Residence Palace Brussels 11 July 2005

SESSION I: The Transatlantic Alliance in the 21 st Century Event 11/07/2005 NATO: New Tasks and Responsibilities JAMIE SHEA (Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Division of Public Diplomacy, NATO): Good morning, everybody. Stefanie, Valerie, thank you very much indeed for introducing the conference. Thank you also for giving me the opportunity to be the moderator or chairman of this, the first session. I do so with great pleasure. As you all know, those of you like me who sort of go around to conferences fairly often, there are two types of moderator. Type one is the frustrated speaker who really cannot resist the temptation to sort of launch into a speech or a presentation of his or her own. This happened for me at a NATO conference in Sweden a couple of months ago where we had about eight people on the panel and I asked the chairman to please be disciplined, just introduce the speakers. He then read out a 40-minute political speech and then said "Are there any questions?" I kid you not. But Stefanie, knowing that I sometimes fall victim to that temptation myself, has quite wisely asked me to be the chairman at eight o'clock in the morning, knowing that I won't have a thought in my head. So therefore, I will be chairman type two, which is the disciplined chap who knows that you are here to listen to the speakers, not the chairman, and then launches the debate and I must say I think we've got excellent panels throughout the day, but I'm very pleased at the very beginning to be asked to introduce such a strong line-up of panelists on the first topic, which is the Transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century. Immediately to my left here, Ambassador Ginte Damusis, who is the Permanent Representative of Lithuania on the North Atlantic Council. Ginte was the first ambassador of her country. She was the one who steered Lithuania into the Alliance and she has been the first-ever woman ambassador at NATO. So, Valerie, you're quite right. We still need a lady Secretary General, but at least we're started with one lady ambassador. But unfortunately for our gender representation, she's leaving in just a few days and we're going to be very sorry to see her go for lots of reasons, but it's good that she can be here today as the first of our speakers and to give us the benefit of her insights as she winds up her term at NATO. On my immediate right, another colleague and in this case, a former colleague, Évelyne Mathey, who used to be on the International Staff for some years at NATO, has now moved back to her national authority in Paris, where she is the deputy head in the NATO office at the Délégation des affaires stratégiques of the French Ministry of Defence. Gale Mattox doesn't need any introduction to any of you. I have been reading her books ever since I was a student before becoming a practitioner of international security and therefore, no conference of this kind could be complete without her. So, Gale, thank you very much for being here. And then just to sort of make sure that I don't feel lonely up here on the panel, Cem Özdemir, a very well-known member of the European Parliament from Germany. And therefore, I think we've got, as I say, everything we need to get off to a good start. Transatlantic relations, Condoleezza Rice is always telling us that we should do them and not analyse them. Well, I'm sure that this being a conference, we're going to analyse them. But I hope (inaudible) Condoleezza Rice we can still do that with a view to seeing how we can move the NATO agenda forward. NATO, of course, shapes the transatlantic relationship but we're also dependent on it to get on with our work and so therefore what's on our minds now, and particularly here in Brussels at NATO Headquarters, is this the new positive mood likely to last in terms of both sides of the Atlantic wanting now to engage each other more? How can NATO take advantage of this new positive environment to move ahead with its extremely ambitious agenda at the present time? And of course with everybody remembering what Chancellor Schroeder said via his Defence minister in Munich last February, can NATO once again become the primary forum for transatlantic consultations on important strategic issues? Do we need a common vision or a common agenda or is the best way forward to sort of get by on ad hoc opportunities for cooperation in areas of joint interest? And then finally, as the EU and the US of course also take advantage of the new climate to talk to each other more and to engage, what's the division of labour between how NATO conducts the transatlantic relationship and how it's done in the US-EU bilateral relationship but can we ensure strategic coherence or at least avoid duplication and conflicts of interest? So a positive mood, but how do we instrumentalize it to our mutual benefit? So, dear panelists, let's analyse but let's also focus on the practical agenda. And having said that, I now turn to our first speaker. I'm going to ask each speaker to keep his or her remarks to five to eight minutes so that we can begin already at this early hour with a good Q&A, good discussion session and therefore warm up- well don't really need to do that, at least today in Brussels for once but at least get the thing off to an effervescent beginning. So, Ambassador, please? GINTE DAMUSIS (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Lithuania to NATO): Thank you, Jamie, for that introduction. It's difficult to envision you as being frustrated. You're never at a loss for words and I'd also like to take this opportunity to say that I am feeling really great, great pleasure at being in a majority, at least for today. I thought I'd start out with a few comments from a new member-state perspective, namely when Lithuania applied to this organization back in 1994, it was quite a different organization. It's not the same organization it is today. But even so, we still consider NATO and its integral transatlantic link as the bedrock of Lithuanian security and we also think it's essential to maintain NATO as a key forum for transatlantic dialogue as well as for the main forum for security policy cooperation between Europe and the United States. There's no doubt that back in the early 1990s, when we formed our vision, our Euro-Atlantic integration vision and set down the strategic goal of NATO membership, that we were influenced by the history of our neighbourhood. But today, we've changed, just as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed, since the Cold War. And because those changes were so dramatic, they initially surprised us. But I think it's specifically that ability of the NATO Alliance to change and to adapt which makes it so attractive to us. During my four and a half years at NATO, I was really exposed to endless discussions about the transatlantic divide, about the technology and capabilities gap, different threat perceptions and strategic visions. But I also would like to draw your attention to the fact that during those same years, NATO was really doing a tremendous work in stabilizing the Euro-Atlantic area through enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, direct engagement in the Balkans and special relationships, special partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. And now NATO has really become an indispensable security actor well beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. But in order for this organization to remain effective in the 21st Century, no doubt NATO's transformation needs to continue and not just militarily but politically as well. I think that the debate about NATO going global is really over. Even though NATO's strategic concept of 1999 remains focused on the Euro-Atlantic region, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have greatly benefited from active NATO engagement in the region and in the immediate neighbourhood over the past decade. And much to our surprise, as I mentioned before, NATO radically shifted its focus after the last round of enlargement. If you take a look at a typical meeting of the North Atlantic Council today, we're discussing operational activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur, and these agenda items prove that NATO's thinking and actions today are extending well beyond the geographical area of responsibility as defined by the Washington Treaty. Also, if you take a look at NATO's very dynamic partnerships and outreach activities, you'll find the Alliance in regions as far afield as Central Asia, the Broader Middle East, Northern Africa. So put quite simply, NATO is already de facto a global security actor. And in our mind, we think that's right. In order to remain the greatest military alliance in history NATO really must continue to go where the threats are. Back in 1999, NATO was the only multilateral organization capable of intervening in Kosovo. No other organization could