Résidence Palace, Brussels 13 Sept. 2006

Press Briefing by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai   Multimedia Audio file (.MP3/27.705kb) Biography James Appathurai JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Ladies and gentlemen, and there are more ladies and gentlemen, than I've seen for quite a while here. Let me first welcome you, to those of you who are coming to your first ever NATO press conference. There are a number of issues for us to discuss. I'm going to run through a number of them. I know you're all here for Afghanistan, so you're going to have to bear with me for five minutes while I run through some of the other issues before I open it up to questions. This will all be on the record unless I ask to go on background or off the record. Let me begin with Afghanistan, to give you an update on where we are. You all know, and the reason you're here, is because the Force Generation Conference has been taking place down at SHAPE. I'm not aware if it's actually finished, but certainly I spoke to the Secretary General just before I came here as to its conduct. There was a separate but relate issues, and that is the issue of Operation Medusa and its conduct in theatre. Let me first update you on Operation Medusa, then turn to the Force Generation Conference. Then I think it's probably most fruitful to quickly run through the rest of agenda, because we could open the floor to questions. Operation Medusa is going well. It is achieving its operational objectives. It is not complete yet, but I can tell you that a significant proportion of the objective has now been taken. In fact, over two-thirds of the objective has been taken. ISAF forces are moving forward. They're moving forward carefully because much of the area has been mined by the Taliban with IEDs and booby traps, which of course, will affect first and foremost the population of that area. So again, the mission is not yet complete, but it is achieving substantial success and the operational commanders, and that includes General Jones, are confident that they have sufficient forces in theatre to complete this mission successfully. Now, I know that in some nations, and my own is included, some elements of the media have focused, I think, quite naturally, on their own national contingents and the impression might inaccurately have been given that Canadians or British or others have been fighting on their own, and that has called into question, for example, whether NATO... other NATO forces have been providing sufficient support. I'd like to give you a little snapshot of what has been provided in the south. What NATO forces have been engaged, and non-NATO forces have been engaged in this effort until now. That does not preclude what will happen soon. But to give you a snapshot. Canada, of course, has been very much in the lead, but also supported by the U.S., Denmark, the U.K. and the Netherlands. I might add, three Afghan Kandaks, that is three Afghan battalions... I just spoke two minutes ago to Mark Laity in theatre, he wanted me to stress the very high quality of fighting forces that they have been providing and the high numbers. These are high numbers of very active and heavily engaged Afghan troops. Canadian ISAF combat units from Kandahar, you're aware of this, the operation has included Danish reconnaissance elements, Dutch troops and artillery that were brought in from Uruzgan, so outside of the immediate area, U.S. infantry units and artillery units from CFC Alpha, in other words, from the coalition in eastern Afghanistan, and significant air support in the form of U.S. and U.K. aircraft from F-18s to A-10s and Harriers. Again, to give you a very clear picture, this has been very much a multinational effort. The point being, when it comes to Op Medusa they are achieving their operational objectives and they are achieving it relatively quickly. Second, that General Jones' assessment is that there are sufficient forces in theatre to complete Operation Medusa successfully. Now, this brings us to a separate, but obviously related issue, and that is generating the outstanding or remaining request for a battalion, reserve battalion to provide operational flexibility, more operational flexibility and effectiveness, to COMISAF throughout the operational area. Again, this is now... this is not linked to Op Medusa. Op Medusa they have sufficient forces to do what they need to do. But clearly the pace and level of operations in the context of Op Medusa highlights the importance of providing 100 percent of what is required to Commander ISAF. In the discussions today positive indications were given in terms of force generation, in terms of forces to be provided by nations to fill the outstanding requirement, in particular for the battalion. And second, positive indications were also given when it came to the removal or adjustment of caveats on existing forces in the theatre. Now, no formal offers were made at the table, but the discussions are continuing. As I say, they're continuing in a positive manner. We have a meeting of ambassadors to take place on Friday. There will be a foreign ministers meeting next week in New York and then the week after that the meeting of defence ministers in Slovenia. These will be important milestones as we move to generate, and I hope and expect, generate quickly, the reserve battalion and associated air elements that remain outstanding. So we're making progress in that regard as well. Oh yes, one thing I did want to mention on the subject of Afghanistan. There was also a discussion today, amongst ambassadors, to step up dramatically, to create, to develop a NATO effort to equip the Afghan National Army. While there were no formal decisions taken at the table, there was a shared will, I think, very positive discussions, for nations to come forward and provide equipment to the Afghan National Army as General Wardak, the Defence Minister, has requested. You all know that NATO has provided substantial amounts of equipment to the Iraqi armed forces. While I cannot say exactly what form NATO support to the Afghan National Army will take, it will certainly not, I think, be too dissimilar from the effort that NATO has made to support the Iraqi armed forces. Let me turn now, quickly, because I know what you're interested in, the... take a quick look at some of the other issues--I'll take three minutes to do this--on our agenda and then we'll come back to questions. First, today at the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, this is what brings together NATO nations and all of our partners. Ambassadors agreed on what we call a Memorandum of Understanding, which aims to improve