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Updated: 13-Sep-2005 NATO Speeches

Berlin,
Germany

13 Sep . 2005

Press briefing

by the NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai

JAMES APPATHURAI (NATO Spokesman): Ladies and gentlemen, mesdames et messieurs.

Thank you for coming.

I won't take up too much of your time but I thought it would be useful for us to have a quick preview of the ministerial both this afternoon and tomorrow. This is all on the record so can use the words as you will. I will do this in English but of course is there if there is anyone who would like to ask questions in French, I'm happy to take them in French as well and we have interpretation.

The meeting this afternoon will focus on transformation; this is not a surprise. But it will be a little bit different in character than the usual meeting of defence ministers- NATO defence ministers when they concentrate on transformation.

Usually they are very focused on the nuts and bolts of the immediate requirements of NATO transformation in their own forces and Alliance-wide.

Today, the secretary general has asked them to lift their eyes from the immediate issues to look to the longer term future.

As you all know, to get a result 10 to 15 years down the road in defence means you have to take decisions now. And of course the Alliance is changing very much, international security is changing very much and ministers--both defence and foreign ministers of course but defence ministers here today--will want to look at what kind of NATO they want at the end of this 10 to 15 year period and what decisions of course would have to be taken now to get there and this will have immediate effects on their own armed forces as well if and when this common vision is shaped.

And the kinds of questions they'll be looking at are for example, what balance do we want between forces that are designed for collective defence or forces that are designed for force projection? What kind of balance do we need between light mobile forces that are designed to move quickly and then leave versus stabilization forces that are designed to stay for long periods of time, as we see in Kosovo, as we've seen in Afghanistan as well.

There is a whole range, of course, open of options and it is not a question of choosing one or the other. NATO has to be able to do the full spectrum of activities but it's a question of balance. And it is very important that defence ministers have a common vision or at least a broadly common vision of where they want the Alliance to be 10 to 15 years from now. That is what the secretary general wants to spark in terms of a discussion this afternoon.

And I know that defence ministers are very interested in that. I've seen the quotes from Defence Minister Struck who has certainly come in support of the secretary general's idea of having a more political dialogue here in NATO not just amongst foreign ministers but also amongst defence ministers. And it's certainly something that the secretary general has welcomed.

They will also discuss this afternoon the NATO Response Force. And this is, for those of you who are not fully familiar with NATO, the transformational tool of the Alliance. It is where forces from all allies come together, train to the highest level with the latest doctrine, the latest technology and for the most demanding missions as well as missions lower down the spectrum; and also is of course, designed to be anything from an initial entry force to a stabilization force for a short period of time to performing humanitarian needs.

You, I'm sure have read, that the NRF or elements of both the naval and air components of the NATO Response Force have been deployed or are being deployed to transport humanitarian supplies from Europe to the United States in response to hurricane Katrina. So this is something that the NRF has not necessarily done before but it shows the breadth of things that the NRF can do.

The NRF is designed to reach full operational capability next October during an exercise that will take place in Cape Verde and we are working towards that but there are of course, for any kind of operation a year away, there are still shortfalls that need to be met. Ministers will discuss how to meet them and this will be of course part of the regular discussions that defence ministers have but certainly they will wish to look at the NRF and how to make sure that we can indeed reach full operational capability next year even as the NRF is performing very important roles today.

There will be a reception this evening, to which you are all invited I do believe for the media.

Tomorrow morning ministers will turn to let's say more practical issues and that is our operations and missions.

Afghanistan obviously will be very high up on the agenda. This is one of NATO's main priorities and it is an operation that is evolving very quickly. You all know that we have deployed 2,000 extra troops into Afghanistan for the election period and they are there- they will be providing security as the elections take place very, very soon now.

But there is a second question and that is how will NATO's mission evolve into the future? And there are two evolutions that will have to be discussed: One is the military evolution, one is the political evolution.

The military evolution is very simple and quite clearly laid out and that is that NATO will gradually take over responsibilities throughout the country. So the International Security Assistance Force will expand its responsibilities from where it is now, in Kabul the north and the west, to the south and to the east. The force generation for area south is going very well and that should move forward, that expansion should move forward in the coming months. I can't give you a number of months but certainly it is well on track.

