NATO HQ, Brussels 8 Feb. 2006

Press Briefing by the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, John Colston Multimedia Audio file .MP3/17105kb Biography John Colston JOHN COLSTON (Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning): Thank you very much and it's very good to see you all here. Thank you. Thank you for coming this afternoon. Taormina is one of the... JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): On the record for the moment. COLSTON: On the record for the introductory remarks. APPATHURAI: And when he wants to go on background he'll do it. COLSTON: Taormina is one of the regular series of informal meetings of the 26 NATO Defence Ministers. These happen twice a year, in addition to the formal meetings of Defence Ministers which take place here in NATO Headquarters normally in June. The last informal session of NATO Defence Ministers was in Berlin back in September last year. This meeting is going to be of particular importance as we look forward to the NATO Summit in Riga at the end of November this year. It's the first of a series of ministerial meetings which will lead up to that Summit . And I would highlight for you from this particular meeting four big themes, which I think are going to occupy the attention of ministers. The first is Afghanistan . That will, of course, include a reflection on where we are today, but more particularly will focus on what is going to happen in Afghanistan this year. And the expansion into the southern provinces of Afghanistan and what more needs to be done to make that successful. Secondly, ensuring that we make a success this year and beyond of the NATO Response Force, which is our key military transformation project, launched in Prague by Heads of State and Government in 2002 and due to be fully up and running this year. A key element both of our operational capability and of our effort to turn our armed forces into modern, deployable, effective armed forces. The third element I would emphasize is practical cooperation between the NATO allies and Russia . The Russian Defence Minister, Sergey Ivanov, will be in Taormina . There will be a discussion between him and the 26 ministers and that will focus on practical cooperation in defence reform, in the area of the fight against terrorism, as well as a broader political exchange. Of particular relevance in relation to the fight against terrorism is of course the preparations for the Russian contribution to Operation Active Endeavour, which is NATO's maritime surveillance counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean. And the Russian navy is preparing itself for this contribution, and there will be Russian ships in Messina Harbour and we will be using those ships as a platform for training of individual Russian officers. And on conclusion of the meeting on the Friday the Secretary General and the Italian Defence Minister, Minister Martino, will be visiting the Moskva which is the lead ship from the Russian navy in Messina harbour to mark that perspective contribution. Fourth element, the first ever meeting between NATO Defence Ministers, and the representatives of the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries. So an opportunity to set the political framework for what we hope will be a pattern of even closer cooperation, including in the defence and military fields between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. So those are the four big themes. Let me just take you briefly through the sequence of meetings. This will start on Thursday, the 9th of February for a discussion amongst the Allies on NATO's transformation. The continuing efforts to ensure that our military, our capabilities, both national capabilities and collective capabilities are fit for NATO's increasingly varied and geographically widespread operations. Have we got the right policies? Have we got the right doctrines? Have we got the right capabilities in place? As I've said, there is going to be a particular focus on what remains to be done to establish the NATO Response Force and prepare its first large-scale live exercise this summer, which will take place in the Cape Verde Islands. We'll also review what we're doing to ensure both collectively and individually, that we're investing in the right military equipment, planning for the right missions and adopting the right funding mechanisms to prepare for today's ... On the Friday morning we will then have a further session of the 26 Ministers, which will focus on operations. And that will be devoted to a review of what is happening and what we are expecting to happen in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq, our support to the African Union in Darfur . And we'll also have an opportunity to reflect on what has happened, and in particular to reflect on our experience of the humanitarian relief operation, which has now come to an end in Pakistan. On the Friday morning we will also, as I say, have a meeting with Sergey Ivanov, for an informal meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, enabling us to discuss current operations, including as I say, Russian support for Operation Active Endeavour. Other current international security issues, and an opportunity to look at the possibilities for additional practical cooperation, for example, in defence reform, or defence against terrorism. And finally, there will be a working lunch with the representatives, Ministers and representatives of the seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries. First ever meeting. An opportunity to discuss ways and means to further enhance our practical