the speed and efficiency of assistance to victims of humanitarian crises or disasters. In other words, what it will do is facilitate the transit of civilian assistance across borders throughout what we call the EAPC area, so the NATO and partner area. Until now there have been legal or practical or customs challenges to get across borders, by definition, as you all know. This MOU aims to ease those and we'll provide more detail in future. It is applicable to the provision of humanitarian assistance in response to disasters, including those triggered by chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event. It is now open for signature to all NATO allies and partners. It aims, of course, to expedite disaster relief. Now let me look forward... sorry, one other thing I should mention. General Valotto today was in the North Atlantic Council. He's the outgoing... has now left, as being the commander of KFOR. He gave a briefing to ambassadors on the security situation in Kosovo. Bottom line, his assessment was, KFOR is well prepared to face any contingency. We have now moved to a task force structure, which means that instead of having the division of Kosovo into multinational brigades, Kosovo for NATO, for KFOR is now one unified area of responsibility, with full flexibility for the operational commander. The situation in northern Kosovo, in his assessment, is now, for the moment, stable. COMKFOR, the new COMKFOR is taking a very close look at the security situation in the north, as well, of course, the rest of the country. And we'll keep a close eye on events. Is there anything else? Okay. Let me just look forward now quickly to the upcoming agenda, and then I'm happy to take your questions. On Thursday, that would be tomorrow, Prime Minister Yanukovych of Ukraine will come to NATO, will meet with the Secretary General. Then will meet with the entire North Atlantic Council..  We will broadcast the opening statements by the Secretary General and the Ukrainian Prime Minister, two minutes each. That will be at 10:00 o'clock. At 11:15 they will give a point de presse in the press area. I think it is safe to say that both the NATO allies and the Prime Minister will wish to discuss what Ukraine's intentions are. What are their aspirations for closer partnership with NATO? Do they have a clear idea on how they wish to move forward, perhaps, when it comes to membership. So this, I believe, and it's no surprise to those of you who follow Ukraine, will be the tenure of the discussions tomorrow. On Friday the Georgian Foreign Minister will also be at NATO. I do not see in the agenda any press opportunity, but we will let you know if there is one. Finally, let me look forward to the Foreign Ministers meeting in New York, give you a flavour of what should be the issues for discussion. This meeting was intended, when it was originally scheduled, very much to look forward to the RiGa Summit. It's the last opportunity for Foreign Ministers to discuss the many political issues on the agenda. Now, of course, while it may well have already been on the agenda, Afghanistan will have a prominent role in those discussions, but let me touch on others. One is, enlargement. What kind of signal will NATO nations wish to give to the aspirant countries in Riga? The Secretary General has said that he expects it to be a positive signal and we do, but of course that needs to be defined a little bit better. On partnerships: How do NATO nations wish to deepen their relations with their existing partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council? How do they wish to reach out and strengthen relations with non-EAPC countries. Training: Will NATO provide training or, in fact, launch a training initiative for in particular Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI countries. As those of you who've followed NATO for a while, know NATO has been for years providing security sector reform and military reform assistance to Central and Eastern European countries who wish to upgrade their militaries, and move them closer to interoperable models. NATO can provide this to interested countries, potentially in the Mediterranean and Gulf region. And of course, operations, it is not surprise to you that they will wish to discuss the situations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Kosovo, of course, is coming... is moving forward, anyway, in the discussions when it relates to status. NATO will wish to have a discussion on what role the Alliance will play once status talks clarify what the future will be for Kosovo and what the future will be for international organizations who might wish to continue to provide support in that regard. I think I've covered all the issues. Surprising, Paul already had his hand up, which meant he knew what the question was before I went through the agenda. Paul. Q: James, you said that the Operation Medusa had achieved two-thirds of its objectives. Can you clarify for us what that means? Does that mean land captured, or is there some other sort of way of measuring those objectives? And secondly, what is the process... you mentioned there are positive indications from the meeting down at SHAPE today. What is the process for turning those positive indications into formal commitments for more troops? APPATHURAI: Good question. I want to say right from the beginning I am not an operational briefer. I'm not a military briefer, and I am not General Richards. So if there is some ambiguity in what I say it's either because I don't know, or I don't want to get in trouble. But my understanding is that in essence they have achieved operational success in moving into and pushing out of approximately and slightly more than two-thirds of the operational area. Those who have been trying to oppose them, principally Taliban, from moving into and establishing a presence in this operational area. I think it's also worth noting that unlike previous military operations that have taken place there in the past, before NATO arrived, at the intention and what will be the fact is that NATO has arrived with the Afghan army to stay. So we will establish a presence that will be for the long term, and bring in development assistance as quickly as possible, and I mean as quickly as possible. Everyone is focused on this issue. To as quickly as possible show the Afghan people that their lives will get better. The second question, positive indications. There are, of course, formal discussions, there are informal discussions. Formal discussions come with decisions attached to them in NATO. Informal discussions, both at the military level and the political level, are ongoing. As I say, while no formal decisions