to see these contributions of forces, so that we can be sure that the force remains robust and effective in the months ahead. Q: (inaudible)... COLSTON: I'm not going to try and quantify it at this stage. APPATHURAI: Last question. Q: Nick Fiorenza, Jane's Defence Weekly. Two questions, if I may. This strategy of going into an... well, I guess you're saying was used for Operation Medusa, of warning the local populous, and I guess that's with using psy-ops, then actually going in and then aid coming in after, right afterwards, is that modelled on what the U.S. has been doing with Operation Enduring Freedom? It sounds very much like what they've been doing for at least for the last year or two. Have there been, let's say, some modifications by NATO of the way the U.S. does it? And I'm wondering. if the U.S. hasn't succeeded in the south a couple of years using similar tactics, as far as I can tell, how long is NATO prepared to use those kinds of tactics? And then the second question is about Georgia. Is there a prospect of Georgia joining the MAP, and I don't know if this is a question to James or to Mr. Colston, but is there a prospect of Georgia being invited to the MAP by Riga, or at Riga? COLSTON: Thank you very much, and on your first question, I'll be honest, I don't know whether there has been any sort of practical lessons learned from ISAF in relation to Enduring Freedom. I would just make the point that the two missions are distinct, and the missions themselves will remain distinct, and Enduring Freedom is an explicitly counterterrorist operation to try and hunt down the bad guys. ISAF is having to deal with the challenge from the Taliban, but that is not its primarily purpose. Its primary purpose is to create a secure environment within which the Karzai government, supported by the international community, can build and can reconstruct. So if you like the struggle against the Taliban is the necessary condition which we have to go through in relation to ISAF, rather than our primary purpose. So I'd just like to underline that distinction. In relation to Georgia, I can't really speculate today on whether Georgia might be ready for a Membership Action Plan and when allies might be ready to consider it. The Intensified Dialogue is a serious process in its own right. And it does allow for a very detailed process of engagement between NATO staffs and the country concerned to support and encourage that process of political and military reform. And during this period Allies will be expecting to see continued significant progress by Georgia in both political and military reform, including of course, a mature and responsible approach from Georgia to relations with its neighbours. APPATHURAI: (inaudible)... Q: Yes. (inaudible)...Italian Press Agency (inaudible)... Just to know if you have a comment on the death today of Italian soldier in Afghanistan, and if you know something more about? COLSTON: I must say of course, that as with the Secretary General and as with all of the allies, we always deeply regret the loss of any life, and particularly the loss of the life of any serviceman or woman working with ISAF. I'm afraid I don't have any particular additional information in relation to this incident. I don't know if you do, James? APPATHURAI: The only information that I have... this is from ISAF. You will probably have seen it already, but there was an explosive device that was detonated against a convoy on the outskirts of Kabul. When I left the office it wasn't clear exactly what that explosive device was. I think by now the Secretary General will have expressed his condolences directly to the Italian ambassador. He had lunch with him, so I can guarantee that he expressed his condolences directly to him and through him to the Italian government. Please, and this will be it. Q: On enlargement, a very little question. There were speculations recently in Azeri press about launching the Intensified Dialogue with Azerbaijan so do this... does this information have any ground... COLSTON: It's not come on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. Thank you very much. APPATHURAI: Thank you. |
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