NATO HQ, Brussels 05 Apr. 2006

Background briefing by the NATO Spokesman Multimedia Audio file (.MP3/13.328kb) Biography James Appathurai JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Hello. Welcome. Thank you for coming. I will touch on just two issues that I wanted to brief you on, and then I'm happy to take your questions. Let me start with Afghanistan . A couple of issues. And two issues that I wanted to brief you on. One is, we got a briefing today in the Council, the ambassadors got a briefing today in the Council, by John Walters, who is the U.S. Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. The short form of that, for those of you who follow American politics, is the U.S. Drug Czar. You might remember William Bennett was the first Drug Czar. And he briefed on counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan . I think some of the messages that he gave today in the Council were interesting and I'd like to just touch on them. One was that according to the UN, in 2005 Afghanistan 's share of global opium cultivation stood at 63 percent. That last year the overall yields for opium were largely the same as they were the year before, but that there was an almost 50 percent decline in the number of hectares under cultivation between '04 and '05. Some provinces, Nangarhar province was the one that he mentioned, which he had just visited, was down 90 percent. Without, of course, concomitant starvation or riots, so it had been a process that was managed. One of the reasons Mr. Walters said for general progress was that the Afghan forces are becoming more effective at dealing with counternarcotics. They have, of course, a developing national army, developing policy and developing counternarcotics security forces that are getting support in terms of planning and logistics from international forces. And that, of course, does include and will include NATO forces in future, as the Alliance expands into the south and then into the east. The Afghan government at the end of January, released a revised national drug control strategy which builds on international efforts and has six pillars: public information, providing alternative livelihoods, elimination-slash-eradication, law enforcement/interdiction, justice reform, and regional counternarcotics cooperation, as well demand reduction and treatment of addicts. So this is an overall and comprehensive counternarcotics effort. The United Kingdom has the lead, as part of the G8 in this overall effort, and the United States of course is very engaged, as well as many other nations. NATO is, of course, very interested in supporting the efforts to counter the narcotics problem in Afghanistan . It is quite clear that narcotics have an effect, not just in our own countries, but of course in Afghanistan 's democratic development and assisting Afghanistan 's democratic development is one of the primary goals of the Alliance . NATO, as we have said so many times, will not be playing an active role in terms of burning poppy fields, but the operational plan that allies have approved, does provide for a supporting role by the PRTs and by ISAF in terms of providing intelligence to Afghan authorities, in terms of where appropriate, providing transport, where necessary providing in extremis support to Afghan security forces that might be, for example, injured in carrying out their duties, so medical evacuation might be provided by ISAF. So NATO will play a supporting role, international terms of the roles that I've mentioned, as part of the overall international effort to tackle this. That was part one of what I wanted to say in terms of Afghanistan . The next part, I'd like to bring you up to date on where we are in terms of preparations for expansion to the south. In addition to the 2,000-plus Canadians who have already deployed to Kandahar province, and U.S. forces already in Zabol, additional troops from the U.K. , the Netherlands , Australia , Denmark , Romania and Estonia continue to be deployed in the southern region to enable the Stage 3 expansion. In other words, Stage 3 has not yet taken place. These forces are deploying in advance of the transfer of authority to ISAF. There is currently a mix of enabling forces, what we call enabling forces, such as engineers, construction units and communication assets, liaison teams and security elements to prepare for the deployment of the maneuver units and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. That's the first thing. In addition, a multinational "groupe aéronaval"... I don't know how you would translate into... carrier group?, based around the French aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, will operate a carrier air group in the Indian Ocean during May and will support both the ISAF and the OEF missions with airborne early warning and Super-Étendard aircraft. This air group, this carrier air group is currently exercising in the Indian Ocean and will be prepared to start operations from mid-May for a temporary period, through the Stage 3 expansion. So there will be quite a robust set of capabilities provided by this carrier air group to facilitate and provide security during the period of Stage 3 expansion. That's what I wanted to say on Afghanistan . Let me turn quickly to give you a little bit more detail as we look towards the high level event that will take place in Rabat , 6, 7 April, so we leave tomorrow and the main event will take place on Friday. I want to give you first some numbers on how the Mediterranean Dialogue is developing and then some of the key messages that I think would be coming out of, or