have undertaken those tasks. And this campaign as well as the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001 really exposed that capabilities gap. So this NATO transformation became and really still remains a priority, motivated principally by concern over this widening gap. And while addressing this gap, NATO will always have to keep one eye on future tasks and challenges. Transformation is the force which drives the Alliance and the militaries specifically of its member states to adapt in order to remain militarily viable in the face of these new security threats. Hence, NATO's future in general and the success of NATO's military transformation in particular depend on the development of military capabilities with global reach and those capabilities are exemplified by the NATO Response Force which requires rapidly deployable and sustainable forces. These forces must be capable of high-intensity operations and be fully interoperable. In the view of my country, we believe that this can be best developed within the NATO framework because NATO is the only multilateral organization today with established mechanisms for interoperability development and with adequate command structures and with considerable operational experience. Global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states are in our opinion the main security threats facing the Euro-Atlantic community now and in the foreseeable future. And therefore, we believe that NATO and its members should continue to focus efforts and resources on developing rapidly deployable and interoperable capabilities. Now, I mentioned before that military transformations of the Alliance should really also be accompanied by political transformation. We can't just address the capability gaps which were exposed in Kosovo and Afghanistan. NATO needs more serious political discussion and clarity about its strategic role. We're completely on board when it comes to supporting, reviewing the relationships between NATO and other international actors because stabilization and reconstruction efforts are an important part of winning the peace in these conflict areas. NATO is not going to be the sole actor in future operations. So therefore, that military transformation needs a broader political context. Closer consultations and stronger NATO ties with the UN and the EU are especially needed and this means striving for more complementarity in our work. And not just in the execution phases of operations but particularly during the planning stages. We also support the Secretary General's calls to actively shape the international security environment in line with the shared strategic vision and values of its members. And despite past policy disagreements over Iraq, I think there is a convergence of American and European views on strategic priorities and its members of both of these organizations. Lithuania is interested in things that are interests, as well as those on the receiving end of both NATO and EU assistance will be best served if NATO and the EU pursue their efforts within a coherent political framework. Not only do we want NATO and the EU to form a real strategic partnership, we want them to actively avoid unnecessary duplication capabilities and structures. And last but not least, NATO will really have to carefully define its role in stabilization and construction activities, especially in areas where its troops are deployed. Ensuring sustainable economic development and political stability in failed states should be an essential part of an exit strategy and as part of the formula for winning the peace. So NATO may actually need to play a greater role in this area to improve cooperation between military and non-military, specifically civilian assets. I thought I would just touch upon Lithuania's response to the transformation challenge. Indeed, due to our historical experience, some aspects of the old NATO still look very attractive to us. We believe that the core functions of NATO established during the Cold War should not be affected or changed by ongoing NATO transformation and most notably this applies to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. I, as well as many of my colleagues from the other new member states, often make a point of emphasizing this, namely that NATO's primary objective remains the security and defence of its members. And only on this understanding can countries like mine really continue radical reforms of their territorial defence structures and focus their efforts on contributions to NATO operations in places as far away as Afghanistan. But we understand that in order to be able to play the same vital role today as it played earlier, NATO has to change. It is the NATO nations who must drive that change forward, primarily by implementing their own reforms and adapting their military structures. And I'm glad that Lithuania has really approached this transformation challenge with a great deal of determination and commitment. We initially set quite ambitious long-term targets to reduce sharply the number of non-deployable units and improve the usability of Lithuanian Armed Forces. We should reach the so-called NATO usability target of having more than eight per cent of our land forces sustainable in international operations by 2014. And in parallel with the restructuring and modernization of our forces, we've been augmenting our operational contributions to the Alliance. This year, we plan to deploy at least 400 troops in different NATO operations or they're already deployed, I should state. We've also decided to establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team in western Afghanistan and this is a very challenging military task for us. But one fact I'd like to draw your attention to is that other allies are helping us, not just with joining our units in Afghanistan but contributing in other ways. For instance, to the integrity of our air space--which is NATO's air space--conducting air policing operations over the Baltic States so in this way, we're able to actually use our limited defence resources for reforms, modernization and operational deployments rather than purchasing costly fighter aircraft. I'd like to conclude by saying that in order to remain viable, NATO, as I mentioned before, has to focus on future tasks and challenges and I think there's areas where Lithuania would be interested in seeing NATO play a role. For instance, in preventing potentially disproportionate levels of damage by terrorist networks or rogue states to high-risk strategic targets. We believe that we should address such questions as perhaps the NATO role and protecting important energy infrastructure such as oil and gas pipelines or atomic energy plants. So I leave Brussels actually quite confident in NATO's future. I think there's grounds for optimism. In our view, the Alliance has an opportunity not to be missed not just because of the benefits it gives to the allies themselves but for the possibilities it provides and NATO is a vehicle for responding to today's global challenges in cooperation with the US which is the main reason all of us are there. It gives us a chance to act jointly in a globally interdependent and interconnected world where a go-it-alone approach is just no longer viable. Thank you. JAMIE SHEA: Ambassador, thanks very much for a very upbeat and comprehensive assessment and particularly suggesting although NATO is doing a lot, it may still need to do more in the future particularly when it comes to terrorism. So thank you for starting us off. Évelyne, je te donne la parole. ÉVELYNE MATHEY (Deputy Head, NATO Office, Delegation for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence, France): Thank you very much. It's both a privilege and a pleasure to be back here in Brussels after five years at NATO, three years at the EU Commission, one year, a little bit more than one year in Paris. When I first was asked to take part in this brainstorming, to be very true, I did not know what WIIS stood for. JAMIE SHEA: Shame on you! ÉVELYNE MATHEY: Sorry, but I was going to suggest that there may be a need then for a French chapter on WIIS. I inquired around me and asked what is it? Nobody knew. No women knew. So I really had questions and I was wondering myself what type of positive discrimination was in the air when I learned about it. I felt reassured to see that a number of pre-eminent gentlemen were also invited and that they were also ready to embark on a transatlantic dialogue which would not necessarily be the exclusive privilege of women in international security. Remembering a controversial book on Mars and Venus inspired by another famous classic, not this time on America and Europe but on men and women, I asked myself if we, women, were not associated with this theme of defence and security because we were supposed to be better positioned to find peaceful solutions and satisfactory exit strategies. I just want to add that my presentation