NATO HQ, Brussels 19 Jan. 2006

Press Briefing by the NATO Spokesman Multimedia Audio file .MP3/15432kb Biography James Appathurai JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): I'd like to touch on three or four things and then of course open the floor to your questions, and this is, as usual, on the record. I think the first thing that is worth doing is clarifying what ISAF is meant to do in Afghanistan, because I think there is some... perhaps some confusion in the press as to what the mission actually is and what it is not. ISAF's mission is to contribute to stability and to help to extend the authority of the Afghan government. When... that is the mission now, it will be the mission when it extends to the south. There are, of course, questions about the relationship between ISAF and the Operation Enduring Freedom and what the different missions are. Operation Enduring Freedom has as its mission to hunt Taliban and al-Qaeda. ISAF has as its mission, as I've mentioned, to extend the authority of the Afghan government, contribute to peace and stability, including and primarily through Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which will be deployed into the south. These will be robustly protected by the force that will be deployed, the ISAF force that will be deployed to the south. And if al-Qaeda or the Taliban attempt to either threaten NATO personnel or prevent them from carrying out their mission, then ISAF will have the authority, the rules of engagement and the capability to take action to prevent them from doing that, either to prevent them from threatening NATO personnel or from carrying out their mission. This can include, yes, if they see, for example, Taliban up in the mountains, possibly preparing an attack on them, the ISAF commander on the ground would have the authority, if necessary, to take pre-emptive action to stop an attack on their personnel, or stop the Taliban from preventing them from carrying out their mission, but this, of course, would be at all times a decision for the operational Commander based on the existing conditions on the ground. I hope that that clarifies somewhat the relationship between the two missions and the difference between the two missions. I'm very happy to answer any questions that you might have. Can we save them till to the end, or do you want to get right in? Q: (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Well, actually, I don't mind. I mean, if we're on the Afghanistan subject why don't we do it. So go ahead. Q: The operational Commander, who is that? I mean, someone sitting in Kabul or someone on the ground in the south. APPATHURAI: There are various levels of command, and in each case, of course, commanders will have to make decisions, but I was speaking in this case very much at the tactical level, where PRT commanders, for example, will have a decision to make in the immediate sense over what to do with immediate intelligence that they might have relating to someone up in the mountains. So this is, of course, something that will take place at all levels. Q: So I mean that's built into whatever the rules of engagement of... APPATHURAI: Of course, the rules of engagement give them the authority and the flexibility to take action, to defend themselves, and to defend their mission robustly. But of course, that doesn't mean they must act, in a sense, in an automatic sense they must assess and they will assess the security situation as they face it and take decisions according to their judgement. Q: Is Nuland being misquoted or... are you saying something different to her? APPATHURAI: I'm not saying anything different from Ambassador Nuland. She has said that NATO forces must be able to take on insurgents and that is absolutely the case. They must be able to act robustly, including against insurgents, if those insurgents are threatening the mission of ISAF. Q: All I heard from counter-insurgency, so I don't know. I mean, maybe someone has interpreted what she said as being counter-insurgency or.... APPATHURAI: That's as far as I'll go. Q: Is there going to be a clear geographical separation between the two missions, or some kind of overlapping? Is OEF going to stay within the southern region when ISAF is going to expand? APPATHURAI: That is a good question about geographical separation. I think what we have to understand is that in Afghanistan, particularly in the south, clear lines, very, very clear lines of geographic separation are not entirely possible. Much as we would like them, they're not entirely possible. The south requires, the people of the south of Afghanistan require many kinds of support. They need the Taliban and al-Qaeda to go away. They need reconstruction. They need the Afghan National Army to be supported. They need outside parties to help to contribute to political settlements. These are all roles that the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have played in various regions and will have to play in the south as well. So all of this action will have to take place concurrently in the south. Now what does that mean for OEF? Operation Enduring Freedom will not be based primarily in the south once ISAF moves into the south, but it will have, of course, the ability, and indeed, the requirement to operate where it must in its mission, which is a distinct mission. That's in the south, but that's also true in the west and in the north and it has been the case until now. So