To the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Orlando, USA 11 Nov. 2003

“NATO Shareholders Report” Address by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson This is my last speech as Secretary General to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Since you are one of NATO’s most important shareholder groups, I thought it right to report to you how we have done and what still needs to be achieved. This will, I hope, enable you to give credit where it is due in your capitals; and to tighten the screws where it is not. So bottom line first: the Alliance is in good shape. We have adapted and transformed. Gone out of area instead of out of business. Created a robust platform for dealing with 21st century challenges. As a T-shirt I was given at our last Colorado Springs Ministerial put it: This ain’t your daddy’s NATO. Not everyone agrees of course. As usual, some critics on both sides of the Atlantic are arguing that Europe and North America have separate destinies, conflicting interests or incompatible world views. The truth is, however, that we have a unique partnership born in common philosophies of freedom and democracy. A partnership forged during half a century’s fight against tyranny. A partnership that now stands as a beacon in a world faced by extremism and instability. A beacon of democracy, toleration, plurality, openness and candour. I would be the last to deny that there are policy differences across the Atlantic, not least on Iraq and European security policy. As there are differences within Europe and within North America. After all, I have to deal with them, day in and day out. But anyone with even the slightest historical perspective will know that there always have been differences, and that there always will be. I do not despair at these differences. On the contrary, like every politician here today, I rejoice in the diversity within the transatlantic community. That is the reason why I abhorred the Soviet system and why I became a democratic politician. Although NATO has moved on, its transformation does not mean that we have abandoned the agenda of the 1990s, the creation of a Europe whole, free and at peace. Far from it. Two of the main themes of last November’s hugely successful Prague Summit related directly to completion of this vitally important task. The first is enlargement. Next year we will welcome into NATO seven new member countries, our biggest enlargement ever, consolidating security and stability in new democracies from the Baltic to the Black Sea. NATO enlargement threatens no-one and benefits everyone. A more stable, predictable Europe helps create a better neighbourhood and better neighbours. Wars will no longer start there. Partnerships can develop and thrive. All of which explains why NATO’s door should remain open for further potential members. The second Prague transformation theme was new Partners. Rightly so because partnership has been one of the extraordinary success stories of the post Cold War period. 46 countries from Vancouver to Vladivostok via Dublin, Skopje, Baku and Tashkent, bound together into the world’s largest permanent coalition. 46 countries meeting together and, more importantly, working together politically and on the ground to deal with today’s common problems. Partnership is not a static concept. We are determined to improve it further, to find new areas for cooperation and to hone in on areas where we can cooperate more effectively with groups of Partners. We are similarly keen to put more substance into our Mediterranean Dialogue, with ideas currently in the NATO melting pot. Most dramatically, of course, we have built partnerships with Ukraine and, especially, Russia which really have broken the international mould. At Rome in May last year we finally said goodbye to tired Cold War stereotypes and established a genuine NATO-Russia partnership based on the NATO-Russia Council. Better than the pomp and rhetoric, the Council actually works, taking forward practical cooperation on terrorism, theater missile defence and similar real world issues. But here too, we are not prepared to rest on our laurels. Military-to-military cooperation has slackened in recent years, largely because Russian peacekeepers have left the Balkans. We must and can do better. Russia’s withdrawal of its troops from the Balkans was possible because of another NATO contribution to the new Europe, the bringing of peace to this war-ravaged region. For most of us, the Balkans are no longer in the headlines. Which is a success in itself. But nobody should underestimate what was achieved by NATO soldiers, sailors and aircrew. In Bosnia, NATO enforced a peace settlement which ended a bloody civil war. Now, barely eight years after atrocities of the scale of Srebrenica, Bosnia works as a multi-ethnic state. Not perfectly but well enough for NATO to consider major reductions in our SFOR troop levels and perhaps even different organizational arrangements. In Kosovo, differences are now the stuff of politics, not ethnic cleansing; and instead of NATO bombing Serb soldiers, we are actively considering taking them under NATO command in Afghanistan. Finally, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1) we learned the lessons of previous crises and intervened before civil war took hold. I am especially proud of my part in that operation, working with the EU’s Javier Solana to stop the bloodshed starting rather than bring it to an end. So much for the pre 9/11 agenda. I put it in that way because it was, of course, September 11 2001 that transformed all of our security environments. A new agenda of apocalyptic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and failing or rogue states was born in the rubble of New York’s Twin Towers. NATO’s response was immediate. The declaration of Article 5 turned Cold War assumptions about the New World rushing to the aid of the Old World on their head. NATO AWACs aircraft appeared over US cities. NATO troops smashed Al Quaida’s networks in the Balkans. NATO ships protected shipping at risk from terrorists in the Mediterranean. Within months, a decade’s theological wrangling over NATO’s out of area role had been jettisoned. All 19 NATO Allies agreed that we had to be able to meet threats from wherever they may come. By November’s Prague Summit we could identify new missions, including defence against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as a central part of the Alliance’s transformation. Even Iraq failed to derail the process. Wounds healed quickly so that by last summer NATO had taken over the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan’s capital, Kabul and provided support to Poland and Spain in setting up their multinational stabilization division in, of all places, Iraq. Today we are on the verge of extending ISAF beyond Kabul. Side by side with this extension of NATO’s missions has been a transformation in our ability to undertake them successfully. 