EU-US Perspectives on International Security
Speech by NATO Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo
at the CEPS-USEU Conference
Ladies and Gentlemen,
It gives me great pleasure to deliver the keynote speech at this seminar on how the EU and the US can enhance their cooperation in the fields of justice, freedom and security.
Before I joined NATO a few years ago, I worked in the European Union – so I think I can claim to understand both organisations. I have to admit, however, that the specific title suggested to me causes a bit of a problem. Because, as a NATO official, I am not really well placed to comment on bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US .
So how do I get around this problem? I will do so by making a virtue out of necessity – namely by offering some reflections on wider institutional setting of transatlantic security.
If you look at this institutional setting, you will find that it increasingly resembles a triangle. There is the transatlantic relationship enshrined in NATO; there is the bilateral EU-US relationship; and there is the emerging relationship between NATO and the EU. This is a rather complex triangle, made up of different institutions, with different areas of expertise, different working methods and cultures, and not least with different memberships. It therefore entails much potential for friction and duplication.
However, if we take a pragmatic rather than a dogmatic approach to the evolution of our organisations, as well as to the relationship between them, I believe that will result in a real bonus for the security of our citizens. If we can avoid being “introspective”, and manage to look at the bigger picture of transatlantic security, I am convinced that we can make this institutional triangle work to our mutual advantage.
So, in order to inform our debate here today, let me briefly set out what I believe to be the main challenges before us – politically, militarily, and institutionally.
First, the political angle. As a security actor, the European Union needs to be seen for what it is worth. Clearly, for the time being, the EU is not yet the strong, coherent actor that it aspires to be, particularly when it comes to security and defence. But there is no doubt in my mind that foreign and defence policies will be coordinated much more closely in the future. The European Security Strategy is a major step forward. And the setback with the Constitutional Treaty has not really slowed progress in this particular area.
So how does this development square with NATO? Some have bluntly stated that a coherent European Security and Defence Policy will make NATO next to redundant. All that is really needed, according to these observers, is a substantial dialogue between the EU and the United States .
However, I believe this maximalist view overestimates the cohesion of the EU –and that it underestimates the importance of the US as a key security actor. There is no doubt in my mind that, over the next few years, the EU-US dialogue – as well as the EU-Canada dialogue, for that matter – will grow in importance. And this dialogue can and will be instrumental in coordinating transatlantic policies on a host of important issues.
But when it comes to security and defence policy, and in particular military action, an enhanced EU-US dialogue alone will not do. When push comes to shove, we need a tried-and-tested framework where everyone across the Atlantic is part of the political consensus building, the decision-making, the military planning, and the military action. NATO provides that framework.
The EU is often credited, and rightly so, for being able to take a comprehensive approach to security. There clearly is no other institution that combines so many different instruments – and that has the financial wherewithal to make a difference.
But it would be a mistake to ignore NATO’s broader strategic impact. For one, NATO is engaged in a number of complex missions and operations – to which I will return in a moment. But we also entertain political and military relations with dozens of countries in Europe , Central Asia and beyond.
The Partnership for Peace has been our pre-eminent instrument for building a common security culture that stretches all the way to Central Asia . We are working closely with several countries in the Balkans to prepare them for possible future NATO membership. We have intensive institutionalised relationships with Russia and Ukraine . We are extending dialogue and cooperation to Northern Africa , the Middle East , and the Gulf region. And we are strengthening our relations with other institutions and non-governmental organisations.
What do these relationships offer us? For a start, they offer significant political and military value. Politically, our partnership policy provides us with an opportunity to discuss security issues with our wider neighbourhood. These discussions not only help to foster common approaches; they also allow us to make use of our partners’ specific expertise, for example on regional issues.
Militarily, partnership offers us more shoulders to distribute the burdens of providing stability. In all major NATO operations today, troops of many partner countries deploy alongside our own. This increases both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of an operation.
Finally, partnership has also shown to have a considerable impact on domestic reform in many partner countries, particularly in the defence and security sector. In other words, it has proven to be an important instrument in our broader policy of fostering democracy.
In sum, this network of political and military ties offers Europe and North America unique opportunities for shaping the wider strategic environment – opportunities which are quite distinct but fully complementary to those available in the EU-context.