But one of the issues that has to be discussed, and I know it's being discussed amongst ministers in the press and will be discussed tomorrow morning here, is the relationship between the NATO-led Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom which is at present in the south and in the east.

The operations are moving closer together geographically, they will have to develop greater synergy, greater mutual support between them. And ministers will wish to discuss how to move them closer together in a way that works best for both missions and for all allies. So that will certainly be an issue on the table.

They will look at Kosovo- Kosovo too is a priority for the Alliance. We have over 16,000 troops there and the political situation is evolving very quickly. As I'm sure you know, NATO Ambassador Kai Eide will soon publish his report or present to the UN Secretary General his report, on his assessment of where Kosovo is in meeting the standards set by the international community. Standards including minority rights, freedom of movement, et cetera.

If his assessment is positive, then the international community will move towards status talks for Kosovo, determining the final political status of Kosovo. Obviously this is a very quick changing, rapidly evolving political situation and for KFOR we will have to, as an Alliance, keep a very close eye on developments. But the mission and KFOR as it restructures, it is in the process of restructuring to be more mobile, more flexible, more present in the field, we'll keep a close eye on political developments and ministers will discuss that here today- or here tomorrow as well.

They- ministers will also discuss the training mission in Iraq. This is a mission that the Alliance set up last year. It is going well. The targets that we have and that we are meeting are that the Alliance- that NATO will train and is training 1,500 Iraqi officers per year: 1,000 inside the country and around 500 outside of the country.

The evolution in this mission is the following: in a few weeks, NATO will open a training academy near Baghdad where we can centralize and indeed enhance our training of Iraqi security forces, particularly Iraqi officers. The numbers will not change--it will still be 1,000 inside the country, 500 outside of the country--but the training academy will allow us to improve and focus our training efforts.

So ministers will wish to discuss not only this immediate step that is the opening of this facility but also wish to look to the future and how they want the training mission to evolve.

Finally let me discuss- well let me mention also that there will be a discussion of terrorism--this goes, I think, almost without saying--anytime NATO defence ministers come together, they must discuss terrorism as it is a threat that they- that we all face in all of our countries.

NATO does do many things in many different ways to combat terrorism from operations such as the one in Afghanistan to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorism to our operation in the Mediterranean--Operation Active Endeavour to which Russia and Ukraine will soon provide support in the form of ships and countries from the southern Mediterranean will also provide support--to the development of technologies.

For example, technologies to defend wide-bodied aircraft against shoulder-fired missiles; technologies to prevent- to protect ships and ports from terrorist attack; technology to prevent- to protect helicopters from terrorist attack. So there will be a discussion also of the technological improvements that are being made and of course enhanced intelligence sharing amongst allies. This has already taken place but ministers will want to discuss how to take it one step further.

This in essence will cover the NATO agenda, the NATO-only agenda but in the afternoon- or sorry, over lunch, there will also be a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov will be here and will have a working lunch with his NRC (NATO-Russia Council) colleagues and the 27 defence ministers will want to discuss together a range of issues relating to enhancing their practical cooperation.

And one of those areas will be, again focused on Afghanistan, there will be discussion amongst the 27 ministers of enhanced cooperation amongst NRC countries to help prevent the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan. This is obviously a threat that we all face. Ninety percent, I think ninety percent plus of the heroin that is on the market- the world market today has its origins in Afghanistan. Much of it ends up on our streets and in our schools and it is obviously incumbent on all of our nations to try to help Afghanistan overcome this challenge.

Let me jump back because I forgot one thing that I do need to mention about Afghanistan and I should've mentioned it when I was discussing the operations.

Ministers will also wish to discuss the long term future of NATO's engagement in Afghanistan beyond the elections. I mentioned the military evolution, I skipped over the political evolution.

The process that began in Bonn which laid out a framework and a roadmap for the international community's engagement in Afghanistan will come to an end as these- as this electoral process comes to an end in Afghanistan. That does not mean the international community can go home. On the contrary, the Afghan Government continues to need support from NATO but also from the United Nations, very much from the European Union, from the international donor community, from the non-governmental organizations that are there.