in this forum will be made as a personal contribution to this brainstorming. As my colleague just mentioned, NATO has been undergoing drastic changes and in all probability will continue to adjust to face the likely challenges it will have to respond to. What will be its effective possibilities and how can the transatlantic Alliance maximize its impact? I'll try to offer some avenues for reflection in the upcoming minutes. Within a few years, NATO has tremendously changed. When I started working at NATO in '98, there were 16 allies and NATO had undertaken no operations outside Europe. It had a special relationship with Russia and Ukraine and 26 partners and it had begun work with six Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Today, NATO's geographical area is actually changed. NATO has more allies than it has partners in the initial sense of the term. It has enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue currently of seven countries into a partnership. It has established links with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is starting to weave relations with countries participating in its military operation as well as with their neighbours. It is also opening up to other international organizations. It is carrying out operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, in the Mediterranean, in Darfur, and is contributing to a training mission in Iraq. It has also covered, on an exceptional basis, high visibility events. It has its response force prepared and NATO has reorganized its command structure. It is addressing the issues of the involvement of partners in operation through enhanced decision building and interoperability. It is currently focusing on terrorism, on the fight against terrorism and it is tempted by the developments of civil military capabilities for illegal trafficking, border control and organized crime. This holistic transformation was initiated at the Washington and Prague Summits and was pursued at the Istanbul Summit of last year. It aims at changing the Alliance into a tool with global, political and functional objectives, at making it operationally effective and at becoming an important actor in crisis management in the larger sense. Underscoring this transformation, NATO Headquarters own organization has been challenged. A number of changes within the IS and the IMS have still to provide room for efficiency in order to continue to make a good organization even better. We all owe it to our taxpayers to avoid unnecessary commitology and to press for results, to fight stove-piping and to identify meaningful ways ahead including by developing internal committee synergy rather than vertical competition; and this reform therefore is much needed and wanted. The question we are faced with is the following one. Can this single organization cope with the type of risks at stake for our populations? It is always very difficult to predict what can happen but it is obvious that the challenges of the future security environment are tentacular and mostly of transnational nature. Changes in the strategic environment cover a wide range of issues from terrorism, extremism, proliferation, threats to health, technology attacks, failed states, organized crime, immigration, displaced people, competition for energy resources and commodities, an equal access to water resources, to regional crisis, fractured societies, and social risks. It is clear that this large spectrum of risks cannot be dealt with by one single country or one single organization. On both sides of the Atlantic, we are confronted with increased security requirements from our populations as well as with the need to defend values of stability, continuity of government, democracy, good governance and protection of our population. On both sides of the Atlantic we have developed specific expertise. Europe is a part of the world where political, diplomatic, military and economic powers can be generated in a meaningful way. The cluster of international powers in Europe comprising the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland and a number of nations are making it in parallel. The $175 billion combined annual defence budget of EU members may seem paltry compared to the $550 billion US budget but it exceeds the military budgets of China, Japan and Russia combined. The US has about 1.4 million men and women in its armed force with about 400,000 troops available for foreign deployment. The EU states have 1.9 million in their armed forces and altogether 50,000 can currently be sent abroad with the objective of 200,000 in the upcoming years. In addition, Europe is developing several key projects. Several key projects have been launched to rectify shortcomings with a long range air transport fleet, an autonomous satellite system, new precision guiding weapons and light transport helicopters. Europe is building greater capability to deal with global threats as enhanced and tight terrorist coordination has created a pan-European arrest warrant that would expedite the extradition of terrorists. It has developed a security strategy, has created the European Defence Agency, is developing its tactical battle groups and its European gendarmerie. Europe is also served by an annual humanitarian aid budget of about 600 million Euros. In addition to what Europe can do, the international community benefits from an international architecture with a number of organizations which have developed special expertise along the years. All those expertises are necessary in time of crises and complex emergencies. We have financial institutions, trade institutions, development organizations, a number of others which are fulfilling special roles in transportation, proliferation, research, human rights, humanitarian affairs, migration, police and justice matters. They have built on the experiences gained in crisis all situations they have ever had to handle. They have developed thereby methods and a network of expertise. Each one of these organizations is playing a role and has to be seen as a necessary building block of the restoration to normalcy. NATO, among those organizations, has developed a unique military expertise. It is adapting to the new challenges and its transformation is well under way. It builds on recent experiences and lessons learned from military operations. Compared to other organizations, these core military functions are making the difference and they are recognized as such. A number of nations are participating both in the operations and in the transformation of the Alliance. They are devoting time, energy, finance, manpower to make it a success. These dual efforts are extremely taxing on all our nations and they should not be squandered by excessive diversification of objectives broaching on duplication with work carried out in other international fora. We should therefore concentrate on core military functions and core missions, improve on them while taking into consideration what is already being done in other relevant organizations. In that sense, the effort to open up towards other international organizations is meaningful insofar as it strives to bring to the fore an enhanced knowledge of what is done by other organizations and avoid recreating already existing expertise. The transatlantic Alliance in the 21st Century is vital to the safeguard of our common values. Both actors, Europeans and Americans, are contributing their share for the protection of those values. We are facing the same risks and we have considerable means and know-how on both sides of the Atlantic. The transatlantic Alliance is vivid so long as its actors cooperate together to meet common objectives. NATO is one of the fora for transatlantic consultation on defence questions, as well as an efficient crisis management organization. If we want the transatlantic Alliance to meet its goals, it has to be done through a close dialogue and consultation based on confidence. We have common objectives in the short-term, to bring the Middle East peace process to a successful conclusion; to continue our tasks in the Balkans; to favour stabilization in Afghanistan and Iraq; to avoid the proliferation of WMDs especially in Iran and North Korea; to work together in order to prevent the collapse of many African states; to build a partnership with Russia and China based on responsibility. We have to add our idiosyncrasies, strengths, as well as our complementary methods and assets to build some relevant expertise to solve a crisis. That approach has to be pegged to the situation. There will be cases when some countries have special links with some regional players. These countries can act as facilitators and be in a good position to take action. In any case, dialogue needs to be promoted to enforce consistency, coherence of action as well as transatlantic cohesion. We must adopt a pragmatic approach to answer in the best way our shared objectives. We should avoid theological