Åre, Sweden 25 May 2005

EAPC Security Forum Panel 2 “NATO and its other Partnerships” This transcript was published as received Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo (Chair, Deputy Secretary General, NATO): I think we should start our session. So the title of this session is: NATO and its Other Partnerships. So ladies and gentlemen I would just like to introduce this by saying that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace are widely regarded as the "flagships" of NATO's cooperation programs and given the depth of cooperation that we have achieved within these frameworks, and their wide geographic reach, this is no surprise. But the EAPC and the PfP are not the only partnership frameworks that NATO has developed. There is more as NATO has also extended partnership beyond Euro-Atlantic area. The logic is clear: today's security threats know no boundaries and that is why we need to seek partners beyond the Euro-Atlantic area as well. The launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue ten years ago was NATO's first step towards a new relationship with our neighbours in Northern Africa and the Middle East. This was a natural step to establish a dialogue with countries which are so relevant to our security and which are developing fast. This interest has only grown over the years and I state the obvious when I say that all of us have an enormous interest in improving our relations with these nations. Since its inception, the Mediterranean Dialogue has steadily gained in substance, and we are now turning it into a genuine partnership framework that will help us all to address common security challenges. Our first ministerial meeting last December has shown the interest of our partners to take a real ownership of this process. Let me stress also that NATO's outreach to these countries is not duplicative of those undertaken by other international organizations and institutions. NATO's dialogue focuses, and I would like to repeat once again, on foreign policy, security and defence. Last year we added a further dimension to our partnership policy. Through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, we seek to engage countries in the Gulf region in a new framework of cooperation and I believe this is a very timely initiative as the region is extremely important from a strategic point of view and it's also exposed to significant security risks. And again, NATO can help address this institution's… and these questions, without duplicating the work of others. As someone who is very closely involved personally in the implementation of the Istanbul Initiative, I am optimistic about the potential of this initiative. Already three countries, which is to say Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, have formally joined this program. And by the way I myself have traveled to about 14 countries of the region. We also try to liaise with those countries; reach out to them; developing a new strategy, which is to say engaging them beforehand, an accusation that we have received in the past (inaudible) NATO like other European or Western institutions who are promoting initiatives in the region without proper consultation. And so we try very carefully to avoid that and before the Istanbul Summit, I personally and other personnel of NATO travelled to all the countries of the region to make sure that this initiative was of their liking and to get their views before launching it formally by our heads of state and government. I also would like to remember that what comes out of the experience we have with those countries looks like NATO has a very good membership. The membership of NATO seems to be very apt to reach out to this group of very important countries because it links together North America and Europe in a way which is probably very effective and it's liked very much by recipients of the initiative. Last, but not least, let me also add that NATO has developed relations with individual countries from very different corners of the world including Australia, New Zealand and Japan. These are countries who share the same strategic concerns as NATO and who have manifested interest in closer cooperation with us over the years. The rationale of cooperating with them is simple and it is to say that it is only natural that likeminded nations should work together to address common concerns. So now coming to the end of this introduction, what is the future of NATO's partnerships? What are the lessons that we have learned so far and where can we do better? And to help us answer these very important, very fundamental questions, we have put together a very distinguished panel that is almost as diverse as NATO's partner and contact countries I just mentioned before. So let me introduce the members of this panel and the discussants. First, on my right, Mrs. Magda Vášáryová, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia. She has been Ambassador to Austria and Poland, as well as the President of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association. She will be the first speaker. We are also pleased to have with us, my left, Ambassador Halim Benattallah from Algeria, a good friend. Algeria is the most recent member of the Mediterranean Dialogue, but is certainly one of the most active members and is clearly coming out every month, every year, with new ideas and we are very encouraged at having you here and I thank you very much Ambassador. Ambassador Benattallah is a key individual behind Algeria's active approach. Our last panellist, last but not least I would like to add, is my good friend Dr. Stephen Larrabee from the RAND Cooperation who most of you know I suspect. Dr. Larrabee is a known on everything related to NATO, an intellectual architect of NATO's post-Cold War transformation, and a well-known… caller…commentator (I don't know English well enough to find the right word for that) on Middle Eastern issues. Dr. Larrabee has also written several major works related to the Mediterranean, including on NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. The three of you have about 10 minutes for your remarks if you like so. Then I have Mr. Thomas Valasek, Director of the Brussels Bureau of the Center for Defence Information. He will be our first discussant. He is a renowned security expert specializing in European defence issues. His numerous publications have made him a sought-after contributor to the transatlantic strategic debate. So we are very happy to have you here today. Next, I have Mr. Carroll, the Director of Programs of the Club of Madrid. He has not only extensive working experience on Capitol Hill, but he has also worked a lot on Middle Eastern issues, notably at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. And I would like the two discussants to limit their comments to about five minutes each if you can and then I will then open the floor for what I hope will be a lively discussion. So with this I give you the floor. We are very eager to hear your comments. Magda Vášáryová (State Secretary, Slovakia): Thank you Mr. Deputy Secretary General. This is not a very nice role for a lady to start, but anyway - MINUTO-RIZZO: (Laughs) VÁŠÁRYOVÁ: Allow me to start by thanking our host, Sweden, for providing such an interesting venue with sun shining through whole of the day for the EAPC Security Forum. I firmly believe that this new format will gain its stable place in the EAPC diary. I personally have chosen this panel because it is particularly close to my heart and to the heart of my citizenship. Since the end of the Cold War, I and many of us witnessed how the cooperation with European and transatlantic structures can help an emerging democracy like Slovakia was, to fully grow up. I have also seen personally how the new European democracies themselves have risen to significance by helping to widen the zone of democracy, freedom and stability in our Central European region. NATO's success has been always based on an active, participative solidarity - willingness to accept risks and tackle challenges together. Recent developments manifest the global nature of current and future security threats. We have to confront these threats accordingly - that's why the NATO's cooperation with its partners is of growing importance. That's why the drive for an enhanced political dialogue within the Alliance is fully extendable also to the EAPC. Slovakia is one of those nations that gathered a close and beneficiary experience with her participation in the Partnership for Peace and this was not long ago. We have it in a good memory. And Slovakia has gone through the demanding reforms during these last seven years. This has helped us to qualify for the membership in the clubs of most developed democratic countries. EAPC, PfP, MAP and bilateral assistance have created a valuable framework for our planning and defence reform implementation. And we know that now it's a payback time and we are willing and ready to share our experiences gained in the process of preparation for NATO membership, especially in the field of development of strategic security policy documents, adaptation of internal structures for cooperation with NATO, defence reform implementation, public relations, public policy and regional co-operation etc. etc. In response to the changing international environment Alliance is putting special impetus on engaging with partners in the strategically important regions of Caucasus and Central Asia. Therefore, NATO refocuses existing resources toward these regions to enhance stability across the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting necessary reforms. Sadly also recent developments in Central Asia displayed that respect for democratic values has not been firmly anchored in all partner nations there. Partnership has to be a two-way street. We urge the Uzbek authorities to allow an independent international investigation of reported use of excessive and disproportionate force by the security forces. Partners are expected to stand by their commitments to universal democratic values. We shouldn't forget that current global security threats are objectively shifting the boundaries of NATO's operation out of the area as the importance of engagement of our Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative partners is increasing. If we are looking to the future, and consider how best the Partnership for Peace can adapt to meet the new challenges that we face together, we can see new opportunities for improvement of our partners' interoperability and strengthening of the political dialogue. We welcome the intention of NATO to seek the possible involvement by troop contributing nations in the decision-shaping process. Both NATO and partners have an interest of