At NATO Annual Conference Brussels 14 April 2005

Press point with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James Jones JAAP DE HOOP SCHEFFER (Secretary General of NATO): Let me thank James Jones and Edmund Giambastiani for joining us here today. I know that there are a few of you who have not attended the conference. Are there many, by the way, who have not attended the conference? Because if all of you have attended the conference it's... I'll not go over all the speeches and themes once again. Let me then, very briefly say, because it seemed that you all have attended the conference, that's... I hope it has become clear to you why transformation was chosen as a subject, because for this Alliance, for NATO to continue in transformation, and that goes for military transformation as much as for political transformation, is essential. Our security requirements are changing and NATO too has to continue to change. Transformation, as you know, is not an event. Transformation is a process. So see this seminar and this conference as an event in that transformation process. We began this morning by touching on three subjects. I gave my assessment--you can read it on the web, so I'll not repeat it--of why we are in NATO's military modernization and if I have to put it in short form here today, I would say we have made a good start. We've developed the right blueprints and put in place some very important new capabilities like the NRF, the NATO Response Force; we discussed at length this morning. But we are still short of some critical capabilities such as long-range air and sealift. And I must say that is more particularly a problem in Europe. We're on the right track, but we're not there yet. And this is, of course, not an obscure technical problem. It means then when a crisis occurs, and the allies decide to act, we might not have enough of what it takes to get where we are needed quickly and on time. So what I also did this morning, I set out some ideas on the importance of a broader political dialogue within NATO, to facilitate consensus, to shape transformation, to guide our operations and guide our missions, and to make our partnerships more fruitful. And as we just finished a session with parliamentarians, unfortunately a bit short, because it was becoming to get interesting, it is essential for maintaining public and parliamentary support for NATO to guarantee a public and parliamentary support, because defending values of the Hindu Kush, doing what we're doing in Afghanistan, is a more difficult story for public opinion, for parliamentary opinion, not only because it costs a lot of money, when it was when we had the rather simple discussion on keeping the Soviet Union out of the Fulder Gap. The security environment has become more complicated and it is definitely more complicated to guarantee political and parliamentary support for what we are doing. We have the parliamentarians touch on it; we might touch on it later. What I did finally was touch on the need for a more coherent approach to the stabilization and reconstruction phase of peace operations. I have not made a plea for NATO to develop all these kind of capabilities because I think that's not necessary. But we need, in the framework of NATO, EU cooperation, NATO-UN cooperation, NATO-NGO cooperation. We need this discussion because I think we need to plan, prepare and coordinate better than we do, for operations we know we have to keep on doing. Afghanistan is not something for a year or for two years, or even for three years. And that goes for KFOR in Kosovo in the same vein. Well General Jones addressed the lessons NATO has learned from its operations. Edmund Giambastiani discussed, of course, the important contribution Allied Command Transformation makes and has to make, because that's its raison d'être, to say it in French. The French ambassadors speak English, I can speak French. It is raison d'être for NATO's military transformation. Both commanders, of course, General Jones and Edmund Giambastiani will be happy to take your questions. We had three NATO Defence Ministers gave their national perspectives. I'll not dwell upon that. And this afternoon we had the parliamentarians. I'll stop here, because otherwise I'll be too long, and there might be some burning questions on the basis of what was discussed, and perhaps on a completely different basis. Thank you very much indeed. MODERATOR: First Léon and then Judy. Q: Léon Bruneau, Association France Press. A question for General Jones and then after for Admiral Giambastiani. General, you said this morning that... well, it's all very fine to develop the NRF, but you did say this morning very clearly that not one single NATO mission was fully resourced. I start again. It's fine to develop the NRF, but you did say very clearly this morning that not one single NATO mission was fully resourced in manpower or financially or etc. And you also said that in Kosovo, for example, that... I'm exaggerating, of course, but a lot of the forces there were not actively... not deployable, or basically not very useful. So I'd like to have your... little bit more... I mean, your assessment of that. What is exactly the problem for you as a military in NATO on that issue? And a question for Admiral Giambastiani: How much of the transformation that you are putting in place is inspired by U.S. military doctrine? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Well, let's go to General Jones first then. GENERAL JAMES JONES (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe): Thank you. The fact that we don't achieve 100 percent of the statement of requirements for our operations has manifest itself in the difficulties we have in generating the manpower required, the equipment required, and sometimes the funding required to support the operation. But in the Force Generation process it's more a characteristic of the first two than the last. I think that the Secretary General and I, and Admiral Giambastiani and others... we've talked about this. It seems intuitively obvious that once the Alliance decides to embark on a particular operation, which is an expression of political will, that we ought to have the same enthusiasm at the level of generating support for the mission. And the Secretary General and I and others have to spend an awful lot of time generating the capabilities required for mission success. So the farther away we come from resourcing the proposed and approved plan that is submitted at all levels, through the military committee and the NAC, the greater the degree of risk that you might not be as successful as you'd like. So that... it's a constant concern. On the other hand, I don't want to be naive enough to think that you're going to get everything you want all of the time. So there's a question of balance, and trade-offs. In Afghanistan, for example, last year we had a long discussion for many months over a single digit number helicopters. You know, from an Alliance that has over 2000 helicopters in its inventory you would think you could generate three or four helicopters without too much difficulty. It was difficult. It doesn't mean it's a show stopper. It doesn't mean that you can't find other ways and work-arounds and compromises and eventually get those instruments there. But the point I was trying to make, I think, was that we would like to see the gap between will to do operations and will to resource operations be narrowed. It's just a... I think it would make the Secretary General's life easier. It would certainly make mine easier, and we could do things more quickly. And in the portfolio that awaits us with expeditionary operations where speed is important, and particularly at the higher end of the crisis, it's something we should think about. Otherwise you run the risk of getting there too late. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Admiral. ADMIRAL EDMUND GIAMBASTIANI (Supreme Allied Commander Transformation): If I could, first of all, your question on how much of our transformation effort has been based on U.S. doctrine and experience is I believe the way you asked the question. Obviously there's a lot, because NATO decided, as an organization, to dual hat, and the United States decided to dual hat an individual who's at U.S. Joint Forces Command. And it's pretty simple. The United States decided about ten years ago, just over ten years ago, that a dedicated organization for transformation, at that times called United States Atlantic Command, but really codified in 1999 with a whole series of authorities, should reside down at U.S. Joint Forces Command. And that in 2002 we should no longer have geographic responsibility. This is on the U.S. side now. So a dedicated organization that wakes up every day thinking about transforming armed forces capabilities. NATO, in 2002 and 2003, decided that a similar dedicated organization was necessary for military transformation, and obviously created Allied Command Transformation. We could extend this down to a whole series of other levels. For example, the only organization at the time in the world that was designed to integrate command and control at the joint task force level--I don't want to get into a lot of this--but this is how we run operations inside the United States between all of the services in a joint way was called a Joint Warfighting Centre. So we did this so that we could train to standards, we could develop standards, we could experiment, if you will, with these organizations. NATO has created a Joint Warfare Centre in Norway to do the same thing. We stood it up on the 23rd of October, 2003. It's not fully operationally capable, but the important thing is is that we've done it. And why have we done this? Our experience, both bad and good in integrating forces within the United States, we've learned a lot and we've wasted some money and some effort and some manpower doing it, and we've tried to, hopefully, take that off the table and export, if you will, and have an exchange of ideas with the Alliance. Finally, what I would tell you, on the U.S. experience, is that we know we have to operate in an alliance environment, multinationally, internationally, and also frankly in a coalition environment. So Joint Forces Command, just two and a half years ago, had on a day-to-day basis probably somewhere in the vicinity of six foreign liaison officers working bilaterally. Today we have 50 from about 30 countries and the number will go to 70 next year. We, obviously, on the NATO side, in Norfolk, in my old command, we had two national liaison representations from the various nations of NATO. Today there are 24 countries represented. And this important work goes on on a day-to-day basis, both bilaterally and also within the Alliance framework. So I would just tell you, that's probably a good backdrop. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: May I make one remark, that as General Jones was referring to, that's the helicopters last year, that's at the moment, if you look at Afghanistan, we're doing well. We're expanding into the west. We will go south at a later stage. I think nations have understood that if you say A, indeed, and committed yourself politically to Afghanistan for a long time, quite obviously, that the B, should follow. When Foreign Ministers say A, Defence ministers, and they have not always such an easy position, given their budgets, they say B. That's why it's so important to have a discussion about how we fund our operations. But in Afghanistan we're doing well. In Kosovo we're doing well. In Kosovo we have, as General Jones has said, not that long ago, we have tooth-to-tail ratio, as it's called, which is not entirely okay. So we make KFOR more efficient and more effective and that's what we should do. And that's what we're going to do. So the call I made specifically last year, and General Jones made, has had its effect. So I think if we look at NATO's ongoing operations, and the training mission in Iraq as well for that matter, I think we're doing fairly well. Q: Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune. This is for the General and the Secretary General. Sorry... DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Not for the Admiral. Q: Not for the Admiral. But you can answer if you want to. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: He's not a General. Q: Nor a Secretary General. I want to ask you about the common funding. Do you think it's gaining ground a little? Because what General Jones says about political will... matching political will with implementation and you've gone on about this as well... I sense from this morning that it's gaining ground. At least it's in the vocabulary and people talk about it more. How far away are you from actually sort of getting to the decision level, or how do you see it? Will it be sort of à la carte, it depends on the mission, common funding for certain missions, or you will pool other things? I'd like to get a better feel of this. And just a little follow-up. Do you also think in its debate in the OSC, (inaudible)... UN, so you see a parallel cost-life or default, the percentages changing, given that this is such an old regime that was set up a long time ago how the cost-life or default percentage, maybe some of the percentages are a bit (inaudible) or outdated. Thank you. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: As I said this morning, the precondition for taking on the common funding issue, it was reinforced by Ambassador Rickets this morning, but I said it as well in so many words in my speech, in my intervention, the precondition for the common funding discussion, and General Jones and I have both been... both gone public with this, is that we have a solution for the general cost shares first. Because if we don't have that, we will not find consensus on more common funding. And to what extent that more common funding then will go it remains, of course, to be seen. But it's clear that the cost-life or the full principle, used to work very well during the days of the Cold War. You had after all a savings account and when the Soviet Union came you emptied that savings account and now you have a current account. And every government, every defence minister knows that NATO will draw on that current account, be it in Afghanistan, be it in Kosovo, be it in the Mediterranean, be it in Iraq. I think it is necessary that we go to another and a different system, as I said this morning, in how we fund our operations and missions. But first of all, and that's a discussion which is also going on and which is not going bad at the moment, by the way, is that we have a general vision of what we call the cost shares. What nation pays what into the civil budget, into the military budget, and into the NSIP. In other words, that is a discussion which has to finish first, and then I'm sure there is sufficient political support in NATO to start a discussion on what are we going to common fund. To start a discussion on, an example General Jones gave this morning, is the... I mentioned it myself, by the way as well, several times, is the AWACS model, the AWACS construction, is that a model? Should we indeed pool other resources, like we have more or less pooled AWACS? I'm relatively optimistic that we can have that discussion in a constructive way, but don't forget my buts. It's the general cost share first. JONES: The only thing I would add to that is that it seems to me that the NATO Response Force is a valid crucible for testing new concepts. I mean, in a way it's an indication of... this issue of common funding is a way of enlarging transformation. Because it is about... it is about how you use your forces, what your philosophy is. It is about how you pay for them, and it is about what they can do. So this is an exciting moment in which the concept of transformation is going beyond just the military capability and it will absolutely include Allied Command Transformation as well, but think of the NRF as, if you will, a 25,000-man crucible in which you can do all kinds of things. The military capability is only one of them, but how you support its operations is another. And what you use it for is a third. So it's really exciting to see the bandwidth widen and have transformation be much more inclusive than just capabilities. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: And do not forget, Judy Dempsey, what I said this morning about the structure and the system. We have to prevent the countries who are going to pay twice. If you have a state-of-the-art air force or army or navy and you're going to common funding those nations will say, excuse us, but we're not going to pay twice, bringing our Apaches in and then paying a larger share because we're going to common fund, if you see what I mean. MODERATOR: We have about ten minutes folks (inaudible)... Q: Paul Ames from the Associated Press. Secretary General, since you do invite questions on other subjects, can I ask for your comments on the reports out of Kiev this morning that next week's meeting in Vilnius is going to offer a concrete perspective of NATO membership for Ukraine? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: You're referring to press reports on I think Minister Antanas Valionis' visit to Kiev. Well let me first of all say that it's an informal meeting next week. And it's essential to say this because at informal meetings usually NATO doesn't take formal decisions. It's the first, by the way, first informal meeting of NATO Foreign ministers. We have, as you know, a NATO-Ukraine Commission meeting at the political level with Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk. We'll certainly, of course, discuss NATO-Ukraine relations. As I said in my press conference with President Yushchenko on the 22nd of February, we'll certainly set a step forward in the relationship between Ukraine and NATO. There will certainly be... there will certainly be results along the lines of intensified dialogue, but there will be no concrete decisions on membership. I mean, that was embedded in your question. That is not the case. But of course, on the basis of the summit in Brussels on the 22nd of February, NATO and Ukraine are looking for ways, how we can strengthen the existing distinctive partnership, how we can strengthen the existing action plan, how we can assist Ukraine in its reform process. I mean, something happened in Ukraine, so I mean what we have offered and we did offer to the previous regime of Kuchma, is, of course, not a yardstick by which we approach the Yushchenko government. That's crystal clear. But if the reports were that NATO is going to decide, or NATO-Ukraine are going to decide on membership, I think that is not yet in the cards. Q: Betina Zhoteva, Trud, Daily Bulgarian. Questions to Secretary General and General Jones, please. Sorry Admiral. GIAMBASTIANI: I don't (inaudible)... (LAUGHTER) UNIDENTIFIED: I'll find a way to... UNIDENTIFIED: (inaudible)... UNIDENTIFIED: I'll find a way to get him to answer. Q: The press conference on NRF inauguration(?) almost two years ago, former Secretary General Lord Robertson said that NRF is the best part of NATO, but he hoped that NRF will never be used. So a year and a half afterwards would you use NRF at the existing NATO operations now, General? And if yes, where and how? If not, what should happen that you use NRF in the future? And Secretary General, please, you said something which afterwards all the people, they become completely quiet, silent in the room, if you remember. You said that if ever was a push to create European bloc in NATO against the U.S., we know the result would be to split EU. You remember that? DE HOOP SCHEFFER: I do very well, but this is not an entirely correct quote, but I'll answer your question. Q: Please, please, explain. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Because your question is what did you mean by that? Q: Yes, please. Thank you. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Thank you. But let's first start on the NRF because I think with the great respect to the strategic commanders, that on the NRF it's first of all a political decision, and then a military one. I think I was as clear as I could be this morning that we do not have the NRF as to say it in French, a sort of "dissuasion nucléaire". You have it, you don't talk about it and preferably you don't use it. That's not what the NRF is for. On the other hand, we should not put the normal Force Generation process within NATO to sleep by creating the impression that whenever there would be a NATO operation we would say, ah, we have the NRF. In comes the NRF, the allies who are in the NRF rotation, they participate, and they pay, referring to an earlier discussion on how we're going to finance it all, and the rest sits back and watches. In other words, the gist of my remarks this morning on the NRF was that of course, every time there is a need for a political debate in the North Atlantic Council, whether or not the NRF will be used, we'll have that debate, and that debate is between the border lines I indicated. The one is the one liner: Not using it is losing it. And