certainly delivered at the meeting. In terms of how the Mediterranean Dialogue has evolved, there are annual work programs called Mediterranean Dialogue Work Program. It has a number, increasing number of elements and activities derived from the Partnership for Peace. For 2006 this work program foresees activities in 26 different areas of cooperation. I have a list I can go through, but that includes military activities and that's 72 percent of the total number; public diplomacy activities; civil emergency planning and crisis management. It is worth noting that the number of activities has increased by 70 percent from 2004 to 2005 and then again another 70 percent from 2005 to 2006. The participation of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries in these activities has already increased steadily since 1997. in 2004 they reached the fixture of a thousand participants. Compared to 2004 there's been an 85 percent increase in participation by these countries. Overall participation in military activities has increased by about 80 percent. The CHODS, the Chiefs of Defence, are now meeting on a regular basis to discuss military cooperation. The next meeting will take place in May of this year. And the NATO military authorities are currently finalizing the modalities of the contribution of some Mediterranean Dialogue countries, namely Algeria , Israel and Morocco , in Operation Active Endeavour. All this to say the move in Istanbul to make the Mediterranean Dialogue more practical has certainly delivered and the messages that I think will be discussed, the key messages that'll be discussed at the meeting, will be, I believe, the importance of increased participation by Mediterranean Dialogue countries in NATO-led military exercises, increased participation in NATO's operations and missions would be very welcome. I might note that countries like Morocco contributes quite a lot to the NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Something which is very welcome. And finally, there will be discussion on defence reform, and in particular in defining precisely where interested Mediterranean Dialogue countries might have their priorities and where NATO might be able to provide support. So this is a nascent area of cooperation. One which is just developing, and I think they'll make an effort Rabat to try to hone what the Mediterranean Dialogue partners want, the interest in countries and what NATO might be able to provide. I think that is frankly all I have in term softwood active things I wanted to tell you, and I am happy now to take your questions , please. Q: Yes, Brooks Tigner, Defense News. PSC and NATO met on Monday. Did they discuss Darfur at all? APPATHURAI: The PSC and NATO met on Monday. The formal meeting, the meeting of the NAC PSC, focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina. And there were briefings by Commander EUFOR, Commander HQ Sarajevo on their various activities. The meeting then ended and then there was an informal meeting of interested countries to discuss Darfur . The High Representative, Dr. Solana, briefed on his recent visit to the region and his assessment of the political developments, and there was, indeed, a discussion around the table of what's happening on the ground in Darfur, what's happening in the UN and where NATO and the EU, for example, are, currently, playing roles to support the African Union and what the future might bring. So there was, indeed, a new formal discussion on that. Q: To follow-up, did they discuss how those two organizations are going to work... might work together in Darfur ? APPATHURAI: I think if I were to characterize the discussion, it was certainly a discussion that focused very much on the current political developments. To bring everybody up to speed and have a shared understanding of what was happening in Addis, in Khartoum , in New York because the focus of the political activity is there. You know the decisions that have been taken by the African Union Peace and Security Council, the decisions that might or might not be taken by the UN, so there is no need, I suppose, at this point, to be discussing further NATO-EU coordination for a potential future mission. Right now NATO is focused on implementing what it has been asked to do and our political discussions were, I think, to bring NATO and EU ambassadors, up to speed on current developments, rather than looking too far into the future. I think Paul you were next. Q: Just a practical question really. Are there going to be any press opportunities in Rabat for photos and news conferences, stuff like this? APPATHURAI: That's a good question, and I'm quite sure there will be a press opportunity on the Friday, there will be a press release coming out today which will give you all of the relevant information. I have to go back and look at it. It's in my computer. Once it's approved by the boss I'll send it out, so that'll come out today. Q: Amanda (inaudible)... to follow up on the question precisely on what you're going to do now for Darfur , I mean, where do we stand now on reviewing for the AU's request for further help? And I have also a question on Belarus after. APPATHURAI: Sure. In terms of Darfur , the situation as it stands is that NATO has been asked to do nothing beyond what you already know. In other words, the capacity-building, which has already come to an end at the end of last month, and the airlift rotation of African Union troops in and out of Darfur , which is slated to come to an end on the 31st of May. NATO has not been asked, either by the UN or the AU to do anything more in terms of