improved consultations. NATO's decision to open selected NATO exercises to interested partners was an important step. We also welcome an intensified effort to implement the Partnership Action Plan against terrorism. We are convinced that NATO should continue - through Partnership for Peace - to support partners who wish to join the Alliance, consistent with the Open Door Policy enshrined in the Washington treaty and the PfP Invitation Document. The road of Ukraine to NATO will no doubt prove that the partnership could be put to use in this regard. Last but not least, a couple of words on the Western Balkans which is one of the priorities of the Slovak foreign policy in the partnerships context. With the benefit of the hindsight I feel that the approach of the international community vis-à-vis this region could have been more creative; let's say more generous. For one, this region which remains critically important for the stability of the whole European continent offers a unique opportunity to bring to life, to test a concept of strategic partnership between NATO and EU. I do think the potential of this concept is still waiting to be used in its fullness. And secondly, making use of such an open-minded character of this forum, I could imagine that when at some future stage looking back and taking lessons-learned, we might come to the conclusion that the Alliance and the case of regional stability would have been better served with Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina as already members of a Partnership of Peace. To sum up Mr. Deputy, I welcome the ambitious approach to the future of the Partnership for Peace taken at the Prague and Istanbul summits and further elaborated at the EAPC ministerial meeting in December. We will need that level of ambition in order to meet the tasks ahead. We have made good use of the first ten years of the PfP also in the Slovak Republic. I am sure we will continue this trend in the decades to come. Thank you very much. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you very much (inaudible). It's very (inaudible) to hear your remarks. (Inaudible)... Halim Benattallah (Ambassador of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria to Belgium): Merci monsieur le Secrétaire Général adjoint, Mesdames et Messieurs. Je suis particulièrement honoré d'avoir été invité à participer à ce forum sur la sécurité du Conseil de coopération nord-atlantique. C'est le signe que le Dialogue Méditerranéen a acquis un rôle beaucoup plus en rapport avec les enjeux de stabilité et de sécurité au sein de l'Alliance. Dans cette optique, les pas en avant accomplis ces derniers mois sont probants. Aussi, je tenterai d'apporter un éclairage en centrant mes propos sur trois thèmes. Le premier concerne le processus d'appropriation du Dialogue Méditerranéen; le second portera sur le début de mise en oeuvre de l'offre de partenariat d'Istanbul; et le troisième, la question cruciale des perceptions mutuelles. Sur le processus d'appropriation du Dialogue Méditerranéen il faudrait dire qu'avant le Sommet d'Istanbul, et pendant que ce Dialogue était l'objet de questionnements au sein de l'Alliance, dans les pays du DM et en tout cas en Algérie, le débat sur le renforcement ou non de celui-ci s'est focalisé sur l'alternative suivante: Faut-il se prononcer sur le statut quo ou accepter d'aller de l'avant, c'est à dire vers un partenariat qui resterait à configurer? La première option indiquait chez nous un souci de prudence politique et militaire. Politique par rapport à l'état de compréhension par la société politique- de la nature de la relation avec l'OTAN. Militaire parce que l'engagement- parce que sortant d'une décennie de lutte contre le terrorisme, l'engagement dans cette direction suggérait une rapide assimilation d'objectifs politiques nouveaux et une adaptation à de nouvelles méthodes et procédures de coopération multilatérales. Quant à la deuxième option, c'est-à-dire aller de l'avant et répondre positivement à l'offre d'Istanbul, elle répondait au besoin de sécurité interne et régionale dans un contexte national post-terrorisme. Ce contexte ne signifiant pas pour autant que le terrorisme, résiduel qu'il soit chez nous, ait lâché prise et qu'il ne soit pas en train de se redéployer en faisant la jonction avec la criminalité organisée qui a elle-même grandi à l'ombre du terrorisme particulièrement dans d'immense no man's land sahélien. Et dans la mesure où la coopération internationale, particulièrement avec l'OTAN, pourrait contribuer à y faire face, à contribuer à la mise à niveau des forces armées de sorte de concourir à la sécurité dans la région méditerranéenne, les vecteurs de coopération offert par le Dialogue Méditerranéen mais également par des initiatives- les deux initiatives américaines sur le Sahel sont venues à point nommé. Ce pourquoi, nous avons été partisans de l'idée de tirer le Dialogue Méditerranéen par le haut, car la démultiplication des contacts qu'elle allait entraîner aux plans politique et militaire serait la clé d'une relation devant être acceptée en un terme comme une relation désormais ordinaire, intégrée dans les programmes militaires et non susceptibles de rouvrir des questionnements existentiels. La ligne arrêtée est que tout en restant ouvert au programme de coopération dans un objectif d'interopérabilité il y a encore fort à faire en vue d'envisager une participation des opérations de maintien de la paix et de gestion de crise, la priorité restant à l'éradication du terrorisme et la mise en condition des forces à travers les programmes d'entraînement qui vont être développés. Par conséquent, en ce qui nous concerne, la gamme des options se situe en deçà de ce plafond et qui vont dans le sens de la mise en oeuvre de la déclaration du Sommet d'Istanbul constitue autant de domaines de coopération priorisés dans le cadre d'une feuille de route bilatérale, individualisée, articulée sur les besoins nationaux. L'acceptation de désigner un officier pour intégrer la cellule de coordination et de planification du partenariat pour la paix que nous venons de notifier participe précisément de cette démarche. Dans la formulation de cette approche et l'acceptation de l'offre de partenariat du Sommet d'Istanbul, deux facteurs ont joué un rôle essentiel. Les jeux des consultations préalables comme l'a mentionné- comme cela a été mentionné à Bruxelles avec des pays membres de l'Alliance et officielles dans les capitales- dans nos propres capitales en préparation du Sommet d'Istanbul. Ces consultations précisément, grandement contribuent à consolider les bases du consensus interne et à donner à ce Dialogue Méditerranéen en Algérie la transparence. D'autre part, le découplage du volet méditerranéen, de l'initiative de coopération d'Istanbul, en respect des spécificités régionales et en considération du degré d'avancement du DM par rapport à cette initiative. Sur le deuxième thème, la mise en oeuvre de la déclaration du Sommet d'Istanbul, les commentaires nécessairement partiels à ce stade pourraient être apportés. D'abord sur la dimension politique, le Sommet a émis quelques recommandations qui mériteraient un suivi avec pertinence. La première c'est d'abord consiste... consistant à renouer avec la pratique des conférences du DM au niveau des ambassadeurs. Ainsi celle qui s'est tenue au collège de Rome, avant le Sommet d'Istanbul pour débattre l'initiative sur le Grand et Moyen-Orient a été fort utile. Dans ce même format, on pourrait penser à mettre en présence des pays du Partenariat pour la Paix avec les pays du Dialogue Méditerranéen pour un partage d'expériences notamment sur les notions d'interopérabilité de réforme de la défense. Celle ensuite se rapportant au dialogue bilatéral de haut-niveau. Dans le cas d'une manifestation d'intérêt de l'Alliance, l'Algérie serait disposée à aller dans ce sens. Pour ce qui est de tirer partie de la coopération, deux idées énoncées dans le communiqué d'Istanbul mériteraient d'être soulignées. La première, en droite ligne avec les visites effectuées par le secrétaire général dans nos capitales et la première rencontre ministérielle qui s'est tenue à Bruxelles au mois de décembre dernier, il serait utile, je pense, d'entretenir ce momentum politique. Je pense qu'une rencontre annuelle visant à encadrer le Dialogue pourrait s'avérer appropriée car un certain niveau d'interopérabilité politique est toujours utile. En effet, autant la coopération militaire s'est enrichie de la mise en place d'outils propres au PfP comme des réunions, deux fois par an, des chefs d'États-Majors ainsi que deux multilatérales d'experts, toujours en plan militaire, deux fois par an, autant la mise en oeuvre du principe de la primauté du politique semble marquer le pas. Deuxièmement- deuxième chose, dans le cas du CPEA et du PfP, une action à entreprendre consisterait aussi à mettre en présence les pays du DM avec les pays du PfP au cas par cas. Peut-être que les pays du DM pourraient assister en observateurs au niveau d'ambassadeur aux réunions du CPEA. Sur la dimension renforcement de la complémentarité avec le processus de Barcelone, le Conseil Atlantique a décidé en juin 2002, l'organisation d'un échange d'informations. En notre qualité de partie prenante à ce processus et pour autant que l'OTAN le souhaiterait, un échange d'information pourrait s'établir sur le sujet- sur le sujet des consultations sur le terrorisme qui ont démarré au plan bilatéral avec l'Union européenne. Si les consultations que nous avons avec l'Union européenne sont sensiblement différentes que celles qui ont commencé avec l'OTAN(?) et peut-être qu'elle mériterait un échange d'information. Sur le volet militaire, la coopération est en train de passer à la vitesse supérieure. La dernière revue de la coopération indique une très nette augmentation en volume des activités, y compris les activités de PfP ouverte aux pays du DM. Il reste, bien entendu, que les besoins ainsi que les capacités d'absorption sont différenciées d'un pays à l'autre. Aussi, bien que les procédures de finalisation ne sont pas encore en place au sujet de notre participation à l'Opération Endeavour, une première intervention des Forces navales algériennes a eu lieu le 9 février dernier. De même, à la deuxième réunion des chefs d'États-Major des pays de l'Alliance du DM, le 10 mai dernier, nous avons suggéré de réfléchir à l'extension de cette opération à la surveillance des frontières terrestres. Un séminaire pourrait peut-être y être consacré pour en examiner la viabilité. Enfin, les consultations dans le domaine du renseignement ont démarré au niveau d'experts. Elles sont, pour l'instant, à chercher leur marque au forum multilatérale. Mener bilatéralement et dans les capitales elles sont sans doute plus productives. Dernier... dernier