Residence Palace Brussels 11 July 2005

SESSION II: Transatlantic Partnerships: Geographical Expansion and Global Relationships Event 11/07/2005 NATO: New Tasks and Responsibilities DR. RONALD D. ASMUS (Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels): ...Director of the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the United States here in Brussels. It's my pleasure to chair this second session on Transatlantic Partnerships: Geographical Expansion and Global Relationships. We have two excellent speakers or panelists this morning. On my left, Professor Helga Haftendorn, Professor Emerita from the Free University. And I have to confess that I was a student of Helga Haftendorn for a year in the mid-nineteen eighties when I was-this sounds very Cold Warish, does it? -a (GERMAN)... (inaudible)... which means I was a Berlin Air Bridge fellow and I was writing my PHD on Germany and I spent... PROF. DR. HELGA HAFTENDORN (Professor Emerita, Free University of Berlin): And he came (inaudible)... Ready for Europe. ASMUS: I came from Ready for Europe -I was even more cold warish, yes! (LAUGHTER)... And I remember spending a year with professor Haftendorn then in the mid-eighties. Gorbachev had just... and I was writing a PHD on the divided Germany-all this sounds like a previous century, which it was. And Professor Haftendorn was a towering figure not only in Germany but in the Transatlantic relationship and we all worshipped at her feet and listened to every word she said. But you know, it's interesting because when we come to the subject we're talking about today, if anyone in 1985 in one of our seminars had said we would have a debate about Global NATO, we would have a debate about NATO in the Middle East, I think people would've been stunned. Because even... if I think back now, ten years ago, in 1995, when the first people started talking about NATO expansion and NATO intervening in the Balkans, it was such a controversial issue. And now, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer comes back from New Zealand, Japan, Australia and places like that because they're actually interested in developing relationships with NATO. So Helga will be very interested for your views and perspectives on this. We all know that the big debate about NATO going beyond Europe out of area about the Middle East, at the end of the day, not only about the Middle East but primarily about the Middle East. So we're very happy to have with us Judith Yaphe, distinguished Research Professor for National Strategic Studies at NDU -and I know just speaking for myself, when I... someone of the courage to say that NATO had to go into the Middle East. One of the people whose articles and papers I was reading very closely was... the ones that Judith was writing. So she... we have on my left one of the leading experts on the... on NATO and the Transatlantic Relationship, on my right, one of the leading writers on Middle Eastern politics and strategy toward the Middle East. So I think it's a great panel. We're... each of them are going to speak about 12 minutes or so; then, we'll have plenty of time for discussion because... Today... So, without further due, Helga, I'd like to turn it over to you. Thank you. PROF. DR. HELGA HAFTENDORN (Professor Emerita, Free University of Berlin): Does the mike work? ASMUS: It should. HAFTENDORN: I'll put it... yeah. Thank you very much, Ron, for your nice introduction. I think I can keep my presentation fairly brief because a number of things have said... and then looking at the papers we have got, the reader's guide which is outside there has already... has most of the facts of what I'm going to say. But the way I want to proceed is I will formulate four theses and a number of questions to them. I'll explain them and what... I find questioning statements very important and to stimulate the discussions. That's something I'll do. My first thesis follows very much up to what the Secretary General has said: there is a need for a strategic partnership between the European Union and NATO. In order to have this strategic partnership-this basically has been the subject on which I've been working for the past year-in order to have such a strategic partnership, we need a revitalization of debate, this in the NATO Council. I was shocked to find out at the end of last year that basically the NATO Council was discussing missions but not purpose. And I think this is something that has to be revitalized but I'm confident that the Secretary General is in this... is doing what... is trying to stimulate that. The second aspect of this is we have to strengthen the relationship between NATO and the EU for... The Secretary mentioned that as a consequence or on... as a follow-up to the (inaudible)... Foreign Ministers Meeting this spring, they resolved to have twice-annually, informal meetings between NATO and EU Foreign Ministers. This will not be 26 plus 25 but because quite a number of members from NATO are also members of the EU and vice-versa. I counted and it's... it's a meeting... it will be a meeting of 32 foreign ministers to informally discuss issues which are of concern to both organizations. I think we also have to upgrade NATO-EU summits. NATO-EU summits, in the past, really have been basically for the press and there was little of substance discussed, I understand that the last summit did have more substance than previous summits but still, at least people in my country are not terribly happy of this. A third aspect is that there needs to be a functional relationship between NATO and EU. There was a question this morning on the battle groups. I think that we have to devise or this is being done right now-especially the British are very active-to