cooperation in the defence, military and security areas. And we hope provide a platform for a deepening of that cooperation in the future. So a meeting which, as I say, will provide the first stepping stone towards a Summit in November this year, and will provide the key input in terms of trying to make sure that that Summit delivers an Alliance fit to respond to the operational leads of the 21st Century. That's it by way of introduction. APPATHURAI: Questions? Q: Mark John from Reuters. It seems clear that among of the Alliance countries don't see eye to eye yet on how the NRF should be used. What sort of missions it should be engaged on and when it does, what kind of funding should take place of those missions. Do you want to stage that debate in Taormina , and what do you expect to come out of that? COLSTON: Let me tell you about it in two parts. First, the way in which the NATO Response Force might be used, and secondly, the funding arrangements, or let me interpret the question slightly more broadly. You know, fair shares within the way in which Allies support the NATO Response Force. To be honest I hope that Taormina will mark the conclusion of the continuing discussion of the circumstances in which the NATO Response Force might be used. The Ministers had a very good discussion on this issue when they met in Berlin last September. And that underlines that the purposes of the NATO Response Force had been clearly set out in the agreed Alliance doctrine for the NATO Response Force. There wasn't any real need to reopen that. That had all been gone through and nations had agreed it. The second reason for some degree of assurance is that we have been through an exercise which we're not particularly expecting to catch the headlines in Taormina, but we've been through an exercise to develop what we're calling the comprehensive political guidance, which is a top-level strategic set of guidance to the various planning activities which take place within NATO. And in that context all 26 Allies have been able to sign up to a fairly clear perception of what it is that they see NATO being able to do and what we should be doing, and what we should be equipped to do in the future. This comprehensive political guidance we hope will become one of the deliverables for the Summit in Riga. So I think that there's no recognition that we don't need to reopen the debate on the use of the NRF because we have the agreements and we have the understandings quite clearly in place. What we do need to do, and this takes me onto the second part of your question, is we need to ensure that everybody feels comfortable that their commitments to the NATO Response Force represent a fair share, that everybody is doing their bit, that we have a reasonable approach to burden sharing in so far as contributions to the NATO Response Force are concerned. And there are two things that we want ministers to look at here. The first is the notion that we might try to plan for national contributions to the NATO Response Force over a longer period of time, so not one or two years as we do it at present. Maybe look out five or six years. And this will enable nations to see that their contributions to the NATO Response Force of whether it be infantry or ships or aircraft, whatever it is, that they are reasonable and proportionate. And it might also help in terms of indicating where national contributions were rather less than reasonable and proportionate. So it might help to create a little bit of private peer pressure on nations to contribute. Alongside that, we do need to think about ways of trying to ensure that the financial implications of commitments to the NATO Response Force are reasonably predictable. As it stands at the moment a nation might offer a contribution to the NATO Response Force without having any idea on whether, and if so how, that contribution might be used. Whether a battalion stays in barracks, whether it goes a 100 kilometres down the road, or whether it deploys 10,000 kilometres. So there's a bit of a lottery factor in there, which we want to see whether we can try and address, by looking at the possibility of an increased use of common funding to address the short-term strategic deployment costs for the NATO Response Force. Q: (inaudible)... National News Agency of Ukraine . Just curious, if Ministers are ready, some how to react on formal statement by Sergey Ivanov concerning potential readiness of Russia in the future to apply for NATO membership? Thank you. COLSTON: NATO remains open and ready to any European nation able to contribute to our aims. We very much welcome any move which Russia is able to make to cooperate more closely with NATO and the NATO Allies, that cooperation is intensely valuable to us, to the extent that Minister Ivanov is committing Russia to a further development of the armed forces and the role of the armed forces in a direction which would be compatible with the interests of NATO, then that is great news. The relationship is important to us, both as a way of finding ways to cooperate practically and as a means of providing a political forum where all of the NATO allies, and of course, the Russian Federation, can fairly and openly and transparently debate those issues on which they may disagree, as well as those issues on which they agree. So Russian interest in closer cooperation is always great. We're keen to encourage it. The question of membership is probably a little further down the road. Q: Shada Islam from DPA, the German News Agency. Could you give us a little bit more detail on the lunch with the seven Mediterranean countries? What's