9/11 gave resonance to my mantra of capabilities, capabilities, capabilities which all of you will have heard – and some of you, in government, may have politely ignored. At Prague, however, 19 Presidents and Prime Ministers finally lived up to their responsibilities. The result was a major programme of modernization. The high capability NATO Response Force. Streamlined command structures and a radically reformed headquarters. A new NATO Transformation Command up the coast in Norfolk, Virginia. And a package of capability commitments covering the key deficiencies in European and Canadian inventories from heavy airlift and air tankers to precision weapons, air ground surveillance and defence against WMD. If Prague was not the complete answer to the transatlantic capabilities gap, it was a massive step in the right direction. So we have a new NATO with new members, new relationships, new missions and new capabilities. To those who have helped us push through this transformation, you have my profound thanks. But the task is not over. My friend and successor, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, will need your energy, enthusiasm and support much as I have if the gains of the past four years are to be consolidated successfully. What are the challenges? Let me give you three examples. First, Afghanistan must be a success. If we fail, we will find Afghanistan on all of our doorsteps. Worse still, NATO’s credibility will be shattered, along with that of every NATO government. Who will stand with us in the war against terror if we take on a commitment such as this and then fail to deliver? I am confident that NATO will succeed in Afghanistan. But to do so, we must meet a second challenge: to increase substantially the usability of European armed forces. Although I have used the figures many times, repetition does not dull their impact. 1.4 million regular soldiers under arms in the 18 non-US NATO countries plus another million or so reserves. Yet with only 55,000 soldiers currently deployed on multinational missions, most of your countries plead that they are overstretched and can do no more. That is quite simply unacceptable. It risks strategic failure in current operations and the inability to react if new crises – or opportunities – occur. Not only NATO’s credibility is at stake. The same pool of forces is used by the UN, the EU and coalitions. I therefore urge you to challenge your governments on the excuses they make for not doing more. Some countries still have outdated legal or constitutional constraints on where they can deploy their forces, especially conscripts. Other countries have not yet acquired the capabilities needed to deploy their troops abroad and supply them while they are there. Others still say they cannot afford to do so. And their governments refuse to argue the case for doing so with parliaments and publics. These are all political issues. So the ball is now firmly in your court. The third challenge is to persuade governments to make a success of the strategic partnership between NATO and the European Union. One of the biggest achievements of my term in office was the agreement earlier this year on the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements under which the EU has guaranteed use of NATO assets for its operations. This is a good deal for taxpayers and voters on both sides of the Atlantic. It means more resources for real capabilities rather than paper armies and paper headquarters. It means no unnecessary duplication between organizations. And it means a net increase in our overall ability to deal with the problems we all face. Berlin Plus does not block. It facilitates. It worked in FYROM where the EU made use of NATO’s assets. It worked in the Congo where NATO decided not to be involved and the EU decided that it did not need NATO’s assets. It can work on each and every occasion because it was designed to cover the whole strategic waterfront. But it will not work if the political will to make it work is absent. So you must challenge governments on the one hand to avoid any unnecessary duplication between NATO and the EU, and any diminuation of Berlin Plus. Yet on the other hand, you must also challenge them not to see each and every strengthening of Europe’s security and defence capacity as a threat to NATO. Because you cannot create a stronger EU at NATO’s expense. Neither can you sustain a healthy transatlantic relationship if Europe and the EU remain militarily weak. Ladies and Gentlemen, The challenges I have set out are the consequences of success, not failure. Had NATO remained a fundamentally Cold War body, not faced up to transformation or fallen apart over Iraq, my messages would have been very different. To continue to succeed, however, the Alliance and its leaders must have understanding and support in and from capitals. I have received that support over the last four years and NATO has been the beneficiary. As I step down from active politics, I look to everyone here today, and to your successors, to help ensure that Jaap too feels that same level of support and friendship during his term. 1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name