devise some kind of procedure, some process how to link NRF, the NATO Response Force with the battle groups. Basically, these are the... they come out of the same pool of troops, and training for battle groups and training for the NRF should not... is not so different. So, right now, some kind of formulas are developed by whichever country first trained... send... signs component for the battle group which then, right after six months, will go on to NRF, vice-versa and so on. But I understand this is still under discussion. But I think it is very important; Bosnia has been mentioned as an example of NATO - EU cooperation. This is a very important mission, a mission out in which the EU takes over the former (inaudible) SFOR mission in Bosnia. NATO will keep a small component in Sarajevo and the Americans will keep a base there but this probably might be a test case for practical cooperation between the two organizations. And in some of my writing excuse me... and this is facilitated by Berlin Plus. Berlin Plus is an agreement to-which was concluded two years ago-by which NATO provides... or the EU can draw on NATO assets, like infrastructure, communications, command and also other means. And the EU so far could not have... discharge its jobs in... in Bosnia without drawing on NATO resources. Also, the command structure is embedded into the NATO Seven Command(?) in Italy-and so, I think this is very important. I... personally, I have also asked for a Berlin Plus in reverse; Berlin Plus in reverse that NATO, in some circumstances, may draw on EU resources. For instance, in Kosovo, besides fighting forces or military... and military forces, we need policemen, we need people that assist the Custodians in rebuilding their legislature and so on and so on. Of course, in Kosovo, there is (inaudible)... but the same problem arises in Afghanistan, that NATO cannot do everything at the same time and doesn't have the capacities for everything in the same quality. And NATO doesn't have the political capacities that the EU has. So my argument for Berlin Plus is think up some procedures, some way by which NATO can grow in EU assets. Okay, my... my third... my second thesis is: build... that NATO build on the positive experiences with NATO enlargement. I think that by and large, NATO enlargement has been very successful. It served three purposes. It... looking from Brussels, it provided NATO this crucial territory, more than the additional effective military capabilities. The two countries which have launched armies, the three-Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia-while the armies of the other countries are fairly small and in the process of rebuilding, I'm now talking about the ten of the most recent additions to it. But territory, especially in the Balkans and the link to Kosovo and... Afghanistan was very important. The second purpose is more political: extending political stability to Eastern Europe, projecting stability to NATO's border regions. And the third: offering the new members a role in the Transatlantic Security Committee plus a strong link with the United States. However, they are required to transform their military and they have to do much more than some of the old members have because they have to rebuild their... their forces from the old... from scratch. But I have some questions on NATO enlargement, some of which already mentioned here. The question is: how much further should NATO enlarge? There are three countries waiting at the doorstep: Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. They all three have signed a membership act... the Membership Action Plan, but as the Secretary said, there is no timeframe set. It will depend on when and whether they fulfil the criteria. But there is some other countries waiting out there, and have argued for NATO membership: Georgia and Moldavia, and my Polish friends have argued for membership of the Ukraine. Um... I'm not so sure whether we should... I think we should... our basic position should remain that NATO's door is still open, but whether to have a very active strategy to include these countries or make these countries members and conclude the Membership Action Plan, I'm not so sure whether this is a very wise action. What I would argue for is... to upgrade the NATO Ukraine Council. Because the Ukrainians have to have a perspective that they are a member of NATO. Right now, the priority is of making Ukraine a member of the European Union. But all of us know how long this will take. So probably we can give the... we should upgrade the Ukrainian... the NATO Ukrainian commission and enrich it with other things. The Ukrainians are very important to NATO and I'll come on that too. But also, in including Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, or as Gale Mattox, earlier said, give the Central Asian countries a perspective on NATO membership of course of course will be... would be very hard on Russia. And I also see reactions from Moscow against some of the trends, some of the arguments. I think it is no... it was no accident that just a week ago, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, they were meeting, they're having a meeting, and some of the statements that were said were not all that friendly on NATO and the United States. Also, the upgrading of the Shanghai Group and the CIS. So one does see countervailing motives for... on the part of Russia and I think we have to think... we have to think things carefully through. So my... my advice would be that if the three countries who are at the doorstep-Albania, Croatia, Macedonia-fulfil the... the state... the criteria of the Membership Action Plan, they should become members. But then we should take things very easy