Residence Palace Brussels 11 July 2005

Keynote speech by Ms. A. Elizabeth Jones, Principal, AEJones LLC and former Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State Event 11/07/2005 NATO: New Tasks and Responsibilities Dr. Gale A. Mattox (Chair and Professor, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy): ...a former president of WIIS and it's terrific to be here and to... and also to enjoy the hospitality of NATO that Stefanie Babst has so nicely organized. Let me just tell you what I've been told, that... how the lunch will proceed. Now hopefully you've all had your salads and your first course, and we will now hear a talk from Elizabeth Jones and then we'll have the main course. So... she's agreed to do Q&A and we'll take the Q&A. So we'll do that before the main course. So let me introduce someone who really doesn't need that much introduction because I think she knows most of the people here. And it's very much my privilege and pleasure to introduce Beth Jones, who is a principal with AEJones. She embodies all the characteristics to address the transatlantic issues under discussion here at this conference today. Not least in the fact that you may have read in her bio that she was born in Germany, so she has already had transatlantic credentials. Her most recent position was a Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at the State Department, and this has further put her, of course, at the forefront of U.S. policy with respect to transatlantic affairs. She oversaw a wide range of demanding challenges. First of all, of course, she was responsible for all the bilateral relationships with the countries under her purview, but she also, of course, had responsibility in the area of NATO and the U.S. role in NATO, including a whole range of issues that happened on her watch: enlargement, the relationship with Russia, NATO's role in Afghanistan, as well as Iraq, and a wide range of other issues. She's developed expertise in her career to do all of these issues, but she also, as we're talking about where does NATO go from here, and what are the wider ranging issues that they might address, she also has expertise. She worked on the critical Caspian region. She's also had direct experience in Central Asia as a former ambassador to Kazakhstan, and even in the important area of the Middle East; Beth has worked as deputy director for Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. So with her wide range of expertise and responsibilities in the U.S. I know you all join me in welcoming her and looking forward to her remarks. Beth Jones. (APPLAUSE) MS. A. ELIZABETH JONES (Principal, AEJones LLC and former Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State): Thank you very much, Gale. Thank... and my thanks to WIIS for inviting me to participate in this conference. It's a very interesting set of topics, very topical for us now and certainly a whole series of issues that we've already talked about this morning that are right at the top of the agenda for very many of us. My talk at lunch today is "Partnerships for Peace." I love "the" Partnership for Peace, but there are a tremendous number of other partnerships that I think are very important to look at and talk about. I feel very, very strongly that NATO has a broad mission, it has a global mission, that it is developing and has worked very well to develop, but I want to start with what I think NATO's purpose is. It's a purpose that was first established with NATO. NATO's one big idea when it was first established and that is that people should be free and protected from oppression. That idea has carried through all of the years that NATO has existed, through all of the transformations that NATO has gone through, including this more recent one. One of the... and the way we articulated that great idea, the grand idea, through the enlargement of NATO, was that NATO is an organization of like-minded states. And I think that helps us think through the kinds of issues and the kind of role that NATO can play as it goes global. Let me first start with what has changed in my view. We've talked a lot about the NATO transformation this morning, but let me just put it in the context that'll help me work through what it is that I think NATO has been doing well and can continue to do well as it goes global. I see that the original danger that NATO saw for itself, as a danger that was in Europe. It was that the single danger. There are still a few dangers to NATO in Europe still. We're not quite finished with Belarus, we're not finished in the Balkans, we're not finished in Moldova, we're not finished in Ukraine. But the new danger now comes from outside Europe. The danger's no longer within Europe itself and these dangers, plural, are transnational, they're asymmetrical, which you've talked a lot about this morning, and fundamentally I believe that these dangers come from failed states. So if we see that... it's no longer just the danger from the one state, from the super state, from the Soviet Union, but from failed states. The other element to the transformation or the changed world that NATO must operate in is that the world is so much smaller. We have media 24/7, so this means that NATO cannot avoid new dangers, or it cannot avoid responding to them the public's and NATO countries' demand that there is a public outcry whenever there is something going on in the world that NATO is not involved in. Darfur is the most recent example. And I think NATO, seeing itself as having a responsibility for participating, or addressing so many of these threats, so many of these situations from outside the country, speaks to NATO's credibility. We talked this morning a bit about NATO's credibility, that it's very important that NATO be seen as wishing to be involved and responding to the dangers that come from outside of Europe. So we... the people that NATO protects, that NATO should see itself as wanting to protect are not just in Western Europe and North America. They are well outside of the region in which NATO countries themselves exist. All of us who are atlanticists always believe that NATO is the bridge that links North America and Europe. I still think that's absolutely true, but the fact is that NATO is no longer the only bridge that brings North America and Europe together. There is also a very strong transatlantic bridge which is in U.S.