NATO HQ, Brussels 26 Jan. 2006

Background briefing by the NATO Spokesman Multimedia Audio file .MP3/23338kb Biography James Appathurai JAMES APPATHURAI (Spokesperson, North Atlantic Treaty Organization): I will hopefully be as quick as possible and then we can go to questions and answers, and I won't take up too much of your time. Let me start with the calendar of today in that there are two major events on our agenda. One is that the Secretary-General is now in Slovakia for the funeral ceremonies… the commemoration ceremony for the Slovak soldiers who died in the air accident a few days ago coming back from KFOR. As you might recall their plane crashed in Hungary . The Secretary-General is attending himself because it is for NATO as well as for the Slovak people, a great tragedy. That is a huge number of people to lose. These were young people coming home at the end of their term, and it's a great tragedy. So the Secretary-General personally felt that he had to be there, and he is there. The second event taking place now, also unfortunately a funeral ceremony or a memorial ceremony, is for Ibrahim Rugova. This is obviously something which NATO, the death of President Rugova is something that NATO regrets, and NATO has sent Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Martin Erdmann to represent the Alliance . Normally, of course, the Secretary-General himself would have been there, but he is in Slovakia . The Secretary-General has said in his condolence press release that he hopes that whoever is chosen to succeed President Rugova continues in President Rugova's tradition of supporting peaceful resolution to conflicts and working for a democratic solution to the issues that are obviously in play now for Kosovo. The calendar, I think, is… is what I'll stick to and just run through some of the issues that are coming up. Tomorrow Prime Minister Martti Ahtisaari will meet with the Secretary-General at 4:00 . The subject is obviously Kosovo. It will obviously be a very important discussion in the context of the death of President Rugova and the attempts to select one person or more than one person both to be President and also to head up the negotiations that are taking place over Kosovo. As you know, President Rugova was the head of the Kosovar Albanian team. They will have to select a new head, and the Secretary-General will discuss with President Ahtisaari what his views are on this issue. On Monday the German Minister of Defence will be at NATO, Minister Jung, and I think there will be a few issues on the table. Of course they will be looking forward to the Secretary-General's visit on Saturday -- I'll come back to that -- to the Munich Security Conference on the fourth of February. The… I won't even try to say that in German. So Munich Security Conference, formerly the Wehrkundetagung. And of course the various issues related to the NATO operations. Germany has a very significant contribution in Afghanistan in particular, so I'm quite sure they'll discuss the evolution of the Afghan operation. Following his visit immediately, will be a visit by the Croatian Prime Minister, Dr. Sanader. Dr. Sanader will also meet with the Council, and there will be a point de presse afterwards. I think it is no surprise to you that I anticipate the principal issue on the agenda, principal two issues, to be enlargement -- in other words, as we look forward to the summit, the Prime Minister may wish to raise the issue of Croatia's accession to the Alliance. Obviously with recent developments, i.e., the arrest of General Gotovina, interest in Croatia has grown around the NATO summits and potential NATO accession. The day after, on Tuesday, will be the Afghan conference, the Afghanistan conference, which is taking place in London . And much of our work in NATO iis pointing and aiming towards that conference. The issues of force generation you're all aware of and, as you know, the United Kingdom is expected -- I've seen the press reports, as you have -- expected to make announcements today in Parliament on how they intend to go forward in terms of contributing troops to the NATO deployment to the South. And we will see what that announcement is. But NATO is of course not only concentrating on the immediate force generation issues but also on the long-term engagement to NATO, and we have been in very close discussion with the Afghan government and with all the other relevant parties: the UN, the EU, the G8, and major donors, to develop the Afghan Compact that will be announced and agreed in London. The Secretary-General will bring a few key messages to this meeting. First, of course, that NATO remains fully committed to the success of ISAF will continue to work for peace and stability in Afghanistan; that NATO will remain engaged in a long-term commitment to assist the people and the government of Afghanistan; that ISAF will continue to expand; and at the same time, that our operational commitment, NATO's operational commitment, is only one part of the combined international effort, and that we cannot succeed alone, therefore that NATO will look to other key partners in the international community to provide the necessary funding and support to the overall process, as well as of course to the government of Afghanistan , to continue to provide active leadership. To give you an example of what I mean by NATO's commitment is only… can only be part of the combined