and not force... or not argue for the early membership of any other either Balkanian, Central European or Asian country. Because there's also a strain on NATO. It adds diversity to NATO. My argument, in my own country was that with NATO enlargement, NATO has become a different NATO. I think this is good. I'm for it, but we have to be very... we have to know that this organization which has doubled or tripled in size has problems in coordination and get... in achieving consensus, and also will be different from the original organization. As I said personally, I think PFP is very important. Also, the Mediterranean dialogue. It is very important also for NATO... for fulfilling NATO missions. If you look what's happening... what's going on in the Balkans and in Kosovo, just take the German example: Germany has forces in both in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. They could not operate without the support of PFP countries. Very important is the Ukraine. Germany so far does not have a wide-body aircraft; so we rent Ukrainian aircraft or we can operate with the Ukraine to provide for aircraft. And if you look carefully at the Kosovo situation, the German camp in... in (inaudible)... in Kosovo is guarded by Moldavian troops. And the Georgians also have a support function in Kosovo. And if you look at ISAP, I don't have the exact numbers right now, but I think of the 26 countries involved in ISAP, I think about 14 are NATO members and 12 are PFP... This changes of course every six months with the... with the rotation. But we have to be aware that a number of operations could not have been done without the support of PFP countries. Same is Operation Active Endeavour, in which some of the Mediterranean countries-and now also Warsaw and Ukraine-will also be partners (inaudible)... The question is or what I've asked myself-and this comes to my question now-is that whether these countries will be content to have some kind of loose operational coordination with NATO headquarters, or whether they also want to have a role and a voice in NATO decisions. I'm not so sure about that. I understand that the Secretary General-I couldn't of course not ask all my questions when he was here but-he has encouraged regional cooperation with the so-called GUAM Group, this is Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldavia. And the Afghan operation very much depends on the support of some of those countries, bases in Uzbekistan, for instance. So for... for instance, Germany cannot send troops to Kabul without changing planes in Uzbekistan, and so both the Americans and we have a base in Uzbekistan which is very important for fulfilling the mission. So my question is: would... how should we go about? What should we do? We need those countries. They want to be close to non-NATO but they... neither are they ready to become NATO members nor is NATO ready to accept them as members. What NATO has done is NATO has concluded independent action plans with some of these countries. This is something similar with the Membership Action Plan, but does not involve preparation for membership. But... and also, there have been a number of decisions which are in this blue book which is out there, cooperation on democratic institutions, reform of the military and so on. I think I should stop here with this point, but this is something we have to think about: to funding joint missions because those countries expect NATO or other partners to pay for their mission while with ISAF and other NATO missions, the golden rule of NATO is the cost (inaudible)... where they fall. So one of the problems of Kabul, of course was that countries who did have the capabilities like the helicopter, were not prepared to send them because they felt that they couldn't afford the expense of those helicopters going to... to Kabul. And the same, the Ukrainians also, they... if the Germans use their transport, Germany has to pay for it. So the question is well, whether some or other NATO will have a common fund to pay all of this. My fourth point concerns the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. What I... My thesis is the NATO-excuse me-the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative has been a brave effort to increase dialogue between NATO and the states of the... of the region. I know that Judith will talk about it in more detail. As far as I see it from a German perspective, it has not been terribly expens... not been terribly successful. Some of those countries which are very (inaudible)... by NATO were wondering why NATO wants something to do with Egypt or Yemen or Abu Dhabi. And if you look at the press-I can't read Arabic but I have a friend who does-they said: do they want to occupy us? There is so far very little understanding what NATO entails other than NATO is a military alliance. So... and also, of course, the question is whether the permanent US Membership is... is an asset or a liability after Iraq? Basically, I feel the Iraq Cooperation Initiative was so much overshadowed by the war in Iraq and some of the... the terrible things that happened there. So probably it will only be... can be revived or be successful, especially because it does follow, if the Iraq War is... or the Iraq situation has improved. Also, I don't think there is consensus on the goals yet. The... President Bush talked about democratization. If you listen to Foreign Minister Fisher, he will talk about stabilization. And on the one hand, Americans talk about democratization, and what they do is stabilization: cooperating with the Saudi regime is stabilization and not democratization. So these two goals, to some extent, pretty often interfere with each other. But I really think that first, we