NATO Speech: EAPC Security Forum - Panel 1 “Addressing Europe's unresolved conflicts”

Åre, Sweden

25 May 2005

EAPC Security Forum

Panel 1 “Addressing Europe's unresolved conflicts”

This transcript was published as received

Jan Petersen (Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs): Let me once again welcome you to this session and the topic is addressing Europe's unresolved conflicts.

As long as we have these unresolved, or perhaps frozen conflicts they will definitely hamper the political, economic and social developments in the regions close to us.

Our ambition should be to analyze the present challenges and find out how to make an optimal use of instruments and mechanisms at our disposal. And more specifically, we should look into how we can be helpful in moving these agendas forward.

We'll have three speakers this morning. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland; it will be Borys Tarasyuk, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine; Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Council for Foreign Defence Policy, the Russian Federation. And they will all have from five to eight minutes to address the topics.

And they will be followed by Antanaas Valionis, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania; Vladimir Socor, of the Jamestown Foundation; Giorgi Baramidze, State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Georgia; and then Dan Fried, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, United States. And they will all have from three to five minutes.

And after that I will open the floor for contributions from you.

We have slightly less than two hours for this session. Mr. Jaroslaw Skonieczka, who is the Director for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Partnership Directorate, Political Affairs and Security Policy in NATO, will be the rapporteur of this session. And he will report during lunch.

The first speaker is, as I said, Mr. Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland. Adam, the floor is yours.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland): Well, I don't know whether I should...

PETERSEN: You just... and hope for the best.

ROTFELD: Thank you very much, Jan. I would like to say that, in fact, it is for me, not only an honour, but pleasure to discuss the issue. However, I have had, once again, a look on written notes I prepared, talking points, and since you said that it has to be five to eight minutes I decided, I would say, to put them aside and to present some main points which will be preceded by two very brief anecdotes.

The first one is connected with the fact that in... for many years director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in '99 I received an invitation from the Holy See for the private audience with Pope, and I was really very much excited. I didn't know what kind of issues could be discussed, how long, and I was informed in advance that it has not to be longer than ten to fifteen minutes.

Later on I have had discussion with John Paul II who mainly wanted to discuss the question of the conflicts. And he raised very basic question to me, saying that since SIPRI is dealing with conflicts for so many years, what in my view is a kind of the very basic explanation that we do have at the moment so many conflicts in the world and in Europe.

I was not prepared, I would say to... I said that everything what I can offer you as an answer will be very banal and maybe even trivial. In my view conflicts are mainly caused by the situations where people are not only frustrated, but they are desperated by the lack of instruments, or other way to solve the conflicts. In other words, in my view, the conflicts are mainly in the countries which are very poor. When people do not have any perspectives they are entering into conflicts.

And Pope listened to me, he said yes, to great extent you are right, but in fact, I will tell you that it is for me a problem that there are so many examples in the history that poverty was even deeper for centuries and people were living in peaceful way, they were neighbours, and suddenly it is a kind of the explosion of the conflict.

When I left him, because I'm not going to discuss, because the discussion was not for ten minutes, but almost for one hour, and my intention is only to say that the conclusion of this very brief presentation was that I raise the question for myself, what he wanted to make... what kind of message he wanted to offer me. And it seems to me that his main intention was to say that in addition to everything what is rational, we have to understand that there are a lot of the irrational elements which are very difficult to define. And in other words, it could be evil, which is I would say, an imminent element of the nature of human beings, but it could be, I would say, something what is very difficult to understand.

The second anecdote is connected with the fact that SIPRI, as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute was established to commemorate 150th anniversary of unbroken peace of Sweden. And being director, after five years I decided to prepare a kind of history of SIPRI, and I wanted to know how people did come to the idea to make such an investment, which in my view is a very good investment. And I noticed that for the first 100th anniversary, in other words, in 1914, before the First World War, it was also such an idea to do something to commemorate one hundred of peace between Sweden and Norway. And two parliaments took a decision to erect a monument in Eda for this very wide decision and on Norwegian side many politicians participated in the ceremony, but on Swedish side nobody participated in Sweden did not pay even one crown for this monument.

Fifty years after, in 150th anniversary, after two world wars, Sweden decided to invest millions and institute is a kind of living memory of that concept that one should try to find the peaceful solution for conflicts. And in my view, the conclusions of that change in Swedish mentality is very much connected with the experience of two great wars. That after two great wars people in Sweden changed their understanding of what happened in previous years, because in one... in 1914 they still... they have had a perception that independent Norway or to say it in different way, the last war for Sweden it was a shame.

But in my view I would say now I would like to come to the main issue of my very brief presentation, is the following: That today and yesterday we spoke a lot about the new nature of conflicts, and this new nature is very much connected with the new security environment. Very often all of us, we are repeating new security environment, and in fact, all of us, we have quite different understanding.

For many, and for myself, it is first of all the collapse of bipolar system, and a need to elaborate the new conceptual framework for security in the world. And this new conceptual framework means that there is a need to think how international community should react for the developments within the countries, not between them.

And I would like to say that, in my view, this is the main problem, because the concept of the sovereign nations is, I would say, developed for centuries, especially in the 19th Century, and in fact, to great extent nationalism, very deep-rooted national interests, they were, I would say, the collision between different type of national interests. They generated a lot of conflicts.

There is no need to say that conflicts are multi-dimensional, political, ethnic, religious, national, social, economic. The problem is that international community does not have instruments how to deal with all these conflicts within the states, and I would like to say that my period in SIPRI, in that respect was, for me at least, very insightful(?) because I noticed that in recent twelve years, since '92, there were more than 60 major armed conflicts in the world, and only three of them were between the states: between India and Pakistan over Kashmir; between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and between Iraq and anti-Iraqi coalition. And I'm saying this that in fact most of the organizations are very well prepared to deal with external threat, not an internal one. And it is not my intention to say that one should ignore the nature of the present international... the contemporary international law, but one should be prepared, at least politically, if not legally, to new way of thinking. Because it seems to me that decisive is to find the way how international community could impose, I would say, the peaceful development within different states.

And having said this, I would like to say that state under international law is composed of two factors. The territory, the population and control of a territory... effective, efficient control over territory and population.

The question, what kind of control, what kind of government. It is not defined within the present (inaudible)... Now we are very often saying that it has to be a democratic control. It has to be a kind of state which is organized, having in mind, I would say, the rules of law as fundamental guidance.

And now speaking about all those frozen conflicts, and then coming to an end, I would like to say the following: That yesterday during this working dinner Dimitrij Rupel, as the chairman in office of the OSCE, said that in fact on the post-Soviet territory there are different type of conflicts. For example, it is question of Moldova, some conflicts in Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, at the moment Uzbekistan, not to mention Chechnya. And that all of them are different. All of them are different.

And he's absolutely right. All conflicts, as a rule, are different, because I commented, I would say, in my reaction, I said, that the first phrase of the Anna Karenina by Tolstoi is that only happy families are alike. The unhappy families are unhappy in their own ways. And the problem is always to find what is the reason of this unhappiness.

And I would like to say that this is one of the questions which should be taken in very serious way, that one should not try to create the kind of common pattern, a model which is applicable to all the states.

And my last point is addressed to the great powers. It seems to me that multilateral, multinational institutions, multilateral organizations and such like the United Nations, NATO, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, OSCE, European Union—but maybe not European Union is a kind of a different animal, because it is not an organization which is comparable to the others—Council of Europe, all of them they have with different mandates, with different character, but what is in common that for the great powers multinational institutions, security sectors, especially, are important as long as they can be used as instruments to implement national strategies of great powers. But great powers, global powers, are not prepared to be instrument for multinational institutions, if there is no need... if there is no interest. And it is, in my view, a very serious problem, what has to be done that... for the United States, for France, for Germany, for Russia and for the others, multinational institutions will be important instruments not only to implement their national (inaudible), but also to implement, I would say, the aims of the institution as such. In other words, how to change, I would say, their approach to this type of institutions.