discussion. We should opt for what will be giving the best results within a reasonable span of time. We should show flexibility in the approach and realism in the task we want NATO to fulfil. For that, we are dependent on the political will of all our nations and on their financial commitment. We are dependent on the will of nations but we are also aware and stumbling on the force generation problems, the serious gap in the NRIs(?), the question of the funding of operations as well as the national financial constraints in nearly all European states and this will not change overnight. So we have to remember that NATO is a genuine vehicle for interoperability and that it should continue to play such a role with a view to improving military ability to react when attacked. The transatlantic Alliance is adapting to its new challenges and we have to be vigilant to open up its scope of action in an appropriate manner and not to be over-ambitious at the expense of realism. JAMIE SHEA: Évelyne, thank you very much indeed. From your presentation, I note that, quite rightly, that no single organization can handle all of those complex challenges that you outlined, but it also raises the question is NATO the right organization and the right forum these days to take its full role? But Europe is transforming. You insisted on that. The question of course from an American perspective is is it doing it fast enough? Could we do more? And then you very much emphasized that you see NATO's role in the military, the traditional military domain, with its unique military expertise, core military functions but you also pointed out that NATO should really devote itself first and foremost to solving its own military challenges such as force generation, the role of the NATO response force and so on. So I think there are some good points on the table there as well from that presentation. So thank you very much. Now, let's move on and I pass the floor to our first US speaker, Professor Gale Mattox. Gale, please. DR. GALE A. MATTOX (Chair and Professor, Department of Political Science, United States Naval Academy): Thank you very much and thank you to Stefanie and Valerie for their work on this conference. It's a real pleasure. Can you hear me now? I'll thank Stefanie and Valerie again and also say that these are my personal remarks. NATO clearly has had a distinguished history of success and we've all--or at least we all called it a success. It was clear at the end of the Cold War that, or many called it… that we had defeated or we had been able to avoid having to come into conflict with the Soviet bear and although the Treaty doesn't list an adversary, it was clear that that was what NATO was set up to do. It's been more difficult since that time to say what should be the roles of NATO. How do we define the threats and how exactly in the future are we going to determine whether or not we again have "success" and how do we avoid then a destabilization or even conflict and what would constitute a threat? If measurement was hard during the Cold War, it's certainly difficult today. What then should be NATO's role in the 21st Century or to be a little less expansive than the organizers were, let me just think in terms of the 25 or 50 years. And let me suggest, as I think both of my predecessors have, that while the analysts are arguing over whether NATO should go global, it really to my mind already has gone global and the institution is simply now in the transition phase of adapting to that fact. And I'd like to talk then about the various roles of NATO today and suggest that NATO has roles in six different ways. I don't know whether these are just exclusive but let me mention six that I see as the most important. It plays a role in fighting the war on terrorism, in combating weapons of mass destruction, in working with the Middle East to create a more stable region, in undertaking selected tasks in Iraq, in cooperating on non-traditional security issues and in stabilizing developing democracies. The accumulation of tasks though for NATO has meant and will mean substantial challenges to absorb them and require us to rethink many of our traditional assumptions about the Alliance. So let me turn to these six roles and attempt to lay out some of the challenges to be expected. First of all, NATO's role as an actor in the war on terrorism. This is the most challenging role confronting NATO today, to my mind and if we had let it slide from our daily priority list, certainly London has refocused us all. The war on terrorism has required NATO to alter substantially not only the way it does business as an organization internally but also externally. It's impacted the scope of NATO. Without the war on terrorism, we would most likely not be having a discussion of NATO's global role. Briefly, internally, the war on terrorism demands a high degree of cooperation and sharing on a wide range of issues, in particular intelligence. It requires coordination across borders which for the non-state actors of terrorism really no longer exist. Externally, the war on terrorism has taken NATO to Afghanistan. For the first time, not only are NATO Forces outside member territory as they were in the Balkans but NATO is outside European borders and territory. At the same time, NATO has broadened its geographical scope, it's also had to deepen its cooperation in the Afghan conflict situation with mounting numbers of casualties and no clarity on the duration of conflict, and I think we're going to have a longer discussion of Afghanistan a little later in the day. Secondly, the role of NATO as an actor in combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is probably the most important defensive role that NATO has and yet one of its most difficult. It is of course an extension of the war on terrorism and again the role of non-state actors in potentially proliferating WMD challenges NATO to rethink its traditional ways of operation and this is in a number of different ways. In Russia, for instance, the threat of proliferation is more of terrorists actually accessing WMD and poses very sobering potential consequences for us. There needs to be a greater concerted effort I think to try to get a handle on that particular challenge and to manage the enhanced controls on WMD which are very necessary. In Iran, four of our major members of NATO are collaborating to convince the Iranians not to pursue a nuclear program. While NATO doesn't have a direct role, I think it has a very important role in backing up those members and in the discussions that occur within the NATO building. On North Korea, here NATO can assist in the sharing of information about weapons of mass destruction and can again play a supportive role in promoting a solution to that potential threat. On a separate front, there's been an important increase in information sharing in the chemical weapons, biological weapons threat with progress also in the area of counter-proliferation. But while NATO members are a potential target of WMD, which could threaten from far beyond its borders, counter-proliferation efforts I think have been hard as an alliance and probably a lot slower in resolution than we would like. The WMD networks are hard to trace and they require a degree of cooperation that has sometimes been very, very difficult to do. Just consider the threat from Pakistan and India of any kind of conflict itself and not even to mention the workings of a certain Mr. Kahn in proliferation as well. So you have a whole lot of different levels and I think that this has made counter-proliferation quite difficult but also challenging and it's something that NATO has looked at but has I don't think gone far enough. Third, NATO's role as an actor in the stabilization of the Middle East. Certainly, the Mediterranean initiative has impacted relationships with the selected number of the region states but this still falls far short of the potential threat that the region would pose should hostilities break out. The outreach to Arab countries by the Istanbul Initiative should really intensify on the side of NATO and of course by individual members. This Broader Middle East-North African initiative I think is a good starting point but it's probably important for NATO to begin to think about maybe an office of Middle Eastern initiatives and bringing very specific expertise on the Middle East into NATO itself. Just starting with a few people who have both language and regional expertise would be a big positive step for NATO. The value-added and the NATO component for Middle East stabilization could also be in the form of support for the peace process, if we can come to that peace process. I don't think that in the future, NATO should shirk from a potential for providing troops to maintain a peace whereas the EU has a role certainly in supporting the developing civil societies, I think NATO's efforts in any peace accord could be critical to that effort. Fourth, NATO's