international effort, NATO will play a role, a supporting role, in the effort against counter-narcotics. And this is obviously one of the key challenges that the country faces. But for an effective counter-narcotics strategy, one must have not only effective Afghan forces, police and army, but farmers have to have alternative livelihoods, there has to be an effective justice system, there has to be a functioning prison system and an effective police service as well. NATO cannot provide all of these things. They have to be developed through funding and capacity building provided by other parties. That is, as I mentioned, the EU, the UN, the G8, and major donors, and of course NGOs all have to be part of the team. NATO's piece of the puzzle cannot make the whole puzzle. It will not work alone. And the Secretary-General will make that appeal publicly at the Afghan conference. The Secretary-General will also, I believe, meet with President Karzai while he is there to discuss the long-term engagement. Next item on the agenda is first of February -- I might have already mentioned it -- Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk is coming to the Alliance . On the second of February the Sec-Gen is going to Paris . He will meet with Defence Minister Alliot-Marie, and he will be at 3:30 at the European American Press Club to give a press conference. So if any of your colleagues wish to attend, I know that the second of February is an interesting date for those who are following the Afghanistan issue because it's the day that the Dutch Parliament is due to discuss a potential to vote on their support for the Afghan deployment. So if you have colleagues in Paris , they may wish to attend. UNIDENTIFIED: Sorry, what is the time again? APPATHURAI: Three-thirty at the European American Press Club. It's where Ambassador Victoria Nuland gave her speech when she went the last time. Third of February: the Minister of Defence of New Zealand will be coming to NATO and visiting with the Secretary-General. Sorry. That is to be confirmed, so I will put that under TBC. The context would be, if he attends of course, I think principally two things. One is that New Zealand is contributing to a PRT in Afghanistan and wished to discuss that. That is currently. New Zealand is contributing to a PRT in Afghanistan . The second issue of course is NATO's let's say structural relationship with New Zealand, or whether there should be a more structural relationship between NATO and New Zealand as a country, which obviously is contributing to the security in areas where NATO is operating. Would we want to consider institutionalizing in some way that relationship? Now, again, this meeting is to be confirmed. Finally, let me mention the Munich security conference. This will be, to my mind, a very interesting meeting. One reason is of course you all remember last year there was a lot of discussion of NATO Chancellor Schroder through Defence Minister Struck, who actually read the speech, in a sense put a challenge on the table when it came to political dialogue at NATO. Now of course there's been a change of regime in Germany , I think many of us will be interested to see what Chancellor Merkel has to say. But the Secretary General will also give, in a sense, his State of the Union address when it comes to NATO. And in particular in the context of the upcoming Summit and what he considers to be, a) the challenges, b) the priorities, and c) his own personal ideas on initiatives that NATO might be able to take, all with the purpose, of course, of doing what any Secretary General has to do, and that is to reinforce the trans-Atlantic relationship, both in terms of political dialogue and cooperation. That, to my mind, is it. I am happy to take your questions on, well, any issue, and I can guess what some of them might be. QUESTION: Yes. Is this on? UNIDENTIFIED: Yes. QUESTION: I'll just speak loudly. I think everyone can hear me. OK? I have two questions, unrelated. One: New Zealand . What does institutionalized relationship with New Zealand mean in concrete terms? And secondly, France and Britain announced yesterday that they're considering to co-develop lightweight radar technology for use on missiles and UAVs, etcetera, and then maybe spin this in to the EDA, the European Development… European Defence Agency, to develop it. NATO, on the other hand, is trying to encourage these kind of projects as well, and common funding, etcetera. I'm just wondering to what extent this complements or detracts from NATO's effort to do the same. Thank you. APPATHURAI: Thank you. Thank you for both questions. You might have seen recently in The Financial Times that the US Ambassador put on the table the issue of NATO's wide relations with countries beyond our traditional zone. And she mentioned specifically, I think, New Zealand , Australia and Japan . I've heard others talk also about South Korea . All this to say there is a discussion underway about the extent to which NATO should engage with countries beyond the traditional area, what we have, for example, called contact countries. And Australia and New Zealand and then Japan are indeed contact countries, which means we have no structural relationship with them, but we do have regular contact with them and do cooperate with these countries in the field, meet regularly with their political leadership, and have lower-level discussions as