So we need, as an international community, to have an extended roadmap, a new roadmap, for how the international community can work together in support of the Afghan Government, in support of their priorities, including of course counter-narcotics.

There must be an essential role of course for the United Nations. There is a critical role for the European Union, and there is a very important role for NATO. No one organization can do what needs to be done on their own; this has to be a team effort in support of the Afghan lead and ministers will certainly discuss here today what role NATO can play as part of this international team effort into the future.

Of course, as I mentioned, this will be an Afghan lead but NATO of course will have its own role to play and our own position as this international team is, in a sense, put together for the post-Bonn Process.

Let me return quickly to the NATO-Russia Council.

I mentioned that there will be a discussion amongst the 27 NRC ministers on combating the flow of narcotics from Afghanistan. There will also be a discussion of enhancing our cooperation when it comes to, for example, training, when it comes to interoperability. Russia is setting up a peacekeeping brigade that will be interoperable with NATO and Alliance defence ministers will want to talk with their Russian colleague about how to make sure these- our military forces can work together for potential future peacekeeping operations.

We'll also want to look at enhanced training, joint training. You all remember, because it was very recent, that Russian submariners were trapped in their submarine under water and it was the United Kingdom that came and helped the Russian Navy to rescue them. The commander- the British commander of that ship had very recently trained with the Russians precisely on submarine search and rescue in the NRC context and it was training that he himself said had proven valuable when it came time to work with his Russian colleagues to try to rescue these sailors. This is the kind of thing that we want to build on.

We have of course arrangements with the Russians on cooperative air space management. In other words, how we work together in the event that a terrorist takes control of an aircraft, we have arrangements with the Russians to work together in that eventuality. And there are many others- many other examples that I can give. So ministers will want to build on this as we move forward.

They will also want to discuss implementing the Russian decision, one which NATO welcomes, to contribute to Operation Active Endeavour. As I mentioned Russia will send two ships I do believe to work with Operation Active Endeavour and they are in the process now of familiarizing themselves with each other; and that should happen at some point in 2006.

That in essence is the- are the highlights of what I think will be the highlights of the meetings this afternoon and tomorrow.

I am ready to take your questions. (Do we have microphones?)

Q (Reuters): James, you mentioned the shortfalls in the NRF. Could you quantify exactly what shortfalls it's experiencing at the moment and what kind of threat this carries for the, you know, the target of a full operability?

APPATHURAI: Well the current manifestation of the NRF is doing what it needs to do. So there's no problem with shortfalls when it comes to the NRF as it is.

What we're talking about of course is generating forces for the NRF rotation for next year. And right now I believe some of the things that allies are looking for include strategic lift and communications equipment.

I have absolutely no doubt these necessary capabilities will be generated in plenty of time for full operational capability. But it is normal, and you're very familiar with the way NATO works, it takes time to generate these kinds of forces.

I should mention that one of the issues surrounding the NRF is one of the larger issues which the secretary general will wish to discuss with defence ministers and that is funding. As it stands now, for those of you who don't follow NATO everyday, the vast bulk of funding for NATO operations lie with the nation that contributes the forces. The 'costs lie where they fall' is the principle that we follow almost exclusively which means nations that contribute a helicopter, have to buy the helicopter, send the helicopter to where its required, pay for its use and bring it back.

One of the issues that the secretary general will bring up and it has implications potentially for the long term future of the funding of the NRF but also more broadly for NATO will be whether or not common funding, in other words, a pool of money to which all nations contribute can be more widely applied to NATO operations simply to some key enablers or key capabilities that are used by everyone which could ease the burden on individual nations, particularly smaller nations, when they wish to contribute to an operation.

I can give you an example. If a country like my own--Canada--is the first to arrive in a country like Afghanistan and it sets up a hospital that everybody uses, could there be some common funding applied to that to help ease the burden on the initial country that's going in?

Another area of discussion may well be whether or not we want, as an Alliance, to acquire for NATO--to be NATO-owned and operated--what are called key enablers. For example, perhaps tactical helicopters or a small capability for strategic airlift. There are discussions underway in the case of strategic airlift, there's a German-led initiative which is moving forward quite quickly.

But there will be a discussion of more flexible uses of NATO budgets to see if we can help balance the financial burdens in a way that demonstrates more solidarity and indeed helps to remove some of the logjams that sometimes inhibit countries from going forward.