practical assistance to the African Union. But as you know, Secretary General Annan called the NATO Secretary General and asked if NATO could consider or could do some planning to consider options for potential future support to the African Union during a bridging period and potentially to the UN subsequent to that. So that process has begun and that's where we stand. Nothing further has been agreed. I think you had one more question. Q: A single question on Belarus . Where do you stand on your reviewing your ties and your cooperation with the country? APPATHURAI: The review continues. Allies continue to discuss what measures they might wish to take. What I can tell you is, and this you already know, NATO's relations with Belarus are already quite restricted. The allies have determined that they will not make contact, or have contacts with Belarussian officials that were involved in repression of the population, certainly during the electoral period. So they are looking now at reviewing that relationship, and as part of that, how they might more actively support civil society in Belarus , but that discussion continues, so I certainly couldn't draw your attention to any conclusions, because they haven't been arrived at yet. Q: This French aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean in May, would it have been there anyway? Is it under the control of France , or is there for NATO... specifically for NATO? And you say it has strike capabilities. Is it there for that, or to transport troops or cargo or equipment? Is that basically sort of NATO troops get attacked in Afghanistan, strike aircraft will come in and does NATO have a strike capability aircraft capability in Afghanistan at the moment? Is this something new basically, or is it just an addition? APPATHURAI: First, the group, the carrier group is at present exercising in the Indian Ocean . So it was certainly always planned that it will be there. The exercises are scheduled to end... I might have mentioned this, at around mid-May, at which point the group will start its mission. ISAF does have strike aircraft in its arsenal and not only does ISAF have it, but of course Operation Enduring Freedom also has, if necessary, exciting strike aircraft, and of course attack helicopters as well. So there's quite a lot of air power around. At all times I am quite sure the operational control over national assets rests finally, in this case, with national authorities, but it is certainly there to support ISAF and OEF, as I mentioned, and it will not surprise you that the overall commanders are in constant touch with each other, and can work out mutual support where necessary. Q: Support that Australia is now launching a joint exercise in Indian Ocean , at the same period. Is that synchronized to some extent to NATO operation? APPATHURAI: I have to say I was totally unaware of an Australian exercise in the Indian Ocean . I couldn't go any further than that. I just don't know about it. Q: Est-ce je peux poser une question en français? APPATHURAI: Bien sûr. Q: Bon. Si j'ai bien compris il y a une volonté en ce qui concerne la réunion de Rabat, une volonté des pays méditerranéens partenaires de l'OTAN pour participer à l'Opération Endeavour. Est-ce qu'il y a déjà des demandes dans ce sens? Et de quels pays émanent-elles, d'une part? Et d'autre part, est-ce qu'il y aura peut-être des pays à cette réunion qui ont déjà présenté leurs demandes de participation à des opérations, par exemple, au Balkan ou Darfour? APPATHURAI: Pas du tout au Darfour. Mais oui, comme j'avais déjà mentionné, excusez-moi, je l'ai fait tout en anglais, le Maroc participe déjà dans les opérations de maintien de la paix de l'OTAN dans les Balkans. Il y a trois pays du Dialogue méditerranéen qui ont déjà proposé leur soutien à l'Opération Active Endeavour, étant l'Algérie, Israël et le Maroc. Comme la Russie, comme l'Ukraine qui vont aussi soutenir cette opération. Mais les modalités restent à être définies. Alors, c'est une question de définir les modalités. Mais il y a un intérêt de la faire... Et évidemment, on a un intérêt commun à restreindre autant que possible le terrorisme, le crime international dans la Mer Méditerranée. C'est un défi commun. Et ce n'est que logique qu'on le fasse ensemble. Q: (inaudible)... What's the status now of the Russian participation? APPATHURAI: They are on the cusp of formally supporting the operation. I understand that there are still some technical arrangements that need to be worked out, but the ships are already sailing with or alongside NATO ships. We have not yet reached the point, I understand, that we can formally say that they are fully part of the operation or fully supporting it for technical reasons, but to all intends and purposes we are virtually there. Q: Still on Belarus , are there any plans for Mr. Milinkevich to go to NATO because he's in the area at the moment? APPATHURAI: I know of no such plans. Q: Yeah, I just wanted to clarify one of the statistics you gave us about opium production. You mentioned that there was a 50 percent decline in the... APPATHURAI: In acreage. Q: In size of acreage from 2004, 2005, and that in 2005 the Afghans share was 63 percent of opium products. But that standalone figure doesn't mean anything. Do you have at the... what the percentage was in 2005 that shows a decline to 63 percent? APPATHURAI: Actually, I don't think that these two are related, in that the share... Afghan's share of global opium cultivation stand at 63 percent. I don't have the figure for the year before. Q: (inaudible)...und the battle or (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Or