well. But there is a discussion underway, particularly as we look forward to the Summit, which basically is seen throught this prism that NATO is increasingly engaged beyond our traditional zone. We have these partners -- I use word 'partners' with a small P -- with whom we cooperate more. Should there be -- and I'm not proposing that there should or should not be, but there is a discussion underway amongst Allies, the extent to which… well, whether or not, or the extent to which, we need to in some way formalize these relationships further than they already have been. I can't go beyond that because there isn't anything beyond that for the moment, except to say that there is a discussion underway, and I anticipate that discussion will get more active as we move towards Riga . Pardon me. Yes? QUESTION: We already have a whole range of relationships that NATO has with various countries -- Russia … and Ukraine , etcetera. So you should… is it going to fit into that gamut of things, or are you talking about something else? APPATHURAI: Well, that's the big question. There are in essence three layers of relationships that NATO has with non-NATO countries. One are exactly as you have pointed out, the very structured relationships, in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, for example, or the direct bilateral, in a sense, relationship that NATO has with Ukraine, the NATO-Russia Council of 27. But in essence these are very structured, they're very clear and guided. The second one is with the Mediterranean Dialogue countries and the ICI countries, which is a different form of partnership, much looser in terms of its structure, but still clear and established, and there is the third level. Now, the third level has had a variety of names. Triple-Non was an excellent acronym that we had for a while. Now we call it Triple-Non: non-NATO, non-Partner, non-Mediterranean Dialogue. Yeah, so we could… we couldn’t come up with anything better until now, which is… we use this expression, 'contact countries.' And there they are utterly informal relationships, but that exist. And so, as I say, there are nations in NATO -- and the US has been quite obvious about this -- saying well, maybe we need to make this a little bit more than just what it is, which is, as I say, utterly informal. But into what framework it would fit, whether it would have its own framework, whether it's necessary at all, all of these questions are now going to have to be debated within NATO, and of course with any country that might wish to be engaged in it. Second, I think you raised a very good point about the development of technologies within the European Union because it raises a larger question. First, no one in NATO discourages the idea of European defence cooperation; on the contrary. For NATO to have an effective, in a sense, European pillar, for the trans-Atlantic relationship to have an effective European pillar, it requires more coherent defence cooperation on the European side because it is quite clear that have 15 defence budgets with 15 separate procurement tracks is not effective when it comes to economies of scale. And in the end, what it ends up doing is making all of the European defence funding in the European context less effective if European partners don't work together. So NATO's always supported the idea of greater European cooperation on defence, including our procurement and design and all of these issues. The challenge is -- and you put your finger on it -- ensuring that there is no unnecessary duplication. And that means the two organizations have to talk together on these issues amongst others. The Secretary General has made no secret of his disquiet over the low level of cooperation and dialogue between the two organizations on a wide range of fronts, and would certainly wish to see much more of it. I think to ensure that nobody is wasting money, more dialogue between the two cooperations is certainly valuable. That being said, we shouldn't overdramatize, in that 19 NATO countries are also EU countries, and nobody wants to waste money. These countries -- and frankly, even the countries that aren't in both organizations -- have full visibility over what's going on. And therefore they will make every effort on a national basis to ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication because it's their money. But that being said, more transparent and regular dialogue and cooperation between the two organizations certainly is something the Secretary-General would like to see, including on that front. QUESTION: James, on the London conference, is NATO expecting new pledges from governments? I thought this was more a political post-Bonn(?) thing. But are you sort of looking for money as well? And in terms of your commitment to Afghanistan , have you sort of set any kind of limit to it? Or is this something that, you know, Karzai will lead for decades to come, or whatever? And in terms of the anti-narcotics role that you plan to play or you're already playing to some extent, can you give us a little bit more detail of what that will entail? Thanks. APPATHURAI: Thanks. All good questions. My understanding is that this is indeed not a pledging conference, or at least it has not been planned to be a pledging conference, though I understand that there may be some pledges made there. That is something I hear from the United Kingdom . We'll see when we get