At the Diplomatic Academy, Warsaw 27 Oct. 2003

NATO: The Challenges Ahead Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been to Poland many times, yet coming here is always special. Poland is, in so many ways, at the heart of European history. A history full of tragedies, of missed opportunities, but also of unbelievable courage. A history of a truly heroic 200-year struggle for freedom and national identity. Today, Poland is writing a new chapter in European history, through its outstanding commitment to international security and stability. Today, Polish troops are engaged in keeping the peace in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and in many other places around the globe. As a staunch NATO Ally, and as one of the largest troop contributors to the United Nations, Poland has established itself as a force for good in the world -- as a country that matches words with deeds. In taking such an active stance, Poland -- the victim of many of the ill-winds of the 20th century -- has applied the lessons of its own recent history: freedom and security cannot simply be taken for granted. These privileges must be fought for and won. Peace and stability do not just "happen". They have to be built -- and maintained. And values mean nothing if one is not prepared to defend them when they are under threat. Poland demonstrates as a nation what NATO demonstrates as an Alliance: Credibility. Credibility is NATO's most precious asset. Everyone expects that if NATO takes on a job, it will succeed. Because it has the political will and the military means to accomplish its missions. That's why we prevailed in the Cold War. Why we made the crucial difference in the Balkans. And why so many hopes are now pinned on us in Afghanistan. Some observers have taken the fierce debate we had earlier this year over Iraq as an indication that NATO's credibility has been compromised. They argue that the new security environment is pushing Allies apart rather than closer together. But they are making a profound mistake. Because they are judging today's transformed Alliance by the outdated yardsticks of the Cold War. It is true that in the Cold War, we were afraid that too much debate would damage the Alliance’s credibility. We were afraid that the Soviet Union could exploit any perceived crack in our unity. In today's environment, however, NATO's credibility is judged by how well we solve problems. Indeed, if debate is a pre-condition for solving problems, for finding new common ground, then we should welcome it. Because it is through debate that a new transatlantic consensus has emerged: a consensus on today’s new threats, the responses needed to meet them, and the capabilities required to do so successfully. Today, no one doubts that terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and failed states have replaced the threats of massive tank armies crossing through Europe. Today, everyone agrees that these new challenges cannot be met by NATO alone, but only by a much broader coalition that includes our Partner countries. And today, everyone agrees that Cold War legacy forces are a waste of money, and that we need forces that are far more mobile and flexible than those of the past. NATO has come a long way, not just in defining that new consensus, but in implementing it. From Operation "Active Endeavor" in the Mediterranean to ISAF in Afghanistan, from our Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism to the initiatives to protect ourselves against the effects of weapons of mass destruction -- this Alliance has fully embraced the need to evolve and adapt in line with the new strategic environment. But we are not there yet. One year after our historic Prague Summit, and half a year before our next Summit in Istanbul, let me outline some of the challenges ahead. The first challenge is the continuing modernisation of our military capabilities. You all know my clarion call for "capabilities, capabilities, capabilities". That has been my trademark ever since I took on the job of Secretary General four years ago. Of course, military power alone cannot set wrongs right. But we have seen in Bosnia that the use of economic sanctions or moral condemnation availed us little without the credible backing of military power. In Kosovo, NATO’s military strength was essential in preventing a man-made humanitarian tragedy. And without the application of military power in Afghanistan, the Taleban would still be in control and playing host to Al Qaida. No, military power certainly is not everything, but effective military means will remain a precondition for security in the 21st century. As Ronald Reagan put it: "I once had to play a sheriff without a gun. I was dead 27 minutes into the show". If we don't want to suffer the same fate, we need modern capabilities. And I am glad to say that we are getting results. Just two weeks ago, the first elements of the new NATO Response Force were set up. European NATO members, including Poland, are working hard to improve their defence capabilities in critical areas. And we are implementing a radical overhaul of our military command structure – to make it leaner and more flexible, with a new command specifically dedicated to transformation. This is good progress, but it is not enough. NATO’s new mission in Afghanistan has revealed a serious shortfall -- the inadequate "usability" of our forces. In a nutshell, the non-US NATO countries have lots of soldiers but far too few of them can be deployed. Although we have over 1.4 million regular soldiers under arms in Europe and Canada and another million or so reserves, the vast majority are at present useless for the kind of missions we are mounting. The reasons are many and various. Some countries have outdated legal or constitutional constraints on where they are able to deploy their forces, especially if they are conscripts. Other countries do not have the capabilities required to deploy them abroad and supply them when they are there. Others still say they cannot afford to do so. Or their Governments do not have the political will to argue the case for doing so with Parliaments and publics. The result is that despite the 1.4 million non-US soldiers available in theory, many governments argue that their armies are overstretched and cannot do any more. Yet out of these 1.4 million troops, only 55,000 are today actually engaged on multinational operations. The harsh truth is that if our Governments are to continue to take on political commitments to do more militarily, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or Africa, or conceivably the Middle East, then they must improve the usability of their armed forces. If they do not, our political ambitions will prove unachievable. That