role as an actor in Iraq. The decision to set up a training centre has further expanded the NATO role. This is a positive initiative and one that broadens the responsibilities of the Alliance, even for those who have chosen to do the training out of country. It's admittedly I think a very modest step but it's an important one for NATO to demonstrate its support for the development of a democratic and a stable Iraq. Assuming a positive development in Iraq, this participation in the country should continue. While involvement in the conflict was difficult for a group of NATO members, they certainly recognized the importance of a stable Iraq for the region and even for European and North American security. Without a peaceful conclusion to the conflict, the unrest will continue to influence the stability of the entire region and that's not an issue that is in the best interests of any of us. Fifthly, NATO's role as an actor in the support of developing democracies. Closer to home than Iraq are the emerged or emerging democracies where there is a need for NATO to play an even more supportive role. The programs adopted to assist those countries who have become already members should not be too quickly cancelled and I think the ambassador mentioned a few of those efforts that are still ongoing and they need to continue. Even more pressing however are the needs of Ukraine and Central Asian countries who have shown a desire to be linked closer to NATO and the Atlantic community of values. In the early 1990s, NATO established the NACSI, now the EAPC, a Partnership for Peace that established a framework for eventual membership of a number of countries. These were very successful programs. They should be complemented probably by an even more assertive program for some of these other countries that have a far longer way to go. To my mind, membership in all of these cases should not be excluded. It should be held out as a potential goal for those countries that are able to stabilize, are able to move in the direction that those members that we've already just recently brought in have moved. Their stability and progress is certainly critical to the European continent. This is equally, if not more important for Russia, and the Alliance role there I think is quite significant. First, to reassure the Russians as we have been I think that the enlargements are not a threat to Russia but a significant factor in stabilizing the region and permitting the development of Russia as a strong partner state. Second, to develop that NATO Russia relationship that was established in 2002 discussions and to bring Russia in on wider discussions as the NATO-Russia Council is structured to do and sometimes maybe it doesn't quite meet up to what we had anticipated. Thirdly, to convince Russia that democratic solutions, and I think this is important, that democratic solutions to the instability in Central Asia and the former Soviet Republics are vital to the long-term success of those countries in the region. It's not that it's not a threat to Russia and that they should join with us rather than work against us in those efforts. Finally, a role as an actor on non-traditional security issues. And my French colleague has talked about many of those non-traditional security issues which I think that NATO ought to be either supporting or themselves working on one of those that is of interest I think to, long-term to WIIS, has been of course human trafficking; but drugs, crime and other issues which undermine political and societal structures are very important I think for stability as well and should not… should belong in the catalogue of issues that NATO has on the table. In conclusion, I'd maintain that despite the debate over whether NATO should go global, I'd say it already has gone global. It has a number of challenges and needs to be sure that it loses its reluctance to permit greater assumption of responsibilities by the Europeans outside the context of NATO, albeit in consultation. We need to recognize that in some areas, responsibilities can pass to regional and other organizations without compromising its mission. I refer specifically to ESDP, which of course is probably predominantly our problem, speaking of the US in this case, and not necessarily most of yours. Thirdly, that NATO proceed slowly in wider contingencies but that it does consider wider contingencies. Despite pressures, the limited involvement in Iraq I think is appropriate to the sensitivities of the member states. Fourthly, that to focus on its ongoing commitment in Afghanistan, using the experiences to inform future contingencies. And finally, NATO needs to use its forces in a reasoned manner with clear objectives which might not only include active conflict but also situations to address human indignities certainly as in Darfur, and I think that it's very appropriate that we do have that involvement in a contingency like Darfur. Thank you very much. JAMIE SHEA: Gale, thanks. All of you have totally ignored my injunction to speak only for five or eight minutes, but you've said so many interesting substantive things that I've decided that it's been worth it on this occasion and that was certainly the case with your very interesting sort of reformulation of all of NATO's current activities under sort of six broad headings and some interesting ideas, very ambitious ideas for how we should push it all forward. So thank you very much for that. But as we have one final speaker, and I really do want to have some time for Q&A and discussion, I'm going to ask Cem if he could show some exemplary discipline and really keep it to five to eight minutes so that we have, as I say, some time before the Secretary General's arrival. Cem, please. MR. CEM ÖZDEMIR (Member of the European Parliament): I will try to do my best. Thanks. Jamie has already announced this to us belonging to a minority of men here, I belong to an additional minority. I'm a Green politician and I think at least a couple of years ago, it would be considered as something very strange having a Green politician on a panel of NATO and women in international security talking about those things. So it is another proof of how the world is changing. Well, I'll try to be very brief. First of all, I have to announce that I'm not an expert on defence policy but I think those who invited me knew that before and invited me because I'm working on foreign policy and on integration or immigration policy and I think this is in a way the other side of the coin when we talk about international security because I think that without these aspects, international security cannot be successful in our western or modern societies. When we talk about diplomacy, common solutions in a multilateral framework, but also the questions on how migration can be moulded, how we integrate migrants into our mainstream societies, how we can provide perspectives, that has also to do, I don't want to simplify here, but it also has to do with how we can make sure that we prevent cells from getting developed in our countries, also how we can prevent radical religious groups from attacking our democracies from inside. I'm very thankful to Gale and to all the other panelists here that they already talked about NATO's efforts so far, so I can be very brief with that. I think it's quite remarkable what NATO has achieved so far with weapons of mass destruction but also with the assistance to new governments we have in Afghanistan, the Balkans, the vital military assistance it provides in the Partnership for Peace program. But I think we should also be very honest that NATO so far, as I would see it, is ill equipped when it comes to the fight of terrorism that we're facing since a couple of years, the new threats that we're facing in the so-called "asymmetric war" and I think we should discuss about that. If there is a role for NATO and how this role for NATO should take place? I guess one of the reasons, as I said again, I was invited here is also maybe to provoke a little bit, at least, and I think we should also talk about the credibility problem that we face and again, I don't want to simplify. I'm not talking about a credibility problem that also our Americans face. We face that credibility problem together when we talk about democracy and our common goals. If it's not only America, if it's not only Spain, if it's not only Britain, if it's not only Denmark, if it's not only Poland that are attacked, if it's all our western democracies together, then I think we should also ask our questions, what are we defending in the first place? For me, the answer is quite clear. It's our way of life, it's our values, it's our civil societies, it's our political system. But we have a problem when we talk about our ways of life and we should also address the questions, the reasons why we went to the war in Iraq? We should talk about our gripe, we should talk about Guantanamo. Again, not to be one-sided, we