And I am saying that fortunately, for example, in my view, the element of the democratization in Ukraine brought us much closer to the new type of thinking and since the next speaker will be Borys Tarasyuk, I would like to say that in my view what happened in Moldova after, I have (inaudible)... Transnistria, it reflects that democracy serves very well for the solution of... for the peaceful solution of some conflicts which are freeze or suspended.

Thank you very much.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much, Adam, for your contribution. Reminding us that all conflicts are different. And for your knowledge of Scandinavian history.

Well, actually I tell you that this very place was, am I not right, Delilah(?), was Norwegian up to the 17th Century. Then you won, we lost, so you keep it.

Well, we... the next speaker is the Foreign Minister of Ukraine. Borys, the floor is yours.

Borys Tarasyuk ( Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine): Guten Tag, God morgon. Dear friends, I would like, first of all, to express the gratitude to the organizers of this very interesting format of our work, very informal one of the EAPC. And what is especially important, that not only the representatives of official delegations are taking part in this forum, but the representatives of NGO and of mass media, including my good friends from Ukraine.

This is certainly a very good forum of work of brain-storming on specific issues, and to my mind EAPC is the right fora for discussing this issue of frozen conflicts.

And I think that the EAPC cannot be comfortable unless the time the frozen conflicts are not being settled. Why I'm concentrating on frozen conflict, because there is no lack of attention to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, in Balkans. At the same time there was, and there is a lack of attention, adequate attention, to the frozen conflicts on the territories of the former Soviet Union.

The one in Moldova, Transnistria , the one in Abkhazia, Georgia and another one in Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan. So all those conflicts, they deserve much greater attention from the EAPC than it used to be the case before.

A few words about the history of this frozen conflicts. From my point of view, we can speak about the origin of those conflicts as being instigated from the former centre. Guiding by the principles divide and rule. So this was the major reason and the major cause of those three conflicts I mentioned before.

Another feature of those conflicts, that is the presence, the military presence in those conflicts, in all those three conflicts, under whatever pretext, be it so-called peacekeeping operation, or whatever. But this military presence is a factor which is not helping to resolve the conflict, but rather to protract unresolution of those conflicts.

I'm not talking about the usual, the normal peacekeeping operation. Conducted by the United Nations, by the OSCE or NATO-led operations. So... and those operations I'm referring to, they have nothing to do with the usual, normal peacekeeping operations.

What is another feature of those conflicts? The origin of the conflicts was more or less similar. There was incitement from outside of the ethnic rifts between the different ethnic groups. So this was also something which was used.

We, in Ukraine, successfully avoided, you know, any kind of this outside attempts to make rift, to make separation, well concerning the situation in the Crimea, and if you remember Ukraine was one of the examples of the country which avoided any troubles, any violence, not talking about the war, in settling the explosively... potential explosive situation in the Crimea.

One... some people say that the inter-ethnic rifts are... well the only reason of the emergence of conflicts inside of the country, but this is correct, but these are just some of the other reasons I referred to.

One may speak about many cases, the corrupt regimes are the main cause of the conflict. Thereafter follow many by-products of the conflict, the organized crime, trafficking, acts of terrorism, smuggling etc. And we in Ukraine feel a lot of this manifestations from the conflict we have at our neighbour, I mean, the Transnistrian conflict.

The common feature of all frozen conflicts is that it is impossible to resolve any of them without the help and mediation of international community. The United Nations, OSCE, European Union, NATO or in this case EAPC, Council of Europe or guarantor states, like Russia and Ukraine are in Transnistria settlement.

A few words about our experience Ukraine has accumulated in avoiding conflicts or helping to resolve the conflicts.

The only realistic way to resolve frozen conflicts, and this has been declared today by Laila Frievalds, that is by democratization. And by democratization of the territories. And in this regard Ukraine can be helpful. With our partners we have reinvigorated the role of GUUAM, the regional institution embracing four countries of the region.

And during the recent meeting in Chisinau, the presidents of all GUUAM countries have decided to transform this institution into the full-fledged international organization, which strives to promote European democratic values in the region, encompassing the current frozen conflicts.

Democracy, security and development are indispensable, and especially in the area of settlement of frozen conflicts. And not only security and developments matters, but also democracy and development matters.

I remember one picture I've seen from the satellite of the Korean peninsula and there was a visible... the picture has been made at night. And there was a visible dividing line between the North Korea and South Korea, with South Korea full of lights, and North Korea, you know, completely blackout.

So this is a kind of visible picture of the co-relationship between democracy and development.

So democracy matters a lot in terms of development. And in this regard I would like to say that after the victory of democracy in Ukraine and in Georgia, both our countries established a kind of coalition, democratic choice. And this has nothing to do with the structure or some organizational issues. This is... the coalition is just the process. And the major objective of this process is to support democracy and to support democratic countries.

We also are working in order to establish greater cooperativeness in the region through re-establish the Baltic and Black Sea cooperation process. Reaching out to the Caspian. Participation of Russia in this process is certainly welcome and indispensable.

Let me say a few words about Transnistria, which lead me... Transnistria case which lead me to some commonalities, which could be followed in settling the conflicts. Recently President Yushchenko put forward the concept of settlement in Transnistria being referred to as Seven Steps to Settlement Through Democracy.

What do we mean under this plan? We mean that the protection of rights of national minorities and the relevant OSCE and Council of Europe instruments are very important in any kind of settlement.

The building up of free media and developing institutes of civil society also are very important. Then the process of demilitarization of those territories, and introduction of international, normal peacekeeping missions with appropriate mandate, and with a wide participation of all interested parties.

The holding of free and fair elections in all separatist enclaves under strict international monitoring. And recognizing of these newly-elected bodies is by no means recognition of the independence of these territories. These bodies will be recognized only as having mandate to negotiate with the central authorities the future status of territories within the borders of their respective states.

And finally, the strict border and customs control by adjacent countries and with the participation of international community to prevent smuggling and trafficking.

These are just a few words about our experience in tackling frozen conflicts.

What can NATO and EAPC do in this regard? First, the EAPC can create at work working group on Europe's frozen conflicts.

Second, the EAPC can elaborate a specific action plan to address challenges of Europe's frozen conflicts.

Third, we may organize the discussion of Europe's frozen conflicts at the next EAPC Atlantic Policy Advisory Group meeting which could be held in Ukraine.

Number four, establishing NATO EAPC information centre, or liaison officers in the capitals of state facing frozen conflicts.

And the last, establishing an informal NATO GUUAM consultative forum to address the problems of frozen conflicts.

I thank you very much.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much for your contribution. I'll now give the floor to Sergei Karaganov. The floor is yours.

Sergei Karaganov (Chairman of the Council for Foreign Defence Policy, Russian Federation): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have the privilege of independent men speaking after to ministers, who used to be independent men, but now are dependent on their federal positions. But I... no no, but I do... I greater respect them and they're really great friends, and I knew that they're also very good thinkers about the... one of the few in Europe who could actually produce new ideas.

So rather than arguing with them, which I could, I would add to their analysis. (Laughs)... Borys is thinking that I'm still plotting against him. I mean, no.

TARASYUK: You're not?

KARAGANOV: I'm not.

(LAUGHTER)

UNIDENTIFIED: Good guys(?).

KARAGANOV: First, I mean, the name of our panel was renamed in terms of political correctness. It was called frozen conflicts. Now it is something else.

But still, I mean, most of us have been talking about frozen conflicts. Which is a very bad term because the frozen conflicts means that they should... could be unfreezed and become real conflicts, first.

Clearly in North Atlantic space, these conflicts deal with the likes of Nagorno Karabakh, Transnistria, Bosnia, Cyprus, Abkhazia, Ossetia, and of course, Kosova, which is the cause célèbre. These are the places in the North Atlantic community to which we all belong, or rather space, our community space, which would be frozen conflicts, or unresolved conflicts.

So Chechnya is a part of that list, but it is somewhat in a different category. It fought for some independence, or quasi-independence. It was given independence. It used it for becoming a bandits' paradise. Then Russia had the will to suppress and eliminate this paradise of bandits and drug traffickers. But the price is known, and it is awful. So we have to have the Russian experience... I mean, always... I mean, in front of us.

We want to reproduce the experience, maybe, but we have to know the price. We have to know the price.