have been taken, positive indications have to have been heard. There are, in every country, discussions that have to take place within the militaries, but also at the political level. So until those discussions are complete no decisions will be taken. And I don't want to lean too far forward. No formal decisions mean no formal announcement. No formal announcements means no formal announcements. But as I say positive indications have been heard of further contributions. Well, let's start there, because I think you were... Q: Oui, bonjour James. Est-ce que tu décrirais ce qui se passe comme un manque de volonté de la part des Alliés, un manque de capacité? Ou est-ce qu'il y aurait eu par hasard une dramatisation un peu excessive du quartier général des Forces alliées pour des raisons sans doute opérationnelles mais qui ne correspondent pas à la réalité sur le terrain? APPATHURAI: La réalité sur le terrain, on a vu, moi, en suivant le Secrétaire général... Et vous comprenez l'anglais. Je pense que c'est mieux que je parle en anglais parce que sinon tout le monde va comprendre. The interpreters at NATO never appreciated the fact that I don't bring them down here, and maybe they were right. I, following the Secretary General and the NAC, saw the operational situation for myself. There is a very high tempo of activity. NATO forces, particularly in the south, are not only working hard, but they are stretched. There is no denying that they are stretched, and that more forces would allow all of the ISAF mission to achieve its objectives more quickly and at lower risk. General Richards has never hidden this fact. And we saw for ourselves how stretched they are. It was in the context, and I said this before, of seeing the level of activity in the south that it became very clear that General Richards would need at his disposal, for the longer term  the reserve battalion that had already been identified, that had not yet been generated. Now Op Medusa made this clear. Op Medusa is achieving its operational success, with all of the various forces being moved in and rearranged from the existing forces in theatre it is achieving its aims. They're not achieved yet, but it was achieving a substantial amount of success and we expect that to continue. But it has certainly highlighted the importance, and I think there General Jones was absolutely right, as General Richard was absolutely right. The importance of filling this. So I don't think it was either an inaccurate assessment... I don't think it was an inaccurate assessment. I think it was absolutely an accurate assessment based on what Operation Medusa was showing us for the overall requirement. In terms of willingness to provide forces, I think the first thing to remember is that there are 37 countries in Afghanistan and 20,000... approximately 20,000 troops there under NATO command. I think it's also worth mentioning that very many of those countries have lost soldiers to attacks and that includes the Germans, it includes the Spanish, it includes the Canadians, it includes the Italians, it includes the U.K. and unfortunately a long list of countries. So no one should doubt the willingness of NATO nations, in whatever region, to put their forces at risk because they've all put their soldiers' lives on the line and some of those soldiers have paid the ultimate price. Many nations have brought in forces to support Op Medusa. I mentioned them to you from outside the immediate area. I mentioned the Dutch, I mentioned the United States. And of course, United Kingdom brought in air support as well, and the Canadians are very heavily engaged. So again, a demonstration of solidarity amongst nations. As I said, Operation Medusa is moving forward successfully until now. We expect that success to continue. But, and here's the but, solidarity is the glue that binds NATO together and the Secretary General certainly expects and hopes that allies will continue to demonstrate solidarity and come forward to meet the shortfall, the operational reserve and the associated air elements that have been identified. Operation Medusa's success, until now, and it's continued success that we expect, does not detract from the need for allies to come forward and fill the remaining shortfall, for the overall flexibility and effectiveness that COMISAF has at its disposal and we will keep up the pressure, have no doubt, on nations and the Secretary General will certainly expect to see results quickly. Q: Thank you. Tim Franks, BBC News. Three quick questions, if I may. APPATHURAI: Please. Q: In terms of turning those positive signals into formal commitments, can we read anything into the fact that you've gone as far as the defence ministers meeting in Slovenia in a couple of weeks time, is that when you hope these signals turn into positive commitments? In terms... this is probably a rather ignorant questions, but in terms of trying to get a reserve battalion of what, about a 1000 troops together, is this a case perhaps of getting 20 troops from Latvia, 40 troops from Country B and so forth? Can one get a reserve battalion together that way? And just lastly, is there any concern from your point of view that if you do get indications that countries are willing to change their rules of engagement, and in other words, be redeployed from, for example, the north, that actually that might somehow undermine the momentum towards getting these extra troops because people might think, well we can redeploy if they're needed in the south? APPATHURAI: Thank you. None of those is an ignorant question. They're all good questions. Slovenia, I think, will certainly be an important moment. When NATO defence ministers meeting in the context of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, in particular the south, and in the context of what is a clear focus on meeting the shortfalls that have already been identified in terms of force levels in Afghanistan, it will certainly be an important moment where we will hope to see progress. There is no doubt. In terms of cobbling together... Chris Riley is sitting next to me. My understanding, please correct me if I'm wrong, is if you're putting together a battalion you would certainly want a framework nation at the centre of that, to be the most effective. You wouldn't want a thousand troops composed of 37 groups of 20, or whatever. You can certainly supplement what is a core group from one or two or three nations, but you wouldn't want to go dramatically beyond that. Am I...? CHRIS RILEY (NATO Press Officer): Pretty much. The package for the operational reserve is all the enablers, the air transport, (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) APPATHURAI: Exactly. So you'd have a core of fighting forces, in a sense, at the centre, surrounded by the enablers that go with it, where you can indeed plug holes and NATO does do this, but I think the optimum is to have at the core a one or two framework, if you wish, of nations. Third, I hope I didn't lean too far forward on caveats, because I want to be clear on this. Positive indications is nothing more than positive indications. It does not in any way undermine the necessity to generate the forces necessary to meet... to provide this battalion that we're discussing. I think we may as well start from the front and we'll go back. Q: The nations you mentioned that are supporting the Canadians were all old allies. Were any new allies involved in the fighting? I'm thinking specifically about the Romanians and the Estonians who are in the south. APPATHURAI: For the moment that's the information I have. We can check it, but that's the information I have until now. Doesn't anyone have any questions on the transit of humanitarian assistance across EAPC borders? Q: Yes. (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: All right, well, let's deal with Afghanistan first and then we'll come back to it. Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Yeah, okay. Q: (inaudible)...Radio Free Europe. I'm sorry if this is an ignorant question, but I was wondering if you could put what you've told us in a wider context. Am I correct in assuming now that if NATO gets this one reserve battalion together it will have enough in the long term to pacify the three-fourths of the country that's current in, or is suppressed by Taliban, or is something more needed? Thank you? APPATHURAI: Good question. First, I think we have to be clear about what NATO's mission is, and I'm glad you raise the question. I'm not trying to spit it back at you, because many people have this impression. NATO's mission is not to pacify the country and that is why comparisons between force levels in Kosovo, for example, or Bosnia and Afghanistan are simply off the mark. NATO's mission is to help establish conditions in which reconstruction and development take place and to help the Afghan government extend their authority. That's exactly why the Afghans are fighting next to us, and why the Afghans will be increasingly the ones who establish presence in their own country. We are there very much in a supporting role and you can see that in the north and in the west. In the south, of course, the combat capability of the Afghan armed forces are simply not up to the level to be able to provide this kind of military capability and that's why NATO forces have very much taken the lead. But that is also why we are heavily engaged in training the Afghan army and now equipping them. Now let me stress, soon equipping them. No formal decision has been taken, but I certainly expect that NATO will start to do this. So that is the broader context. In terms of the force levels it is up to the military commanders, of course, to tell the political leadership what it is that they believe is necessary. After returning from Afghanistan, having spoken to General Richards in the field, General Jones and General Richards have been consistent in saying that the... what we call the statement of requirements, in other words, the overall list of military requirements that they identified 18 months ago and the operational plan, both of which were then agreed and endorsed by all 26 NATO nations, they both agree that these are still completely valid to complete the mission as set. Q: Yes, Brooks Tigner, Defense News. Two questions. Caveats, how soon are they talking about removing caveats? Something less vague than just soon. One week, two weeks, a month? And on this... on the achievement of Medusa, if you've achieved two-thirds of the territory that means Taliban has pulled back. So the logical... one of the logical places for them to pull back is to the Pakistan frontier. Are the NATO troops moving in to cut off that retreat? That's the basic military question. What's going on there? Thank you. APPATHURAI: Two answer the basic military question I think what I'm going to do is refer you down to ISAF, to answer that question. I don't want to speak for General Richards on how he's deploying his troops along which area or not. That would be, I think, beyond my mandate. And unfortunately on caveats I cannot say the caveats will be removed at all. All I've said was we've heard positive signals. I could not give you timelines or details. Q: James, General Jones said last week... I mean, he identified the period between now and the onset of winter in Afghanistan as a defining time in this conflict. Is there not a danger that by the time that NATO gets round to generating these forces that you may not have had positive indications about, by the time they're actually there, that window of opportunity that General Jones was talking about as being absolutely crucial, may have closed? APPATHURAI: Well, in fact, I think the success that we're seeing in Op Medusa is quite relevant here. Op Medusa is pushing into the heartland of opposition to the central government. This has been the private hunting ground of the Taliban and narco traffickers for quite a long time. There has never been, as far as I understand, in the history of Afghanistan central government control there. And the whole purpose of this operation was of course to prevent the Taliban from cutting off Kandahar, but also to push in there, push them out and allow the population there to see the benefits of central government control, and associated with that development.  I agree with General Jones, that it is a very important moment, and I think Op Medusa and the success that it's achieving is designed precisely to take advantage of this important moment. The success that it's achieving, I think will be a success for NATO by the time of the onset of winter. Now, as a separate issue, the generation of this battalion also needs to be done and it needs to be done quickly. So let there be no doubt that the success of Operation Medusa does not remove the requirement to provide the operational commander with the capability he needs to be as effective as possible. Q: Okay, just two questions, James. The reserve battalion, will it be just that, will it be held in reserve, when it gets there, if it gets there, or is the idea they will be deployed in combat as soon as they do? Second question, President Musharraf was in town, has been in town this week and he said he didn't think it was necessary to visit NATO to talk about the issues such as Taliban and border infiltration by coming up to NATO Headquarters. Do you regret