this only makes sense. It would be perhaps nicer, or easier, if there were clear geographic separations between where people needed stability and where the Taliban and al-Qaeda were. Unfortunately that is just not the case, and we have to roll up our sleeves and make sure that we keep things as clear as possible and do the job where it's required. Let me mention two more things, and then I will happily open the floor to your questions. One is that the Council agenda from yesterday, I think the most noteworthy, the only noteworthy element, was a briefing by Jan Pronk who is the UN Secretary General's Special Representative in Sudan. I'm sure you all know him, particularly those of you from The Netherlands. He's been a long-standing international figure. This has been a long scheduled meeting, so I wouldn't want to place it in the context of any recent discussions on... it wasn't put onto the agenda as a result of recent discussions on Darfur, but it will be no surprise to you that his discussion was with the Secretary General and with the North Atlantic Council focused exclusively on the situation in Sudan. Mr. Pronk made a few points. One was to update Allies on the ongoing political discussions. And that doesn't mean just in theatre, but internationally. And that is to clarify that, in fact, the African Union still has to hold its summit, I believe it's in Khartoum, to decide whether it wishes to hand over to the United Nations its mission, AMIS mission in Darfur. Then the Security Council would have to take a decision on this issue, and only then could the international community, and particularly the United Nations, move towards any kind of a transfer of the AMIS mission, the AU-led in Darfur, to the UN. Second point, he laid out his vision of what that force might look like, and you might have seen this, I think, reflected already in the press. His vision is that Darfur reports a very large force, more than 12,000... 12,000 to 20,000 are the figures that I have heard. Present throughout the area. In other words, not a force that is small and mobile and reactive, but a force that is large and present to help provide confidence to people who need to return to their homes. These people want a security presence when they get there, not after the attack has taken place. That force would also have to be well-equipped and robust, and that it would have to have a long-term mandate, not a short-term six-month. He is talking about small numbers of years rather than small numbers of months. He shared this view with the Allies and there was a substantive discussion of his presentation. I should add that NATO, and this is not in the last day, but NATO has extended its support to the African Union until the end of May. So NATO is continuing to provide airlift rotation for African troops, African battalions for AMIS, for the AU-led mission and we have extended... the Alliance has extended also its capacity-building support for the African Union. In other words, to help the AU develop its own capability to handle large-scale operations when it comes to planning, when it comes to logistics, when it comes to simply being able to read and use the kind of mapping necessary for large-scale military operations. So that was that. I wanted to to give you some numbers, moving to Pakistan, on the Pakistan airlift, which is our Pakistan support operation which is, as you know, coming to an end in a little over a week. But we have collated what has been accomplished until now. NATO has delivered 18,000 tents, over half a million blankets, 80,000 mattresses, 17,000 stoves, as well as food and medical supplies in about 170 sorties, and I mentioned this last week, NATO has delivered about 3,500 tonnes of aid. Our helicopters have lifted over 1,600 tonnes of relief from Islamabad to forward supply bases and from there on directly to the point of need. They've also moved over 6,000 ill, injured and displaced people out of the earthquake zone. The NATO field hospital has seen nearly 5,000 patients--that's just the hospital itself--as well as sending mobile medical teams into the mountains to treat a further 3,500. So around 8,500 patients have been treated by the NATO medical staff, which have also contributed to the World Health Organization immunization program, that has helped to prevent the outbreak of disease. NATO has built about 110 multi-functional shelters at high altitude, rebuilt nine schools, cleared 22 kilometres of road and removed debris and provided fresh water for over 8,000 people. So I thought it would be nice to put that all into a package, that it has been a substantial level of contribution to the country. Finally, let me mention the Secretary General's upcoming agenda, and then I'm happy to take your questions. Turning to next week, on the 23rd of January the Prime Minister of Norway will be coming on Monday. The President of Slovenia will be coming to NATO on Tuesday, the 24th. On Thursday, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for African Affairs, Ms. Frazer, F-R-A-Z-E-R, will be speaking to the Council and that will be immediately followed by a visit by UN Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping, M. Guéhenno. The week after that, the 30th of January, the German Minister of Defence, Mr. Jung, will be at NATO, followed by the Croatian Prime Minister, who will be attending again on the 30th. The 31st is the Afghanistan conference. We've discussed that at