Q: Without going into philosophical discussion on where NATO should be in 10 to 15 years, I'm assuming the secretary general, and apparently he's prepared a text, has some fairly precise ideas.

Could you give us some insight as to where he thinks NATO should be in 10 to 15 years? And I ask that in the context of the fact that many countries are reluctant to have NATO be the, as I they could say, the 'gendarmes of the world' you know the world police cops. So could you give us some insight on that?

APPATHURAI: To a certain extent I can and obviously I would suggest that you ask this question to him this afternoon or tomorrow morning because I can't get out ahead of him.

What I can say is he certainly agrees with those countries that do not want NATO to be the 'gendarmes du monde' and he would say and will say I'm sure if you ask him the question that NATO has neither the ambition nor the financial means nor the military capability to be the 'gendarmes du monde'.

So that is not something that he would propose nor would he support as in any way realistic.

In terms of what he has put in front of ministers, it is principally presenting to them the same kind of range of options that I discussed with you earlier today. In others words what will be the balance, what should be the balance for example between stabilization and collective defence forces?

And of course these kinds of issues are the ones that ministers need to discuss so in terms of his own personal views, I think you should ask him but certainly the paper that he has put in front of the ministers has helped to sort of crystallize for them what the various positions are. These are not questions of either or. They are questions of proportion and balance.

Q (German Public Radio): I wonder if you could enlighten us, what is the status now on the debate or even maybe decision making or pre-decision making on the combination- to combine two operations in Afghanistan under one military command structure?

And just also to get the latest figures. How many troops are there now in Afghanistan including those 2,000 you just mentioned and is there further reinforcement in this middle and long term an option? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: Yes. As you know this is an informal meeting of defence ministers which means, in terms of decision making, no decisions are required here today. So you should not expect any decisions on command structures or anything else.

A fundamental NATO principle and one on which all nations agree is unity of command. That is, that a mission should have unity of command.

Now within that broad principle, there are many ways to do it and that is what's under discussion amongst nations. All nations agree that ISAF and OEF need to work more closely together, that there should be greater synergy between the two missions and that when NATO takes over operations throughout the country that there must be unity of command.

Now within that, that is where the details need to be worked out and different countries have different visions but I would not suggest as I have seen in some press reports that there is much controversy over this. I think there are broadly shared visions that this makes sense.

Now you heard discussions that there could be two task forces under one commander and these are all options that are out on the table so I don't want to prejudge discussions amongst ministers but what I would suggest is that there is a broadly-shared agreement that these two missions should move closer together and that there should be, when NATO- when ISAF takes over full operations in the community, there should be unity of command.

Oh I'm sorry- er, numbers.

There are over 10,000 soldiers in ISAF now. This is with the election surge. I have heard discussions now, sorry- 2,000 or so of those soldiers will be withdrawn after the election period but the numbers will start to go up again as NATO expands into the south.

There are for example Provincial Reconstruction Teams and indeed other forces that are moving into the south including from my own country, which now are under Operation Enduring Freedom, but when NATO expands into the south they will come under a NATO banner.

So I don't have and I'm not sure- I don't have precise numbers on what that will be and I'm not sure it's clear yet how much the numbers will go up but certainly many of the forces that are in the south now under OEF will go under ISAF when ISAF expands to the south.

Q (Associated Press): How soon after this weekend do you expect NATO to actually reach an agreement on the synergies between the two forces in Afghanistan?

APPATHURAI: That's a very good question and I am afraid I couldn't give timelines.

I do know, and as I mentioned to you already, that the force generation for Stage 3 which took a major step forward in June at a force generation conference, June or July, is going very well and many nations as I just mentioned are already moving their forces south in anticipation of ISAF expanding into the south.

The extent to which decisions need to be taken on command arrangements before that happens is one of the things which ministers I'm sure will discuss today but I couldn't give you timelines, I'm sorry.

Q: One last question, on the training mission in Iraq. You said in a couple of weeks, are we talking?

APPATHURAI: In the coming weeks.

Q: In the coming weeks. Okay. Are we talking- can you be at least more precise by saying before the end of the month or are we talking October? Just to have an idea.