The problem... unrecognized states is not a new phenomenon. During the last 60 years we have had, I mean, national liberation movements who fled their colonial powers and then created themselves into independent states due to the fact that United States fought against the old colonial powers and Russia and the Soviet Union fought against old colonial powers. And I mean, the combined efforts of those new arrivals brought onto the world scene about hundred states, which could not control their territory, could not produce the basic goods being stability, education, health, stability, economic growth for their population. And now, I mean, United Nations... United Nations are almost dominated by countries who are failed or failing.

Which is a very important issue to be thought about when we think about the unrecognized states on the territory of the former Soviet Union or former Yugoslavia.

These states have created a habit of dependence, the philosophy if aid, which corrupts elites, and the philosophy of guilt, which is very strong outside on these... of these nations.

We never, we never, we here, never were able to question the right of the nations for independence and statehood, even though these rights of nations were achieved in most cases by blood, mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and even outright genocide. Most of the national liberation leaders and fighters were terrorists in the modern understanding of the term.

So now I'm coming a bit more concrete to the burning issues of Europe. So five to fifteen years has passed since these countries, or these territories parted with their mother nations to which they were formerly belonged. We should always remember that these nations emerged or... or emerged as a result of the disintegration of two great multinational countries. One Yugoslavia and one the Russian Empire, Soviet Union.

These countries... most of these countries didn't have neither legitimacy nor the right for... I mean, the historic right. However, I mean, many of the charges on these... in these countries believe that they have the same right for independence as the countries to which they formerly belonged. And we are now dealing with an aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

It's unbelievable for me that the disintegration of the Soviet Union was so bloodless. I mean, relatively bloodless. But we have to look after. I mean, we lost, in all these wars, much less than in the national liberation was in Yugoslavia.

But ten to fifteen years passed. In most of these entities new elites were formed, new historical mythologies were formed, new histories were formed and new affinities, national identities were formed. And in addition to that elites, both in these separatist entities, as well as in mother countries, have developed some kind of a common interest in keeping the status quo. For economic reasons. We all know about the illegal trade through... which is coming through Abkhazia, or else from Transnistria, but we know that the profiteers are not only in Abkhazia and in Transnistria, but elsewhere. And the biggest profiteers of that.

Now we also know, and that is much more important, that in many of the countries which have these break-away provinces, a political interest in keeping the status quo that has been developed. You will remember that Mr. Schevernadze has been getting 300,000 refugees and not trying to domesticate them for almost ten years. And that was an explanation why he failed to reform his country. Now we are willing to see that Georgian young reformers could do away with his legacy, but these people are there. They were never domesticated. And that was the explanation for no reform and for unbelievable corruption.

The same is happening in Moldova, to a certain extent, and in other countries.

So I mean, the parallel interests were developed. So what are the possible solutions? Status quo. Satisfactory, but not to longer.

Second, reunification by means of dialogue. We should be sure that we have to... that we have the stuff, and we have the will to improve that dialogue.

A recognition of these countries are sovereign states. Why, for example, Georgia is a sovereign state and Abkhazia is not? Why Russia is a sovereign state and Georgia is a sovereign state...

UNIDENTIFIED: And Chechnya not.

KARAGANOV: And Chechnya is not. I mean, I explain very simply Russia has had the will to impose its will on Chechnya. I mean, these countries could not have the will or the power to impose their will on Chechnya.

Reunification by force. We tried it. We know the price.

Reunification by free will of peoples of unrecognized states. That could happen only through a very long process of negotiations and of development of the mother states. Because most of the mother states now are less developed or equally less developed than the unrecognized states, I mean. Georgia, until very recently was, I mean, less developed than Abkhazia. I mean, hopefully it is getting better now.

And... I mean, and nobody in his right mind would want to join a Georgia who used to be a failing state. Now hopefully it is not a failing state. It is a state which is getting out. The same goes for Moldova. The same goes for many other countries.

International involvement. Russia has been, in terms of peacekeeping, has been the most effect... I'm sorry, for the first time now I'm becoming partisan. Before that, I was... I'm scholarly.

Russia has been the best peacekeeper in the world. Let me remind you... le t me remind you that all of these conflicts were kept, at least, frozen, frozen or whatever, or kept... I mean, kept under control for almost ten to fifteen years. I mean, I mean, under control. People were not killing each other.

And some of the conflicts, like in Tajikistan were actually solved because we could have had, I mean, a forceful (inaudible) of Tajikistan. We solved that problem. But that is not an overall solution. And so... and who should participate in peacekeeping reunification, etc. It's a big question. GUUAM by all means.

European Union is telling us that it could involve Russia in dealing with these unresolved conflicts, which is weird, because European Union, with all my great respect, doesn't have any instruments as so far to play any kind of a role there. NATO has, probably will have. And Russia is not against international participation on these conflicts. The question is, what do the other bodies bring to this? Do they want simply to participate or do they want to solve or freeze or unfreeze the conflicts.

Yeah, and I'm finishing. European Union was good in Macedonia. But it is a small issue and it was effective in Cyprus, but for obvious reasons. OSCE is useful, but in a very limited way. So probably, probably after ten years or fifteen years of unrecognized states we have to deal with that matter much more seriously in two or three years. Some of them should be recognized, some of them should be put under some kind of international mandate. Some of them should be reunited. But we do not have a magic formula. Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. This completes the list of the three first speakers, and as you certainly know I have not kept a very strict discipline, to put it that way, but to allow for all... everyone to speak, perhaps I should remind ourselves that the discussants will have from three to five minutes to comment on what has been said and introduce other points as well.

So my... now in the next group of speakers the first speaker will be the foreign Minister of Lithuania, Antanas, the floor is yours.

Antanas Valionis (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania): Thank you very much. You know, I am tight, much more than my colleague Sergei, so I will try to speak more precisely, but I will start from saying that Lithuania is on the eastern border of NATO and the eastern border of European Union. And in this place very different approaches are meeting. Lithuania, together with NATO, with the European Union, thinks that only democratic and free states in the neighbourhood with market economy, can increase security of Lithuania, of European Union or NATO.

Sometimes I have imagination that in our neighbourhood, especially in Russia, some people think that only extension of territory can guarantee security. And those different approaches sometimes meet each other in Ukraine, for example, in Moldova and so on. And that is one of the problems we can solve, I think, it's the only way to extend democracy.

The previous speakers have presented numerous insights into the causes, the effects and the instruments of addressing the frozen conflicts that still persist on our continent. And I would like to add a few words regarding more general factors, contributing to more or less successful conflict resolution.

This instability in the western Balkans is still unfinished business, even though we see this region's future firmly (inaudible) in Europe and to the transatlantic community. Such international organizations as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union do play the very important role in helping the Balkans to heal their wounds. But the factor European and transatlantic integration seems to be crucial. The perspective of joining NATO and the European Union supported by a wide range of so-called outreach instruments, has encouraged much-needed reforms, and now serves as a magnet for those countries wishing to build a more certain and prosperous future.

I'm confident that a similar approach will be highly appreciated in other parts of Europe dealing with their unresolved conflicts. After the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, as well as consolidation of pro-European leadership in Moldova the Transnistrian case seems to have high chance for a breakthrough.

We expect that by further implementing democratic and market-oriented reforms Moldova itself will accelerate the resolution process.

A good deal of effort must also be shown on the Ukrainian side. We believe that Ukraine, which has declared its pro-European vocation, is genuinely interested in ensuring full control on the Ukraine-Moldova border, including its Transnistrian segment. And we urge the Ukrainian leadership to do so.

Last week President Adamkus met President Yushchenko in Vilnius, where they spent some time discussing this issue. I want to believe that the Ukrainian leadership will resist the enormous pressure on put on it by various elements and willing to give up the status quo.

Last, but not least, we must also ensure full implementation of the Istanbul commitments by Russia. It is striking sometimes how much we are focused on the negotiations, formats rather than addressing the basic courses of instability. In Transnistria we must help the parties to get rid on the major destabilizing factors before any long-term solution could be reached.

And it's in doing this we should insist on democratic values and provide a clear-cut perspective for those nations who want to follow this path.