not having had the chance to discuss some of those pretty vital issues with him? APPATHURAI: On the first question, again, I don't want to speak for the operational commander, so I'll let him do with this reserve battalion what he decides at the time to do with it. In terms of President Musharraf, I can tell you that there are good and deepening relations between NATO and Pakistan at all levels. At the military level from SHAPE, for example. General Jones has just come back from Pakistan, and spoken to his counterparts and that's the top level military leadership in Pakistan. The senior civilian representative is part of... I think it's COMISAF, is part of the tripartite... do they both go or is it just... it's just COMISAF? RILEY: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Yeah, COMISAF is part of the tripartite NATO, Afghan and Pakistani commission which regulates many of the important border issues that are being discussed in COMISAF. For us is a pretty high ranking guy as well. Would other political discussions be welcome? Well they'd always be welcome, but I think what's important to note is our relations with Pakistan are practical, they are regular, they are high level and they will be deepened. Yeah, sorry, excuse me. Q: Thank you. Finally. Q: Two questions, one purely technical about the battalion. It's been said that we need this battalion and some people are saying between 600, 800, 1000 could be, but there are other reports that are talking that that could be even 2000, 2500 people mobilized. So the battalion for the people that are lay people (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Excuse me. Happy to (inaudible). Q: ...is this, when you are talking about the core... the core... the battalion is the core and the rest are the supporting forces, or there are supporting forces to the centre in the battalion and there are other supportive forces (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: I'll explain that. Q: Okay. APPATHURAI: Second question? Q: And the second question is, since we are needing badly this tactical battalion that is not there because it was not provided, must we assume that that is not either a strategic battalion reserve us in every operation should be one tactical, another strategic, and is not a mistake going to operation without having this back-up of people? Thank you. APPATHURAI: Yeah. First question, what is a battalion and where does the 2000 number come from? Again, I will defer to Chris if I'm wrong, but a battalion, depending on the country, can stretch to 500, 600, 700 people. There are the associated elements around them, engineers, medical and other levels of support. The second number, which brings us up to a higher number, is General Jones was also talking about providing more helicopters and more aircraft, fixed wing aircraft. And those, of course, come with big packages of people around them as well. So that's the second element of support. The battalion and there is air elements, which bring the number up higher. APPATHURAI: Again, that's up to the force generation process, and of course, how they are used is up to the commander. In terms of reserves, there is a strategic reserve for ISAF. There is an operational reserve for ISAF. And there is always the NATO Response Force in the background. So let there be no doubt we don't take on operations without the necessary reserves. This is something we've done for a little while now. I think we have to go back. I'll come back to you. Q: Concerning tomorrow's visit of Mr. Yanukovych... APPATHURAI: Hey! Ahhh, yes. Q: Yes. You told that NATO will wait what Yanukovych will say about the future cooperation and development of cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. And so concerning to my sources there is a frame statement of cabinet of ministers that is to be that we are very satisfied, we are highly appreciative of the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine and we are continuing in the same spirit, etc. etc. So are you going to put that principal questions to Mr. Yanukovych in which ways would be developed the relationship between Ukraine and cooperation between Ukraine and NATO? Because tomorrow it would be also the commission of NATO and Ukraine. There is... it's not only the visit of Mr. Yanukovych, but there is definite points to discuss. What are you going to discuss tomorrow with him exactly? APPATHURAI: Well, I think you're quite right to mention the two elements. There is the principal question, and that is what speed and what direction does Ukraine wish to take in terms of its relations with NATO. We have, of course, a framework for cooperation with NATO and that's the Intensified Dialogue. And so the elements of our cooperation are already very clear and established. And there's no reason to call those into question. The question is, how far and how fast does Ukraine wish to go. And that is, I think, the first message that ambassadors and the Secretary General will wish to hear from the new government. After that, with that in mind, the next question is, how quickly do we go forward in implementing what is already a very well-defined program of cooperation? So I think that there is no problem. There is no conceptual problem with how this meeting will go tomorrow. To be fair... Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: I presume the rest of the questions are on Afghanistan? Q: Yeah, sorry. I have to come back to Afghanistan. First question, the German government just extended mandate for Afghanistan. Keeping the caveat they have. Would you say that is in the spirit of solidarity, the General Secretary like to see? And second question, on a more general basis, if I'm not wrong, the main task of OEF, which operated in the area, we see the fighting now, the main task was hunting and killing terrorists and other insurgents. And they had 28,000 men with a rough mandate in the end. So is there any explanation by NATO why this OEF mission obviously failed? And where do you take the optimism from that a small ISAF force with many other tasks, like supporting the civilian side, could succeed? APPATHURAI: First point, I have to say I am unaware of any formal caveat restrictions on the deployment, geographic deployment of German troops? Unaware of. That being said, I think it would be a profound mistake to call into question Germany's contribution in Afghanistan. Almost 3000 troops have been there... well the level is now almost 3000 troops. Thousands of German troops have been in Afghanistan for a long time. They are shouldering the burden in the north. They have suffered casualties, and everyone recognizes that Germany has done