length here. I won't go into it again unless you want to discuss it. It appears likely that on the 1st of February Foreign Minister Tarasyuk will be at NATO Headquarters. And for our French colleagues, the Secretary General is likely to visit Paris on the 2nd of February, and I'm trying to arrange for him to go to the Association Euro-Atlantique, so we will see how that goes. That was what I have for you today and I'm happy to take your questions. Q: The meeting of Sec Gen with Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte... APPATHURAI: Indeed, I did forget. Q: What was discussed and... you reminded me, speaking about ISAF, reminded me on the rules of engagement in Bosnia, because as I remember, NATO soldiers didn't have a duty to arrest indictees, but they could do that if they see them during the normal... doing their normal job. What are the rules of engagement of NATO personnel at the moment in Bosnia regarding the war crime indictees? APPATHURAI: Thank you. Excuse me for not mentioning the visit of Carla del Ponte. I'd spoken to a few people about it already. I was present at the meeting. Ms. del Ponte and the Secretary General began their meeting, of course, by discussing NATO-ICTY cooperation. The tribunal, of course, regularly comes to NATO with requests for information, not least in response to developments that are taking place, for example, in the trial of Mr. Milosevic, and of course they discussed those requests and how NATO can best respond to them, and the Secretary General, of course, reiterated his personal commitment to ensuring that requests from the tribunal are responded to as quickly as possible and that will be done. They, of course, discussed the outstanding cases. I believe there are six indictees who are not facing justice, and in particular the two most prominent, who you know where they might be located, and the ongoing efforts to ensure that they face justice in The Hague . The Secretary General, for his part, of course, reconfirmed NATO's full support, but also his belief that the greatest contributor to stability in that region must be Euro-Atlantic integration and that means bringing, in particular, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina in this case, close to NATO, closer to the EU, but that will require, and this is not news, full cooperation with the tribunal from NATO's perspective. That means that these two individuals in particular must be facing justice in The Hague . And that was the substance of the meeting. In terms of rules of engagement, I am not aware of any change of the rules of engagement for NATO troops in Bosnia , but of course NATO's presence in Bosnia has been dramatically reduced, as you know. NATO now has a Headquarters, not tens of thousands of troops spread around the country. So individual NATO nations, of course, have their particular role in apprehending indictees, but the NATO Headquarters is, of course, focused very much on assisting in defence reform, deterring terrorism, and where it can, contributing to the hunt for these individuals. But EUFOR, I think, of course, has a much more prominent role to play now. Q: I don't know what Madame del Ponte said today, but based on what she was saying before, and her spokesperson yesterday, it's believed that Mladic is in Serbia and he is being protected by Serbia-Montenegro army. NATO already said several times that you are in close cooperation with army of Serbia-Montenegro, helping them in a defence reform and in technical assessment and things like that. Are you aware then that you are cooperating with an army that is protecting war criminals? APPATHURAI: The defence cooperation between NATO and the army of Serbia and Montenegro, we think it's important, it's valuable and it contributes to principles that NATO countries hold dear, and that includes democratic control of the military, that means transparency in the military, so of course it is not only technical, but also, I think, supporting the overall values that we believe in. I am not aware, of course, personally whether or not the Serbian army is hiding Mr. Milosevic, but certainly NATO... Q: Mladic. APPATHURAI: Mladic, sorry, Mr. Mladic, but certainly NATO, I think is taking quite a strong stand as an organization when it comes to conditionality. I think as strong as any organization, to say that rapprochement to NATO and participation and Partnership for Peace depends on that. So I think NATO has nothing to hide and no reason to hang its head when it comes to our political stand on the importance of full cooperation with the Tribunal. Q: James, on Darfur , if the African Union were to decide on UN troops would the Alliance ... would NATO change its own role in the peacekeeping or peace monitoring mission? Did Mr. Pronk ask you for a changed mandate there? And with regards to the Pakistan relief effort, do you know which countries of the Alliance are staying back on an individual basis? Thanks. APPATHURAI: Mr. Pronk did not ask anything of NATO, certainly at present. Precisely, I might add, in the context that the political developments both in the AU and the UN wouldn't even allow for it were he to ask for the Alliance to change its role. We are simply not at the stage where the AU has even handed over to the United Nations this mission. NATO has done what has been asked of it by Président Konare of the African Union in a letter that he sent to the Secretary General for airlift of African