The Balkans experience can also be applied to the South Caucasus. Instruments of cooperation can facilitate regional dialogue and cooperation which are lacking in this region. The goals of our assistance and engagement in the South Caucasus should be to focus attention on such areas as implementing domestic reforms, introducing long-term strategic planning, strengthening democratic control of the armed forces, boosting democratic institutions.

This focused efforts will in the long run have a positive influence on the peaceful resolution of regional problems.

NATO already works hard in many of these areas. We know that effect of NATO's assistance from our own experience. And we are ready to provide advice.

I encourage NATO member states to be even more visionary and flexible in responding to the individual needs of our partners and the partners themselves to be more proactive in making the best use of the instruments available to them.

By successfully combining NATO's and EU instruments in the APC area, we will support an encourage painful, yet necessary reforms, generate socio-economic progress and foster a stronger transatlantic perspective. This can, in the long run, warm up conditions for the resolution of frozen conflicts.

Good neighbourly relations, political dialogue, and especially the ability to compromise, these are some of the keys to success that helped us on our way to NATO. I'm deeply convinced that such measures as the implementation of membership action plan and the development of Vilnius Ten cooperation process have been the most effective means for promoting peace and stability in our continent.

The recent GUUAM Summit is an example of similar laudable regional cooperation, which I'm sure will develop further and will be encouraged by NATO and the EU. (inaudible), the level of such cooperation, but that prospects for a solving seemingly insolvable conflicts in the region.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. I now turn to Vladimir Socor, who will be the next speaker.

Vladimir Socor (The Jamestown Foundation): I have systemized my comments into six conceptual points, implying in each case a policy recommendation as well.

First, interests: All of these conflicts are unfolding in the greater Black Sea region, an area where the Euro-Atlantic community has major interests. The area provide a strategic access corridor to operations areas in Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East for Allied Forces. And it provides and energy transit corridor for Caspian oil and gas to European consumer countries. At stake is the energy independence of Europe in the future.

This area is truly, paraphrasing MacIntosh, the new pivot of history at this particular stage. Conflict settlement strategies should proceed from this place.

Two, international law: It is necessary to restore the operation of international law in this region. Since 1991 this region has been practically outside the purview of international law. Borders have been de facto shifted, or erases, foreign troops and bases are stationed in foreign countries without their consent. The principal offender against international law in the region is, of course, Russia and its military.

Conflict settlement efforts need to proceed from solving this problem, the restoration of international law.

Third, the democracy dimension of conflict settlement: Any political settlements of these conflicts, any solution to the political status of the secessionist areas must be democratic solutions. The secessionist... At least three of the secessionist enclaves, Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia—Karabakh being in some ways in a separate category—are characterized by a model of governance that involves a fusion of black and grey markets... black and grey economy structures, the state apparatus and the security services.

Arriving at political settlements and political status determination with the incumbent leaderships would involve anti-democratic quick fixes. Political settlements need to be preceded by a transitional period of democracy and civil society building in the secessionist enclaves. Before any elections can take place it is necessary to enable the populous of these areas to build NGOs, independent non-governmental organizations, political parties, free local media, and ensure their access to international information.

Only after such a transitional period can legitimate and credible elections be held.

Fourth, demilitarization: The secessionist enclaves are over-militarized. There are so-called peacekeeping forces provided by Russia, which are peacekeeping in... which are anything but peacekeeping. There are the armed forces of the secessionist enclaves themselves, created through transfers of personnel and armaments from the Russian armed forces. There are the security services of the secessionist authorities, and finally, there are the so-called unaccounted for, treaty-limited equipment, this wonderful linguistic creation of the OSCE. Those are heavy weaponry holdings that would have had to be scrapped or repatriated to Russia under the CFE treaty. Instead, they were handed over to the secessionist forces.

Before a viable political settlement can be discussed, let alone reached, the regions have to be demilitarized, and the peacekeeping model needs to be changed. Not only the areas, but the peacekeeping operations need to be demilitarized and civilianized. With the possible exception of Karabakh, where perhaps a strong military peacekeeping operation might be necessary with the events of political agreement among the parties, but in Transnistria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, there is no need for militarized peacekeeping.

In 2003 the European Union developed, for a very short time, peacekeeping concepts involving predominantly civilian components. With only a token military component. It was proposed for Transnistria. It got nowhere because it was shut down within the European Union by certain West European governments. I think this two-year-old concept needs to be placed back on the table.

Point number five, process: The current negotiating formats are... in fact they belong not just to history, but to a prehistoric stage as seen from today's perspective. They date back to the late... to the early 1990s, when the enlargement of the European Union and NATO and the acquisition of major western interests in this region would have been unthinkable more than a decade ago.

In the meantime, western interests have increased exponentially, and have outgrown the existing negotiating formats.

Western institutions have essentially taken a hands-off approach to conflict settlement. In 2002 the NATO-Russia summit and the U.S.-Russia summit held back-to-back in May 2002 in Italy, envisage joint efforts at peacekeeping and conflict settlement in the four frozen conflicts which were named; were specifically listed. Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Karabakh. Nothing was heard about that initiative since May 2002.

The European Union, despite its great economic interest in the region, is practically an absentee in terms of conflict settlement. The European Union has taken the very easy approach of appointing, of selecting special representatives who, in fact, exercise post-retirement sinecures in these regions. It is the case of Heikki Talvitie and of Mr. Jacobovits, of course. The EU is completely disengaged from these issues.

About the OSCE the less said, the better. The OSCE has been eviscerated from within by Russia. If the OSCE is to survive as a credible international organization it has to abandon its ambition of being a security actor. The OSCE's competitive strength is in the field of democracy building-election monitoring and the like. That's what I see a role for the OSCE in democracy building in the secessionist enclaves.

Security should be left to more capable actors.

And finally, last, but by so means least, the sixth point, the role of Russia: Russia is the problem, not the solution, in most of these cases. Russia's interests do need to be taken into account. Russia's voice needs to be taken into account. But as a voice in the debate, not as a veto on the process.

We need to graduate from this stage in which we consider Russia a veto on the process, and listen respectfully, but in a non-binding way, to Russia's view.

In conclusion, the vision that should guide us, our efforts for solving these problems, should be the vision of Euro-Atlantic enlargement. We should regard this area as the follow-up stage of Euro-Atlantic enlargement. And we should proceed from this premise in trying to solve these conflicts in accordance with Euro-Atlantic interests, not with the interests of the former imperial power.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. I think we have a lot of points here which we should discuss later. I think I'd go immediately now to...

UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible)...

PETERSEN: Sorry. No, immediately to Giorgi, than to Dan Fried and then to the... my point was only that I think that... I just watched the audience and saw that they're taking note of a few points, so I think we'll have a lot of contributions in debate afterwards. So no, we are going to Giorgi Baramidze for his contribution and then to Dan Fried and then I will throw it open to discussions.

Giorgi Baramidze (State Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Georgia): Thank you Mr, Chairman. First of all, I have to say that... many thanks to the organizers for giving us this wonderful opportunity to come here and to have such a frank discussion.

And I have to begin with the support to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, which has given us some ideas how we can under the auspices of the EAPC, have established some institutions in order to deal with unresolved conflicts, and we fully support that proposals.

Speaking about Europe's unresolved conflicts, and European security, most acute concerns are existing conflicts in Moldova and in South Caucasus, obviously. We've been speaking about these. We welcome Ukraine's constructive role in the Transnistria conflict resolution, with their respect of territorial integrity of Moldova. And we welcome recent renewal talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and it was very promise of dialogue between two presidents in Warsaw, so we hope this process will go on and we will have serious progress in that regard. And Georgia, certainly interested to have a peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, to have resolved their Karabakh issues.

Beginning... being lawless black holes and safe haven for terrorists, smuggling, human trafficking and other illegal activities, conflict zones represent threat not only to the Black Sea region, but to the whole European security.