a lot. And continues to do a lot and the extension is very welcome by NATO. NATO has asked each and every country to look at what they can do to support this mission, but there is no doubt that Germany has been, and continues to pull its weight in Afghanistan. When it comes to OEF I, of course, am not paid by OEF, so I don't want to speak to their success, but I think you've hit on the key point. OEF has had a mission to, in essence, conduct targeted operations against terrorist leadership, intelligence-driven, targeted operations against terrorist leadership. So they have been moving, moving around and conducting very mobile operations. NATO has come into the south with A, a different mission, which is to establish presence, the presence of NATO forces and the presence of the Afghan government and establish government authority. And we are doing it with twice the force levels that OEF had in the south. And let no one doubt that they are coming in robustly. We can see that every day. So the mission is different, and the force levels are double what OEF had in the past, but let me stress, OEF helped to establish the conditions for ISAF's success, and that is happening. And second, ISAF right now is counting on a lot of support from Operation Enduring Freedom as they can count on support and have counted on support from us, air support. So this is certainly a partnership. It is a partnership that is working across over necessary geographic boundaries to achieve what is our common aim, and that is to help Afghanistan establish its own authority in its own country. Q: Oui. Could you tell us how many Taliban have been killed in the south since the fight began one month ago? And how many soldiers, allied soldiers, have been killed. Those two figures. APPATHURAI: Yes. Since operations began a month ago, I couldn't conceivably give you either of those figures. Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI:  I'd ask you to contact ISAF on that. I don't want to speak to those numbers. Sorry, with apologies, but whatever number they are willing to give you it'll be more up to date than what I can give you. Q: Could NATO theoretically mobilize and deploy parts of the NRF to help out until the winter comes in? And who would be able to take such a decision? APPATHURAI: Based on the assessment that I just gave you, which is that Operation Medusa is achieving with the existing forces in theatre the success that it was intended to succeed, I do not foresee a discussion amongst ambassadors or at the formal level of the NRF being deployed. Certainly in this context. Though you have, of course, raised, and I don't hide this here, an interesting theological debate about when and where the NRF is necessary. Frankly, I don't think that theological debate will be had in this context, because I don't think it is, frankly, going to be necessary; at least in the immediate context. I don't want to prejudge what might happen. But certainly, as I say, if our top military commander says existing forces in theatre are, for the moment, sufficient to complete the mission, then I think that's where we need to leave that discussion. Sorry, was there a second question? Q: Who will be in the position to make such decisions? APPATHURAI: Well, to make such decisions? The deployment of the NRF would require a unanimous decision by the Council. Q: If I could just try and pin you down a tiny little bit. The battalion, you said you've had positive indications on troop generation, the ideal scenario would be one or two nations providing the troops. APPATHURAI: Framework. Q: The framework. APPATHURAI: Bulk(?). Q: Do you have positive indications about your ideal scenario? APPATHURAI: I won't go beyond... I'm sorry, but I can't go beyond what I've said, no. I'm sorry about this, but that's... I'm on... I'm already on a long leash, but that's as long as it gets. Q: Just could you... in your view, how could you outline the main difficulties in Afghanistan? Would be the strong resistance from Taliban or the lack of a logistic or the lack of forces, or anything... or solidarity? What's the main difficulty? Second question, concerning the foreign ministers in New York. You mentioned the second is a partnership deepening will be really... the partnership, I mean, for the enlargement or some other (inaudible) will be settled on. I mean, what kind of relations, just like Japan or Australia or what kind of thing will be done? Okay, thank you. APPATHURAI: Yeah, absolutely. The challenge is... Now I'm speaking I have to say on a quasi-personal basis, but I think the challenges in Afghanistan depend on which region you're addressing. Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Oh, in the south. In the south the main challenge is of course to establish sufficient security--you're never going to have, I think, in the immediate future a totally safe and secure environment in which development and reconstruction can take place totally without the protection of security forces. That's not realistic. But what we have to do is establish sufficient security for development and reconstruction to take place, as I said, for the Afghan people to see their lives get better and recognize the benefits of central government authority. I have to say I have not grown up in Afghanistan, but it's probably easy to demonstrate once you have sufficient security that life will be better under the government of Afghanistan than the Taliban. But we have to be in a position to be able to do that. So the immediate challenge is to get through this phase. It is a phase of robust military operations to set the conditions for development and reconstruction to take place as quickly as possible, and I mean as quickly as possible. In terms of partnership, I do not expect to see any new formal structures established when it comes to relations between NATO and... and countries outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. What I do expect is a discussion, and I think it will certainly take place in New York and right up to the day of the Riga Summit, a discussion of how to deepen and strengthen the relations between NATO and each of these countries. We call them contact countries for want of a better word, but Japan, Australia, New Zealand, potentially South Korea, these are countries that share our values, that contribute to our operations, and with which it only makes sense to have a deeper political dialogue and a stronger, more practical military partnership as well from a NATO perspective. So that's the tenor of the discussion. The meat on the bones, I think, or the meat will have to be put on the bones as we get closer to Riga. Q: Mr. Costa from the UN, I