on the agenda? I know you said it's informal, but still. And what are you actually hoping to achieve when you talk about practical cooperation and intensified cooperation? Thanks. COLSTON: Okay. The lunch is going to involve Ministers or their representatives from seven Mediterranean Dialogue countries. That's Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria. Have I mentioned them all? I think I have. Those nations have been involved in a program of political and practical cooperation with NATO since the Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994. Both in Prague in 2002 and in Istanbul in 2004 NATO Ministers said that they wanted to reinforce and make more practical the extent of our cooperation with the Mediterranean Dialogue nations. They're critical because they are in the most part, Mediterranean littoral countries and the security of the Mediterranean Sea is of great interest to them, as it is of great interest to us. They're critical also because we want to see how we can work with them to help to extend stability and security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. There is a program of military to military cooperation in place with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries already. We want to see how we can expand and deepen that in areas such as improving interoperability, between the forces of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the forces of NATO countries, using some of the expertise which we have developed in working with both Allied and Partner nations in the modernization and restructuring of their armed forces, and offering that expertise to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and of course, finally and critically, cooperating in the efforts to contribute to the fight against terrorism, and a number of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries are already practically engages in examining how, for example, they might be able to contribute to the aims of Operation Active Endeavour, which I mentioned earlier in the Russian context. So what we're hoping is that this meeting, which as I say, is the first meeting of its kind ever to take place, will provide a bit of clarity to the Mediterranean Dialogue nations, but NATO is not proposing here to go and tell them how to do their business. We're not trying to impose any particular NATO view of the world on them. But we are saying that we are open and interested in deeper and broader cooperation and we hope that this working lunch will provide the political framework within which NATO experts and experts from NATO capitals will be able to work more closely with those seven countries. Q: Can I just follow-up? Do you expect all ministers to be there? (inaudible)...? COLSTON: We expect, I think, five ministers and there'll be two countries which are represented either by senior military or senior diplomatic personnel. APPATHURAI: Leon. Q: You don't have the name of those two countries by any chance? It would be helpful. COLSTON: Let's wait and see (inaudible)... Q: Bon. My question was on Afghanistan and the events today and previous events. But today, do you have any information as to... which would allow you to say that these... that the people who attacked that base in Meymaneh were specifically targeting Norwegians or... NATO soldiers? I mean, there's a distinction there. And second, are you worried that in some way, somehow down the road, the Afghan population is turning on NATO? APPATHURAI: Can I ask a favour? Can we deal with just the questions of Taormina first, and then we'll... because I'm sure we're going to have a fulsome discussion on Afghanistan , so if you... why don't we finish up with Taormina and then we'll turn to Afghanistan . Q: You don't think the Ministers will talk about this? APPATHURAI: They may well, but we'll turn to that in a minute. Q: Sorry, (inaudible) from Reuters. Could I just come back to the financing question that you spoke about earlier. Could you say it more specific what you were told to see as the result from Taormina on this funding (inaudible)... and when... if you want to see some decisions made (inaudible)... maybe a testing period for certain aspects of funding and so on. Could you just maybe be more specific on that and maybe how you see the response of the NATO governments (inaudible)...to that. And second question, which is maybe related also to the (inaudible)... is that wouldn't you expect to maybe in the meeting with Mediterranean partners the question of all these uproar in Istanbul drawing Muhammad might play a role in the discussion in (inaudible)? COLSTON: Yeah, okay thanks for that. On the funding arrangements. One of these advantages.. one of the real advantages of these informal meetings is that they are informal. We don't take decisions so we can all walk away from the meeting saying objective achieved because no one can hold us to account for having taken decisions or not. But as far as funding is concerned, we do need to have a genuine debate amongst the Ministers. This is a relatively new idea, which the Secretary General has put in front of Ministers to consider the scope for using common funding in this way. And there are a number of Ministers who will want to think long and hard before they agree that this is a sensible way forward. So what we're hoping to do in Taormina is to get that understanding that this is something that we've got to look at seriously, and it may well be, as I think you're suggesting, that we might attempt to do it for a trial period, to see what its impact was. But my expectation, my hope would be that we develop