whether it's gone up or down at all. My understanding from the briefing we got today was that in fact the total levels of production coming out of Afghanistan have not declined dramatically over the years, but the acreage devoted to poppy production... Q: Right, that's my understanding too. It doesn't really matter if they've already got raw opium stock stored away, or they boot up the intensity of their cultivation in the acreage that remains, it doesn't matter if they've cut it. APPATHURAI: Well, there's two ways of looking at it. One is yes, and certainly I'm not here to defend one thing or the other, but it is by one measure the amount of opium coming out of Afghanistan, from what I understand, is not declining dramatically. So that's very relevant. What is also important though is to look, in a structural sense, at Afghanistan 's economy and how it is evolving and the question that needs to be addressed is how do we move as an international community? Afghan farmers, off poppies and onto something else. And is that working in terms of providing them alternate livelihoods. In terms of the reconstruction and development that needs to happen in the very most practical sense for example, building roads that they can take normal crops to market, that is another test. And so if you can see a dramatic reduction in acreage devoted to poppies and therefore an increase in acreage devoted to other things that is a mark of success within the country. It doesn't affect, of course, in this context, or at least in this year, how much opium is ending up in our streets. That's actually absolutely irrelevant. But there is a structural change that may be beginning in Afghanistan , there may be some success being established. I don't think two years is a worthwhile statistical base, but certainly it's a positive step in terms of moving people into a different kind of economy. So that was what I think he wanted to mention in the briefing on this. Q: Since we're back on Afghanistan , General Jones made some comments last Friday where Stage 4, the final expansion, would be completed... could be completed by August and you mentioned that dateline specifically. I wondered if you could tell us did that have any reaction at NATO amongst the ambassadors. Would they tend to agree that it'd be possible to do that by August, or not? And I say this because there were also statements by the U.S. ambassador in Afghanistan , which seemed to downplay Jones' comments. And second, this is just for clarification, once it is completed, Stage 4, and considering what Jones said, is it very clear that ISAF would... I mean, most of the troops in Afghanistan would be under ISAF command, but there would be a remaining set of U.S. troops which would remain under OEF command. In other words, that there's no question of eliminating the OEF mission. Clarify on that. APPATHURAI: I would say two things in terms of the Stage 4 timing to characterize a discussion in NATO. One is NATO, certainly NATO Headquarters, is focused on Stage 3. Doing it when it's appropriate, when the appropriate conditions are in place. And as a second point, there has been no formal discussion amongst ambassadors of the timing of Stage 4. that, I think, effectively characterizes where we are within NATO. Second point. My understanding is that indeed you are right, there would be a remaining Operation Enduring Freedom, whatever it would be called, but there would be separate coalition forces even after expansion to Stage 4. That would continue to carry out the mission that they have now, which is targeted intelligence driven operations against terrorist leadership. So that would indeed, my understanding is that the planning would be that that would remain. Q: Can I just follow up. Why are you using the conditional? I mean, you say it's your understanding, but what are the actual plans? I say this because it's a little bit confusing if you hear statements from even, you know, officials, like the ambassador, the U.S. ambassador (inaudible), where you basically said NATO would control all security forces in Afghanistan . So that would not take into account this separate part, you know? APPATHURAI: I use the conditional only because until ambassadors, or until NATO nations decide things formally it's not for me to make conclusions, but certainly my understanding of all the planning, is that when NATO expands to Stage 4, whenever that will be, indeed conductions operations throughout the country, there will be a remaining separate Operation Enduring Freedom, doing a separate mission. Q: On the military side it seems like Stage... well, at least at the ARRC level, the commander, General Richards, said a couple of weeks ago that he was expecting Stage 4 to be completed this year also. I mean it sounds now like the military is being more... well, optimistic, to say the least, than the political side, or... APPATHURAI: I wouldn't say there was any light between the military and the political side. I think certainly everybody considers this year to be a realistic timeline for expansion to Stage 4, for all the reasons that General Jones has already, I'm sure, said out to all of you. But as I say, we're taking things one step at a time. Stage 3 is the next step. Quite naturally Stage 4 follows, but here's been no political discussion within the Alliance formally, or to my knowledge informally, of when that should take place. So I don't see a disconnect, but certainly... on the political side there hasn't been that discussion yet. Q: It's a record. APPATHURAI: It's not a record, but it's pretty close.