thème s'agissant de...de notre environnement politique, le tableau global relatif au dernier développement dans le cas du DM doit cependant être connecté précisément à notre environnement- à l'environnement dans lequel nous évoluons. Celui-ci conditionne dans une certaine mesure, le degré de coopération dans le cas du DM. Ainsi, depuis l'impulsion donnée au Sommet d'Istanbul on peut faire les constats suivants, certains concours assurent consolidation, d'autres pourraient créer une situation de porte à faux dans les pays du DM. Sur les facteurs concourrant à sa consolidation, deux en particulier mériteraient d'être soulignés. Il s'agit des progrès dans la construction démocratique dans les trois pays du Maghreb comme facteurs de stabilité. Et en second lieu on note depuis que le Dialogue Méditerranéen a démarré une amélioration de la confiance dans la sous-région du Maghreb. Quant à la situation de porte à faux dans laquelle peuvent se trouver les pays partenaires du DM, celle-ci est liée à l'image véhiculée sur les pays arabes et musulmans comme sources d'insécurité potentielle. Les déclarations entendues en relation avec l'ouverture en lieu de négociation avec la Turquie évoquant le "péril musulman" ont d'ailleurs marqué les consciences. Ceci ne signifiant pas que nombres de pays arabes doivent s'exonérer du devoir démocratique sous prétexte de lutte contre le terrorisme ou de sentiment d'hostilité supposé à leur égard bien que ce sentiment ait été alimenté ces derniers temps par certains... par certains faits. Il est néanmoins important que la greffe démocratique en Irak puisse produire des effets attendus et améliorer les perceptions mutuelles. La sécurité et la stabilité possible de la Méditerranée pourraient se jouer, aussi, en Irak et en Palestine où les forces laïques sont en train d'être supplantées par l'extrémisme religieux qui a tendance à devenir une valeur refuge. La question va être donc de s'avoir si celui-ci sera soluble dans un système démocratique ou si les partis religieux de plus en plus extrémistes vont prendre le contrôle pour prendre en otage les États dans la région. M. le secrétaire général, de nouveaux défis de sécurité se dessinent donc pour l'Alliance et ses partenaires en Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient. Je vous remercie. MINUTO-RIZZO: Je vous remercie beaucoup cher ami pour vos remarques présentées à ce forum et surtout advenant de quelqu'un qui est impliqué directement - c'est vraiment l'autre partie de notre dialogue. On pourrait (inaudible) c'est vraiment très, très important pour nous et c'est apprécié. Merci beaucoup. I turn now to Stephen Larrabee to see what's the view across the ocean from Rand (inaudible)... you started I think your first book on the military in '95, '96? You have a lot experience to get you here. Stephen Larrabee (Rand Corporation, United States): Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I'd like to focus my remarks on two major strategic issues which are likely in my view to affect NATO's future and its transformation. The first, which has already been touched upon, is how to deal with the broader Middle East and what NATO's role should be. Now in the past the Middle East was not a major priority for NATO. During the Cold War NATO's attention was largely focused on the central front in Europe. It's true that NATO did develop the Mediterranean Dialogue as both speakers have mentioned, beginning in 1994. But at that time the Mediterranean Dialogue was never really a priority for NATO; NATO's attention was focused in the mid-nineties on the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe - the first round of enlargement, as well as the war in the Balkans. The United States at the same time did not want at that point NATO and Europe particularly strongly involved in the Middle East. NATO was seen by most Europe members as a European alliance to defend members' territory against attack from outside, not to deal with problems in the Middle East. Thus there was kind of limited support for the Mediterranean Initiative, mostly coming from the Southern members of NATO. But I would submit that this period of neglect is now ending; that the Middle East is in fact becoming an increasingly focus of NATO's attention and activity and this is true for several reasons. First of all I would argue that the strategic context has changed dramatically since the mid-1990's. NATO's old agenda which I would call unification of Germany, partnership with Russia and stabilization of the Balkans and enlargement, is complete or nearly complete. It's not over, but it's nearly complete. Europe today is increasingly stable. The security challenges that NATO and its members face largely come from beyond Europe. There are new types of security challenges, particularly weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Most of these, as I say, come from beyond Europe; many of them in fact from the Middle East. Second I would argue, and this may be somewhat controversial, that NATO's Mediterranean Initiative in its original form no longer corresponded to the changes in the strategic environment and the new strategic challenges that NATO faces. It was a product essentially of the 1990's strategic environment focused on the Maghreb and the Mashrak, ordinary(?) as to be sure but it excluded other important areas, particularly the Gulf, which are becoming of greater strategic importance. Thirdly it focused on political dialogue and perceptions and did not deal very deeply with defence cooperation itself. And finally it did not deal with the new security challenges - weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Thirdly, in the meantime, the Middle East has become an important American priority, particularly since 9/11 and as a result the United States attitude has changed. Whereas in the 1990's it was reluctant to see NATO get involved in the Middle East, that attitude has changed. The United States now is focusing its own attention much more on the Middle East... wants to see NATO involved. And of course if NATO is already involved in the broader Middle East in the sense of being involved in Afghanistan and also in training in Iraq. And this has focused a new debate it seems to me on the Middle East in the way that was not true in the past. That was the reason that you had the kind of debate that you had last year in NATO leading up to the Istanbul Summit where you had, I would argue, two kind of approaches. One wanting to focus deep in the Mediterranean Dialogue and another arguing that the approach should be broadened. And in a way what Istanbul ended up doing, in my view, is it kind of compromised where NATO decided to do both - (inaudible) deep in the Mediterranean Dialogue and preserve its (inaudible) and at the same time also launch a new initiative - the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative - which focused particularly on deepening defence cooperation and interoperability with the countries of the Gulf. This initiative is just the ICI's... just in its infancy. NATO is in the process of consulting with the Gulf countries about their desires and interests, but it seems to me already there are a couple things that need to be said. And the first is that as the ICI develops, and this is true also for the Mediterranean Initiative dialogue as well, we need to develop both initiatives jointly with the partners and avoid any kind of made in Brussels approach. We need to give the partners a sense of owner... if it's going to... both initiatives are going to succeed, to give the partners a sense of ownership in these and I think this was somewhat of a problem at the beginning in the Mediterranean Dialogue, less so today. There are a number of open issues which still need to be addressed. One of the most sensitive I would argue what about Iran? Should Iran be included for instance in the ICI? It's obviously a member of... part of the Gulf. Is it better to isolate Iran or to engage it? That's the issue I think which NATO will have to wrestle with. Secondly, what role for the Palestinian Authority? Arafat's death has presented a number of new opportunities. How should NATO approach the Palestinian Authority? What should its role be there? Thirdly, terrorism. Should cooperation against terrorism be included on the agenda of the ICI and Mediterranean Initiative? This is obviously a sensitive issue. But on the other hand I would argue it can't be avoided. Thirdly... fourthly, what about PfP for the Middle East? Several members and observers have suggested that PfP should be applied to the Mediterranean and to the Middle East and that NATO should build on the success that PfP has had in Eastern Europe. But the social and economic and political conditions in the Middle East I would argue are quite different. In Eastern Europe, NATO had a very positive image. Most members wanted... most partners actually wanted to join NATO, whereas in the Middle East NATO's image is at best mixed, and in many cases negative. Most don't want membership and it's not really an option. Thus I would argue that PfP can't be transferred lock, stock and barrel to the Middle East, but some selected elements of it may in fact be relevant. Fifth issue really is one that was touched on by the Ambassador - the need to ensure complementarity. In developing both the ICI and the Mediterranean Initiative, NATO will need to co-ordinate closely with the European Union, the Barcelona Process. The European-Mediterranean Partnership is much broader than NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, but both have security components. And therefore it's important to avoid duplication and overlap. Finally the relationship to the Middle East peace process. The Mediterranean Initiative and the ICI and the Middle East peace process on the other hand are separate processes. But I would submit they in fact are indirectly linked. I think experience has shown that when the Middle East peace process is moribund or stalled, it's very difficult to get movement in other multilateral fora, particularly the Mediterranean Dialogue and it also is true for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Thus the ICI and the Mediterranean Initiative are unlikely to succeed without a stronger effort to promote the Middle East peace process. Now fortunately it seems to me there are new opportunities, particularly since Arafat's death, to revive the Middle East peace process. And the revival it seems to me is likely to have three consequences if it takes place. First it will make the development of a U.S.