Resolution of those conflicts require certainly joint efforts. Speaking about conflicts in Georgia, I would like to note current critical situation which cannot be tolerated. Russia is still not playing a constructive role, and I'm not surprised, because even such a distinguished intellectual as Mr. Karaganov is questioning issue of the territorial integrity of Georgia. If this is the case, if people like Mr. Karaganov is questioning territorial integrity of Georgia, of course, we are not surprised that Russia... Russian officials are not playing a constructive role in this process.

Separatists are trying to keep status quo and status quo is the following, that we have ethnic cleansing conducted, for instance, in Abkhazia, so what we are offering right now to sort of agree with the consequences of ethnic cleansing, and ethnic cleansing is not out subtle definition. Is the OSCE resolution, and they referred these resolutions in UN many times. So I don't think that a (inaudible) should tolerate that in cleansing... in the 21st century.

And CIS, actually, Russian peacekeepers are ineffective, and I have to remind my colleagues that more than 1700 innocent civilians were killed during the so-called peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia.

Georgian government is committed to peaceful resolution of the conflict and has a clear vision of the process. We are trying to build confidence and activate dialogue. President Saakashvili's Strasbourg initiative offer a comprehensive plan of the peaceful conflict resolution. We are ready to compromise and offer any kind of security guarantees, any form of political and cultural autonomy, special pacts and economic favourable measures.

Our goal is to restore territorial integrity, protect human rights and rule of law on the whole territory of Georgia, of course, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

We believe in the (inaudible) of the peacekeeping process will significantly contribute to the progress of the conflict resolutions. Here we see the necessity of more active engagement of the UN, OSCE, European Union and particularly NATO. While resolving the conflicts we are offering a win-win solution for any party involved, including Russia, including Abkhazia, Ossetians, our citizens. Everybody can be winner, and will be winner when these conflicts will be resolved.

Particular attention should be drawn first to the protection on human rights and elimination of the consequences of ethnic cleansing in Abkhazia, Georgia. Second, return of the refugees and IDPs, regardless their nationality and political identity. Creation of the international police unit in Gali region of Abkhazia is very important.

We believe timely and smooth withdrawal of the Russia military bases from Georgia territory will contribute toward a... to the conflict resolution.

Finally, I would like to underline the peaceful conflict resolution and restoration of territorial integrity is adequately reflected in Georgia's IPAP, which is our main pass to NATO integration and will be also reflected to an action plan within European Neighbourhood Policy. And the restoration of territorial integrity of Georgia will be tremendous impetus for modernization and democratization of our society.

Thank you very much, sir.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. And now I turn to Dan Fried, who will be the last speaker in this part of our discussions. The floor is yours.

Dan Fried (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European & Eurasian Affairs): This has been a lively panel and I am in the unfortunate position of following Vladimir Socor, whose rhetorical flourishes, not to say substantive suggestions, I don't dare to follow. But very lively Vladimir.

There are two strategic contexts in which we're discussing the frozen conflicts. And these two have been referred to by other discussants. One is the emergence of the Black Sea region as a frontier for democratic and reformist impulses, which have been gaining strength over the past year and a half, and as a possible venue for accelerated Euro-Atlantic integration.

That is one overall context. The second overall context is the possibility that we are witnessing, in this region, but also in Central Asia, an acceleration of domestic political developments, as societies become impatient and unwilling... impatient with and unwilling to tolerate misgovernance, corruption, authoritarian rule and the resultant stagnation or deterioration of their well-being.

I do not know whether what's happened in Uzbekistan, or even Kyrgyzstan, should be characterized in the same way that we have characterized the democratic advances in Ukraine and Georgia. But the reaction of populations to misgovernance seems to be something all of these areas have in common.

If these two... if I have adequately described, or accurately described the overall context then we may face a situation in which the frozen conflicts will no longer remain frozen, and merely the subject for mid-level government bureaucrats in the West, and specialists to study. These may be unfreezing in ways which could be hopeful or very dangerous.

If an acceleration of political developments constitutes a potential problem it also could lead to potential solutions. Speaker after speaker today has identified democracy and reform within the region as one of the chief assets for those of us searching for solutions to these conflicts.

To put it very concretely, a reformist, functional, higher performing Georgian state is going to be obviously a more attractive magnet for the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia than a Georgian state which is not functioning as well.

A reformist Moldova, certain of its... confident of its future with Europe, confident in its democratic and free market reforms, is going to be an attractive place for the people of Transnistria.

These two factors should help frame our discussion. International organizations, whether the OSCE, NATO and the EAPC, and the EU, are going to have to get involved more actively in the search for solutions if we do not find ourselves forced to deal with the aftermath of conflicts, which may be the result if we fail.

Our Russian colleague referred to Russian peacekeeping forces, I believe, as the best in the world, or certainly awfully good at having kept the peace in the frozen conflicts. I don't wish to look back and assess the role, except to acknowledge that in many cases Russian peacekeeping forces did achieve certain things. But looking ahead, it is not enough merely to have kept the peace. The efforts, and Russian efforts also, need to be focused on achieving solutions.

Throughout the region we are seeing the beginnings of more serious discussions and more serious approaches to finding solutions, whether this is the useful context on Nagorno Karabakh, a new set of Ukrainian proposals for Transnistria and a new Ukrainian government which seems to be taking a much more active role and very constructive role in seeking and contributing to a solution; President Saakashvili's autonomy offer for South Ossetia, which is clearly meant as an offer to be worked on and even expanded, all of this suggests that the mechanisms are available, the political will among some of the parties is there, and if the context is as I suggested, the time is now to move ahead.

Two weeks ago... two weeks ago and a day, President Bush was in Georgia. With respect to frozen conflicts he made two points, one of which was peaceful solutions are the only ones which should be contemplated. Loose talk of war, of restoring territorial integrity through force, is not really a good approach.

And secondly, that settlements need to be pursued with all energy.

The relationship between reform, political acceleration in the region, and solution to frozen conflicts, is something which I think is common to almost all the speakers today. It will be out task to take these elements and pursue solutions actively. That certainly will be the position of my government working with the governments represented here, and some of the governments in the audience.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. I know that quite a few of you would now like to make a contribution. We just have one half hour to go and I know it's pretty difficult now to focus a discussion, but still I just want to suggest at least keep in mind that a lot of people would really like to speak.

The first speaker I have on my list is Sir Brian Fall, who will be the first speaker. To be followed by the ambassador from Macedonia. And I'll try to handle the rest. Yeah... does anyone have a microphone? I guess we need a microphone.

Yeah, okay got one. Yeah. Sir Brian Fall.

SIR BRIAN FALL: Mr. Chairman, thank you. European Union contribution has been either ignored or described as weird. Thought I'd just say a word on the South Caucasus where Britain is about to take over the presidency, and the union is clearly intent on becoming more active. The country reports will be succeeded by action plans and we will have a much more concrete policy base. And I...(Microphone cuts out)...to the new European partnership. So this is work in progress, but it's work heading, I think in a good direction.

It will be based on the idea that there is no alternative to peaceful resolution. What President Bush said in his visit to Georgia was extremely important and will have full support, I'm sure, from the European Union diplomacy. We would like to build on the idea of regional dialogue in the South Caucasus to the extent that it can be done, and that is longer term, but we need to make a start, wherever it's possible, to think in transborder terms about what's needed.

We need, I think, to make everybody more aware of the opportunity costs of non-settlement, and I don't think that civil society in each of the three countries in the South Caucasus is aware as it should be of what is being lost by a failure to resolve.

The cost of compromise is headline stuff. The opportunity cost of non-resolving is more difficult to bring out.

And finally, a small, but in human terms, a very important point. Sergei Karaganov, I think you could have been a little more generous to the new Georgian government on the IDP issue, where the political change has already been enormous, from Naderishvili(?) to Alasania and I think that the emphasis there, I hope, from Russia as well as from others, will be on this returning refugees to the Gali district in the first place, which is what all the friends of the Secretary General and the Security Council are pressing. That will be hugely important in changing the political climate.

And the final point, I think the EU view will certainly be that Russia is, and must be encouraged to be a part of the solution. We do not see Russia purely in Socorian terms.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Ambassador.

Q: Bonjour, je vais parler en français.