a general understanding that we're going to try and put a proposal together, debate it amongst the nations here in Brussels with the aim of getting Ministers to sign up to this formally when they meet again in June. With regard to your second point about the relationship of the meeting of Mediterranean dialogue countries, with the cartoon, with the caricature issue. I think the first thing I want to say it's very important not to regard this issue in the context of Taormina as in any way an issue of NATO versus the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. The NATO Allies have in common the fact that they want to promote and deepen cooperation throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, and beyond, including in the Maghreb and in the broader Middle East region and that is clear that's an objective, and they also have in common a condemnation of the use of violence to pursue personal beliefs, however firmly held. But one should not regard either NATO or indeed the Mediterranean Dialogue as a Bloc with a particular view. Remember that about somewhere around a fifth of the population of NATO is Muslim; remember that the Mediterranean Dialogue contains Israel. So there is not an opposition of view there. And our early soundings do suggest there is no particular wish on any side to allow this issue to dominate or to be a major feature of the exchanges in Taormina. We do want to concentrate on those issues of particular interest to Defence Ministers. APPATHURAI: If I can add, because I think John's hit the nail on the head, first, we don't anticipate. This is not on the agenda. Second point that I think is worth remembering about the Mediterranean Dialogue and that is that it has always focused very much on practical ways to deepen cooperation between the relevant countries and it has flourished precisely because it has managed to do this without importing into the Mediterranean Dialogue discussions regional political issues. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian issue or others. It is a practical form of cooperation and building on that... or using that cooperation as a foundation we've built trust. So the character of these kind of discussions are different than the kinds of issues that you have raised. Q: Yeah, Paul Ames from the Associated Press. Two questions. One is also related to this. Looking at Afghanistan and the planning for Stage 3, in the light of what's happened today and the general outrage about this, is there any consideration of re-thinking Denmark 's role in the move into the southern sector? And secondly, when you talk about the use of NRF and said that question is close to being resolved, in what way has it been resolved? I mean, there seem to be distinct differences in Munich over the weekend between how Mrs. Alliot-Marie saw that compared to some of the other countries. Is the NRF going to be like a general use unit, or is it only going to be used for these big front-entry type operations? COLSTON: ...(Break in Transmission)...afterwards. So on your second question, on the use of the NRF. The use of the NRF has been debated by NATO. We've agreed to various policy and military doctrine documents which set it all out. And those uses range from a rapid response capability in the context of the most demanding military operations, if ever there were a threat to the territory of the Alliance, or if we were engaged in a very demanding crisis response operation, all the way through to humanitarian relief operations, which are an acknowledged task of the NATO Response Force. So we don't have to reopen that. That's all settled. I acknowledge the fact that there are nuances of view between those who will tend to emphasize the utility of the NATO Response Force as the first and immediate response to whatever crisis may emerge next, or whatever requirement for military capability may emerge next, and those who may be arguing we always need to keep the NATO Response Force in reserve in case of any worse emergency for which it might be required. But I think actually we are moving towards a recognition that there is a sensible and dispassionate and objective test for when the NRF should be used and when it should not, and that is simply does it militarily make sense to use the NATO Response Force in this way. If there is a demand for a Headquarters, a command and control capability to be deployed quickly to an area of crisis or concern, if there is a need to be able to project military capability over a significant distance at short notice, if there is a need to have military capability properly protected against the potential of a local threat. If two or three of those factors are there in any particular crisis situation then the NATO Response Force may well be the right answer. But trying to steer this debate onto an understanding that we've already written down what the NATO Response Force is for, provided that we are guided by objective military advice about whether it is the right instrument to use in any one particular circumstance, I think that we can overcome the nuances of difference to which you've referred. APPATHURAI: Tommy, any questions? Q: (inaudible).... I have a question about the dialogue of the Mediterranean countries. If I remember correctly they were very reluctant, firstly, after the... or it might have even been before the Istanbul Initiative. I remember well at a certain point the General Secretary wasn't even welcome to be recepted in Egypt when he wanted to travel there. What has happened so that you now are... can look forward to a more practical cooperation? I mean, what made