there. But certainly you're right that the intention is not for it to be a pledging conference. If other parties wish to provide funding to NATO to assist, I'm sure we'd be very, very happy to open a bank account to allow that to happen. In terms of time limits, no, NATO has not set a time limit. But of course one always looks at and states what is your goal. And the overall mission you're quite aware of. The overall goals of the international community is that Afghanistan can stand on its own feet. Clearly one benchmark for NATO will be that the Afghan government -- and that means the Afghan National Army, Afghan security services -- can provide for the security of the country on their own. That has to be one of the benchmarks towards which we work, because of course that will be one of the benchmarks which allow, in the end, NATO to withdraw. What does that mean? It means helping to train the Afghan National Army. And that is being done. It is being done on a very robust level. And with the expanded mission, that will be taken up a notch. We will do more training of the Afghan National Army, and there is the possibility written in the OPLAN of providing embedded trainers to the Afghan National Army to assist them in not only barracks but also when they deploy out into the field. But I should stress this does not mean that NATO is going to be engaging as an alliance in combat operations. These people are not there to do that. But they can be there, as they move out of the barracks, to work with them and help them to organize and to plan the kind of operations that they will have to do. In terms of counter-narcotics, I just had a look at that this morning, in fact, to see what kind of role NATO can play. Again, to put it bluntly, NATO is not going to be going out and burning poppy fields. That is very clear. It is not the job that NATO has been given. That is a job for the Afghan armed forces to do. But NATO can provide support, and it is support that has a variety of forms. One is very simply intelligence: 'We have seen something that you might find interesting.' One is on transport. And we can help the Afghan officials, including militaries, who might be engaged in counter-narcotics efforts, to move around. Third is support particularly in the terms of medical evacuation. If they get in trouble, we can get them out and that… and also provide medical assistance to them. These are… and in terms of advice, counsel, on how it might best be done. These would be the main areas of support that NATO could provide in terms of counter-narcotics, according to the new operational plan. QUESTION: (Inaudible)… James what sort of caveats are European nations still insisting on as NATO goes through to stage three in Afghanistan, could you characterize that by giving perhaps some examples? And how happy are you with the progress that has been made over the past months in actually reducing those national caveats? APPATHURAI: Well, let me take the second question because obviously that's a safer way to approach this question. First, you all know that over Kosovo -- caveats, for those who don't follow NATO, are national restrictions put on the employment of national contributions to NATO operations. Some of them are stated; some of them are not stated. But in Kosovo, for example, there were troops that could not move, that had national restrictions on movement from one zone to another zone, or restrictions on the protection of patrimonial sites or restrictions on doing crowd control. Now, if you're in Kosovo, if you can't do crowd control you can't move and you can't protect patrimonial sites. It's hard for the force commander to use those forces in an effective way. And the March riots of last year certainly shone a very bright spotlight for all Allies on the actual operational implications of what these caveats mean for the commander on the ground. Since then and Mark is quite right to point it out -- there has been a big effort. And I have to say -- privately or publicly I would say this -- real success in highlighting the problem and reducing the number of caveats. Well over, I would say well over 50 percent of the caveats in Kosovo that existed last March have been removed, much of these related to the movement of forces in terms of crowd and riot control. And in fact, not only have the caveats been removed in Kosovo, but the troops that have been sent are now troops that are capable of crowd or riot control and equipped and trained for it. So all this to say Kosovo shone the spotlight on it. Caveats have been less of a problem in Afghanistan , for a variety of reasons. Of course now, as troops deploy, or as we plan for troops to deploy to the south, the nations are very well aware of this issue and of the challenges that they pose. So I have not heard a significant discomfort -- let me put it that way -- about caveats in terms of NATO's deployment to the south. The nations that are going are well aware that this is a very robust environment, and that force commander needs a flexibility required to do what is necessary. And we're talking about of course forces that are very effective, very mobile, and that I would say are combat experienced. All this to say I have not heard of a problem in terms of caveats in terms of the deployment to the south, nor (inaudible)…sense in Afghanistan , and I hope not to. QUESTION: And, Afghanistan , one hears nevertheless that