D'abord, je voudrais exprimer mes compliments pour l'extraordinaire organisation de nos hôtes Suédois. Tous les orateurs ont utilisés plusieurs termes, on a parlé de conflit, de conflit gelé, de petit conflit...donc on a même mentionné la Macédoine, et je suis l'ambassadeur de la Macédoine à l'OTAN. Puis, on a parlé de la crise et aussi de la présence de troupes étrangères ou à savoir, l'occupation.

D'ici, il parait qu'il sorte 3 choses importantes, que chaque crise est particulières donc chaque conflit est particulier et il faut une approche particulières.

Deuxièmement, peut-être pour vous c'est une question formelle mais, que chaque crise il y a aussi des conséquences. A savoir, prenons l'intervention asymétrique de l'armée ou les conséquences concernant le procès devant les tribunaux a l'AEAI. Parce-qu'il y a des débats, est-ce une occupation ou est-ce une crise ou est-ce que c'était un conflit.

Concernant la Macédoine, on a parlé de la crise, une crise géré d'une façons extraordinaires. D'abord par la présence de l'O.S.C., de l'union européenne et de l'OTAN, une approche disons multi-institutionelles. Et deuxièmes choses très importantes, la méthodologie interdisciplinaire.

Peut-être je pourrais citer ce qu'a dit ce matin le secrétaire général, pour gérer la crise, la meilleur solution, c'est une dimension démocratique et de démilitarisation mais, aussi une approche économique, social , politique et militaire. Peut-être ont peu approcher...ajouter une approche culturelle ou identitaire, surtout quand il s'agit de crise ou il y a des entités de différente natures religieuses etcetera.

Donc pour conclure, nous avons vécu une expérience très positives de gérer la crise avec les éléments qui était mentionnés ce matin de la part du secrétaire générale. Merci.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. I must apologize for not knowing the names, but I think I've got most of you on my list and I simply have to point. I have after the next speaker I still have about nine speakers, and I guess I missed some, so please keep that in mind.

But now, sorry, it's your turn. Yeah.

URBAN AHLIN (Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, Swedish Parliament): Thank you very much. Can you hear me?

My name is Urban Ahlin, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Swedish Parliament, and have one statement and one question. And the first statement is to Sergei Karaganov, because I didn't understand the logic when you said that the Chechnyan conflict should be put in another category than the other unsolved conflicts, because the fight in Chechnya was about independence.

And to my opinion, in my opinion, the conflict in Kosovo, or in Transnistrian conflict or in Cypress is also about independence. I can't see really the logic behind that.

The question to the panel is based upon what the Lithuanian Foreign Minister said, that we all share the same dreams and the same values of living in a society with free market economy, social welfare, democracy and so on. And isn't the simple truth about this that we have been very successful in the European Union and in NATO in enlarging to countries, helping them in reforming because they have had a driving force, a carrot in becoming a member of NATO or the European Union in the future, and because of that they have had this driving force to make reforms and democratize the countries and so on.

And we have been so successful, so the European Union and the NATO has now enlarged until a situation where we come so close to those frozen conflicts, or unresolved conflicts.

So we reach an area which I call a common neighbourhood with the Russian Federation. And here is my point. I have visited lots of elections, being election observers, and I must say I'm frustrated, I'm puzzled by standing in a polling station in Belarus or in Ukraine, see obvious fraud, standing next to a Russian colleague, seeing the same thing.

But afterwards, when we are delivering our statement on the election, I say that we saw irregularities, it was not dealt with in a good order, and it was lots of fraud here. And my Russian colleague, which was in the same polling station, says everything was (Russian Phrase)..., everything was very good. And for me this is puzzling. How can it be like that? We are in the same polling station, looking at the same thing.

And in my view we need to go ahead and say what's the problem with democracy, market economy, social reforms in this area? Is there any country in this region that is actually not benefiting from it? It's good for us in European Union, to strengthen our security. It's good for the people in the region. And it's also good for the Russian Federation. And in my view the problem is that there are great powers inside European Union and NATO that is more keen on having a bilateral relationship with the Russian Federation, and by that overlooking the frozen conflicts in this region. And that must stop.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. Deputy Minister from Moldova.

Q: Very recent parliamentary elections provided for a political climate that is extremely favourable for achieving Moldova's strategic objective of European integration on the (inaudible)... cooperation or with Euro-Atlantic structures. All the parliamentary factions have committed to work together in order to bring Moldova closer to the European Union to promoting a common position for the peaceful settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, transatlantic democratic institution.

Cooperation with NATO is the best way in the (inaudible) Moldavian (inaudible)... force of the international community and construct a common system of Euro-Atlantic stability and security.

The problem of separatism in the Republic of Moldova regretfully become one of frozen conflicts in Europe and continues to remain an extremely negative phenomenon which (inaudible) the system of stability and security so as the rest(?) of Europe.

In fact, we are talking about a conflict followed by neo-imperialistic interests (inaudible)... who is both of the mafia-type separatist clique from (inaudible).

It's of use that the exhausting negotiation format will not provide for the settlement of this problem. At the same time (inaudible) is dealing with their format, the stabilization forces on the international monitoring of a Moldova-Ukrainian border deal with the external dimension of Transnistrian problem and must be decided without the participation of anti-constitutional, anti-democratic and the Crimean region for (inaudible).

The settlement model must ensure (inaudible)... under territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova and provide for an autonomist (inaudible) for the Transnistrian region as part of a Moldovan state. The armed forces of the Russian Federation, which continue to be illegally stationed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, are in fact (inaudible)...in the negotiation process and provide for the perpetuation of separatism.

The Republic of Moldova call on the Russian Federation to fully withdraw unconditionally, complete and without delay, its armed forces from the Republic of Moldova. The so-called peacekeeping operation presently deployed in the separatist region does not correspond to universal standards of peacekeeping and contributes to the consolidation of a separatist regime.

We believe that in this phase of the conflict it's necessary to deploy a multinational stabilization force in accordance with exacting standards. The international monitoring of the Moldova-Ukrainian border, especially its Transnistrian segment, will constitute a radical contribution to the settlement of the Transnistrian problem by placing of activity of the region economic agents in conformity with the legislation of a Republic of Moldova and our international commitments.

Moldova believes that the Transnistrian problem is an issue of regional security, and requires a close cooperation, first of all, between the Republic of Moldova and its neighbours Ukraine and Romania, as well as with the participation of (inaudible)... as the EU and United States.

In the present in Moldova the Ukrainian initiative on the identification of a solution for Transnistrian problem are stating very carefully. In the same time, any opinion from the international community in this issue are very welcome.

In this context I would like to mention it that democratization is the necessary element which could help to bring in the region (inaudible)... values and democratic principles.

PETERSEN: We are now into the discussion, so... if you allow for others to contribute (inaudible)... That's fine, thank you very much.

It's your turn. It's coming.

Oksana Antonenko ( International Institute for Strategic Studies in London): Thank you. I hope it's on. My name is Oksana Antonenko. I'm from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. And as someone from NGO and also someone who spends a lot of time in separatist regions, I spend a lot of time in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh, I would just like to say a few words, I think, in the spirit of contribution from a think tank community, NGO society that is present at this meeting.

I think what is very important, I think, when we talk about a separate conflicts is to understand the societies that live there. We have a lot of representatives here from the NGO community, from Western Europe, from South Caucasus, from Western areas(?), but we actually have no one here representing the societies of those regions. And there is no question, of course, that we cannot recognize the legitimacy of separatist regimes.

But at the same time there's lots of people, I think, living for fifteen years in the areas of conflict, who actually can provide a very interesting perspective, I think, for all of us to understand how to move forward. And what was said by Borys Tarasyuk about the need for democratization in those societies, is an absolutely essential precondition for us, to move forward, to create a legitimate counterpart on the other side for peace talks. To broaden the horizons of those people who actually have been living for fifteen years in isolation, surrounded by crime, surrounded by lawlessness, surrounded by total lack of information about what's going on.

We need to invest, and I think NATO also as well as the European Union in the major education programs in those regions, in the major information programs in those regions. We need to bring young people from those regions to the West. To give them opportunity to get education. To give them opportunity to understand what democracy is all about.