have to solve the Iraq and... thing, before we have an active strategy or have a lasting solution for the Arab-Israeli or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. To conclude, I think we still need to think about what alliance we want to have. I was a little bit unhappy that in the first panel, we talked about various aspects of NATO and of the Transatlantic Partnership but we didn't talk much on NATO's purpose. What do... what do we want NATO for? Do we want to have closed... lines for common defence, a security community, an instrument to achieve global stability, this would be... this would be what I call an onion... an onion model, or should... I contrast it with another model which would be that NATO... No, I'm sorry... I got my models wrong. But (inaudible)... the question is whether NATO should expand and have new relationships, one after the other and one... cooperating with this and that and that, whether this would not overextend NATO's resources, whether we should not think back, whether we shouldn't focus on the main purpose of NATO, providing security and stability for the countries in the region and project this stability abroad. So... and I'm one of the persons... maybe I'm still looking back to the old NATO, maybe, I'm still, because I'm... but because I think that we should not weaken NATO NATO is so important in a number of purposes but I would ask and would counsel that we should beware of overextension. Thank you very much. ASMUS: Thank you very much, Helga. Judith, the (inaudible)... DR. JUDITH YAPHE (Distinguished Research Professor, National Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Washington, DC): Um mm... Thank you Ron and I want to thank WIIS for inviting me. This is my third activity with you and every one of them has been a pleasure, but the chocolate here is the best, I have to admit. There are a lot of things I want to say and I'll try to say them as simply and succinctly as possible. The first one is my comments on (inaudible)... do not reflect the views of any government institution I've ever worked for which leads me to my second point, which is I've heard a lot about intelligence, and when everyone talks about NATO, US, European cooperation, that's the first thing I've heard and it's the only thing I've heard. And intelligence is, I would like to say, I may be the only practitioner here but having 24 years in intelligence, I would like to say that intelligence is an art, not a science, and that intelligence has long been engaged in cooperation between the United States and all of the NATO members. I sometimes wonder how much closer one could get and I would to simply raise the question that it's not intelligence as such but those who listen to it and have... want to receive the message It's receptivity both in here and in Washington and I just feel I have to make that comment. Now, the other thing I would (inaudible)... as I listen to all of these especially Helga, I left with the... one question: should Iraq join NATO? I don't know how far extension goes. But let me raise with you some issues: I am not a NATO expert. I've heard more about NATO today than I've heard in all my life and... and that's fine because I think I'm here for my value as an outsider and I want to try to address this with the... the problems in the regions and where I think we need to engage and can engage with effectiveness. But before I say that, let me set my third point: there are a lot of uncertainties in the region about what you want. What does the United States want, what does NATO want, why are they interested in us? Do we want them here or not? Who are they coming to help? You talk about democracy and a lot of other issues but I don't think that... I'm not sure that that's a NATO message. And it's wonderful that NATO is having all kinds of new relationships in the region... And I don't know anything about the African Union but let me tell you, the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Persian Gulf, it's not a military organization, it never was, it's never meant to be. If the GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia and its five small neighbours want to link up with anybody, it seems to me it's the EU that they share the most interests in. Having said that, I would simply offer NATO a little bit of caution: these gulf states are consumers of security, they're not contributors too. And you need to think about that as you engage further. Now, having said that, alright. What I'd like to do is talk about some areas, issues where we can-and should be-engaging jointly, and where we have been and I think can continue to be very effective. I also want to talk about consequences if we fail because I think those consequences are very grave. And I'll finish up with a cautionary note-another one-to NATO that seems eager to go into the Middle East. Okay. First issue, obviously, the War in Iraq. You can't get away from it, it's everywhere. Was the war in Iraq a regime change? Was it the right course? That's not the issue anymore. If you want to argue about that, that's fine, people can do it, but I think the real issue as we get into it is where are we now, where do we want Iraq to go, where does Iraq want to go? And that's the basic issue. I'm a little bit of an optimist, I know nobody else is, but I still tend to think that Iraqis can determine this and can come out of this. I can't predict six weeks from now, I can tell you where I think it might be six years from now which is counterintuitive from an intelligence analyst, by the way. Anyway, if we fail in Iraq, I think the consequences would be very serious. Iraq before Saddam fell was not a hot bed of support for international terrorism. Saddam