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Updated: 11-Jul-2005 NATO Speeches

Residence
Palace
Brussels

11 July 2005

Keynote Speech

by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the WIIS Conference, Brussels, 11 July 2005

Event
11/07/2005
NATO: New Tasks and Responsibilities

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to be here this morning, and I want to express my sincere thanks to “Women in International Security” and NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division for organising this event. It is the first cooperation between WIIS and NATO. And it demonstrates that security is clearly no longer a male-dominated profession. Because the issue is not gender, but talent. An Alliance as active as NATO needs the support by the best and the brightest of our strategic community.

Just a few weeks ago, NATO entered a new phase in its evolution. We agreed to help the African Union to expand its peacekeeping mission in the Sudanese province of Darfur. The Alliance will airlift additional African Union peacekeepers into this crisis-stricken region, and it will also assist with training and planning.

NATO’s decision demonstrates that we do not turn a blind eye to a continent that has already seen far too much suffering. I have always been convinced that, if called upon to assist, the 26 NATO Allies would be ready.

But NATO’s support for Darfur not only shows our willingness to live up to our moral obligations. It is also a demonstration of the changing transatlantic security agenda. Simply put, we must find ways to cope with the darker side of globalisation.

Terrorism is perhaps the most obvious example as we have again witnessed last Thursday with the barbaric attacks in London. Terrorism has mutated from a national problem of law enforcement into a threat to international security and stability. But there is more. Failed states now produce spill over effects – from drugs to terrorism – that affect all our societies directly. And the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction makes the use of such weapons against our countries much more likely than it was during the Cold War.

In such a volatile security environment, cooperation is our only option. Indeed, in the years ahead, we will see the need for transatlantic coordination and cooperation increase even further, and on an ever wider range of issues. And not only will Europe and North America have to intensify their cooperation; we will also have to work together more and more closely with other players in other parts of the world.

In managing transatlantic security cooperation, NATO remains key. It is the only permanent structure where Europe and North America can shape a common approach to the new security challenges. And it is the only forum where political decisions can be seamlessly translated into effective transatlantic military action.

It is this unique symbiosis between political consensus-building and military competence that explains why NATO is so busy. The Alliance has long ceased to be a “single issue” institution, geared exclusively towards deterring an overwhelming threat. Instead, NATO has become a much more flexible and versatile institution, delivering security in many different ways, and in many different places.

In my remarks this morning, I want to provide you with an overview of the most pressing tasks we are facing. So let me share with you our “to do” list – the agenda of an Alliance that is very much in demand.

Une des tâches les plus importantes pour l’avenir est de poursuivre l’extension de notre présence en Afghanistan. Nous devons aider le président Karzaï à relever trois défis de taille : construire un état démocratique, s’attaquer au problème des stupéfiants et veiller à ce que l’Afghanistan ne redevienne jamais un sanctuaire pour les terroristes.

À l’automne dernier, l’OTAN a contribué à permettre la tenue des toutes premières élections présidentielles organisées en Afghanistan. La participation au scrutin a été de 80%, ce qui est en soi un taux impressionnant. Mais j’ai trouvé particulièrement encourageant que 40% de ces électeurs aient été des femmes. Y a-t-il plus belle preuve de la volonté farouche de toutes ces femmes et de tous ces hommes d’avoir leur mot à dire au sujet de leur propre avenir ? Existe-t-il meilleur argument pour nous inciter à augmenter encore le nombre d’équipes de reconstruction provinciale et à mettre en place l’environnement de sécurité qui permettra à tous les citoyens d’Afghanistan de trouver la place qui leur revient dans la société? N’est-ce pas là pour nous la meilleure raison de tout mettre en oeuvre afin que les élections législatives de septembre prochain soient aussi un succès ?

Un autre défi majeur est de maintenir notre engagement à l’égard du Kosovo. Ce pays traverse une période déterminante pour son avenir, et c’est pourquoi nous devons rester pleinement engagés : militairement, dans le cadre de la KFOR, plus grande opération militaire jamais menée par l’OTAN, et aussi politiquement, grâce au travail du Groupe de contact et au soutien que nous apportons au processus d'application des normes.

Il va de soi que l’attention que nous accordons au Kosovo ne signifie pas que nous négligeons pour autant le reste des Balkans. Nous coopérons étroitement avec l’Albanie, la Croatie et l'ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine1 dans le cadre du Plan d'action pour l'adhésion. Nous conservons l’espoir d’un renforcement marqué de la coopération avec la Bosnie-Herzégovine et la Serbie-Monténégro, pour autant que ces pays respectent certaines conditions, notamment une pleine coopération avec le Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie de La Haye.

L’Iraq est un autre enjeu majeur de notre agenda. Tout comme en Afghanistan, les élections de février dernier en Iraq ont apporté une démonstration éclatante de l’aspiration de la population à une existence meilleure et plus sûre. Bien évidemment, il faudra du temps pour mettre en place des institutions solides et efficaces en Iraq, pour asseoir la notion d’état de droit et pour encourager le progrès économique. Tous ces efforts dépendront essentiellement de la capacité des autorités iraquiennes d’assurer à leur population un niveau de sécurité minimum. L’OTAN reste déterminée à aider les autorités iraquiennes à relever ce défi, notamment dans le cadre de notre mission de formation. Celle-ci devrait permettre chaque année à un millier de membres de haut niveau des forces de sécurité de suivre un entraînement.