-European strategy towards the Middle East much easier. Arafat, rightly or wrongly, was seen by the Bush administration as part of the problem, not part of the solution. As long as he was in power, the administration was reluctant to engage strongly in the Middle East peace process. However with his death, new opportunities have arisen and in fact I think the United States now is ready to engage and shown itself ready to engage the Middle East peace process in a way that was not true before. Secondly, I think that the revival of peace process will open up new possibilities to revive the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI in a way that wasn't possible while it was stalled. Thirdly, and this is also very controversial but the Secretary General has alluded to it a number of times in speeches, the revival of the peace process does raise the issue of a possible NATO peacekeeping role after an Arab-Israeli settlement. Now we're far from that at this particular point and you first would need a settlement before you could even consider this, but it is an issue that I think NATO needs to begin thinking about now because it may in fact have to face this at a certain point in time. Finally the second major issue I'd like to deal with is how NATO is to deal with the Ukraine in what I would and what some observers have termed "The Third Wave of Democratization". Now the Orange Revolution in Ukraine I would submit has major strategic consequences for the West and for NATO in particular. The Orange Revolution does not represent simply a collapse of just another autocratic regime on Europe's periphery. Rather Ukraine is the lynchpin which Sherm Garnett once called the keystone in the arch of the former Soviet and Russian Empire. The Orange Revolution will have major consequences for developments in the Western CIS. It will make it much more difficult for Lukashenko in Belarus to avoid opening up. It's also likely to accelerate the process of change in Moldova, and indeed actually over the longer term, could have implications for internal developments in Russia itself. And for those reasons I would argue that in fact the Orange Revolution is likely to spark a new debate in the West and revive many of the old debates of the 1990's - that is to say how far can you extend Europe's frontiers? How far should NATO and the EU enlarge? Many of these issues were debated in the 1990's, but I think they're likely to come back before now. And the real issue I think facing the West is whether now needs to make a sort of second strategic leap to try to integrate Ukraine and the other countries in the CIS into broader Euro-Atlantic structures. This new strategic challenge however comes at a very delicate moment in Europe's evolution. The EU in particular has a very full plate with ratification of the EU Treaty, the digestion of ten new members, Turkish succession, negotiations, finally the integration of the Western Balkans. That is a major and very strong agenda and it's understandable that some countries are weary of a new round of enlargement. NATO itself is also facing similar dilemmas regarding enlargement, as well as the question of its transformation into the Middle East. The big difference I would argue with the 1990's is that the Eastern enlargement in the 1990's was in the 1990's essentially the Western project. There were differences perhaps between the United States and some allies on the timing and the pace, but not on the ultimate goal. Today the West, especially the United States, is engaged in another major project - that is democratization of the Middle East, which is likely to absorb an enormous amount of attention and resources of Western policy makers. The question is then - can the West pursue both agendas at the same time - that is democratization in the Middle East and opening up to the Third Wave of Democratization in the Western CIS? And I think the issue is not clear, but one would hope that in fact, I would argue strategically its necessary, to pursue both agendas at the same time. Thank you very much. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you very much (inaudible). Very interesting view. I mean you have put things in perspective (inaudible) looking at the future - Palestinians, peace process, etc. So now I turn to our discussants and I give the floor first to you Mr. Valasek. Please. Thomas Valasek (Director, Centre for Defence Information, Brussels): Thank you Mr. Ambassador. It is a job of a discussant to ask the hard questions. (Inaudible)... we'll have no foreign ministry or institution looking over our shoulder and that is exactly what I will try to do in my presentation. First Madame Secretary, you made a number of excellent points. I would like to pick up on two with your permission. One - I was particularly heartened to hear you speak of a payback time in the sense that the new member states do have a special responsibility for imparting the experience they have acquired in the course of the accession process on to today's partners. And it is a policy that I know Poland, Slovakia and others have put in practice in places like Ukraine and Western Balkans and that is one that I wanted to complement your foreign ministry and others on. That is the positive part of a message. There is a somewhat darker part... darker message that you have alluded to in your presentation, particularly with Uzbekistan. The fact that what the Uzbekistan example points out is that there is a limitation to using the old partnership model and its effectiveness when you venture out of the area of Central Europe. The truth is the closer we move into other... or rather the further we move away from the current enlargement zone, the bigger the challenges in dealing with the new partners become, and ironically the less effective NATO becomes in its ability to exercise influence vis-à-vis the new partner countries. And I think this is a question I would like to pose not just to the panellists, but also to the audience here today. How do we deal with the dilemma of the Alliance taking on ever bigger tasks, but in the process possibly losing the most effective tool that it has been able to yield in the past - which is the promise of membership? The fact is a lot of the new countries, a lot of the new partners, have no near to mid-term prospect of membership. And it was precisely the prospect of membership and the very desire to make it happen, to make it materialize, that has provided... proved to be a terribly effective incentive when it came to incorporating or democratizing the armed forces of Slovakia, of Romania, and others. So how do we reconcile the dilemma? How do we take on an ever-more ambitious agenda in the full knowledge that the range of tools that NATO yields is in some ways becoming less and less useful the further away we venture from the NATO's original area of operations? That is a question again that I would like to pose to all the panellists. One other question that is directed more or less directly at Dr. Larrabee concerns the nature of EU-NATO relationship. It is an issue that is not specifically and explicitly on the agenda of any of the panels at this security forum, but it is one that really hangs over all of our discussions. It is true that NATO has an absolutely indispensable expertise at its disposal. It possesses tools, whether it is in terms of its ability to democratize armed forced, to institute military reforms in partner countries that are absolutely, absolutely essential and crucial. The question is are they still unique? The fact is the more the European Union ventures into the security realm, the more it begins to walk and talk like NATO. And increasingly we see European Union, again, taking over the operations in Bosnia; just yesterday European Union has offered military aid to Sudan, which is I know an area... a sort of operation that NATO has been looking into very closely. So increasingly the work of the two organizations is beginning to mirror each other. The question before the Alliance is how can it continue reinventing itself to make sure that it remains on the cutting edge as a security provider? And I think the answer, certainly a part of the answer, lies in the contribution of the non-EU member states, particularly the largest ally of them all, the United States. U.S. involvement is after all what makes NATO NATO. It gives the Alliance a military prowess and a security expertise that is unrivalled. But the question is how relevant does NATO continue to be to Washington? Has the expertise of the greater/broader Middle East dialogue of 2004 been conducive to engaging Europe and European allies in NATO more or has it been somewhat of a discouragement? In other words, just to rephrase it and make it more relevant for today's discussion within NATO, is the United States ready to put some of the difficult questions such as the one you mentioned - Iran's potential membership in Istanbul - is it ready to put these difficult questions on NATO's agenda? Will we ever be able to live up to NATO's Secretary General's call for making the North Atlantic Council a platform, a forum, where we discuss some of the really hard questions in the full knowledge that we may not come to conclusions and we may not have a consensus of all 26 member states. And last question is very specific and I think I will pose it to Madame State Secretary with your permission. Again, taking from something that Dr. Larrabee mentioned, you alluded Dr. Larrabee to certain enlargement fatigue, both in EU and NATO. There is a number of countries, and again I spoke of the problem of not possessing the enlargement... or membership prospect, when dealing with Uzbekistan as a relevant tool. But there is a number of countries out there including for instance Ukraine, that have demonstrated very clear and strong political will to be in NATO. But there are increasingly more and stronger questions about NATO's and European Union's willingness to continue enlarging. Perhaps not surprising given how large the (inaudible) and ambitious the (inaudible)... of enlargement were. But my question to you Madame Secretary would be do you... what can the new member states do in terms of making sure... keeping NATO's feet to fire; making sure that the will to continue enlarging is there? And do you feel that Slovakia has a special responsibility to make sure the enlargement process continues on its (inaudible), particularly vis-à-vis Ukraine, Slovakia's neighbour? MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you Mr. Valasek. And I now I give the floor to Mr. Carroll. Not forget please that the title of this panel is NATO and its Other Partnerships. Of course we all have a tendency to add to that very relevant question, but still we cannot take one hour and discuss all the issues that exist in the world. So please try to be as focused as you can. Thank you. Sean C. Carroll (Director of Programs, Club of