-EU collaboration. The U.S. is never going to be a member of the European Union, but that collaboration, I think, is critical as we look to how NATO should think about addressing the threats that affect the people who make up the member states of NATO, but also the responsibility that NATO sees for work elsewhere in the world. One last point before I go into the main part of my talk. The NATO bridge that I mention is still a very, very strong bridge. It may not be the only one, but another way to think about it, in a more physical sense, is that the NATO bridge has a span in Europe, but it now extends way beyond Europe to Central Asia. It extends on to the south and to the southeast in Afghanistan, in Africa and in Iraq, and I think that's the way to think about that NATO bridge. It's just gotten much, much longer as it works through to address the new threats. What is the task then for NATO, now that we think in terms of NATO going global, what is the focus? I think we... NATO really redefined its mission after 9/11, but I think we were already going through this transformational process. Certainly with the Balkans. The Balkans, though, interestingly enough if we think back to what the debate was then, even though the Balkans are very much in Europe, there's no question now that it's... that the Balkans are in Europe, the Balkans at the time seemed very far away politically and conceptually in terms of NATO and NATO operations. It seems almost inconceivable now that we thought of the Balkans as being out-of-area, but obviously we did. And I just wanted to take a minute today to recall that this is the tenth anniversary of the terrible events in Srebrenica, that NATO came together to help address at the time. If we agree that the source of the transnational threats is failed states, then I believe, and this is my fundamental point, that NATO's task is to bring those failed states, those sources of mortal threat, back into the international community. As Judith said, we don't do no nation building, but the fact is that a lot of the work that NATO has done has been directed and has been focused in that direction. We talked this morning a lot about military capabilities in connection with NATO, but there is also a very important focus in NATO on political talks. Again, because NATO is an organization of like-minded countries, like-minded states, this has been made clear through enlargement, and when you look at the tasks that we put before the countries that have recently joined NATO, many of the tasks certainly were military tasks, but very, very, many of them had nothing to do really with the military. They were nation-building. They were a civil society kinds of tasks; how to treat minorities, what about democracy, what about economic reform? All of those kinds of issues not made it its business to address as well in order to be sure that these countries were ready to join the military organization of NATO, but more importantly, the likeminded organization of NATO. If we look... if we see that NATO's task is to bring those failed states back into the international community, of course NATO would not ever be expected to do this alone. In fact, it wasn't that long ago that no one thought that NATO should have a role like that. But the fact is that NATO should see itself as having this role, and it does see itself as having this role. It has taken on this role. Right after the break-up of the Soviet Union NATO has developed and established what I think is one of the most... the more brilliant of its ideas, which is Partnership for Peace. Mediterranean Dialogue came along as well. But that was something that was extremely important at the time. There was a very big debate, certainly in Washington about doing that at the time, principally because of what political effect it might have on the Soviet Union, on Russia, as it was becoming. But it's turned out to be an extremely good idea, a very, very good organization, that was in its original concept, it was simply an organization to be in association with NATO and to try to bring... try to establish some links with all of these countries to NATO as an organization, both as a military organization, and as an organization of like-minded countries. And then just a year ago NATO did something else, we did something else to develop the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which was based conceptually on Partnership for Peace. It was very clear that we didn't want another Partnership for Peace, we didn't want to enlarge Partnership for Peace, although that was part of the discussion when we came up with the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, but it was imply that Partnership for Peace was big enough, it had enough to do already, but some of the concepts from Partnership for Peace could be borrowed to be used in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to do some of the work that PFP had been doing so well. I wanted to just go through a couple of the things that Partnership for Peace did so well. To give... to remind us of the kind of work that they did and to give us the incentive and the initiatives to keep doing this kind of work, and to keep doing it in an organized a way as we possibly can. I recall, for instance, that Denmark served as the mentor for the Baltic Battalion in the early nineties, and Denmark did the same. When we saw the success of the Baltic Battalion we asked Denmark to come help us work with the Central Asians to develop the Central Asian Battalion. It hasn't worked as well, but some of the concepts were nevertheless very important. One of the other areas that Partnership for Peace worked on so well is to help the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia and some of the others to develop their own defence doctrine. What sort of doctrine should they have after the break-up of the Soviet Union. And there the primary focus of many of these countries, if not all of them, was on defence. Defence of the homeland, border defence, border control, and as a side capability, to develop the ability to participate in blue helmet operations, in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Which brings in the interoperability that has become so important for the military development of these... the development of the militaries of these countries. But getting into more of the civil society kind of work that NATO did through Partnership for Peace, we did a lot of work in training. How to have... what does civilian control of the military really mean in a practical sense? How do you... how does a military develop a budget that a Parliament can scrutinize? What are the elements of that? How do you defend a budget before Parliament if you are a military that's so used to secrecy and not having to respond to public queries. But at the same time, one of the... one of the more interesting training programs that was done was to train parliamentarians as well in how do you scrutinize a military budget? How do you ask the questions? How do you require, how do you demand the appropriate oversight to demonstrate that civilian control of the military is part of participating in good governance. It