should also talk about our policies. When I speak here as a German towards Russia and towards Chechnya, in particular my Chancellor and his role here, I think this is also a problem with credibility that we should talk about. It is directly linked to security questions. I’m very convinced that there is a link between that. So if we want to convince those people outside our societies that we believe in freedom and democracy and that we want to help to reach out for freedom and democracy, we should think how we can achieve that and how it can be successful. I’m not talking about those people, probably we cannot reach. I’m not talking about radicals that will never believe us because they don't share our values. I’m talking about mainstream people, I’m talking about the so-called radical Muslim world and the mainstream beliefs there, how we can be more successful there because I think it’s one of the most important interests of our societies on both sides of the transatlantic ocean that we have to be more successful here. Again, let me also give good news. I think the agreements of last weekend’s G8 Summit with the debt relief, with the development money for Africa, these are very good decisions and it is a proof of good governance so far, what we’ve seen there. Our western democracies together have to redefine their common interests to be more successful. I welcome President Bush’s visits to the European Union in March. I think this was a very welcome gesture, also on different sides of the political agenda in Europe so far. I think also the recent Europe-US summit was very successful with the search for common ground and I think here, we’re on a good way. I have to admit, so far, still there is a lot of things we have to do. We’re talking about the smallest common denominator so far when we talk about our common interests. Let me come to the end. Without, I think on both sides it is very important that we neither have (inaudible) nor that we are jealous towards what we are trying to achieve on both sides of the transatlantic ocean. When we talked about Iraq, it was not only a division that we faced between both sides of the transatlantic ocean. As a European, I have to admit we also had a division inside the European Union. We had representatives from different sides, from different countries of the European Union. I guess we were on the same sides, at least our political leaders were on the same sides, but that is not the case with the whole European Union so far. So that is another I think target, that we Europeans also should be more sensitive towards reaching out inside European Union for achieving a common defence and foreign policy. I say this especially after the failures of the Constitution in the Netherlands and in France that this is even more important now that we also fulfill, as Europeans, our role if we want to be successful here. I think it’s very important that NATO now has the mission in Darfur and I’m also very glad and thankful that the US has accepted ICC Rules. That gives a hope for a common foster effect, if multilateral policy with respect to international law. NATO and the European Union membership are, I think, in some ways overlapping. Of course there is some competition, but we should do everything not to waste our energy because we cannot afford, in a time where we are asked by our citizens to use taxpayers’ money very carefully, to put together the tools that we have, the means that we have, to have more success together. Let me finish by saying it is today 10 years ago that we had the horrible massacre in Srebrenica and I remember quite well as a European, and by the way let me add to that also as a Muslim, that we Europeans were not able to finish what happened in Srebrenica and in Bosnia before. It was our American friends who were able to bring the means that were necessary to finish what happened in Srebrenica and in Bosnia. So I think this is another proof, let us remember that together, why, on both sides of the transatlantic ocean, we need ourselves. JAMIE SHEA: Cem, thanks very much indeed for widening the horizons even further, particularly showing that NATO’s agenda has to fit into an overall, sort of global agenda in defence of democratic values and human rights. Thanks also for reminding us that what we take on, such as the fight against terrorism, we have to do with credibility and produce deliverables and concrete actions. And thank you also for reminding us that NATO needs a strong European pillar and therefore we have an interest in a strong Europe with the Constitution in some shape or form, at least, moving ahead in terms of a substance of it. But that’s also compatible with NATO. So I thought that also, that was an interesting complement to what the other speakers have said. So, four very substantive presentations. Not much time inevitably for a discussion, but some time at least. So who would like to begin? As a way, so please give your name, your organization and if you’re going to address your question to a particular member of the panel, it would be helpful if you could make that clear, so that I don't need to wonder who I’m going to address your question to. Incidentally, if I remember from this place, there should be some microphones in the side pockets of your chairs. Yes, and you can use those. So who would like to begin? Yes, please? MARCELA SZYMANSKI: How this works? Sorry, this is Marcela Szymanski, from APCO in Brussels. I was thinking about all the missions that you described, what could actually prevent NATO from fulfilling all those wonderful, great and very necessary calls? And one of the things that caught my attention is the fact that there is a need of energy security supply that can still stop NATO with its best intentions. You were talking, Dr. Mattox, about the need to reassure Russia, but how do you reassure someone who knows it can make you literally run out of gas? Lithuania suffers periodically of oil supply cuts every time they do not act according to particular Russian demands and the EU, or NATO, for that matter, has not done anything in solidarity with these member states. How can NATO fight terrorism, support state building in the CIS or even take strategic decisions about the Middle East when there is a shadow of this threat of energy supply that now is so strongly dependent on Russia? JAMIE SHEA: Okay, thanks for that question. I’m going to take two others so that we can have three each round and then I’ll ask the panelists to respond. That way, I think we’ll move faster. Who wants to ask another question? Yes, Knut, please. Dr. KNUT KIRSTE: (Project Officer, NATO Public Diplomecy Division)Yes, Knut Kirste. I’m on the International Staff of NATO. There seems to be a lot of agreement on the panel. JAMIE SHEA: It’s all right, we can hear. Go ahead, Knut. Dr. KNUT KIRSTE: A lot of agreement on the panel on the need for transformation as we move into the 21st Century. We need sort of a new organization. But there is also an emerging debate. When we talk about transformation, you’re making NATO fit for these 21st Century challenges. What kind of transformation is required? And it seems to me we have an emerging debate over whether NATO needs to be doing more of the same, just do it better or whether NATO needs to do entirely new things and entirely different things and there seems to be also a different level of ambition here on the panel--I noticed that from different countries--you know, whether we need new tools in NATO, whether we need to address conflict with different instruments and tools or whether we should focus on the military side alone. And I think if I could have from the two panel members that made reference to that, a bit more clarification… JAMIE SHEA: Okay. Dr. KNUT KIRSTE: … whether NATO needs to do new things or just do more of the same. JAMIE SHEA: All right, thanks for that. That’s noted. And one final question for this round, then I’ll ask the panelists to respond. Yes, please? Prof. Dr. HELGA HAFTENDORN: (Professor Emerita, Free University of Berlin) Thank you very much. I’m Helga Haftendorn, Free University of Berlin. JAMIE SHEA: Of course. HELGA HAFTENDORN: I’m wondering, this panel focuses on the state of the Alliance. I think the Secretary General has initiated some very important reforms which came out of the criticism voiced by the German Chancellor Schroeder and the American Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld--that NATO should shape up or otherwise it would be a problem. So maybe someone on the panel could enlighten us on the status of these reforms? I understand that Vilnius Summit was quite a success and that after the Vilnius Summit there was an agreement on informal, more informal discussions, both on NATO and with the EU members and that the Secretary has started some internal reforms with an expert group and a group of former, or a group of political figures. It may be that someone of you could enlighten us on