Madrid, Spain): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I will try to focus on that. You're probably wondering as I was just 24 hours ago why I'm here. I'm a democracy expert, not a NATO or security expert. But I have found out in the last 24 hours that's why I'm here. I was in the NATO headquarters yesterday for only the second time in my life. I saw the model of the proposed new NATO - (TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY) ... being built for us, so I've asked around and I'm glad to see I'm not the only one who doesn't know the answer. But in briefings at the headquarters and more importantly talking with people here, I see that NATO is making a push to put democracy first. I spoke last night with a high level official from the Secretariat who said that actually stability comes first; security is second; and democracy is only a distant third. So last night I was excited thinking I was going to concentrate my remarks on urging a reordering of those priorities. But the Secretary General this morning put democracy squarely first. He also said that modernization and democracy go hand in hand and I would add that integration and democracy of course go hand in hand. And we at the Club of Madrid - let me just give you a minute on what the Club of Madrid is. It's a fairly new organization that counts on the experience and leadership of now 57 former Presidents and Prime Ministers from all around the world, many of them from Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe, to promote democracy in the world. And wherever we go, particularly in the European neighbourhood, we see the nexus between democratization and integration certainly on the question of Turkey and EU enlargement. Anyone's who has been to Georgia and seen the massive European flags hanging from every public building in Tbilisi - it took me awhile to figure out how they could get away with it until I was reminded that the flag was also the Council of Europe's flag. But clearly Georgia putting on their sleeve which direction they want to go in. We saw it the first project that the Club of Madrid was involved in in Serbia Montenegro. In fact it was a partnership with NATO and I'll get back to that in a second. The recommendations I would make are three. NATO should continue to put democracy first because as the Secretary General stated, without democracy there isn't security. We saw it most recently in Uzbekistan. It will be, I hope, at the top of the agenda on his trip to Addis Ababa to talk about Darfur and Sudan. Two: defence reform must be at least a first among equal priorities. My understanding is that after Istanbul, defence reform was pushed up the agenda. It was lower on the agenda beforehand. Where security sector reform is needed in partner countries and in most of the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI countries it is needed. Dialogue, cooperation, particularly joint operations, peacekeeping and otherwise cannot continue without democratic reform. In Serbia and Montenegro of course we have the chicken and egg question of the Hague indictees and moving forward on reform. I will say that in the one partnership we have had with NATO where we convened a regional meeting in Thessaloniki to talk about peace and security and democracy in the Balkans with a focus on Serbia Montenegro, all of the high-level participants from the region (Defence Ministers, Deputy Foreign Minister, and a member of the Club of Madrid, the former Prime Minister of Albania) urged PfP for Serbia Montenegro because they said that is the way forward on reform. The Club of Madrid of course doesn't have a position on enlargement. We do have a position on democracy and democratic reform. And to the extent that cooperation can put democratic reform at the same time that democratic reform is a condition for cooperation, I think that's beneficial. Thirdly, NATO need to work with partners. It's been clearly said this morning by the Secretary General at this panel today. That means in the broadest sense, not only with the EAPC, the Med Dialogue and ICI countries, and not only within those countries their militaries, but of course their governments, their civilian authorities, their publics, but also with organizations like the Club of Madrid and - (TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY) ... who can do the political and civic education that's needed. NATO can't do it alone. Sometimes NATO is not very welcome, which was of course the case immediately after the bombing of Belgrade and Serbia Montenegro, which is one reason we were asked to help work on that. As Steve Larrabee said, the public, at least in many Middle East countries, are wary of NATO. And of course NATO is good at military to military education, but not as good on the education for reform with civilian authorities, the policy elite and the public. As Minister Vášáryová said, NATO countries can now help on this. We also have many former Presidents and Prime Ministers from the region who can help to talk about their integration experiences and that has to be done on the political and on the civil society level, as well as on the military level. Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Mr. Carroll I think that your angle is very relevant to our discussion so don't be afraid to be coming from nowhere at all. This is not the case. So I think we had about an hour of speaking from this part of the room and I think it would be interesting now to open the debate where you could express your views, make comments or ask questions. And of course I will ask you to be as to the point as possible and also to, when you ask for the floor, also to say your name because not all of you are known to us. So I open the floor for discussion and I see that the first speaker is (inaudible) Drago(?) of Italy. Q: (Speaking in Italian)... MINUTO-RIZZO: I want to give the opportunity... (speaking in Italian)... (TECHNICAL DIFFICULTY) Q: (Speaking in Italian)... UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you. Yes I am. Q: (Speaking in Italian)... MINUTO-RIZZO: Grazie. Thank you very much. I had I think... John Kenny perhaps? You were making signs with your hands, but they were not sure it was a clear request for the floor. Now I see it is. JOHN KENNY: Is this on? OK good. Well thank you very much. I'd like to thank the panellists and of course the Swedish organizers for hosting this very, very useful opening event of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Meeting in the security forum framework. I think it's proven to be very useful so far and I look forward to doing it again next year and continuing along this path. I'd also like to thank the panellists for their thoughts that they shared with us. In particular I thought it was useful for the Deputy Secretary General to review where we stand in a way in the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI, the two partnerships that are outside of the EAPC framework that I think we have to look at most today in this session. And also special thanks to the Algerian Ambassador and Steve Larrabee. I thought your comments on those particular aspects of our work were very, very useful, and naturally to the others. I'd like to concentrate mostly on the work with the Middle East as it defines expression in the Mediterranean Dialogue and in ICI and say a few things about American policy and how we see NATO moving ahead, and then maybe pick up on some questions and some comments that have been raised about what has... how do the various elements of partnership fit together. We would agree with the Deputy Secretary General's assessment of where things stand. We think we're moving ahead in a new framework, a new spirit, in both the Mediterranean Dialogue, and of course given that the ICI is a new initiative in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, in a new framework of engagement and dialogue and cooperation with the countries of the Middle East. We have indeed Algeria and another country in the Mediterranean Dialogue, Israel, interested in participating in Operation Active Endeavour, the Alliance's only current Article Five operation and we think this is an excellent beginning and we would look forward to more operational cooperation with the partners in the Mediterranean. And we would also, as I will take up later, like to broaden this to countries in the ICI as we continue to develop our relations with those countries in the Gulf. With regard to ICI, note that we do have the three member countries now that you've mentioned. We think we can move ahead quickly with adding new members. We know that the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are already engaged. We think that Yemen is clearly a country that is interested in membership, or at least at discussing this further. And we would think that Iraq at some time in the foreseeable future would be ready to participate in ICI. It's a country with which we already have a training relationship, where our interests are clear. We think that we have had enough discussion with Iraqis to know that we have considerable areas where training would continue perhaps in a more structured partnership framework after we complete perhaps our training mission there and we would look forward to developing that relationship. We also think there may be a place for countries beyond the Arab world in ICI. That's a question that we need to deal with. How do we build our relations with those countries in a partner setting? The countries that come to mind from our point of view are first of all Afghanistan, where we have a significant operational presence and a great interest in the future of that country. We were talking just the other night and I think even this morning about the need for NATO to be involved in the post-Bonn(?) framework and that implies that we would want a broad partnership with that country in the long term. Iran... it's hard to talk, particularly today, about where we go ahead on Iran. So I would say I'd rather leave aside Iran. It's probably one of the most difficult cases. We ought not to begin with the most difficult cases I think. But we should... to diverge a bit, I think we should recognize that we can discuss these issues in the context of our political dialogue in NATO. We've made great progress on that. We had the first session of the sort of newly enhanced political dialogue in NATO at the Vilnius Foreign Ministers' meeting just a little over a month ago where we talked about the Middle East. And if we can talk about the Middle East peace process and developments in the Middle East among ourselves in the spirit of openness and transparency, I believe because we are also briefing the Mediterranean Dialogue partners about this, we should be