We need to create a constituency there and we also need to respect the grievances of the society. The society which went through several conflicts and lost lives, lost loved ones.

So what I think I would want to support very much, first of all, what was the initiative of Ukraine towards Transnistrian conflict, I think we also have to think about similar initiatives in the South Caucasus. And we also have to find the forum for informal brain-storming discussions, which could actually be comprehensive and which can involve representatives from those regions.

And I'm very glad to say that IISS, which I represent, we just started now an informal dialogue in the Georgian South Ossetia context where we bring representatives both from Georgia and South Ossetia on the numerous times, around the table, to have an opportunity for them to talk and arrive to reconciliation.

We need to support initiatives like that in Abkhazia. We need to support initiatives like that in Nagorno Karabakh, and I think if we can find the way to articulate the programs like that, that would be the major contribution of this meeting.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. I would like now to recognize Vladimir Chizhov, if you would like to speak. And look, just to tell you that I would like debate to run up to five to one, and then I will invite the participants here to give very, very short comments, but I can't recognize anyone after five to one. Vladimir.

VLADIMIR CHIZHOV (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia): ( Speaks in Russian)...

PETERSEN: Thank you very much, Vladimir. Then you sir, and then to be followed by the gentleman with the yellow tie.

Q: Thank you. Temuri Yakobashvili, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. I want to extend my gratitude to Mr. Karaganov for self-explanatory comments and avoiding my job of naming a (inaudible).

What I want to say that continue the pattern that Mr. Fried gave, in those countries that western engagement was more, we had democratic revolutions. And in those countries that western engagement was less we don't have democratic revolution, we had the bloodshed.

But I want to remind that those areas are what Russia was considering the nearest abroad, the near abroad, and so have executed this exclusive rights to be a mediator or to be only country who has some sort of exclusive rights on mediating on conflict resolutions.

But I also want to underline that in spite of difference of the conflicts, one thing is in common. Of those conflicts that we are referring as the frozen conflicts, represent today end of secessionist movements in the ex-Soviet territories because all those regimes are controlled, centrally from Moscow, Moscow appoint those people, they are Russian citizens, so we cannot say that these people are striving for independence. In most of the cases they're appointed from Moscow and govern from Moscow, and I think that it's a very important to understand what we are dealing with.

And I want to echo what Oksana was saying, that we are disenfranchising those people from any sort of developments that are taking place in our country. And I think it's a task of NATO to be more engaged and individual members also, more engaged in what Secretary General referred today as shared security perception and values. So if we will have elites in our countries and in all the regions which share security perceptions then the conflict resolutions will be much easier.

And I think that NATO's task can be in our part of the world, in Georgia and in other countries, to promote creation of national security communities, which is not only one ministry, Ministry of Defence or Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but much more people what you know, media, NGOs, what this forum is also serving for, the creation of those kind of communities. And I believe that those communities would have to incorporate representatives of Abkhazia, Ossetia, Karabakh, plus this and others.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. Sir, it's your turn.

Q: (inaudible)... Atlantic Association. I have a question to Mr. Tarasyuk. Mr. Minister, you said that recently that GUUAM country signs joint agreement about democracy promotion and common approach to conflict resolution. Following from your approach from Transnistria conflict resolution and participation in democracy promotion in that (inaudible) in your role or proposition that you presented, does it mean that all four countries of GUUAM are sharing the same view, and for example, there's a readiness from four of the countries to send a representative, for example, to Nagorno Karabakh republic, local government election that would be taking in June 19, next month?

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you. And now across the aisle to you, sir.

Q: Thank you Mr. Chairman. My name is Nikolai Petrov(?) of the Euro- Atlantic Centre of Moldova. It's a non-government organization. I would like to start my... with a rather simple point. We understand in Moldova for fifteen years of unstable situation and my country's desperate need for security guarantees. Of course it's necessary to address the Transnistria conflict, understanding the real nature of it. This is a rather simple... well, understanding from our point of view. It's from the beginning has been territorial and political.

Since then in fifteen years saw its development it has another geo-political dimension with the full involvement of Russian Federation that provides military umbrella, as well as economic and political assistance to this separatist regime.

And I will very grateful to Mr. Rotfled to remember '93(?), you had it the first CSE(?) mission to Moldova and you came to the conclusions that this conflict is territorial and political. But since probably mid-'90s it has clear geo-political dimensions and it means that to be addressed now it's necessary to have strategic partnership and a system from international community. Minister Tarasyuk mentioned it.

So from our point of view, now we have totally different situation and dynamics and a wider Black Sea region, Caspian region and with emergency with GUUAM, with assistance of NATO, and based of commonality of long-term interests, probably there is a totally new reality and potential synergy for the settlement of all these conflicts. And EAPC process, it's one of the best framework because GUUAM needs logic and deeper cooperation with NATO.

And I would like to today to contemplate our Abkhazia and Georgian friends, because this is their(?) first then Baku-Ceyhan pipeline started to work. And we have big terminal, oil terminal in Moldova that is run for the time being by Abkhazia oil company. This is a wonderful economic long-term basis for cooperation and with raising the profile of GUUAM as original organization dealing as well as the security and the long-term guarantees for independent development of our...well of member countries.

Thank you for your attention.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much.

I can just recognize one or two more speakers before we have to wind up, but you'll certainly be the first one, and I know that I have to disappoint some members in all the audience.

Q: Thank you Dieter Mahncke, College of Europe, Bruges and Warsaw. In view of the time, let me put a complex question in a simple way. Through most of the statements today, particularly this morning in the plenary session, we talked about democratization, about on the ground problems. The Swedish Foreign Minister mentioned the difficulties of moving from short-term to mid-term and long-term reconstruction, the difficulties of finding out why the families are unhappy or the Pope's comment that many of the conflicts also had very strong irrational components.

All of this leads to the point that you need people, you need personnel to deal with these issues. We're not going to solve these issues through UN resolution or EU common positions or whatever. You need personnel. You need personnel in a double sense. You need personnel, indigenous personnel, who can determine what is required, who can ask the right questions, who can tell you what is needed, and when they get what is needed, who can then transform this and realize construction and development, on the one hand.

You need personnel, on the other side, from the EU, from NATO, who can understand these issues, who can deal with the questions, who know something about multicultural communication and so forth, so that together we can do these things.

My question to you really is, what are you doing about this? Are these people being trained, and what else do you think we might do in future to achieve this? Thank you.

PETERSEN: I can only recognize one more. If you have a one-minute intervention. Madam.

VIRA NANIVSKA (Director, International Centre for Policy Studies, Kiev, Ukraine): Thank you very much. I'm Vira Nanivska from Kiev, Ukraine. I direct International Centre for Policy Studies. My question actually is to Mr. Ambassador, British ambassador.

Sir, I would like to tell you that during Ukrainian revolution we have de-Sovietized. That means that our population, the people in the (inaudible) decided stop listening to the rubbish of the government, which speaks about democracy and does the opposite.

We heard in... we know about the best democrat in the world, Mr. Stalin, who created the best constitution. Maybe you heard about this. And western diplomats very often were happy to hear his double talk.

Today Mr. Karaganov explained to us that the best peacekeeping is in prison. And I agree with him, absolutely. Nowhere else you have the best peacekeeping. The problem is that the citizens of these prisons or these peace-kept places, do not like that way. And they'd rather have... the quarrel, they conflict, and they want to have their way and they want to hear different voices.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. I would like to ask the panel who would need some seconds to comment. Adam, you would like to. Go first.

ROTFELD: Very brief. First of all, I would like to say, one question was very simple and directly addressed to me about the Transnistrian conflict. I would like to say that it seems to me that after listening carefully to that what Borys Tarasyuk said, it is really an opportunity for the new beginning to resolve the conflict. And we should not miss that opportunity. And I would like to say that that was by the way the last sentence in my very brief introduction, that democracy and democratization of Ukraine, opened the chance to resolve the conflict in the (inaudible) of Ukraine.

