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| Updated: 18-Aug-2006 | NATO Speeches |
Kabul, 18 Aug 2006 |
Kabul Podcast Audio report by Mark Laity, NATO's civilian spokesman in Afghanistan
Life deployed in the headquarters of an operation can be quite schizophrenic. On the one hand you live, sleep and breathe the operation, and the reality of it soaks through as you live amongst armed soldiers, travel in a city where armed guards and their rifles are so common that you rarely notice them, and only occasionally remember that this is not normal. But the risks in Kabul are far more potential than actual – I have spent some time in dangerous cities, and Kabul does not feel dangerous – testament to the effectiveness of ISAF and its allies. But on the other hand is the reality of operations elsewhere, a reality mostly seen through a computer screen in your office revealing the routine hardships down south, where the risks are real not potential, and ISAF forces are battling to bring the same stability to those areas that previous ISAFs have brought to North and West Afghanistan and Kabul. On the screen that reality is expressed in acronyms and initials, the clipped jargon of soldiers seeking to bring clarity and shape to the confusion of conflict. So a typical entry in the event log could read something like, TIC, TF Nebula (Sandstone 25), C/S received 2xRPG and SAFire from 10-15 TB, engaging with 25mm, 7.62, 5.56, 1 x WIA, QRF stood to, CAS requested. So what does this mean? Well TIC, T I C, means Troops in Contact; TF Nebula is Task Force Nebula and Sandstone 25 is part of that Task force. C/S are our soldiers, fired on with RPGs, Rocket Propelled Grenades and S A F, Small Arms Fire by ten to fifteen T B, Taleban. They are now returning fire with a 25 mm gun, that’s probably a cannon on an armoured vehicle, 7.62 mm, probably light machine guns, 5.56mm, that’s rifles. 1xW I A means one Wounded in Action, so one of our guys is wounded and the QRF being stood to is the Quick Reaction Force being readied. CAS is C A S, which is Close Air Support, so airpower is being called in to help. Bottom line, this is a sharp and vicious fight, tough enough to potentially need reinforcements and certainly enough to call in airpower to attack the insurgents. All this is expressed in a short paragraph, and often the progress of the fight can be watched unrolling on the operational chatroom, the email topline messaging system that charts significant events such as medevacs, the evacuation of wounded, or the use of air launched weapons. Sometimes the urgency and stress can be sensed in the hurried requests and replies, but mostly they are equally cryptic, testifying to the training and professionalism of NATO’s forces. The end of such events is equally terse – TIC declared closed at, say, 1700. Then we’ll see the summary, expressed in KIA or WIA, killed in action or wounded in action. As we know some of those KIA or WIA have been ISAF, and that gets the attention of the world. And that can give the impression of insurgent success, but that would be a false image. The overwhelming majority of TICs end with no ISAF casualties, and the insurgents repelled or defeated, sometimes having lost many dead and wounded. Of course, the success of the ISAF mission is not about killing insurgents – we know that sustainable success will depend on the Afghan people in the south giving us and the Government their support because they recognize this offers a real future. At the same time, in the face of the violence and intimidation of the insurgents, ISAF and the Afghan security forces have to demonstrate their ability to provide the security the people so desperately want – and that means when challenged we have to be tough and effective in response, so that insurgents know just how high the price of taking on ISAF can be. And that price has been high for them. But while the forces down south are bearing the brunt of the action, it is our job in the relative safety of Kabul to make sure that their extraordinary efforts, their courage, their hardships, their skill, are not wasted. And the best way we can do that is to ensure that as those on the frontline stabilize security in such areas then coming rapidly in behind are the improvements that will entrench progress, notably development and better government. That in turn means ISAF HQ in Kabul, where I am, has the safer but undramatic role of not only providing maximum support for the frontline fight, but also working with the government and rest of the international community to help create the strategies and changes that will turn a vision of the future into reality. All sides now recognize that over the last years there has been a failure to meet the expectations of the Afghan people, leading to disillusionment in some areas, especially the south, potentially creating support for insurgents. Improvement was needed. So, for instance, ISAF HQ is now a key part of the new Policy Action Group, a combined international community/government-led body to try to focus more effort in critical areas, notably the south. By creating a more effective, streamlined decision-making machinery, we should be able to implement key policies more quickly than before. Of course this will not suddenly make everything better overnight, but it does something to address the problem of how to effectively turn decisions at the top to progress on the ground. And there is the link between Kabul and the frontline. Traditionally and understandably the soldier at the front has a cynical view of those more comfortably ensconced further to the rear – in their place I would be the same. But it is the undramatic hard work to create a long-term impact that will help ensure the courage of those ISAF soldiers engaged in today’s TICs gets the reward it deserves. |
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