And second, will there be any talk, I mean, just give us a rapid overview of how many trainers and instructors there are just for my memory.

APPATHURAI: Certainly before mid-October this facility will be open and up and running. There are already people there refurbishing it. I visited with the secretary general of course many months ago and it was already starting to take shape.

In terms of trainers, I would want to confirm this number so I'm sorry I'm going to have to- I don't want to say a 'bĂȘtise' in front of cameras so I will come back to you on this question. I want to check it.

Q (DPA): James you talked about a NATO role in a post-Bonn effort for Afghanistan. Can you give us an idea of what kind of a role you're thinking of, will this then- what kind of political intonations will that have? Thank you.

APPATHURAI: Well I can give you a broad outline and that is as the situation in Afghanistan changes politically and in a security sense, so we'll have the change the roles of the international organizations that are there.

The Afghan Government will be fully formed I presume in just a few weeks with a parliament and a president. And their army is being trained at a very rapid rate and taking on greater and greater responsibilities. The president is deploying what they call kandaks which are basically battalions more and more out into the regions and they're playing a very positive role.

The police is also being trained in ever greater numbers and taking on ever greater roles.

So the security role for international organizations has to change.

The challenge is also changing. Clearly the focus both of the Karzai government and of the international community is looking at narcotics very much and how can we, as an international community, support the Afghan efforts to tackle narcotics.

The UN has been in the lead on this in one sense and the G8- the UK has been in the lead for the G8 in the counter-narcotics effort as well. NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams have played a supporting role that is in their mandate, simply by providing information but they have not played an active role in the actual counter-narcotics effort.

So with all of this in mind, changing security landscape, changing security tasks, changing political structure and the end as I say of the roadmap that was set out in Bonn; clearly a new discussion needs to be had.

What will the UN do? What will the EU do? What will NATO do? And what does the Afghan Government want now in this new environment?

This is what we need to work out together. It needs to be an Afghan-led process, supported directly by the United Nations, and with the other representatives of the international community playing that- playing their part, neither taking too much of the lead nor walking away. We all have to stay and do our part.

Q: On Afghanistan, can you tell us when you are planning- when you want to start and when you want to complete Stage 3 and Stage 4?

And the second question regarding synergy, I mean, can you give us maybe more details and the options on the table apart from saying it's a question of balance. I mean can you give us a bit more details about (inaudible).

APPATHURAI: In terms of timelines, they really are not clear and it's not my position to speculate what ministers will do because of course it is up to them. As I say Stage 3 preparations are going well. I can foresee the real possibility of a decision on Stage 3 being taken in the coming months but I don't know what- how many months that will be.

Of course NATO hopes to move as quickly as possible. That is in our operational plan to take over responsibilities throughout the country but these very important questions like the one that you just raised need to be worked out and they are of course not just technical but political questions as well--the relationship between the two operations.

I will give you one example that has already been public of a potential option because this was in The Wall Street Journal so I'm not revealing any secrets and it is only one of the options that was considered and it is being considered.

But the- one option could be to have two separate task forces, one that does security- er sorry, stability operations like the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, another one that does the more robust counter-terrorist operations. Both under a dual-hatted commander that he or she or himself or herself would be under the ISAF commander. So you would have an overall unity of command at the very top and then below that a dual-hatted commander who would have dual responsibilities for two separate operations within that overall unity of command.

As I say this is one option that has been considered, there are others, but this gives you an idea of the kind of thing that ministers will be discussing.

Q: (inaudible) is complete?

APPATHURAI: That's as far as I'll go on this.

Q: James, on the same issue, when you're in Afghanistan it's quite clear that the distinction between the ISAF Forces and the OEF Forces- they have ISAF written on the side of their vehicles in big letters, they have ISAF patches. How would that- would troops with ISAF written on their shoulders and ISAF written on their trucks be doing the combat exercises or would the- would there be a new name for the combat force? How would that work in terms of the labelling of the force down there?

APPATHURAI: That's an interesting question. I have never heard it asked, so I don't think I can give you a good answer to that question. I think it will be worked out in later details but I don't have an answer. I don't think it's even been, at least not to me it has not been raised.

Thank you very much.

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