some countries insist that there can be no night flying in helicopters or they won't let their helicopters be used in any other way by other NATO or other troops, which clearly is restrictive. APPATHURAI: I mean, you're right. I'm not saying there is no problem at all. There are challenges there. Some of these relate to safety. They're not caveats, but simply the equipment that the particular forces have. Different forces have different national characteristics, national capabilities, different training. That is simply a fact of life when it comes to NATO because it is a multinational operation. Some forces can do different things. I remember flying I think with you, Paul, up north to Kunduz or to Kandahar -- I can't remember which -- and the plane that came in in front of us from a nation that shall go unnamed was super well equipped with counter measures and sensors and could go anywhere at any time. And then the plane that came to pick me up, the sensors were two people looking out the window, and the counter measures were a good pilot. And there of course you're more restricted in where you can go and what you can fly and where you can land. So these caveats are very often not based on whims but on the capabilities that you happen to have. And I think this case of night flying does relate very much to that. It's not that they don't like flying at night; it's that they just don't have the equipment necessary to do it safely in that kind of environment. So all this to say I think we have to be careful about being precise about why they do what they do. All this to say everyone's looking at it, everyone's aware of it, and hopefully it will not be a great challenge. QUESTION: James, is there any specific reason for Mr. Tarasyuk coming this time to NATO? And what kind of topics is NATO going to put on the table? APPATHURAI: There is, as far as I'm aware, no specific issue. This is part of the regular exchanges that we have with Ukraine , which have continued and will continue of course beyond the election, no matter who is elected. The issue that will be put on the table of course by NATO will not change, and that is that Ukraine and NATO are working together on a series of reforms in Ukraine . We hope and expect that those will continue and that we will continue to provide our support for it. But there… I don't expect any surprises coming from this meeting. I think it was there... là-basically. QUESTION: James, on Afghanistan , firstly, on the Dutch vote, how confident are you that it's going to be yes, and what happens if it isn't? Secondly, just on the narcotics issue, the UN last year detected a particular problem on a deterioration in areas under NATO control, and there were different theories as to why that may be, maybe because security was improved and it was, you know, a better place to sell your narcotics. But has there been any review of policy since then to take that into account? And finally, if I can just… a point of clarification. When you were talking earlier about the Secretary General's concerns about a lack of coordination between NATO and the EU, were you talking about NATO and the EU generally, or between NATO and the EDA? APPATHURAI: To answer the first question… sorry, the last question first, between NATO and the EU more broadly. There is a broad problem, certainly not related to the EDA in particular. I of course, well, in terms of predictions, I shouldn't say this because this is being broadcast back to the NATO headquarters and being watched on all the… potentially watched on any TV. But for my Master's thesis I analyzed the Maastricht Agreement on European Union, and I concluded in it that there would never be a single European currency nor a single European armed capability. So I'm not very good at predictions, and I certainly wouldn't want to offer that up for the Dutch. I mean, obviously I'm following it very closely, but I couldn't comment on the Dutch decision. We hope… I mean, you… you will not be surprised to hear this. We hope that the Parliament will confirm the cabinet's decision to make this contribution. The Dutch contribution would be very welcome indeed. These are excellent forces. It's a very important mission. And it is, as the Secretary General has said, a matter of solidarity -- solidarity between NATO allies, solidarity with the UN, and very much solidarity with the Afghan people whom we have promised a level of support. And for all these reasons, we certainly hope that the Dutch Parliament will confirm the cabinet's decision. In terms of what happens the day after, we are -- and I've said this here before, and I won't change that line -- we are focused on Plan A. And Plan A is that the Dutch Parliament does confirm that decision. I am aware of, as you all are aware, of course, that it is true that the UN has identified an upsurge in poppy production in areas under NATO control. I do believe, in fact, that one of the reasons is that indeed the areas under NATO control are more stable, and therefore it is an easier environment for poppy production to take place. I think there's two points to make here. One is we are throwing the baby out with the bath water is the wrong expression, but we shouldn't lose track of the larger aim… Or no, let me put this another way. We shouldn't lose track of the success because there's a new problem. The success in building stability in the North and the West, and indeed