doesn't have to be adversarial, but it's nevertheless how to be responsible about scrutinizing a budget, how to be responsible about overseeing a military that is in the service of the people of the country, not just in service of the president and his coterie or the few people around him. What have been the results of this... of the kind of work... this kind of work that NATO has done, that Partnership for Peace has done so well? Some of the work has been done in collaboration either with bilateral programs of the United States or others, but also some of the kind of work that I've mentioned has also been... the EU is recently becoming more and more involved in doing this kind of work as well with the countries of the Caucasus, Central Asia and others closer to Europe. There's a new buzzword around Washington that's called... the buzzword is "transformation diplomacy." There's a new thought... there's a thought that this is new and that this is the kind of thing the United States should be working on. I actually argue that NATO came up with that first. That's something... that transformation diplomacy is exactly what NATO and Partnership for Peace have been doing for the past dozen years. This transformation diplomacy, after all, is what ended up in the enlargement of NATO and the enlargement of the EU. That's all very, very transformational diplomacy with a lot of programs to back that up. But as I said earlier, PFP wasn't just a track to NATO membership, the programs that PFP put on the table and advocated for and got these countries to participate in, were to enhance the value, to get countries to understand the value of civilian control of the military, to insist on transparency of budgeting for defence, and to work with them in terms of what... doctrine focused on national defence, national defence. Because of the work it does with parliaments, with civil society, NATO works alongside other organizations that promotes the values of political choice, political participation, that promotes the notion of economic reform, which results in job creation, which brings prosperity, which supports free media and other institutions that shine a very bright light on corruption, one of the biggest difficulties, one of the biggest issues that we addressed with the new NATO members that were invited to join not that long ago. All of the kinds of issues that are... that must be addressed in order to attack the transnational crime that undermines and weakens the societies of the countries that we're concerned about. I argue when you have responsible government, when you have responsible military under civilian control, you really reduce substantially the chance for failed states to exist, to continue to fail, where threats to NATO allies and partners originate. Partnership for Peace and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative programs also advance the capabilities for blue helmet operations, which increases the international capacity in this alarmingly... in this area where there's alarmingly few capabilities. It's very, very difficult, as everybody here knows, to get enough military commitments or enough police and gendarmerie commitments to do the kind of policing and military work, peacekeeping work, and training that NATO and other organizations would like the international community to participate in. Interoperability among the militaries is key. This is something that the militaries of the partnership countries who participate with us, with NATO, either in Iraq or Afghanistan and the Balkans, wherever it may be, they particularly see the advisability and the advantage of interoperability from simple... from the simple capability of being able to speak to each other by radio, but also being able to understand what we mean... what is meant by this kind of operation or that kind of operation. The interoperability becomes a great advantage and it's something that I certainly found in my work in Central Asia. It was one of the most important reasons why militaries wanted to participate with NATO and with other partnership countries, is to develop that capability. The Balkans tragedies of course were the first areas in which PFP countries were able to practice interoperability with NATO. That's still something that's terribly important and it's an area that we constantly see improvements in and the need for improvement as we operate together in the Balkans, but also obviously as we operate together in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the phenomenon that I think is terribly important is that the more interoperability there is, the greater the incentive to participate either more in the club, to be part of the club, whether it's to actually join NATO, or simply to participate in Partnership for Peace and all of that builds on itself, I believe, and brings greater incentives and greater improvements in civil society, in free media and all the elements of civil society that address the problems of failed states. In conclusion, I want to repeat that I believe NATO's one great idea hasn't changed; that despite 60 years of evolution that it is still NATO's purpose to protect and defend the right of free people to choose their governments and to live in freedom. NATO has, indeed, taken on a big chunk of the responsibility for accomplishing this, as has the European Union. We... I think it's very important, as we said earlier, to keep working on these kinds of things. We can debate for a very long time the competition that might become involved between NATO and the European Union through ESDP and how to do these operations, but the fact of the matter is, if we focus on getting the work done, on bringing these countries... on addressing the difficulties of these countries, addressing the elements of being a failed state, we will find that we have way too much work to do and we don't really need to spend quite so much time arguing about whose capability we're using in which way. In conclusion let me just quote from Senator Fulbright. He said: In the long course of history having people who under your thought is much greater security than another submarine. I think that's a very, very important thought for the kind of work that I'm advocating that NATO continue to do through Partnership for Peace. As much as military interoperability is terribly important, the political interoperability that I'm talking about is equally important and is a very, very important task for NATO to continue to try to do through Partnership for Peace and through the other instruments that it has developed. Thank you very much. (APPLAUSE) JONES: I know there's a danger of keeping people from their lunch, but I'm happy to take your comments or questions. I think lunch rules. Thank you all very much.