Second, my point is, the question what was raised by Minister Vladimir Chizhov. I would like to say that this question I raise for myself many times. Why conflicts like Northern Ireland, Basqueland, Catalonia, Corsica, are not within the OSCE. And I will tell you that after a really very, very honest and fair approach, the conclusion, my conclusion is the following: That conflicts could be resolved by international organizations only when it is an added value. The democratic countries, they do not need, I would say, that type of added value, because they are good enough, and if it is not possible for the United Kingdom to resolve the conflict in Northern Ireland, I do not see really a space for the OSCE, with great my respect to the OSCE, because in fact, I devoted a lot of... part of my life the OSCE and I know what can be done. But believe me, it is not possible.

In many countries, for example, in Transnistria region it was possible. Not always, but to some extent. In other words, democracy and conflict resolution, it is very much interconnected.

And last point is, that both Borys Tarasyuk and many others here and Oksana Antonenko (inaudible) raised the question, that there is a need to maybe it has to be a kind of the conclusion of this meeting. There is a need to think about the centre. I don't know whether it has to be Euro-Atlantic security centre, or Euro-Atlantic conflict solution centre, but it seems to me that it would be really important both for governmental and non-governmental institutions, to offer some conceptual approach to different conflicts. Not one scheme, but simply to assist and to help find a solution.

I'm not thinking about the new theoretical, conceptual, I would say, research institute. I have in mind, I would say, something what could be very pragmatical and would help us out to find a solution for the frozen conflicts in Europe.

Thank you very much.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. Who would like to go second. Dan Fried perhaps.

FRIED: I agree with Daniel Rotfeld in his point. In addressing Minister Chizhov's concerns, why the OSCE hasn't taken the lead in Northern Ireland and it's because developed democracies are handling the situation. We're... when ... I don't think there is a question of as much value-added, but that is, in any rate, a largely polemical point.

I think the key now is to recognize the relationship between democracy and reforms on the one hand, and the solution to the frozen conflicts on the other.

It is true that the new democratic governments in Georgia and Ukraine have opened the way to solutions in Transnistria and South Ossetia in ways that were not possible before. So if democracy taken the wrong way leads to nationalism and separatist conflicts, democracy taken the right way and with the right kind of leadership opens the way to solutions to these conflicts. That's what we need to do and not argue about the theory of the OSCE east of Vienna, west of Vienna.

The OSCE, the EU, NATO, EAPC, and of course, Russia is a member of EAPC, and a member of the OSCE, those are the institutions which should, when there is value-added to be had, engage themselves. And I think it's our intention, certainly my government's intention to do as much as it can in that respect.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. Borys.

TARASYUK: Thank you. There were two questions addressed to me. Whether all countries of GUUAM share the Ukrainian proposal concerning the settlement in Transnistria. During the GUUAM summit there were, in principle, positive comments made by the presidents of GUUAM countries. At the same time, they were commenting... the seven steps disclosed by President Yushchenko.

The second steps, this is just the brief description of the whole plan, the whole plan became the subject of some(?) study later and to the best of my knowledge all GUUAM countries do support Ukrainian proposals. And I was surprised at hearing from distinguished representative of Moldova that the proposals are still being... well studied. From reliable Moldovan sources, I claim to say that the study is over, and the proposals were supported.

As to Karabakh, the situation in Nagorno Karabakh was not thoroughly discussed at the recent summit of GUUAM, but I would like to assure you that it will be discussed during the forthcoming ministerial GUUAM meeting.

Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much. Sergei.

KARAGANOV: I think a few remarks. First, U.S. role, Sir Brian, European Union role is not weird. It's kinky. I mean, if European Union wants to get itself involved let it get. It is people and money. So far none... I mean.. yes, I mean... so far only words.

UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible)...

KARAGANOV: No no, not in the conflicts except for Kosovo, Macedonia, etc.

UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible)... Abkhazia...

KARAGANOV: I mean, Abkhazia, I mean little bit.

Second, so I'm the most generous towards Georgia, and I think that they're... I'm leader of the party in Russia who thinks that the only way to solve their problems of break-away states is to help Georgia to prosper.

And third, Chechnya is in a different category. Simply because Russia had the will and the ability to fight and to kill. And I don't want these... this issue to be... I mean, be the customary, to be custom.

Fourth, Kosovo is a key state, I reiterate. If Kosovo is acknowledged as a state, independent state, then all others will have the right, and some will be independent sooner or later, whether we want it or not.

And the last, we'll have to stop quarrelling and understand that we are... we are indeed united in Europe. I mean, we're still competing, which is a pity. I do not want even to quarrel with Socor view of the world, because it's, from my point, is irrelevant. But we have to be united. Otherwise, we are in for trouble. And these tiny problems, which you have on our hands now are very small.

PETERSEN: Thank you. Now, Giorgi Baramidze for a quick remark.

BARAMIDZE: Thank you very much. Thank you for... all my colleagues, for really very interesting and the participants very interesting, and frank discussions.

I have to refer to, first of all, Oksana Antonenko's remarks about giving the possibility, the local people living in secessionist regions, not stages, regions, to have elected or chosen their own leaders. But we are trying to have this process, but there is a major power influencing that regions, which is not willing to do that. That's what... and this is the Russia. And we know that in South Ossetia we have appointed so-called leader, there locally and recently in so-called elections in Abkhazia, without majority of the population which was sort of kicked out from Abkhazia. Even those people who are currently living in Abkhazia were not allowed to have elected their leader, without serious interference.

So that we are dealing right now with Russia and with Russia's interest, to really have settled these conflicts or not. But we believe this is in Russia's best interest to have united Georgia in really democratic and prosperous Georgia, where human rights are protected, rule of law is safeguarded, and where all people have opportunity to live in prosperous country, in free country, and do a business, and achieve whatever they want to achieve in this world.

This is our goal, actually. Very simple. If you apply this to Abkhazia completely, we want to let refugees, majority of the population, including those Abkhazians, ethnic Abkhazians who opposing idea of separatism, go back, have an election, democratic... really democratic election, and then they will choose what they want to do.

So that's very simple. As simple as it is. That's what we want. But in order to achieve this we want to pursue it, our great neighbour of Russia, to agree with the simple idea that it's good to have the stability in its southern flank rather than have destabilization.

So this is the point, and it's good to have a democratic neighbour and neighbour of NATO member or EU member, eventually, which will contribute to Russia's well-being as well, because we will have then possibility to have great economic relationship, increase this relationship and use this tremendous potential of this region to make people be happier. That's the point. Thank you.

PETERSEN: Thank you very much, and now Vladimir... I guess you have to be very, very quick if I may sort of state(?). Even if a lot to comment on.

SOCOR: Too nominative points by way of conclusion. First, settlements need to be based on aspirations of regional countries and of Euro-Atlantic interests, not on the Russian or Soviet past. What Russia is proposing is to preserve the Russian Imperial and Soviet past through unresolved conflicts, or through settlements in conformity with the legacies of the past.

This partly explains the insistence on preserving the quote, existing formats, unquote, which are part of the different historic stage. Those frameworks ensure multiple representation of Russian interests, directly or indirectly, while excluding any direct western representation. This is why the so-called existing formats needs to be cast aside. It's not necessary to proclaim their dissolution or their cessation. They could easily be circumvented or allowed to die a natural death by transferring the substantive negotiations to those parties that are interested in a future oriented European-type settlement. That's the first point.

And the second point has to do with the proper definition of interests. Euro-Atlantic interests in the region require strong, secure, economically successful partner states. Euro-Atlantic interests are synonymous with nation-building interests in this region. They are twin sides of one and the same set of interests.

And this is the vision that must guide conflict settlement efforts. Thank you.

PETERSEN: Well thank you, all of you. I think it's not my job to sum up in any way. It'd rather difficult. We were reminded at the outset that all these conflicts are different. But on the other hand, we were also reminded that the democratization and the reform process is certainly creating new opportunities, and I think we really should put an emphasis on this.

I absolutely agree with what Borys said, that it is not possible to solve these conflicts without international contributions, but on the other hand, we should remind ourselves that with a real political will from the parties themselves, it will be impossible to reach a solution.

We have international mechanisms. I'm not going to comment on whether they are adequate or not. But certainly we should...