in the capital, is something that we can't lose. And we shouldn't undermine that success because there's a new problem, and that is a growth in the production of narcotics, because of course this has many factors as well. What we have to do is tackle the increased production in narcotics. This has all the elements that I mentioned to you. It has an element of crop eradication. It has an element of crop income substitution, an element of policing, and element of justice. And of course it has a lot to do with neighbouring countries as well and transit from those… of narcotics through those countries. So this is a very, very complicated problem with many sources and many solutions. That's what this compact is all about. I have already mentioned that NATO, in the new operational… or the revised operational plan that we have, sets out quite clearly a number of roles that NATO can play to tackle narcotics. And what I should stress is, everybody is aware of this problem. Everybody understands that a centre of gravity, as we call it, for Afghanistan 's future success is getting a-hold of this problem. Now, I mean, it's the Afghans first that have to tackle it, but they need help. And we will do what we can to ensure that they are effective at tackling it because we obviously do not want to see Afghanistan 's success choked off by… by narcotics. QUESTION: James, what is NATO's reaction on Palestinian elections? APPATHURAI: No reaction. Sorry. That's no reaction from me, anyway. I'll see if the Secretary-General has something to say on it, but not me. QUESTION: James, I think the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping is here tomorrow. Is he meeting with the Secretary-General, and is there anything particular on the agenda? UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping is here tomorrow, I think going to NATO. I just wonder if there's anything particular on the agenda there? APPATHURAI: You are quite right. (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) QUESTION: …requests coming in from them for NATO to do anything? APPATHURAI: There are two visits tomorrow. But yes, one of those… sorry, I forgot tomorrow. US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa , and I'm sorry, I think her name is Frazer but I don't have it with me, will be coming to NATO. And Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno... no, sorry, the head of UN DPKO Guéhenno will be coming to… so Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Keeping Affairs will be here as well, and will meet with the Council tomorrow. This is a long-scheduled visit, I should stress, one that predates the new focus, revised focus, on Darfur with the discussion in the AU of potentially handing over the AU mission in Darfur to the UN. That being said, it's probably a timely visit because I'm quite sure that the Council will want to discuss with Mr. Guéhenno precisely that, see what the ideas are in the United Nations on this potential hand-over. Whether he will come with any requests, I have no idea. I have not heard that he will, even informally. But we'll see what he wishes to contribute. The relationship between NATO and the UN is obviously one that has been deepening on a practical level, both into Pakistan , in Darfur , and the more long-standing operations in Afghanistan and in Kosovo and the Balkans. So we do have quite a lot on our agenda in terms of practical cooperation between NATO and the UN, more, I have to say, than I have ever seen in my seven years at NATO. So I'm sure we can fill up the time. QUESTION: The British are sending 3500 troops to Afghanistan . How many of the 6000 does NATO already have for the expansion to the south? And are the Dutch ones the only ones missing? And can the expansion be made on schedule if the Dutch say yes on February two? APPATHURAI: The Dutch… the British decision is one of course for the -- cryptic messages from my staff: 'today.' Oh yes, today. Today. Today is the visit of… This is great. They watch from headquarters. Guéhenno is visiting today. Not tomorrow; today. Yes, today. Later today. Absolutely right. Thank you. The numbers that have been discussed for the expansion to the south are indeed around 6000, but that number has to be determined finally by the military commanders. I have heard or seen the same press reports that you have seen: 3500, potentially 4000 from the UK . That is up to Secretary Reid to discuss, to announce after the potential cabinet discussion today in Parliament. They may not announce it. I leave that of course entirely to the UK , both in terms of numbers and timing. But as you know, the Canadians have made a substantial contribution as well, 12 to 1400 Canadian troops. And indeed, the advance elements of those troops have already begun reconnaissance into the south of Afghanistan . The Danish government has publicly announced they will up their contribution to around 300 to that operation as well. And other governments I know, including the Norwegians, are considering making substantial contributions as well, though final decisions still remain to be made. I also know that the Australian government is considering a provincial reconstruction team in southern Afghanistan as well. In NATO we have an expression: 'Nothing is agreed till everything is agreed.' And that means all the pieces of the puzzle have to be there before the Supreme Allied Commander can come forward