what’s going on and how NATO is shaping up. Thank you. JAMIE SHEA: Thanks a lot. So I’m going to ask Ginte first to respond on the transformation and NATO reform and then maybe Gale, you’d like to say something about energy supplies in Russia. And then I’ll ask other members of the panel quickly to make any remarks on those questions. Thank you. Please? GINTE DAMUSIS: Starting perhaps from the last question, yes, you are right, at the Vilnius Informal Foreign Ministers meeting which took place in April, I think there was a good impulse given to what the Secretary General has been promoting as a true political dialogue, transatlantic dialogue, and we saw good evidence of that particularly on the first evening of that ministerial where the ministers discussed everything from the Middle East peace process to concrete measures for improving the Mediterranean Dialogue outreach program. So I think that’s something that obviously we want to see continue and it is continuing. It was in the North Atlantic Council. We have briefings that are given by individual member states on different issues of concern and there’s really a very strong attempt in trying to really reach a strategic level of discussion to provide that political framework for NATO’s work. I also just wanted to briefly address the question about, you know, what perhaps could be stopping these NATO missions and operations. I would say two, I give two brief answers to that question. I think it’s political will upon which we depend for our decision-making and also resources, some NATO member states have very high political ambitions, but this isn't followed up with resources, not just from the NATO member states themselves, but in terms of the reforms that are under way in the Alliance there’s internal issues that we have to deal with, for instance, in terms of agreeing to provide common funding towards different operations and missions. Also, in these political discussions too often we tend not to focus on what needs to be accomplished but more in terms of describing what national restrictions and caveats each member state has. So I think we have to really reach this stage of solidarity where we can overcome that and do what needs to be done. JAMIE SHEA: Gale, please. DR. GALE A. MATTOX: First of all, on the energy issue, I think that there are several things. I mean, bringing Russia closer to the Atlantic Alliance certainly means that we have then an overlap of common interests and I think that that probably helps to address some of this issue in that those common interests then of course, it would not be to their advantage to take steps against that energy source. But that’s kind of a more fuzzy connection. And I think that, without being an expert on energy sources, I’d point to the second question and that is on transformation and on new tools. I don't agree that the transformation should only be looking at military tools. I think it should be broader than just military tools, and certainly this would be an area where you could merge both of those issues that the two of you have brought up and I think, hopefully, be able to find some kind of cooperative agreements on this particular issue. And the NATO Russia Council is there, not used frequently enough and that may be somewhere it should actually… is logically embedded. JAMIE SHEA: Évelyne or Cem, do you want to say anything in response to the newest questions? Évelyne first, please. ÉVELYNE MATHEY: Oui je veux parler en français pour changer. Je voulais simplement dire que nous avons beaucoup parlé de la transformation, de l'élargissement des missions de l'OTAN mais que nous avons oublié quelque chose. C'est que in fine, ce sont les états membres qui fournissent et les moyens financiers et les moyens humains. Donc, ce que je peux vous dire, c'est que pour un certain nombre de nos pays, les moyens financiers sont limités, et je parle au nom d'un pays qui pourtant réserve un pourcentage non négligeable de son budget à la défense, parmi les pays Européens. Par ailleurs, en terme de moyens humains, nous avons en ce qui nous concerne profité énormément de force. Nous sommes en situation où nous ne pourrons plus continuer à profiter beaucoup plus. Donc, cela veut dire que nous pouvons sur le papier décider de beaucoup de choses mais que nous serons en butée au moment de fournir, et c'est déjà ce qui arrive parce que pour certaines rotations de la NRF notamment, nous avons un certain nombre de préoccupations. Il y a un papier de SHAPE qui vient de sortir qui est extrêmement préoccupant. Donc, si vous voulez, je crois que il faut aussi que les moyens dont nous disposons soient pris en compte, que nous ne réagissions pas en fonction exclusivement d'objectifs politiques théoriques et ensuite, d'exécution de cet objectif théorique. Il y a moyens humains, moyens financiers qui relèvent exclusivement des nations qui sont à prendre en compte. Voilà. JAMIE SHEA: Thank you for that reality check. And, Cem, any comments on the questions? CEM ÖZDEMIR: Yes, thanks. Very briefly, first of all, energy, of course as a Green I have to say something on energy. It’s very important. I think there’s a clear link between the way we’re depending on oil from the Greater Middle East and democracy. That’s quite obvious. If you look at all those countries, how many of those are democracies? I mean, I think it’s one of the things that makes really sense and everybody should be deeply convinced and united that if you want to reduce the way we’re depending on energy from that region, it’s all about renewable energy and I think this should be part of security strategies that we, from now on, talk about renewable energy, if we really understand what’s going on in the world. And just very briefly, because my forefathers came from Turkey, I mean, look at the energy alliance that are currently built and how, you know, unsolved problems play roles here. Look how the line goes around Armenia. So I mean, this has also to do with security and unsolved problems where I think NATO and we, as Europeans, play a very crucial role, that how Armenia is between Russia on one side and Turkey on the other side and unfortunately we haven’t managed to solve that problem to be more efficient. And finally with the military means, I think it would be not honest to promise that we will dramatically change our defence budgets. This won’t happen so far in the European Union even with new governments, new administrations in the European Union. What we can promise, what we can do and what we have to do is work closer together, put our means together and of course do what we have to do when we talk about moving our troops, that’s quite obvious. We have achieved that in Afghanistan. But I think we, as Europeans, are now in a danger to also put into risk where we were successful so far and this is how do we deal with our neighbouring countries? I’m talking here about enlargements. You know that much better than I know that from Mr. Sarkozy, in France, but also from my country, from other countries. You can go through left and right, the European social democrats, other parties, these are now starting to question the whole (inaudible) towards enlargement. And if not about security, what are we talking about when we talk about enlargement? We mainly (inaudible) how do we deal with our neighbouring countries. I’m talking here about enlargements. You know that much better than I know that, from (inaudible) how do we deal with those countries in the western Balkans and in Turkey and if we don't manage to convince our citizens, we have a serious problem. JAMIE SHEA: Cem, thanks. The Secretary General will be here in few moments, but we do have time for another very brief round, if anybody wants to come in with a comment or a question, take advantage. Yes, please, sir? ANSLEM GENTLE: Hello, I’m Anslem Gentle, US Army Reserves. The question is NATO has stated the only threat in the next 10 years is terrorism, the biggest threat. But is NATO situated to adapt and change to this threat in the next few years because the average person on the street, they see terrorism, like last week, and then they see NATO standing up battle groups and ships and armies that who are they going to fight? So can NATO adapt with this threat in the next few years? JAMIE SHEA: That’s a very good question. Thanks. I can take two more brief ones. Yes, please Madam? Lt. SARAH DACHOS: (Strategy Officer, US Command Navel Forces Europe) I'm Lt. Sarah Dachos. I’m with the US Naval forces in Naples with Naval Forces Europe. My question also tails on to this gentleman’s and the gentleman behind there about transformation with NATO. With the new push for EU battle groups and what we’re doing with the EU battle groups, frankly taking away forces from NATO, how is that going to prevent them from transforming in the direction they want to go to with the push for EU battle groups and also the push to be able to do defence in Europe and projected out