these countries move into your direction? Or didn't they move? COLSTON: Thank you. I mean, since Istanbul , which was June 2004, we had a very successful meeting of NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue Foreign Ministers here in Brussels in December 2004. And now just about a year on we're trying to bring together the Defence Ministers. I would be misleading you if I said that there was not sometimes within the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, certainly within public opinion within those countries, some degree of suspicion, some degree of misunderstanding of NATO's present role and present understanding... and present intention in relation to the Mediterranean Dialogue partners. That is why a political dialogue such as this is so important. It's not necessarily easy. Sometimes it can be challenging. Sometimes it can take an effort to explain why we believe that this particular form of partnership is of importance and why we think it is of real value to our Mediterranean Dialogue partners. So I'm not saying that there has been a sea change in the approach of the Mediterranean Dialogue partners. I hope that there is a growing recognition that NATO's objectives and the interests of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries themselves can and will coincide. I hope that that's why they're coming to Taormina . But we do face a real need to engage and to explain what we believe that we have in common. Q: Nick Fiorenza, Jane's Defence Weekly. On the common funding issue, the NATO AWACS force is always touted as an example of common funding, but it seems to me the last few times that the force has been used, including for Turin Winter Olympics that it's been British aircraft, British AWACS which have been conducting the mission. As far as I know that's a contribution in kind, which would imply that the Brits are paying rather than NATO is paying for that actual mission. So how good an example is... at least those particular missions, how good an example are they of common funding, or am I wrong about that? COLSTON: Whether you're right or not I confess I simply don't know. I can check on the nationality of which... APPATHURAI: Turin it is British (inaudible)... (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) COLSTON: It was British, was it? Yeah, so... Q: Which would mean that the Brits are paying, not NATO, right? COLSTON: Yeah, but the British chose to make a contribution in kind to the NATO AEW capability. That was their choice at the time. Certainly the AWACS force out of Geilenkirchen has been used for a whole series of public events where NATO has agreed to provide a degree of security. So I'm certainly not aware that Turin suddenly represents a change of direction or of policy. And that would surprise me very much if it were. The AWACS model, of course, as it applies to common funding, is only one of a number of ways in which multinational approaches to the provision of military capability can be achieved. And it can be achieved either through creating a collective force under a NATO flag, as was done with the AWACS, or through a number of nations choosing to work together on a multinational basis to provide capabilities for NATO and equally for the European Union. One of the things we're expecting the German Defence Minister, Minister Jung to be announcing this week is the conclusion of the Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution, whereby 15 NATO and European Union nations have come together to lease capacity of Russian and Ukrainian aircraft in support of NATO and other operations. So that's one way in which nations can come together multinationally to help provide some of a response to this particular shortfall. Q: You're expecting Jung to announce that at Taormina then? COLSTON: I'm expecting Jung in Taormina to announce that all of the nations have now signed up and that there will be an inauguration ceremony in Leipzig airport. I forget... it's next month in March. Q: Okay, Dragan Blagolevich,... News Agency. Relating Kosovo, will Ministers discuss security situation and possible threats, having in mind very difficult year of the negotiations on status, and real forces, capabilities (inaudible). COLSTON: Yes, I'm... yes, I'm sure, I'm sure first of all that they'll want to discuss Kosovo and I'm sure secondly that they will, indeed, yes, want to confirm their firm intention to maintain the operational capacity, the military capability of KFOR through what will indeed be likely to be a sensitive year. Q: Yes, do you still need some political commitments to extend ISAF to the south? First, and to complete the whole process. And secondly, when could Stage 4 take place? COLSTON: Firstly, I'll leave the detail of Afghanistan to James to follow up, but you will be aware of the major commitments which have now been put in place by each of the nations who are due to be leading the ISAF effort in the provinces in the south. So we have the basis for the... on which we can proceed to Stage 3, following the major commitments which have been made by the British, by the Canadians, and by the Dutch. And of course, by all the other nations who are supporting them. I don't want to fool you by saying that necessarily means that we have met every last serial in the statement of requirements, and there will be some outstanding issues which we're still wishing to press on, but the basic form is there. And as to when Stage 4 will happen, after Stage 3. APPATHURAI: Good answer. I'm going to use that one. Q: When do you expect Stage 3 to be finished? APPATHURAI: Summer. COLSTON: Summer.