and say OK, everything is ready to go. But what you can see from this is there will be a substantial British contribution, a substantial Canadian contribution, significant contributions from other countries at a lower level as well. So we are well on the way. In terms of timing, certainly if the Dutch Parliament confirms the cabinet decisions, the time lines we are looking at are between June and September for this expansion to take place. It is not just, I should stress not just a question of finding the numbers of troops and political commitments, but there are very technical things that have to be done. Facilities have to be established. Communications and information systems have to be expanded beyond the north and west also to include the south, which sometimes means that equipment has to be purchased. So all of these technical things also help to determine the timing of deployment. But that is the time line that is being looked at. QUESTION: James, are these relations… or to enhance relations with the contact group, is this in the context of the case-by-case or operational levels, or is this even strategic relations? What is the content of all these possibilities? (SPEAKERS OVERLAP) APPATHURAI: Well, I should stress we're at the beginning of a discussion amongst Allies, so I cannot comment on where the discussion will go. We shouldn't exaggerate it. We're not talking about bringing North… South Korea into -- and certainly not North Korea -- bring North… South Korea into NATO tomorrow. That is not the essence of the discussion. But whether or not there is a value in a more structural relationship, whether these countries might be interested, all of these issues now need to be debated. That's all. That's all I meant by that. QUESTION: I want to follow up on that... APPATHURAI: Yeah. QUESTION: … New Zealand thing. I mean, this has wider policy implications, unless of course New Zealand 's seeking a security guarantee from NATO, which I doubt is the case. APPATHURAI: Yeah. QUESTION: But what is the purpose? If you can't tell us what kind of structure, the structure doesn't mean anything. And that… then what's the purpose of this? Is it to do joint defence planning? Is it to make it easier for them to join NATO missions abroad, which they can do already anyway? Why are you doing this? APPATHURAI: Well, the… it's not a we… not a me, obviously. But why would nations want to have this discussion? For example -- I'll use the US again as an example because they have been quite public about it. And I recommend to you Ambassador Nuland's interview in the FT because I think that' helps… QUESTION: I read it, though it just didn't shed much light on the situation. APPATHURAI: (Laughs)… Well, she might to shed more light certainly on the US view. There is a US perspective, for example, and I think other countries within NATO at least have sympathy for it, that if you have like-minded countries, democracies with effective armed forces, that not only wish to, not only can, but indeed to contribute to the efforts that NATO is taking on, perhaps there is a logic to… and again, you'll forgive me if I don't go into the details because the details are simply not there yet -- perhaps there is a logic to a more structural relationship, for example, that would facilitate -- I'll give you one example -- facilitate an exchange of classified information. Where you're working together, that would be an element of a more structural relationship. That's the kind of issue that we'll be looking at. How do… is there a value in more regular political discussion? Are there technical arrangements that might facilitate cooperation? I think those would be the two main elements. Go ahead. QUESTION: Yeah, two follow-up questions, actually. Your briefing last year on hopes for stage three, and the words ... the term you used then was 'early next year,' without specifying. Now we're hearing June to September. So can you give us some insight on what the slippage has been on that? And on the EU-NATO relationship, there's a report in the Figaro, saying that there was a scheduled meeting of the EU and NATO on anti-terrorism, but that France blocked that. Could you confirm that please? APPATHURAI: To answer the second one, all I can say, or all I will say, on that subject is there was indeed a planned NAC-PSC meeting for last Monday that was cancelled. I have to say I cannot go into… I cannot go into the details any more than I have. What I can say, though, and this is the larger sense, it's what I've said already, and I certainly don't pin this on any country or on any issue, but what we do have -- and again, I'm just repeating myself -- what we do have is a very narrow and limited NATO-EU relationship for a variety of reasons, and one which certainly the Secretary-General believes we need to get beyond. There are a whole host of issues, including, yes, terrorism; including, for example, our outreach to the broader Middle East ; including, for example, NATO's relations with Ukraine and the EU's relations with Ukraine , our approach to Russia , our approach to enlargement. There are a whole host of issues that the two organizations could usefully discuss, not leaving out, of course, defence cooperation issues. So certainly more would be better. QUESTION: Was this one of the regular NAC-PSC meetings… APPATHURAI: Yes. QUESTION: …or… APPATHURAI: Yes. QUESTION: …and… and was… was