of Europe without US influence? JAMIE SHEA: That’s also a good question. Any more? All right, we’ll take those. But this should be a conference, by the way, folks, where the answers are better than the questions, which is always a great challenge, believe me. But I know we’re going to be up to it, so as the questions did concern a lot NATO and how we’re doing on terrorism and the business of coherence with EU on force planning, I’ll ask the ambassador to kick off. GINTE DAMUSIS: I think the London bombings are a good example of the dilemma that this terrorist threat poses, not only to member states, but the Alliance itself. And it also shows that NATO isn’t necessarily the most logical choice to respond to those threats. I think, you know, terrorism can’t be addressed by military force alone, especially I think when terrorist attacks take place against open societies. It’s obviously a very difficult challenge for all of us. On the other hand, there are preventive measures that can be taken and that are being taken by the Alliance. I think one thing that hasn’t really been addressed here, but which receives a lot of attention in the North Atlantic Council is, for instance, how to enhance intelligence sharing and cooperation and not just among the allies themselves but also with strategic partners. Another good example, for instance, we talked about illegal migration, human trafficking. Since 2001, Operation Active Endeavour, for instance, has been quite successful in dealing with terrorism in the Mediterranean. There’s patrolling that’s been taking place and it’s had a very positive side effect on some of these other problems that were mentioned. For instance, on human trafficking. So I think, you know, there’s these concrete steps being taken, but no doubt, you know, much more needs to be done. NATO’s been working on CBRN defence and other areas which can address this threat and obviously the aftermath of this terrorist threat. In terms of EU battle groups, we ourselves are taking part, joined up with Poland and the Netherlands in a battle group and we don't see this as taking forces away from NATO. We see this as something that complements NATO. And being a small country with limited resources, with one set of armed forces, obviously we’re very conscious and sensitive to this fact as well. We want NATO and the EU to complement one another and I think the more that can be done in terms of strengthening European capabilities, the better. JAMIE SHEA: Thank you. I know, Évelyne, you wanted to come in on this one as well. ÉVELYNE MATHEY: Oui, je voulais réagir sur le terrorisme. Alors, je pense qu'il est bien évident que compte tenu de ce qui s'est passé en 2001, il était impossible que l'OTAN ne réagisse pas. Donc, toutes les directions de l'OTAN ont été sollicitées pour faire du travail dans le domaine et quand on voit le document qui vient d'être noté par les ministres sur la somme de travail qui a été accomplie, je crois qu'on ne peut que s'en féliciter. Néanmoins, en matière de terrorisme, en matière de ce que nous avons connu, que ce soit à Madrid ou à Londres ou que ce soit ce que nous avons connu sans que la presse ne s'en soit saisie, il est bien évident que ce ne sont pas des gesticulations militaires qui feront la différence. Dans ce cas, il y a effectivement des échanges de renseignements entre pays et je pense que beaucoup de nos pays collaborent dans un cadre qui n'est pas nécessairement l'OTAN. Et c'est dans ce cadre, c'est la pénétration des réseaux, ça prend du temps. Ça n'est pas de la réaction très rapide en général mais c'est l'échange d'information, c'est la protection des sources, c'est des années parfois qui sont prises pour pouvoir élargir le nombre de personnes dont nous souhaitons faire des cibles. Voilà, alors je voulais réagir à cela parce qu'il me semble indispensable que l'OTAN s'y intéresse, mais l'OTAN ne peut peut-être pas avoir l'angle opérationnel, le meilleur dans le cas de terrorisme. Par ailleurs, ce que nous avons connu à Madrid et à Londres, ce ne sont pas des opérations extrêmement compliquées à monter. Ce ne sont pas des opérations qui demandent des technologies très sophistiquées. Gardons cela en tête. Ce sont des opérations qui sont pas très compliquées, qui ne demandent pas de niveau d'expertise et de technologie très avancé mais qui demandent du temps pour qu'on soit paré. Voilà. JAMIE SHEA: Gale, you wanted a few final… DR. GALE A. MATTOX: Just a comment or two. I mean, I would definitely support the ambassador’s comments on intelligence sharing and the importance of that. I mean, I think that the Alliance has come a long way over the last few years in that area, but it has quite a ways still to go. But I would underline another aspect that I think I mentioned in my remarks, and that is that positioning ourselves to reach out to failing states and positioning ourselves, in particular, to reach out to the Middle East is very important and I don't think that’s being done as quickly as we really should. I mean, if we feel that part of the problem does come from difficulties from Northern Africa and from the Middle East and if we want to have some kind of really coherent strategy, I think that NATO needs to have a more concerted Middle East component in its strategy and I think that includes developing that expertise within the organization that I just don’t see now. I don't see it there and I don't see it occurring and I think that that’s something that we shouldn’t ignore, we shouldn’t diminish the importance of that at all and it’s something that I don't see happening by NATO as quickly as I would like to see it happen. JAMIE SHEA: Cem, any final, very brief comment? CEM ÖZDEMIR: I fully agree, also, with the ambassador about the kind of job sharing we should do when it comes to European battle groups. Our role will mainly be on the neighbouring countries, as I mentioned, and those countries where the US alone is not able to fulfil or where we have to help the US, that we finish the fight against terrorism. Of course, we have to fight the sources of terrorism where they occur, like in Afghanistan. But let me finish by saying we should also make everything sure that in the fight against the monster that we don't become a monster. JAMIE SHEA: That’s a good one to end on. Well, dear panelists, thanks very much. As far as I’m concerned, this panel does prove two things. Number one, that rational intellectual discourse is possible at eight o’clock in the morning, particularly if you leave it to WIIS. I’m not sure in NATO, we’d be up to it, frankly. And the second thing is that obviously, we’ve got a big agenda in the Alliance. What I take briefly from this panel, as the Secretary General arrives, is that first of all, NATO has gone global. That would seem to be an irreversible trend. We have not only a big agenda, but I think as Gale with her six points, pointed out, we have potentially a very large agenda coming up, particularly that she would like to see it on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East and Iraq. But as Ginte stressed, that the two conditions are political will and adequate resources. Should we be more restrictive in defining NATO’s functions? Évelyne seemed to point to that from her perspective, we should focus more on the military specializations of NATO. Or should we embrace this much larger political military agenda? But where would the resources come from? I think that’s an interesting subject for debate. Everybody stressed on the panel the need for more interaction with the other major international organizations, UN-EU. But at precisely where that division of labour should be, I think again, is a topic which we can move into the next panels as we go through today. The need for NATO to transform. I think there’s universal consensus among the panelists on the need to press ahead with that agenda and the Secretary General, I know, will have more to say on that in his keynote address in a moment. Cem did stress, I think, very usefully the need for us to look harder at what we’re doing to combat international terrorism and to make sure that we’re credible with the deliverables. And also, finally, the need for NATO’s political agenda to fit more broadly into the current international effort to engage with other societies, particularly in the Muslim world, to continue the process of the integration of Eastern Europe and the neighbourhood beyond which we started with NATO’s enlargement in the 1990s and a bubble to make sure that we link our security interests with the democratic values that we’re trying to promote. So that’s what I concluded, I think, from a good first session which has warmed us up and now I think we’ve arrived at a good time for the Secretary General’s address. And I know that Chantal is going to introduce the Secretary General, but in the meantime, could I ask everybody to thank most warmly our four panelists for starting us off? Thank you very much indeed.