able to talk about an issue like Iran. And I would look forward to maybe being able to take up aspects of the Iranian issue which are not so directly related to the EU3 Initiative, because that might best remain in the EU framework. I have a question about where we go with partnership and I was very interested in the comments made by the State Secretary and other comments by the Algerian Ambassador and Steve Larrabee about finding new ways to include partners in different formats maybe. Is there a variable geometry that we should be looking at? And I'd be interested in the sensitivities about this. Are there sensitivities? For example, the political dialogue that we have developed in the Mediterranean Dialogue exists at 26-plus-7 level and it may be able to exist at a 26-plus-1 level, or even a 26-plus-N level, but within the confines of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Can we put together groups of countries from the various framework arrangements - Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, ICI, and I would suggest even contact countries that are very interested such as Australia or Japan - based on a common set of interests to meet in different frameworks outside of the framework that we now have which is simply the troop-contributing framework where we meet from time to time to talk about operations. I think we see the Partnership for Peace has begun to move beyond the stage of an anteroom for membership. Some countries that are in the Partnership for Peace we assume will become members and we hope very much that they will become members in the long run. But others, I think, since this is a two-way street, some aren't interested; other perhaps are not even close to being ready. In this new circumstance where we have partners, some of whom are not interested in membership in the Partnership for Peace, we have countries in the Mediterranean Dialogue who I think we... this is not a framework in which countries are applying for membership from NATO. That's clear. We have ICI and then we have the contact countries, some of whom are intensely interested in developing their relations. Can we put ourselves together in different frameworks for political dialogue and cooperation and what are the constraints from a political point of view and what would be the gains and losses that would come from this arrangement? Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you. I think you are the one who was asking to speak. The lady is coming to you. Q: Thank you so much. I'm (inaudible)... from Finland and I would like maybe mine to the Deputy Secretary General, when we are talking about the philosophy of the NATO and its partnerships what concerns the states and nations and the geographic regions and areas. But there's also the partnership between various institutions and NATO. And we know the last history in Europe... especially in Europe, and it was a long-lasting process and the final result was the Berlin Plus... Berlin Plus. And I think that we can agree that it was a good deal. And we are satisfied with that. But it concerns just the military crisis management. But since now in the nearest future there is also the raising problem that concerns civil crisis management, and I would like to ask from a point of view of NATO, Mr. Deputy Secretary General, what is your idea? Is there any need to try to find some kind of new Berlin Plus what concerns civil crisis management activities between EU and NATO? How do you foresee this kind of trouble(?) between the institutions? Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you. I think the next speaker was somebody off the floor. It's you, yes. JOHN BIGGAR (Irish Mission, Brussels): Thank you, Mr. Deputy Secretary. I'm John Biggar from the Irish Mission in Brussels. Firstly, I'd like to thank all the panellists and the discussants for raising some very, very interesting questions. I won't deal with all of the ones and points I'd like to make, because we're out of time, but first of all, I should thank particularly Secretary... Madam State Secretary for your very strong comments in relation to the need for democratic values in partnership. And I think that goes to the numbers I think Mr. Carroll also. I don't know if he's an Irish citizen. He certainly sounds like an Irish citizen in his comments. The... I wonder how can one ensure better compliance within the existing partnership with the requirement of democratic values and human rights. And secondly, is it possible to foresee developing other partnerships which ignore those democratic values in allies(?)? I certainly hope the answer to that would be no. But in that case how would you go about ensuring that? Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you. I think I had somebody here in this corner. You were, yes. You have the floor. Q: (Speaking in Unknown Language)... MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you. Now let's continue with our discussion of the floor. I have the ambassador of Canada, Ambassador Juneau. AMBASSADOR JEAN-PIERRE JUNEAU (NATO Permanent Representative): Thank you very much. Very briefly, a few comments. First, I must say that I enjoy very much what was said by the panellists, and in particular Mr. Carroll. I think it's important that we are reminded here that we have values. I don't know with whom he spoke last night, but obviously he didn't speak with the Canadian because he would have been told that democracy is a fundamental value as far as NATO is concerned, and also as far as the kind of partnership that we want to develop with our other countries. My second point is that for us, Canada, we look at NATO more and more as a political military organization. We like to remind people that in 1949 it was the Prime Minister... it was the Prime Minister Pearson, which included so-called... what we called political clause in NATO that was really never very much used during the Cold War. But we like to activate now and as we are reaching out outside the traditional European theatre we are also transforming our organization, and we are also defining new objective for organization. And it's in that sense that NATO remains relevant for a country like Canada, which is... which is, as you know, on the other side of the Atlantic. But we have also to make sure that we don't become as they say in the United States, big hat and no cattle, because as we define new partnership there is also additional financial obligations, and we are speaking quite a lot about the transformation process that we like to do in our organization, but I hope that with our partners we are not creating expectations on which we are not going to be able to deliver. I must say for us Canadians also, despite the fact that we are on the other side, the Med Dialogue is very important. And in fact, we are happy to see that it's in fact... the Med Dialogue is gaining a new life. I was in Algeria and in Tunisia just weeks ago and in my quote, as we say, in my national capacity, and it was extremely interesting to see the kind of discussions that we have with our friends in the Maghreb and it's quite sure that there is a great future that we have to develop with those partners. But to conclude with what I said at the beginning, democracy is the core value that an organization like NATO is defending and promoting. Thank you very much. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you very much for this. I think I have Ambassador Khandogiy from Ukraine at this point. AMBASSADOR VOLODYMYR KHANDOGIY (Ambassador of Ukraine to NATO): Thank you very much Mr. Chairman and I have a couple of brief comments, if I may. First of all, one of a general nature, and I wanted to pick up where my Canadian colleague, Ambassador Juneau left, about this democratic values that are critical in terms of future in the development of relations with NATO, be it individually, or within the partnerships. And I think Ukraine is the good example of it. If you go back a couple of years back, and look at the relations between Ukraine and NATO, for instance, we had very deep relations, in fact, in defence reform and other areas, but we were lacking important ingredient, and that was a lack of democracy. And after the victorious democratic revolution in Ukraine it was just like a jumpstart. Now the doors are being opened for Ukraine because Ukraine is now among those countries that share common values for the Alliance, and pretty much encouraged now with this attitude towards Ukraine. So democracy comes first. This is something that we also share. Now, about the partnerships, as the title of our discussion today is NATO and Other Partnerships. I think that we should not limit ourselves to the partnerships that already exist. I think the partnerships within already existing partnerships are also an option, and I would venture to say that, for instance, if you think about development in new types of partnerships, for instance, NATO, GUUAM, as an example, or maybe within the Mediterranean Dialogue there will be like-minded countries that would go further than somebody... than other countries. So I think it's also an option to have partnerships within the partnership. That's what I'm trying to say. And one last, maybe, comment is... a bit down to earth comment it's about our interfacing in NATO, being a loyal partner in the EAPC, I must confess this, we do not know much about what other partnerships are doing. And I think it would be beneficial for all if we in NATO would be better interfacing among ourselves and we're not talking about joint meetings. Some alluded to this. I think it was Ambassador of Algeria said that having meetings between the EAPC and Mediterranean or other... in other fashion to exchange information about not necessarily sort of diluting what other partnerships are doing, but simply sharing information would be very important, I think. Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Thank you and now we have Ambassador D'Aboville, as the next speaker, of France. AMBASSADOR BENOÎT D'ABOVILLE ( Permanent Representative of France to NATO): I wish... Trois points. Le premier, c'est celui à la suite de ce que vient de dire l'ambassadeur Kandogiy. C'est vrai que nous manquons d'une information horizontale, eh, et par exemple, je serais très heureux, par exemple, si l'ambassadeur Khandogiy pouvait faire de la publicité sur le discount qu'il va donner pour la location des Antonovs aux autres partenaires et aux opérations de l'OTAN. Ça, ça serait une information horizontale qui serait extrêmement utile. Mais je pense aussi qu'au fur et à mesure que le partenariat s'étend nous devons revenir sur cette question qui a été abordée à un moment autrefois et dont on ne parle plus, c'est peut-être de voir si nous ne devons pas tenir des réunions plus régionales: Balkan, Asie centrale, nous avons déjà la Méditerranée, parce que... Et en fait, certains des panels ici même sont régionaux, par exemple, le panel Balkan. Parce qu'il y a quand même des éléments de dialogue qui sont utiles. Je pense par exemple sur le Caucase, c'est intéressant entre partenaires du Caucase de... d'échanger. La deuxième question, c'est les valeurs démocratiques. Je crois que là nous avons un point qui n'a jamais été officiellement soulevé et qui peut-être sans doute est difficile à résoudre en raison de la règle du consensus. Mais est-ce qu'on peut suspendre un partenaire? Est-ce qu'on peut suspendre un partenaire? Après tout, il y a des voisinages qui peuvent être gênants. On ne peut pas toujours avoir recours à des procédés disons de circonstance. Il se trouve que dans un certain nombre de cas il y a des partenaires bilatéraux entre l'OTAN et un pays. Et donc, à ce moment-là, on peut faire passer des messages. Mais il n'y a pas de partenariat spécifique, il y a un problème. Je crois que c'est une question que nous devons nous poser d'une manière ou une autre. Le troisième point, c'est celui de la coopération avec les institutions OSCE, Nations-Unies, Union Européenne. Moi, je me demande si l'approche qui est implicite dans les interventions que nous avons entendues ce matin et hier soir, qui est une approche un peu institutionelle... bon mettons de... qui se résume à dire "Mettons de côté nos rivalités bureaucratiques institutionnelles. Organisons la transparence, la coopération" est vraiment la bonne méthode. Évidemment, il faut le faire. Il faut qu'il y ait de la coopération... Moi, je me demande si on ne devrait pas plutôt mettre l'accent sur une coopération "bottom-up", c'est-à-dire que chaque crise, chaque opération, chaque mission a des aspects spécifiques. Et je crois que le ministre Rupel, le président de l'OSCE, avait raison de mettre ce point. Chaque... chaque situation est spécifique. L'Afghanistan, ce n'est pas les Balkans en terme de coopération avec l'OSCE, avec les Nations-Unies. Les problèmes d'ownership, les problèmes de sortie de crise sont différents dans chacun des cas. Et je pense que nous ne mettons pas assez l'accent sur la coopération sur place et qui existe souvent, mais sur lequel nous sommes peu informés et la flexibilité de cette coopération sur place, plutôt que de s'engager dans une... à construire une espèce de rafinerie avec des tuyaux partout pour faire de l'interinstitutionnel. MINUTO-RIZZO: Merci, mon prochain intervenant, Monsieur Manuel (inaudible) de l'Espagne, représentant, je crois du ministère des Affaires étrangères, je crois savoir. Q: That's right. (Inaudible)...General for International Security Affairs . And first of all I want to thank all panellists because it was very interesting of what you said about this NATO's other partnerships. Of course, coming from Spain, I think that a very important issue, as my Italian colleague mentioned before, is for NATO to develop a true Mediterranean partnership with members to its South. But of course the title of the panel is very rightly broader frame. I would also say that, as Mr. Valasek said, that EU-NATO relations is not provided for in this context; but indeed I think it could come within this panel because it is also an important thing to develop the EU-NATO relationship and to seek added value and these issues are very important issues and (inaudible)... the French Ambassador just said, we should also try to see that each situation where both organizations act has to have its own political context which decides which international organization has to take measures; has to... can provide added value for the solution of a particular crisis or for the development of a particular kind of partnership. We also had in the EU of course the EU was (inaudible) process which is a central framework for the relationship between countries of both shores of the Mediterranean and we should try to see that what other organizations, including NATO, do are also complementary to that a central effort. I mean central not because of the importance of any organization, but because of the broadness of the process because of the global aspect of both. It is being done in Barcelona, which as you know will also attain its 10th anniversary in November this year with Samitin(?), the same capital Barcelona where the original meeting took place in 1995. But focusing again on what I think is the most important issue in this context in this panel which is NATO's Mediterranean partnership - and I stress this word partnership- because it is more than just dialogue. I think what we achieved in Istanbul was to move ahead from just having a dialogue, which is very important, which has been developed for the last 10 years. We had the first ministerial meeting of the Mediterranean Dialogue in December last year. But we should move ahead beyond that and really develop a true Mediterranean partnership, of course in parallel to the efforts in the broader Middle East countries which also are part of the Istanbul Initiative... Cooperation Initiative. But again, Mediterranean partnership should be focused on the idea that, as Mr. Rizzo said at the beginning, we share the same risks. Risks know no boundaries indeed. So what ever happens, whatever threatens, whatever interests our partners to the South, should be of interest to us because we share the same threats. We should try to strive for the principle of co-ownership was also as Mr. Rizzo and Mr. (inaudible) Ambassador, Mr. Benattallah and Mr. Larrabee. Co-ownership is a very important issue because we are talking indeed about partnership, not about just having a dialogue to explain what NATO does which is very important, which is the prerequisite. But if you are partners, you have to be co-owners of the whole process and take in to account what the other side wants, what the other side is interested about. And again also we should like to develop a true cooperation in the framework of this partnership, a practical cooperation with contacts of the military to military level and others because while confidence building is done in a broad political framework (inaudible)... ministerial meetings and so on and we hope we are going to have more ministerial meetings in the Mediterranean Dialogue in the future. Maybe this year for example. But while this is important, true confidence is built also through military to military contacts. And last aspect I think it is worth exploring the possibility that we look for synergies between the EAPC and the Mediterranean Dialogue while we always try to express the (inaudible) of the Mediterranean Dialogue, which is a particular region with particular security interests. But at the same time we should go beyond just using some instruments developed in the EAPC also for our Mediterranean partners and looking for broader contacts for a broader participation of our partners to the South in the EAPC context. It could be worth exploring for example the idea of having some kind of observer status for the Mediterranean Dialogue partners in EAPC. Thank you very much. MINUTO-RIZZO: Muchos gracias. Thank you very much. Now I think its 20 minutes to 1:00 so what I'm suggesting is that we have 10 minutes more of questions and then telegraphic couple of sentences each here and then we go to a conclusion because at 1:15 we have the lunch where everything will be put together. I'm told that the Armenian delegation would like to take the floor. Mr. Tatikian(?). Then... and after her I have the gentleman there who you had long time that you asked for the floor and then the Ambassador of Switzerland here please. Q: Thank you Chairman. First of all I would like to join my thanks to the Swedish authorities to host this wonderful event. And although today the Caucasus is in the panel on the unresolved conflicts; however Caucasus is not only about conflicts fortunately and there is at least one commonality which combines the states in the Caucasus. That is the fact that all three states in the region have adopted the objective of the European integration and one of the states in the region have adopted also the objective Euro-Atlantic integration. And in that context sees all three states are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy which was recently proposed to the Caucasian states and they are starting develop individual action plans with the European Union which will be ready until the end of the year. And all threes states have already drafted their presentation documents for individual action partnership plans with NATO. And in this context my question would be whether NATO and EU would find possible to launch any partnership in the Caucasus; to launch some complementarity mechanisms since obviously there are commonalities within IPIP(?)... between IPIP(?) and individual action plan with the European Union. And obviously there has been some labour division between two organizations. And my question would be whether any cooperation and coordination is possible between NATO and European Union in the Caucasus? Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Please identify yourself. Q: Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Klaus (inaudible). I am the Deputy (inaudible) of the Austrian Mission. Earlier this morning I was looking at this beautiful EAPC symbol which is looming above the mountains of (inaudible) and which we've had I think for about 10 years now and I was wondering what it actually represents. Is the moon? Is it a star? But then I realized it is actually a wheel. The hub of the wheel is, I would say in this comparison, is the knack and I wouldn't limit it to the EAPC and to the classical partnership alone, but to all the different new partnerships we are having: to the classical EAPC partnership, to the Mediterranean Dialogue, to the Russian Federation, to Ukraine, to the contact countries, to ICI, and maybe even to the other international organizations- to the European Union, to the OECE and to the UN. We have a hub; we have several spokes; but I'm wondering whether we have already a wheel which is running in one direction. The different partners sitting at the end of each of these spokes do not know, do not actually know what's going on with NATO's partnerships with the other partners. For instance we as partners know only to a limited extent what's going on with the Mediterranean Dialogue and I'm wondering what the panellists think about the necessity to have a forum to complete this wheel and to have a common forum for all the partners. Or would such a thing create a sort of a global NATO and create a competition to the United Nations? And if there were to be a new forum, do we need a list of democratic values and a clear procedure for the acceptance of new partners and also possible expulsion? Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Ambassador Meilleur je croix. Je vous avais promis. MEILLEUR (Ambassador): Oui, merci beaucoup, je serai très bref. À la suite de ce qui vient d'être dit, je voudrais simplement dire que pour un pays partenaire non membre de l'Alliance nous sommes très interessés et tout à fait prêts d'apporter notre contribution à la coopération avec les pays de la Méditerranée du sud et du Golfe. Et je crois que nous avons déjà commencé à ouvrir des cours à Genève au Centre démocratique des forces armées, au Geneva Center for Security Studies, récemment à Lugano il y avait un séminaire sur le terrorisme, le financement du terrorisme où des représentants de ces pays ont été invités. Et je crois qu'il y a énormément à faire dans ce domaine, dans les compétences qui sont évidemment celles de l'OTAN qu'il s'agisse du contrôle des frontières, du droit international humanitaire et du contrôle des frontières etc. Je voudrais simplement poser quand même une question un petit peu provocative à la suite de qui a été suggéré par M. Larrabee, c'est au fond ce dialogue, ces coopérations qui se font avec des groupes choisis de pays qui sont, je dirais plus proches, peut-être moins dangereux que d'autres, pourquoi le limiter à ces pays-là? Il y a d'autres pays, je pense notamment à la Syrie, au Liban, à la Libye, enfin il y a d'autres pays dans la région qui peut-être seraient prêts à entamer certaines formes de dialogue sur des sujets choisis. Merci beaucoup. MINUTO-RIZZO: Merci. Je crois devoir terminer notre tour. Mais on me dit qu'encore il faut donner la parole peut-être à deux personnes, à la personne là au fond. Puis je donne ici la parole aussi encore à ce Monsieur je crois de l'ambassade de Grèce. Et peut-être Benoit, si tu veux après mettre quelques mots seulement parce qu'autrement on sera... on mangera froid. Q: Thank you very much, my name is Rudy Gabon(SP). I am from the German NATO delegation in Brussels. And I think you have several speakers ask for more interaction of the various partnership frameworks and I think we should not forget that there is already a lot of interaction. If we speak of NATO's other partnerships, then we mean of course the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI that is aimed at the Gulf countries at the moment, and a number of less institutionalized partnerships with other countries like Japan or Serbia Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. And if these countries take part in activities, then these activities are mainly PfP activities. They are not many specialized activities for NATO's other partnerships, which means that Algerian officers meet maybe the Serbian officers or officers from NATO countries in all these activities. They can even meet Iraqi officers because Iraqis take part in some activities at the NATO Defence College in Rome. So there is a lot of interaction. What we don't have is a political dialogue that includes all these various partnership frameworks and maybe next year's EAPC security forum is a good opportunity to include all these various partnerships, the whole NATO partnership family. Thank you. MINUTO-RIZZO: Yes you. Very shortly please. Q: Yes. (Inaudible) of the Greek Embassy in Stockholm. I'm basing my questions on the remarks of Mr. Kenny and the Ambassadors from Canada and France. 95 percent of human conversation ends always in the question how much? Therefore in so many partnerships to come ahead, somebody has to pay. So I'm addressing this brief question to the panel if it's possible for an answer. Second thing: what is the time scope of a partnership? Is it just a relationship? Do you have a good time for some time and then break off? Or we end to something more important? Because it makes a difference; it makes a difference in the behaviour of both parties and both parties should be mature, know what they want and go after it. Thank you very much. MINUTO-RIZZO: Full of doubts with (inaudible)… Ambassadeur d'Aboville. AMBASSADOR BENOÎT D'ABOVILLE: Je me garderais de répondre sur la question du financement parce que c'est une question très délicate. Non, de toutes façons pour le partenariat, il y a les trust funds, tout le monde est invité à payer. Donc, il n'y a pas de problème. Si vous voulez payer, payez. Non, je crois qu'il ne faudrait pas tout de même que nous oublions un principe fondamental de toutes les institutions internationales qui est quand même le principe de la spécialisation. On ne peut pas faire n'importe quoi avec n'importe qui, n'importe comment. Parce qu'à ce moment-là, on entre dans un espèce de magma dans lequel finalement le dialogue et la coopération souffrent. Et moi, je pense qu'il est essentiel que l'on respecte un petit la notion de "core business", c'est-à-dire le coeur du métier. Le coeur du métier de l'OTAN au-delà du dialogue politique qui est le bienvenu, c'est fondamentalement les opérations. L'OTAN est devenu expéditionnaire. Donc, les missions et les opérations. Et nous sommes extraordinairement, je crois, reconnaissants aux partenaires qui participent. Et deuxièmement, la réforme du secteur de défense entendue au sens large. Personnellement, je pense que toutes les activités de protection civile etc. ce sont des (INAUDIBLE) inutiles. Mais eh... il faut... Dans le domaine des opérations et dans le domaine de la réforme du secteur de défense, l'OTAN a une véritable valeur ajoutée que n'ont pas d'autres organisations. En revanche, il faut aussi respecter le principe de l'autonomie de décision de chaque organisation. L'OTAN ne veut pas être obligé de suivre des décisions de l'Union européenne. Et l'Union européenne elle a son autonomie également. C'est pour ça que la question qui a été posée par notre ami arménien sur la possibilité d'une... d'une opération conjointe OTAN-UE dans le... dans le Caucase ne se pose pas. Il y a... il y a 19 pays de l'OTAN qui sont membres de l'Union européenne, donc ils sont cohérents avec eux-mêmes. Donc, ils savent ce qui se fait dans un forum ou dans un autre. Mais l'idée de faire des actions communes pose la question de "Who is the top dog?". Qui conduit l'opération? À ce moment-là, on entre dans une situation qui est absolument insoluble. D'accord. MINUTO-RIZZO: All right, so this is the end of our discussion. Time is pressing. I thought that at the beginning that two hours was too long; I see it's not the case. It's (inaudible)... away. So I'm not so unhappy about that. Perhaps on this side of the room will be less, let's say profound in our answers than we thought, but this time is time. So I will ask to my colleagues on the panel to say a few words, perhaps three minutes each starting this time on your side with you Steve. LARRABEE: Let me address - MINUTO-RIZZO: And then the Ambassador of Algeria and then Madame Minister. LARRABEE: Quickly three issues that came up. One was the issue raised by Thomas Valasek about the EU-NATO relationship and the need for complementarity. And it seems to me here that the EU's comparative advantage is in fact in social and the economic area. Most of the problems in the region in the Mediterranean are in fact, most even the security problems, are fundamentally of a social and economic nature. And therefore this is an area where the EU does have a comparative advantage. On the other hand, as I said, both organizations do have security components and it will be increasingly necessary as NATO and the EU get more involved in the Mediterranean, Middle East, to maintain a degree of complementarity and avoid duplication. Secondly the question which was raised, it's a broader issue - whether NATO is really the platform for dealing with many of the broader security issues. This is an issue that was raised by Chancellor Schroeder at the German (inaudible) meeting where he said that in fact NATO was no longer the venue for transatlantic discussions on security issues. This caused a huge uproar. But if you actually look at it and step back, personally I think he was right. And part of the problem is in fact that NATO has not been that type of a forum. And I think one of the best examples is the fact of the EU embargo… the lifting of the… proposal to the lift the embargo on China. This was something that was not really discussed transatlantically in a detailed way and I think part of that problem is… that arises from the fact that there wasn't a really deep-seeded transatlantic dialogue on this issue. And indeed China has not been an issue that's been discussed really on… has not been an issue on the NATO agenda; but I would argue, and I think the embargo issue illustrates this, that increasingly the issue of China is one that will need to be discussed both in the EU-US dialogue and in NATO. Lastly, the issue was raised about the question do we need a new fora? I think part of the… I'm somewhat sceptical quite frankly. I think enlarging the fora would create more problems than it would solve and I think it would be much better to take up John Kudnick's(SP) discussion suggestion that we have some sort of variable geometry where some countries are involved in certain parts of the dialogue and other countries involved in others. I think that way you would maintain a much better dialogue than if you just put everyone all together in the same pot. Thank you. BENATTALLAH: Deux commentaires simplement, la première en relation avec ce que le...l'ambassadeur de l'Ukraine avait dit et plus précisément sur la question des valeurs et de la démocratie et je croix que l'ambassadeur de l'Ukraine a cite son cas. Le cas de son pays était également le cas de l'Algérie dans la mesure ou en 1995, lorsque le dialogue Méditerraneen avait été lance, l'Algérie n'était pas encore in. Et ce n'est au fur et a mesure que la situation ses décanter au plan politique chez nous que nous avons eu l'offre de rejoindre le dialogue Méditerraneen et donc, il y a effectivement une base commune sur laquelle nous travaillons. Deuxième point, s'agissant de l'interaction [SPEAKS IN GERMAN] Il me semble que la configuration de l'alliance fonctionne en quelque sorte en...il y a plusieurs rouages qui fonctionnent, peut-être pas tout a fait indépendamment mais, les mettre en synergie me semble, en tout cas pour un pays partenaire assez intéressante. Et la il y a...on peu travailler a 2 niveaux. Il y a le fait que sur un plan pratique, de militaire a militaire il y a effectivement une participation des pays Méditerranéens du fait de l'ouverture des programmes PFQ aux pays Méditerranéens, il y a sur le terrain déjà une interaction de militaire a militaire. Il resterait peut-être de la complémenter sur le plan du dialogue politique et la sans aller dans... a penser a mettre en place une...