Hussein had been supporting international terrorism for 20 years or more but he certainly did not support, care for or like the Al-Qaïda and the Islamic extremists that now find shelter and safe haven in Iraq. It has become a place where the-I will come back to that in a minute, on the war, when I talk about terrorism. My point here is: if we fail in Iraq, and it's not a military victory that's possible, but if we fail, there will be other insurgencies in other places, there will be spill-over. I think we're seeing a little bit of that already, and I worry that... I can't speak for Europeans, I can't speak for NATO, but speaking for Americans and I think for the Iraqis that I know, there is not patience. And yet insurgencies takes a long time to defeat. If you think about Malaya, the Philippines, Ireland as I watched on CNN the other night and what, these took ten, twenty, a long time commitment- and I don't... I worry that we don't have the patience for that. The other thing is depending how you approach this. A military solution is not the best because it does not produce the kind of cooperation that leads to conflict resolution. It does tend to produce more... it stiffens the opposition and tends to breed... provide breeding ground for more resistance to... than it does, I think, to cooperation. So we have a problem. We need a political solution helped by the military and helped by building indigenous forces-political and military-and dealing with root causes but I don't think we... those are issues we need to get in here. My second is the War on the Terrorism. What lesson should we draw from what happened on 9/11 in the United States, what happened the 3/11-the attacks of Madrid-what happened in London last week? And here I will weave together the consequences: if we fail in Iraq and if we fail in Afghanistan, if we fail on the War on Terrorism, there will be more Londons, more Madrids, more Twin Towers because this is a phenomenon that doesn't know borders or limitations. Iraq has become what it was not before the war: it is a safe haven. It is a training ground. You can get much better training at fighting than you can in Afghanistan. So, Iraq is providing that training ground from which one can then go on to other places. I'm not talking about an Al-Qaeda. You know, this is not World War... you know, this is not the Cold War with... it's not even the Vietnam War. You're not dealing with one single coherent movement. You're dealing with a horizontal-not a vertical-set of structures that are able to plan, do work freely, and there are linkages as well. But if we fail in that, we will simply see more of the same in more places. What are the strategic implications of a nuclear armed Iran-and here's one of the places where I think we've seen more success. Yes, I know, it's the EU that is negotiating this but it's an EU - NATO. I'm not so sure that Iran-or many other regions distinguish very much EU from NATO in terms of totally separate organizations movements. Worst than that, Iran sees that the United States is behind everything, of course, NATO is doing-we have orchestrated, written the menus. We're just not in the room that they would like us... I think prefer us in the room. My point is, again, I've been in negotiations and discussions between the Iranians, think tanks and counterparts who work on these issues, and they're stunned by the fact that the European Union or the European countries have not supported them. After all, aren't they just like you? If France could be trusted with nuclear weapons, why can't Iran? And that's not saying we... they want nuclear weapons. Of course, you'll never hear an Iranian really admit that, but the point is this: they see a sell-out by the Europeans, the United States, so that we can overcome the differences we have on Iraq and they are stunned when they are told not only do the United States and the EU stand together on Iran not crossing that threshold to acquire nuclear weapons. It's not a personal thing, Iran but if you do, then... our... any non- or counter-proliferation regime is finished, NPT/ IAEA, all of those good things... How will you monitor in the future when one more country has slipped through. It will simply be a sign to others who had foresworn these weapons, these systems, that they can come back to them. So, my point here is I think here is an instance where cooperation, the United States working with EU partners, and NATO is present in all of this, has worked to catch the Iranians' intention and make them think twice. And I don't think that there is a decision on where they will go. Now there are a lot of other issues that could spill over, especially in terms of the Mediterranean Partnership. We don't need to go into them here but I think we need to think about instability, whether it's Islamist or nationalist or whatever, it's not just in Syria. What happens if Turkey ultimately gets into a club that dissolves at the same time that it lets it in? What if we fail in terms of the peace process or all the other different alliances, the military-dominated politics in this region. I have heard some of the countries in the region say: we welcome NATO in because we want our governments to see what it's like to deal with a system where the military comes under civilian authority. I don't think it's going to happen... One of the people saying that was Turkish but nevertheless, there are some issues. I'm not... My time is going but let me move on. I've always worried about one other thing which is what I call the dialogue of the def, that I think we have had different approaches. It used to be that it was containment vs. critical dialogue, neither one of which got us anywhere. Containment did in a sense