think yesterday, asked for NATO to have a mandate in the battle against drugs and particularly to take... have an aggressive role in taking on the drugs traffickers. Was that discussed by the NATO ambassadors today and do you have any view on that? APPATHURAI: Well, the Secretary General has a view, and I think you've probably seen it, but to be clear, NATO has a mandate from the United Nations. It also has a clear partnership with the Afghan government, and that mandate is clear, that NATO does not have a lead role, and I might add, the Secretary General has been very clear, NATO is not seeking a lead role in the counternarcotics effort. NATO can and is playing a robust supporting role in terms of providing intelligence to the Afghan counternarcotics agencies, in terms of providing logistical support to them, transport, for example, in terms of providing medical evacuation in extremis to them, and in terms of providing training, both to Afghan officials and in neighbouring countries as well. Counternarcotics officials. Those are the roles we've been given. Those are the roles we're doing, and NATO is not seeking a role beyond that. Brooks. Q: Yeah, I have to come back to my question about the Taliban. You've been asked what the strategy is in the south. You can't answer it. You've been asked statistics, you can't answer. I've asked you which way is the Taliban going? You can't answer, you haven't been authorized, and yet you've come in here and you've told us it's a success. And it's a success because three-quarters of the territory, or two-thirds, or whatever, has been occupied, but you can't tell us how. This raises a host of questions. Is the Taliban still in the territory? Have they been pushed out? You've got all the technology in the world and you know what's going on there. To do that is to bank on the credulity of most of the journalists in this room to go out and say it's a success simply because you've said it's a success. Now, I realize you're only authorized to say what you're authorized to say, but I don't find that satisfactory. You should be authorized, from SHAPE, you are the spokesman of NATO, which is the organization as a whole, and if we ask you these kind of questions it's proof of your operation as a success or not. And I can't, for my newspaper, which is the world's biggest defence publication, I'm not going to write that NATO is a success if you can't say... if you can't give us a little more substance as to why and what the problems are there, and whether... what the Taliban is doing and what you see that they've done and where they're going? Thanks. APPATHURAI: I appreciate the question. I'll say again, I'm not the operational commander, and other people are answering these questions. Now you have seen, for example, ISAF publish figures of over 500 Taliban killed. So I will cite my own organization as having said that. I have... you will have also have seen General Richards' spokesman this morning say... I don't know if he's General Richards'. He's the senior civilian representative spokesman, Mark Laity, say that ISAF forces have pushed into an established presence, in, as I say, over two-thirds now of the area into which they wish to push. What does this mean? It means that yes, the Taliban is moving in that area. Does it mean that they've all left? I can't say. Does it mean that two or three might infiltrate and plant an IED, of course I can't say. What I can say is that this operation is achieving the success that it wishes to achieve in terms of establishing its presence. In terms of territory, this comes directly from, of course, operational commanders. But whether you wish to print it or not, the best thing to do is for you to go down to Panjwai and have a look. What was the other thing I didn't answer? The strategy. The strategy is quite clear. And I think I've been quite clear about it. It is indeed alongside the Afghans, to push the Taliban out of this territory, establish an Afghan presence there, and immediately begin to provide reconstruction and development with the Afghan central government to establish their presence there. That is the NATO mission. That's exactly what they're doing and the relevance of it in Panjwai is that this is a strategically important area for the security of Kandahar, for transit from Kandahar and psychologically because it's the heartland of the Taliban. So for all of those reasons it is a strategically important mission. Q: Yeah, James, just... the meeting down in SHAPE, that's still ongoing as we speak. APPATHURAI: Well, it was when I walked in the room. I don't know... Q: But your expectation is that when you said there have been no formal commitments on the table you're not expecting those formal commitments to come later on this afternoon? APPATHURAI: In the time... well, you're ahead of me if you know that it's still going on, but... Q: No no, I'm just asking whether... APPATHURAI: No, I'm not expecting... Q: The expectation's going to come later at one of these ministerial meetings or... APPATHURAI: Yes, exactly. Q: ...something like that. Today it's... APPATHURAI: I don't expect anything more. Q: There's not going to be any surprises for us (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) Q: Okay. Secondly, a caveat question. There's a... a slightly unusual caveat question. There's stories circulating on one of the American TV networks today that NATO commanders in Afghanistan are upset because a U.S. drone detected a whole bunch of Taliban leaders in a cemetery, but then let them go because U.S. rules of engagement did not allow fighting in cemeteries. I guess from the looks on your faces you don't have any comment on that. APPATHURAI: A, I hadn't seen the story, B, I can't speak for U.S. rules of engagement, so... that... I presume this would be OEF. Q: Well, it wasn't that clear. APPATHURAI: Yeah. I haven't seen the story, but B, I couldn't comment on their rules of engagement. Let's go to Mark and then we'll come back to you two. Q: James, I just wanted to check your comment on the timing of it. You say that Slovenia will be an important moment. I assume that's in terms of finalizing the offers for these reinforcements. That would mean presumably that they're not actually going to be deployed until sometime quite well into October, if that's the time frame. Slovenia's the 27th, 28th of September. APPATHURAI: Twenty-eight, twenty-nine. Q: Okay. So if the agreement on who's actually going to make up this battalion's not actually finalized till then then we're looking at sometime in October for an actual deployment. APPATHURAI: I suspect you're quite right, that there would be no way to get a deployment... well, let