I would also like to mention NATO’s role as a permanent structured forum for political dialogue among the Allies. That role may have been under-valued at times, when NATO was mainly focused on conducting its operations and enhancing its military capabilities. But the importance of NATO as a framework for dialogue has clearly been rediscovered. Over the past year, we have had more regular, and increasingly constructive, political discussions at different levels on issues such as Iraq , Darfur and the Middle East . And I am pleased that NATO is also increasingly seen and respected as a political player – for example in the discussions on the future of Kosovo and Afghanistan .
Let me now turn to the military angle. Let there be no mistake. Real capabilities are and will remain the litmus test for any European efforts in the area of defence and security – whether in the NATO framework or within the EU. For the past several years, the priority within the Alliance has been to improve the "European pillar". This process was based on the need to give Europe more military punch to conduct the so-called “Petersberg tasks”.
This logic has already proven its value. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina , the EU has demonstrated that it can act effectively in the military realm, and in the interest of the entire transatlantic community.
It is equally obvious, however, that NATO remains central to meeting many security challenges. Just look at NATO’s current operations and missions. There is KFOR in Kosovo, and an expanding ISAF in Afghanistan . There is our anti-terrorist naval operation in the Mediterranean . There is our training mission for Iraqi security forces. There is our airlift and logistical support and capacity building for the African Union in Darfur . And recently, NATO delivered humanitarian relief to the victims of the earthquake in Pakistan .
Such large-scale, complex missions require the closest cooperation between Europe and North America . And that is why Europe – in addition to packing its own military punch – must seek to retain its ability to cooperate militarily with the United States as well.
Moreover, if EU countries concentrate solely on acquiring "autonomous" capabilities the result might be a division of labour where the US would do the high intensity fighting and the Europeans would do the rest. This would be politically unsustainable – both across the Atlantic as well as within Europe . And that is one more reason for Europe and North America to retain their ability to cooperate militarily.
Again, the bilateral EU-US framework would not suffice for this. If Europe and North America want to meet the challenge of military transformation together, NATO is the right framework. Over the past several years, we have put several major modernisation efforts on track, which are aimed at preserving and even enhancing our ability to act in unison. And while these initiatives may have originated in NATO, they also reinforce many of the specific European capabilities efforts that are currently underway.
And this brings me to the institutional angle. NATO-EU relations are currently locked in a cooperation agenda that is artificially limited to military crisis management in the Balkans and the harmonization of force modernisation plans. Why? Because some still cling to the belief that the EU is a threat to NATO and needs to be contained. And others still see NATO as a straitjacket for European ambitions, and believe that the EU should stay at arms' length from the Alliance .
I am convinced that these institutional and intellectual demarcation lines will not last. Because the realities of the post-9/11 security landscape cannot be ignored. Combating terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and dealing with “failed states” have become the key security tasks of our time.
Against this background, NATO-EU cooperation simply cannot remain limited to a few carefully selected areas. More and more, this cooperation will need to evolve – to cover not just the areas where NATO and the EU do similar things, but also those areas where we have clear common interests, and different yet complementary instruments to pursue those interests.
I am optimistic that NATO and the EU can build such a much more pragmatic, transparent partnership. 19 nations are now a member of both organisations, and that will help to bring us closer together. And I already see signs of greater realism on all sides. A realisation that, regardless of the fate of the Constitutional Treaty, the Union is bound to become a stronger security actor. But a realisation, also, that the EU can be a better security actor when it is a partner for the United States and NATO, and not a counterweight.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Cold War division of labour, which had NATO provide the protective umbrella for the European integration process, is a thing of the past. The European integration process has progressed to a point where the EU is becoming a strategic actor in its own right. This means that NATO is no longer the only “kid on the block” of our security institutions.
The NATO Alliance has to accommodate a growing EU security dimension. And it also has to accommodate an ever more substantial dialogue between the EU and the United States . Because the transatlantic relationship, including the security relationship, has become too broad to be managed through NATO alone.
At the same time, neither can the EU’s bilateral dialogue with the US ultimately replace the unique transatlantic cooperation in the NATO framework. That framework offers strategic benefits that are simply too great to be ignored.
Thank you.
Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name |