against Iraq because there was unity. It was under UN sanction, UN legislation. But I worry sometimes that we are talking passed each other. I would like to think as our speakers said early this morning that that may be over. Now, if we fail, if we fail, we will open ourselves to manipulation, I think, to be played off one against the other and that would benefit no one. Well, I've covered several issues and I think that... Let me just use one example as to how this... whether there are some pitfalls and problems. And that comes back, in the end comes to Iraq. You think you can walk away from it but trust me, after thirty years, you can't, at least I can't. NATO in Iraq has been given as an example for so many kinds of cooperation and yet, I think it's still... it's obviously a work in progress. The NATO effort there has been very small but very welcome. Now, I wanted to do this in the context of what some of the problems could be as well because there has always been conditionality. I don't know much about the Istanbul Agreement but I do know that it looked at the Iraq issue and it said that there were three conditions for NATO support and effort towards Iraq. And again, this isn't the backdrop of NATO and I don't know that NATO military or militaries think much differently from the American military -which is that we don't do no nation-building, to quote a political phrase in the last election. We don't do nation-building. Yes, militaries do. This is not the 19th Century of grand strategies, it seems to me, and massive wars, and modern technology is nice but you're fighting against an asymmetric threat, to a great extent, and that is the threat for the foreseeable future: the armies of the terrorists. So in terms of looking at Iraq and what this might mean, the Istanbul Accord-or it may be just a... general in NATO-three requirements for engagements. One was the UN Security Council Resolution, the second a request from the Iraqi government for military support, and the third was unanimous consent within NATO. Now all of these three conditions have been met. There is a UN Security Council Resolution, 1546. There is an Iraqi request: the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Ayad Allawi spoke to the UN, he was the head of the last provisional government. But I think that this is a consistent position regardless of which provisional government is there. There is the Istanbul Declaration which was a pledge of support by the 26 members to help Iraq to train its security forces, quote-unquote, "as a matter of urgency". Now having said that, "as a matter or urgency", what do we have. I don't know if the statistics are up to date, but my understanding is the current status of NATO Forces in Iraq was something like 85 personnel in Baghdad-does that still sound right?-516 Iraqi officers trained so far, 126 in NATO training in Europe, education and training. It's small but it's a beginning. But my point would be this. What I think I worry about and I think it's, if there's a worry about the consistency of the United States to stay the course, and that's what you hear from Iraqis: are you going to stay the course? They are not saying: we want you out tomorrow or else. The government has not settled on a timeline and knows that in part, that's self-defeating. But my point would simply be this as I conclude: it seems to be that there are a couple of issues: political support, consensus, money and people, all of which will affect NATO, NATO's ability to have an impact in this critical region as was Iraq. NATO is dependent on political support for funding and personnel. Funding seems to be something like what we call at home the Jerry Lewis TV Marathon on Labour Day Weekend, where he spends two days on television-or used to-raising money for muscular dystrophy It's funding for these efforts like that. Personnel issues: many countries limit the personnel, can only serve in certain places for a certain period of time, on certain kinds of missions. I don't think you can run a military campaign, be it fighting or education, whatever, with those kinds of limitations. And again, merging political statements with political will. Statements are great. We will help in Iraq. We will help in Iran with earthquake. We will help in Afghanistan. And where's the cheque? Where's the money? It hasn't come yet. So that I think that a lot of nice consensus or political statements but it's overshadowed by posturing and an inability or failure to deliver. So, I think I have used up my time. Let me conclude with this question or issue: what price... what if we fail? Well, whether we succeed or fail is going to have a cost. Which will be the higher cost? It may seem that success will be more expensive than failure. I don't think so. I would rather throw money at this than lives and see more events... than see more events like what happened in New York or Madrid. And I would just... and with this note, what should be NATO's... Be careful what you ask for. NATO will be very welcome. The United States has been welcome in many ways. I know there's a lot of criticism of a lot of... there's issues; I'm not proud of what has been done in a lot of... a lot of cases, but I am proud of some other things that have been done, as are, I think, Iraqis. But the region has a very long memory. Americans don't. To us, history is what happened, what, last week? But, I'll just remind you... something which happened in 2003 when the Mongolians came as part of the International Security Force to Baghdad, they were welcome for their return, their second coming to Iraq. They had first been there in 1258. So I think that for... what does this mean for NATO? Quite seriously, Europe, NATO, has a certain...