the other one is: Let's not completely demolish the Force Generation process because we have the NRF. I mentioned it because the NRF mandate is a wide mandate. The NRF mandate is a wide mandate. That's why I mentioned deliberately the tsunami. That example might have surprised some of you, but I mean, the NRF can very well have a humanitarian mission, like it can be a force of first entry. It can do many more things on which General Jones can give his comments. But that is how I see the NRF. You know that, to give you one complete example, last fall in Afghanistan when we supported the presidential elections there was one Italian NRF battalion lifted into Afghanistan. We had some discussion in Council about that. Of course, we had also the... our over-the-horizon reserves on top of that. I say again, had a horrible tsunami or a major humanitarian or natural disaster happened closer to the NATO area I'm convinced that the Atlantic Council would have discussed what the answer would have been, and that it would not have been excluded to use the NRF. Briefly, because General Jones will comment on the NRF as well, briefly on your second question: What I said was this, that I'm an Atlanticist and I'm a European. I see NATO as the primary forum in the transatlantic(?) relationship to have this political debate on security-related questions. But I see the European Union and I think it's a positive thing to develop in its integration its own security and defence identify. Those two should be complementary. There should be no duplication, no need for the European Union to reinvent the wheel, which is turning successfully for decades in NATO. And I made a political remark in answering a question; I see the man who asked the question sitting there. That if about compatibility, political compatibility, if there would be a drive in the European Union (I don't see it, but if there would be) to further European integration against the United States, and I made this remark describing the unique character of NATO because we have United States at the table, that the results of that European integration drive would be that Europe would be split. Because I do not see any uniformity in opinion in Europe about seeing a process of European integration which is presenting itself as a sort of competitor for the United States of America. In other words, a sort of competitor for NATO. I don't see that happen. I think those two processes can develop in harmony very well indeed. General, on the NRF. JONES: I'll be very brief. I think it's important to remember that while the NRF is... could be the sine quo non of transformation, it is not the sine quo non of the overall military capability in the Alliance. And it occupies a niche of the top third, if you will, of three levels of capability. If you associate the word expeditionary with the NRF you have it right. Which means rapid capability to deploy in response to whatever; an ability to sustain itself once it arrives; and a preparedness to be replaced by a follow-on force, which is the second level of NATO's capability, and that would be the deployable forces, which are not maintained at the same high readiness level. And those forces, in turn, could be replaced, if the mission should go longer and longer, by forces maintained at lower readiness, which is how we do our operations. So think of the NATO Response Force not as replacing anything, but as being complementary to a three-part capability in the Alliance, that has been lacking in the past, and fortunately when we reach full operational capability will make a significant contribution. But I think it would be a mistake to forget the other two parts of the capability, because they're extraordinarily important. MODERATOR: I'm really sorry, I know there are outstanding questions, but we're ten minutes over time (inaudible)... DE HOOP SCHEFFER: I think if we're ten minutes over time we have to... one final then. Q: Nick Fiorenza, Defence News. We heard today from the Danish Defence Minister that they have exceeded the usability goals set at Istanbul, and I've been hearing over the last couple of days and weeks that other countries claim to have met them already or to have exceeded them. Secretary General, do you agree with that, and maybe General Jones' comments too. DE HOOP SCHEFFER: Well some have, some haven't. But I said in my speech, I think this morning, that in this whole usability matrix we're developing, we're developing the common baseline because if I declare less forces than I have I'll make the 30 percent much more quickly than when I declare everything. In other words, we need a common baseline. We need an answer to the question, do we count reserves? What about conscription? In other words, we are not there yet. We have made good progress in the 40 percent, 8 percent discussion. There are certainly some allies, and I think Demark, indeed, is a good example, who have made it, or who are in the process of making it. But I'm further working for this common baseline, because if you don't have a common baseline, I mean it is relatively virtual discussion. And I think the 40 percent and 8 percent is a very important discussion indeed, because there is a lot to do still on usability, deployability, sustainability of our forces, but this common...