me walk back from that. I do not... I cannot predict when, if, when, formal offers will come. What I said was that Slovenia will be an important moment. I expect it to be. And if commitments are made at or by Slovenia, yes, you're right, that deployments couldn't take place till after that. That's the way it is. Q: (inaudible)...at the very latest... APPATHURAI: I mean, we have separated, I hope, I've tried to separate two issues. Op Medusa and its success from the overall flexibility that the commander wants to have. But that is not linked to any event or timeframe. That is a separate... related, of course, but separate issue, of filling fully the CJSOR. So I  I think it's important not to put an artificial timeline on that. As quickly as possible NATO nations want that. Don't get me wrong. The Secretary General wants it as much as anyone. But I don't think... I want to try to separate out these two issues because they are, indeed, separate. General Jones believes that he has sufficient forces... there are sufficient forces in theatre to complete the Operation Medusa successfully. I know it's a follow-up so... Q: It's a follow-up. I mean, you talk about artificial timelines, but General Jones was quite specific last week. He said he wanted them there before the snow came. Because he thinks he's got an opportunity there and he wants to take full advantage of that, and he said those extra troops would help him take advantage of that. APPATHURAI: Yeah. Q: The way you're talking, they're not going to be there before the snow comes down. APPATHURAI: I don't know when the snow comes, but certainly all I will say is certainly on the record, but even off the record is, everyone's moving as fast as possible. We want to get this done as quickly as possible. I think these two fellows are here... Q: You mentioned that the main target will be to provide sufficient security in the southern part. Within how long time? Within one year, two year, or five years, or what's your expectation for that? APPATHURAI: My expectation, and this frankly is based on... not my expectation, but I think the Secretary General's expectation, and hope, based on what the whole council saw when they were in Afghanistan, is we're not talking about one or two years. We're talking about weeks and months. That as quickly as possible, quick impact projects have to be brought in on the development and reconstruction side, to start to begin to make immediate, or as near to as possible immediate improvements to the lives of the people who are living there. So... RILEY: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Yeah, yeah. I can give you. Thanks, Chris. This is good. RILEY: It's what (inaudible)... Medusa (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Well it's what they're doing on Medusa. Yeah. The combined post-combat effort in Panjwai will focus first on immediate aid for those displaced to resettle, then on the groundwork for getting crop level, school attendance and employment up to pre-Taliban levels. So that gives you an idea. And they're talking about as quickly as possible to achieve these things. Q: Do you think it'll be possible to achieve that, really? APPATHURAI: Well, it's all possible. It may take time. Afghanistan is not Canada. It takes time. But it has to be done. And it will be done. Q: Follow-up to Mark John’s questions, previous one, did the Secretary General or anyone of the higher officials of NATO  meet President of Pakistan even informal way and why not when you had such a big operation successfully in Kashmir region? APPATHURAI: I am not aware that any senior NATO official met with the President and I am not aware of why. I believe it was simply scheduling issues. Lise. Q: Just a few things I didn't get very well. I think you said there was going to be a meeting of the ambassadors on Friday? What are they going to discuss? APPATHURAI: On the Afghanistan issue. Q: What are they going to talk about, because if you don't expect any progress before Slovenia... APPATHURAI: Well, Slovenia's not too far away, but more to the point there's a meeting of foreign ministers in New York next Thursday, so with Afghanistan on the agenda they will certainly be looking forward to that. Q: And then you said about 1000 battalion. It's 1000 with all the support they need, or it's 2500 because I've seen that figure. APPATHURAI: Yeah, a battalion is 500, 600, 700, with associated elements. Then there's a separate bit relating to helicopters and aircraft which is also part of this statement of requirements. It's not part of what a battalion structure is. It's part of the statement of requirements. Q: And that's a total... APPATHURAI: That's the extra troops above the battalion. UNIDENTIFIED: They're talking capabilities, not numbers. Journalists want numbers. They're talking about capabilities, not numbers. Q: So what is the 2500 figure? APPATHURAI: Well General Jones' numbers. UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible)...keep asking what does that mean in numbers? Well, it can mean plus or minus a certain (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) APPATHURAI: What's outstanding is a battalion and helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. If you try to attach numbers to that a battalion can stretch up to a 1000 and then there's more numbers above that. General Jones has used around or up to 2000. Q: Okay the last one. There's one thing I can't understand. You say that the Operation Medusa is a success. APPATHURAI: Is achieving success. It's not complete. Q: There are about... APPATHURAI: Let me be clear. Q: There are how many people in the south? Ten thousand troops more or less? APPATHURAI: Slightly less, but yes. Q: Okay, about. Now how many of these 10,000 are involved in the Operation Medusa? APPATHURAI: I think you have to direct that question to ISAF. Q: I mean, what does one battalion make a difference for? What's important about the battalion? APPATHURAI: Once again, the battalion is not linked to Op Medusa. Q: Yes, I know, but... APPATHURAI: I'm separating these issues out, right? Q: Right. APPATHURAI: So that's the answer. The battalion is not linked to Op Medusa. Q: And yet troops in Medusa are overstretched. APPATHURAI: They are stretched. Q: They are stretched. Not overstretched. They are stretched. APPATHURAI: They are stretched. General Richards has been very clear that if he had more he could do more. If he had more he could do what he has to do faster and he could do it, in his words, at lower risk to his soldiers. That would be the advantage of having these forces. But it does not call into question his ability successfully to prosecute this mission.