At NATO Annual Conference Brussels 14 April 2005

Transforming NATO – A Political and Military Challenge Address by H.E. Mr. Gediminas Kirkilas Minister of National Defence of Lithuania PANEL: NATIONAL APPROACHES TO NATO TRANSFORMATION Mr. Secretary General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen I am honored to have this opportunity to address such a distinguished audience of security experts and decision makers. Many voices in the security community complain about the slow pace of NATO’s Transformation and talk about the need to accelerate the process. But speaking from our one-year experience as a NATO member, we felt as if we jumped on a very fast moving train. Indeed, from the perspective of my country, the organization we joined is far different from the one we applied to in 1994. During our accession process, political pundits worried about the problems, which Lithuania and the other new countries might import into the Alliance. Russia’s negative attitude toward NATO enlargement was of particular concern. Today, these perceived problems are a thing of the past. Our current discussions now focus on national contributions to NATO’s activities, often in areas far away from the Baltic region. As the title of this panel suggests, I will attempt to provide a Lithuanian perspective on the process of NATO Transformation. First and foremost, I will present what our expectations are from the ongoing review of structures and missions of the Alliance. Even more importantly, I would like to also address what we do not expect from NATO transformation. Indeed, we believe that there are important elements, which are worth preserving within the current, or old NATO, so to speak. In this context, I will provide our initial thoughts on one of the elements of NATO’s transformation, namely, NATO reform. In our view, the overall objective of NATO’s transformation – is to make sure that the Alliance remains capable of dealing with current and future security threats and challenges. The ongoing review and adaptation of NATO’s structures; the need for deployable capabilities; the need to reform national defence structures -- all would be much less pressing if they were not related to the very “raison d’etre” of this Alliance. Transformation is not only about NATO’s future role. It is very much about the future relevance of this Alliance. Indeed, the NATO of 1994 was very attractive to us. But in order to be able to play the same vital role today as it played in 1994, NATO has to change. There are two key tasks, which, in our view, will determine the success of this Transformation: Firstly, we have to define collectively NATO’s area of competence and responsibilities in the new environment. More specifically, NATO nations have to agree which challenges they want the Alliance to address and which will be left to others. This is important precondition for consensus building on how and when the Alliance should act in response to these challenges. Cooperation and sharing of responsibilities with the EU and UN in crisis response operations is also of paramount importance. Secondly, we should focus efforts on thenecessary capabilities. Political aspirations have to be always supported by the necessary means. It will be the national efforts of defence transformation, which will determine NATO’s success in underpinning its political ambitions with the necessary capabilities. I hope that these issues will receive particular attention in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, which NATO nations agreed to develop at the Istanbul Summit. *** Transformation is also about burden – sharing. The Allies can share their burdens proportionally only if all NATO countries sincerely embrace Transformation objectives. The discussion on the usability of forces is central, in our view, both for NATO Transformation and for burden-sharing within Alliance. In this respect, we support the setting of ambitious usability targets for Alliance forces, which would guide national reform efforts. I look forward to discussing the usability issue with my colleagues at the next Ministerial meeting in June. Last but not least, this Transformation is also about NATO’s global reach. Until very recently NATO’s focus of activities was on the Euro-Atlantic region. Indeed, NATO has made a tremendous contribution to security and stability in this area. My country is one of those which has greatly benefited from the active NATO’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe. But today, with global terrorism at the top of NATO’s security agenda; with NATO’s outreach activities and partnerships extended to Northern Africa and the Middle East; with NATO’s flag flying in places like Afghanistan and Iraq -– the North Atlantic Alliance already is a de facto global security actor. NATO has to underpin its expanded role with adequate capabilities. It should be capable of deploying its forces over considerable distances; if necessary, well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. This does not suggest that we want NATO to be a future global policeman, which intervenes in every possible conflict. Far from that. We see the Alliance as being capable of acting decisively and with global reach, whenever and wherever, the vital security interests of its members are threatened. *** Let me now turn to the elements, which, we believe, should not be changed by this Transformation: First and foremost, the transformation should not try to redefine Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. I would even argue that it would be important to emphasize that NATO’s primary objective remains the security and defence of its members. Only on this understanding can countries, like Lithuania, continue radical reforms of their territorial defence structures and focus their efforts on contributions to NATO’s operations in places like Afghanistan. Secondly, NATO is unique due to its high–end military capabilities. This uniqueness should be preserved. The nature of ongoing operations (KFOR, ISAF) may suggest that more attention should be given to stabilization operations. This is true, and the challenges of such operations should not be underestimated. However, the ultimate success of NATO’s transformation efforts will be determined by its ability to undertake the most challenging of military operations. If NATO’s capabilities were limited to those needed for lower intensity operations, Allies would have to rely on national, rather than collective, means whenever their vital security interests are threatened. This could put the credibility of Article 5 guarantees at stake. Thus, the growth in NATO’s involvement in stabilization operations should not reduce the importance of developing robust military capabilities such as NATO’s Response Force. *** Last but not least, NATO must maintain a clear military focus in all its activities. Inevitably, the ongoing stabilization operations expose our troops to problems of the societies wherein they operate. Organized crime, human trafficking, drugs,– are just some of the problems Commanders of NATO forces have to deal with on a daily basis. There may be a great temptation to use NATO forces to address some of these (no doubt, very important) problems. We believe that this temptation should be resisted. We would advocate a clear division of labor with other organizations; and NATO should be very cautious about undertaking non-military functions. The Alliance should closely cooperate with other organizations, be it governmental or non-governmental in providing a secure environment. At the same time, NATO should not assume direct responsibility for tasks that are beyond the area of its competence. *** I will end my remarks by providing Lithuania’s perspective on NATO Reform. Let me start by saying that we fully support the Secretary General in this endeavor. We like his comprehensive approach to reform, namely, that there should be no “sacred cows” in this process. Indeed, the advantage of being a new country in the club is that we have no “sacred cows” and no vested interests in this process other than wanting to see this Alliance function as effectively as possible. As many other NATO nations, we would support a leaner and less complex committee structure within the Alliance. Also, we are particularly attached to your idea, Mr. Secretary General, of making the North Atlantic Council more political. We believe that military transformation can be enhanced by NATO’s political transformation, that political dialogue on strategic questions will bring us closer to shared perceptions, which are fundamental for building consensus and a sense of common principles. [With this I would like to end my introductory remarks and I look forward to our follow-on discussions.]