anti-terrorism, you know, the top item on the agenda, or… APPATHURAI: Not formally on the agenda, if you read it. It was,… the article refers to an informal meeting. Formally on the agenda at NAC-PSC meetings in general we discuss Bosnia , which is the issue governed by the Berlin-plus arrangements. And it is a relatively narrow, I would say, set of subjects, but subject is in fact what it is. In terms of slippage, perhaps I was overly optimistic in saying early next year. There are, of course… let me put it another way. This is a very, very complicated thing to do. In terms of the force generation, in terms of what is a changing security environment, and in terms of the complexity of setting up an operation in the South, not just in terms of logistics and establishments and communication equipment, but also what we had to have, which was relatively complicated discussions to establish command arrangements that would work between OEF and ISAF. For all those reasons, I guess I was overly optimistic. But we're not far off the… my projected time lines. And as I say, this summer this should happen. QUESTION: But on that, I mean, SACEUR just a couple of weeks ago said he hoped that stage three would be completed by June-July. So this slippage has occurred more recently than since last year. APPATHURAI: Well, I mean, if SACEUR is saying June-July and I'm saying approximately the same things, I'm adding August and September to be careful so I don't hear Mark in September saying, 'You said June and July.' But what I hear is between June and September. I defer of course to SACEUR's military advice because it's better than mine. But the consensus view in NATO is that is the time frame within which we are envisioning this expansion. QUESTION: James, since you'll be operating so close to the Pakistani border. Will you need some kind of formal relationship with Islamabad , or do you need some kind of institutional arrangements, some agreements… APPATHURAI: Good question. QUESTION: …transit, whatever. APPATHURAI: Good question. Yes. QUESTION: Thank you. APPATHURAI: Two things… three things on that subject. One is on February first, the humanitarian relief operation will come to an end formally. We will have a small ceremony in Pakistan and a statement here, but we're not going to make too much of a fuss. The relationship that we've built with the Pakistan government, I think, will be a good relationship because we do have, as you point out, an important operation right next door, and moving closer to the Pakistani border. There is an issue of what we call lines of communication, and that is a transit, where we might need or wish to support or supply the ISAF mission most effectively or efficiently through Pakistan . So there are discussions underway between NATO and the government of Pakistan to formalize an arrangement for transit where necessary. This is of course something that would need to be worked out, and it is very much up to the Pakistani government how it wishes to approach this. But certainly it would be valuable from a technical point of view for NATO to have that kind of agreement between NATO and the Pakistani government. Sorry, Paul. I cut you off. QUESTION: It was just about another cancelled meeting. Apparently the meeting that was planned, the EAPC meeting that was being talked about in Macedonia in May… is that not going to happen now, and… and why not? APPATHURAI: The… well, I don't think any final decisions have been taken on this issue so I don't want to pronounce too much. But I don't anticipate that there will be indeed a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council meeting in May anywhere. I should stress it's got nothing to do with the location, but more to do with the organization, finding issues that are of common interest, then making the logistical arrangements. This is more of a logistics problem than it is anything else, trying to find a date where everybody can show up conveniently. So that's where we are, and we are looking for new dates, basically, to… to arrange this meeting. And it will happen. QUESTION: I know I shouldn't be asking you this, but have you seen a program for the Munich conference? Can you give us an idea of who's speaking? Because the organizers have never released the program at all. You know, the day it starts… APPATHURAI: To be honest, I haven't seen a program either. What… all I know is that Chancellor Merkel will be speaking in the morning. I believe Javier Solano will be speaking in the morning, though I'm not a hundred percent sure of that. It's just hallway conversation. The Secretary-General will be chairing a panel on security in the afternoon. But… and he will leave that meeting, I should add for our Balkan friends, for a ministerial level contact group meeting in the Foreign Office in the afternoon. Sorry, this is London . Sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry. That's London . Forget it. Now I'm just babbling. Yeah, so that's what I know, but I really don't know much, and I personally have not seen a program either. QUESTION: Is Chairman (inaudible) going to give his own speech? APPATHURAI: He's going to give his own speech. QUESTION: (Inaudible)… the Balkans? APPATHURAI: Yes, sorry, the second point. On Saturday in the afternoon at the Foreign Office there will be a ministerial level meeting of the contract group, and the Secretary-General will be attending as well.