Another challenge is to bring Ukraine closer to Euro-Atlantic structures. What happened in Ukraine last December was the proverbial “acceleration of history”. The courage and determination shown by the Ukrainian people has earned them worldwide respect and goodwill. And, as I could see firsthand during my recent visit to Kyiv, it has given new momentum to Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions. How far and how fast these ambitions can be realised will be determined by Ukraine itself, not least by the progress in domestic reform. But it is clear that NATO will continue to assist Ukraine, as this country charts its way into the future.

We must also develop further our relationship with Russia. The opportunities are clearly there. Over the past years, we have intensified our cooperation in preventing, combating and managing the consequences of terrorism. Russia has offered practical support to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and more recently, to our anti-terrorist naval patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. We have also broadened our political dialogue – exchanging views on Iraq, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and other sensitive subjects. To be sure, we don’t always agree, but we work and talk together in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect. This is a relationship that still has a lot of untapped potential. During my recent meeting with President Putin in Moscow, I made it clear that NATO is keen to develop that potential.

We must also build new ties to our Partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Both are regions of considerable geopolitical importance. Both are regions that face daunting challenges of transition. And both are regions where NATO has a lot to offer. That’s why we have stepped up our cooperation with our Partners in these regions. We want to develop a partnership that is a real two-way street – for the benefit of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.

We must also develop our relations with countries across the Mediterranean and into the broader Middle Eastern region. No other region’s evolution could have a greater impact on transatlantic security. That’s why finding ways to influence positive developments in these regions has to be a joint transatlantic effort. NATO has taken up the challenge through a reinvigorated Mediterranean Dialogue with North African and Middle Eastern countries and a new cooperative outreach to the Gulf States. And we are pleased to see that our efforts in that part of the world have met with a lot of interest and eagerness to jointly start a new partnership.

Another task ahead of us is to deepen the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. The transatlantic community must come to terms with the reality of the European Union as a genuine security actor. The EU may be the “new kid on the block” of security institutions, but it needs to be recognised. That’s why NATO and the EU need to build a closer relationship. We have already had two significant successes in developing our cooperation. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU took over from NATO the responsibility to keep the peace. But as Darfur demonstrates, NATO and the EU should aim further. Our goal must be to consult and coordinate our approaches to all central security problems of our age: terrorism, failed states, humanitarian disasters, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

We must also develop a more structured relationship between NATO and the United Nations beyond our excellent cooperation in the different theatres. I intend to go in September to New York to do just that.

We must continue NATO’s military transformation. Today, no country can afford to maintain forces just for national territorial defence. Each NATO member must be able to make a contribution to the full spectrum of operations. What we need, therefore, are forces that can react quickly, that can be deployed over strategic distance, and then sustained over a long period of time. And we need a better mix of forces that are capable of performing both high intensity combat tasks and post-conflict reconstruction work.

Within NATO, we have made good progress in developing such capabilities. We have streamlined our military structure and created a strategic command specifically devoted to operations. The NATO Response Force will enable us to react to new challenges even more quickly. We are taking a hard look at our force planning and force generation procedures. And we have created a strategic command dealing exclusively with transformation, which will help us ensure sure that future missions can be better planned, equipped, and paid for.

But we have also looked beyond mere capabilities. For example, NATO has adopted a comprehensive policy to contribute to international efforts to combat the trafficking in human beings. And we are working closely with our Partner countries and other organisations to combat this scourge.

Finally, we must strengthen NATO’s political dimension. For a long time, and quite rightfully, we have focused our transformation efforts on becoming more capable militarily. This focus must be maintained. After all, military competence is what distinguishes NATO from many other multilateral frameworks. However, all these transformed military capabilities will be worthless if Allies don’t agree on whether or how to use them. That’s why our military transformation must be complemented by a political one. Simply put, we must use NATO not only as a mechanism for military planning, but also as a forum for political debate.

Today, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed states pose new challenges. New security players, such as the EU, are finding their role. Other parts of the world are growing in relevance. We must adapt deterrence and established non-proliferation regimes to the new circumstances. And we must discuss new approaches to the Caucasus, the broader Middle East, and other regions.

In the face of such enormous challenges, how could we avoid debate – and more importantly, why would we? We should welcome debate, not fear it. Because it will ultimately strengthen our political cohesion, reinforce our operational effectiveness, and enhance our credibility in the eyes of our publics.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

What I have presented here today is what you might call “a full plate”. Today, NATO is pursuing an ambitious agenda that ranges from peacekeeping in Kosovo to fostering defence reform in Ukraine, and from training security forces in Iraq to providing security for the upcoming Afghan elections.

Let there be no illusions: this agenda is as difficult politically as it is challenging in military terms. But if we are able to maintain the spirit of transatlantic cooperation that is our hallmark, we can succeed. As long as Europe and North America understand that their partnership is unique – and precious – this Alliance will continue to project security and stability in new ways and in new places.

Thank you.

  1. La Turquie reconnaît la République de Macédoine sous son nom constitutionnel.

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