battalions and capacity building. If a different request were to come then I'm quite sure the Council would discuss it with a very open mind, but we are certainly not there yet. In terms of the relief effort, all I know, and this is certainly not exhaustive, because it's not based on a proper analysis, but I know that the German government intends to leave behind at least, I believe, it's two helicopters and some personnel. The French government has committed to leave behind a fuel farm. In other words... well, a fuel facility which will help both the Pakistani and UN helicopters to keep flying. And I suspect that the United States will be also maintaining a humanitarian presence there as well. Beyond that I am not aware... I don't know if my colleagues know anymore than I do. That's what I know. Q: James, you told us Mr. Pronk had to tell the Council and what he was not asking for, but what about the debate in the Council? I mean, was there some reflection what one might offer to the United Nations in case they're asking for, or they're building up a stronger United Nations peacekeeping force? APPATHURAI: Well, NATO... Q: Is it possible that NATO takes over a role of leading this mission (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: To my mind that seems, frankly, unlikely that NATO would take over the lead of the operation. There simply is no discussion of that in the international community. It seems very clear that the African Union is leaning in the direction of handing over to the African Union ... sorry, to the United Nations. And I think that is something obviously that Secretary General Annan has come out to support and he is clearly making public statements saying that he believes that this would be a necessary step. I think much of this led by the fact that the African Union is not... doesn't have the funds to continue doing what they're doing. Now, will NATO continue to play a supporting role? That remains to be seen, but for the moment our mission is slated to end at the end of May, as I've mentioned, and no request has come forward for any further NATO role. NATO, of course, has enough on its plate that we will not begin speculating on other things. It takes us a long time to get through a Council meeting just with our own business. But if another request comes, of course there'll be a discussion. Q: Just on the same point, you said that Jan Pronk was talking about needing up to 20,000 troops. I'm thinking there are 17,000 UN troops in the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example. I mean, is it actually realistic to station this vast number of troops? APPATHURAI: Well, at an on the record briefing you wouldn't expect me perhaps to speculate on the realism of it. I think Mr. Pronk did what Mr. Pronk's job is to do, and that is to lay out clearly what he believes the requirement is. This is a man who is very, very expert in this region. In his expert opinion this is what is needed, and of course, there's few people who are better able to pronounce on it. Now, there are many steps between here and there, and NATO is as familiar as any organization with force generation problems. And or course, the UN has force generation challenges in the south of Darfur already, though that number is slowly creeping up. The number of UN troops in the south of Darfur is slowly creeping up and that's a good thing. But it will be a challenge coming up with 20,000 troops for a large-scale operation. It's something that would be a challenge for any organization, but that does not diminish the accuracy of his analysis, nor the importance of actually making a greater contribution to solving the problems in Darfur . I think we were there, and then here. Q: So far as I know, James, today a new Ukrainian ambassador was represented to the NATO leadership. First of all, are you satisfied with the person of the former Minister of Defence of Ukraine on that post, and second, what is your expectations from, let me say, so introduction of a new diplomatic body in relations between Ukraine and NATO? APPATHURAI: Well, I think it will not surprise you to hear me say, but it is actually true, that NATO and the Secretary General, all of us, frankly, have had a very good relationship with the outgoing ambassador. It has worked very well. We've had a very good and professional relationship with him. And also the knowledge that he had a good and strong tie with his own capital and that's, of course, something that everybody wants in a multilateral environment like ours. You want to be sure that when you speak to the ambassador he's heard, and this ambassador was heard in Kyiv and certainly his professionalism and his presence will be missed. The new incoming ambassador has met with the Secretary General already. And of course, what we look for from him is simply a continuation of the same, not only good level of professionalism, but also a good personal working relationship, which we all had with the outgoing ambassador, and Ambassador Morozov, and Robert reminds me of this, has experience within his own ministry of Defence and NATO Affairs and we've met... and the Deputy Secretary General has met him recently. So he is coming in experienced, and that's a good thing. Q: On ISAF and the Dutch vote next week, what would it mean if the Dutch Parliament says no to the extension and how easily could the foreseen troops from The Netherlands could be substituted by others? APPATHURAI: Well, certainly you won't be surprised to hear me say that we are focused on Plan A and Plan A is that the Dutch Parliament, and we believe will, or hope, certainly hope they will, decide to support the government, the Dutch government's decision to deploy this force to the south in partnership with the other NATO Aallies, who are going to do it. My own country, as you know, Canada , has already begun deploying personnel to the south in anticipation of that, and indeed, one of them was killed and two more are in a coma as a result of an attack just a few days ago. So we are well aware, as a country, and as an Alliance of the difficulties there. But we do hope and do believe that this is an important mission and hope... we do believe that this is an important mission and certainly hope that the Dutch Parliament will support the cabinet's decision. This is a mission of around 10,000 troops now. It will grow by several thousand with contributions coming from many, many countries. Some NATO countries..., and non-NATO countries as well. The U.K. contribution to the deployment to the south and the Canadian contribution, with added contributions from countries such as... who just doubled their contribution? Ah Denmark, exactly. Thank you. UNIDENTIFIED: Formal decision next week. APPATHURAI: A formal decision next week, but the Danes are intending to double their contribution. Other countries are in discussion within their own governments to send troops to the south. I know, for example, the Australians are also looking at deployment. So as I say, this is a multinational effort. Many countries are contributing to it. If the Dutch choose not to deploy it will be unfortunate, but I am very confident that this mission will go forward and it will go forward with the necessary numbers of troops and the required military contributions. Q: On the Balkans, James, on the visit of Ms. del Ponte, did she raise any criticism against the governments of Bosnia and Serbia for not cooperating in the search of the indictees? APPATHURAI: Well, you will not be surprised that she is not fully satisfied with the contributions, or with the efforts of these governments to apprehend the indictees. She has made her dissatisfaction public on many occasions. That has not changed as far as I could tell from that meeting. She is still not happy. I don't think you will see the chief prosecutor happy with cooperation until the two individuals, in particular, but in her case I thinks he's focused on all six, until all six are where she believes, and where we all believe, they belong. Q: James, let me go back to Augustin's question on NATO's personal engagement in Bosnia. Yesterday we had a quite funny situation when the police of Republika Srpska go search Mladic in the territory and the day before Mrs. del Ponte says that he's in Serbia, so who is primarily in charge of searching and arresting the war indictees in Bosnia? NATO, EU, or local police? APPATHURAI: The primary responsibility for apprehending indictees lies with the local governments. There can be no exception to this. They have the responsibility, and it is them that pay the price for not succeeding in carrying out that responsibility, and that price is being held back from closer cooperation with organizations like NATO and like the EU. So that is quite clear. NATO and the EU both have the authority to conduct operations, to apprehend indictees and to support the local government in their responsibility to do it. So it's not a question of hierarchy. But the primary responsibility lies with the local government. Q: Which manner was NATO then involved in yesterday's search, when Mladic was not there. The last... APPATHURAI: Yesterday's search. Q: Yes. APPATHURAI: I am not aware... I am not aware, and I probably couldn't comment. Q: For the search going on, has anybody asked you to support the job or... APPATHURAI: I am not aware of any NATO role in that particular search. No NATO role as far as I know. I can check this, but I'm reasonably confident that there was no NATO role. Q: James, just to hop back to ISAF, you said that they'd have the required military contributions, even if the Dutch Parliament did not go ahead with deployment. Does that include attack helicopters? APPATHURAI: I didn't say have, but I'm confident they will have. Q: Yeah, I know, I was just (inaudible)... APPATHURAI: Let's not get too far ahead of ourselves. The Dutch Parliament is going through a, I think, quite a thorough process of examining this situation. They will hold their hearings. I understand now that they will not be sending a delegation out to Afghanistan, but de toute façon they will look at this question very thoroughly and we will see, I believe it's on February 2nd, what they choose, what the Dutch Parliament chooses to do. But I do know that whatever the Dutch Parliament decides to do, and we're confident that NATO will deploy to the south when it takes over, when it announces... when SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander announces that he is ready to conduct a NATO operation in the south it will be because he has what he considers to be the relevant and necessary military forces. And I think it should be clear that when these forces are deployed they will be robust, they will defend themselves robustly and they will have the equipment and the rules of engagement necessary to carry out their mission and no one should think otherwise. That's it.