would be a disaster for the people of Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere where the international community is or might need to become involved. And it would be a disaster for NATO's credibility, for that of the EU and the UN, and for every country making up the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. The second major challenge before us is NATO enlargement. NATO's enlargement process is a success story -- a success story that came about because of one key ingredient: credibility. Poland's accession, in the first round of NATO enlargement after the end of Cold War, was of huge historical significance. Poland had long been the foremost victim of great power rivalry on the Continent. Now it was the prospect of Polish NATO membership that made many Russians opposed to NATO enlargement. NATO stood firm. We sent a clear message that we believed in the right of any country to determine its own future, by its own free choice, and not to have its future determined by others. We also stood firm in our belief that Russia had to be associated with this new Europe, and that NATO enlargement would not divert our attention from achieving this goal. In the mid-1990s, few believed that this could be done. Bringing Poland into NATO and building a strong NATO-Russia relationship seemed like an impossible aspiration. Today, however, Poland is in NATO, together with the Czech Republic and Hungary. Next year, at our Istanbul Summit, seven more nations, including the three Baltic countries, will join this Alliance. Yet our relations with Russia have never been better. Once again, NATO demonstrated its key virtue: credibility. We could achieve all this because we were credible in our commitment to enlargement, and we were equally credible in our commitment to build a sound NATO-Russia partnership. As a result, Europe has left the Cold War firmly behind. Now we can tackle 21st century challenges without old Cold War baggage getting the way. But we cannot rest on our laurels. There are still countries out there who want to emulate the success story of Poland -- joining NATO and the EU in due course. We must offer them the chance to move along that path. That is why even after the Istanbul Summit next year, NATO's door should remain open. Our challenge with Russia is no longer to build a new relationship -- that relationship already exists -- but to cement our partnership by delivering real, practical progress across the full spectrum of cooperation. Here, too, we are making solid gains. Today, NATO and Russia work together on an ever broadening range of security issues -- crisis management, combating terrorism, dealing with chemical attacks against our societies, or maritime search and rescue operations. We are undertaking joint assessments of terrorism and proliferation. And we hope to deliver even more, particularly in the area of military cooperation. Today, at the end of my tenure as Secretary General, I can confidently say that associating Russia to the new, undivided Europe is one of NATO's greatest achievements. We have also made real progress in building a relationship with one of Poland's key neighbours: Ukraine. But questions remain. How can NATO best assist in Ukraine's transition? How can we help move a country whose name means "borderland" into mainstream Europe? I will not deny that we have been frustrated by the pace of reform in Ukraine. But I am encouraged by the progress that we have made in moving the relationship forward -- particularly in the past year, since the Ukrainian Government has made a more determined effort to push ahead with its drive for Euro-Atlantic integration. Ukraine’s progress toward democratic reform is essential to that integration. I am therefore pleased that the Government has set out a forward looking agenda for change. Clear progress in democratic reform is vital. Enshrining that commitment in the changes to the constitution would be a very welcome step indeed. So would be steps to ensure media freedom, including during next year’s elections. Because they would send strong signals that Ukraine is moving ever closer to the common values shared within NATO and the EU, and increasingly across the continent. This would be a strong basis for moving our relationship to a new level. Because our commitment to support Ukraine in its transition is unflinching. The final challenge I would like to reflect upon here today is the establishment of a real strategic partnership with the European Union. Next year, 10 nations, including Poland, will join the EU. This will mean that the number of countries who are members of both NATO and the EU will increase even further -- to 19. And yet, despite this large overlap in membership, and despite significant progress in our relationship, both institutions remain further apart than is good for them -- or for European security. The EU seems nervous about being overshadowed by what NATO is, whereas NATO seems nervous about competition from what the EU might become. This kind of thinking has produced a marriage of expediency rather than a marriage of conviction. As someone who has always argued for a stronger European role in security I find this ambivalence in our relationship particularly disappointing. What must be done? Let me first tell you what should not be done: We should not continue the pointless debates over "old" versus "new" Europe, or on the EU becoming a "counterweight" to the United States. Not should we engage in the unnecessary duplication of capabilities. Or in competition between paper armies or headquarters. What we really need is NATO-EU relations that embrace the future, not the past. We have the blueprint – the so-called Berlin Plus arrangements, agreed earlier this year, which gave the EU guaranteed access to NATO assets when NATO itself does not want to undertake a particular operation. This is a great deal which allows Europe to do more without the costly duplication of capabilities in which we have all already invested, in NATO. The next step is to broaden our cooperation in all areas where our interests overlap, and where we can complement each other. There are many such areas: combating terrorism, managing crises, and - above all - improving military capabilities. Not so long ago, NATO and the EU together prevented a civil war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1). This was a glimpse of the cooperative future to which we can and should aspire. A future in which both institutions work together rather than try to upstage one another. Let there be no mistake: in the volatile 21st century security environment neither institution will run out of work. Ladies and Gentlemen, Referring to that crisis, some few weeks ago I went back to Macedonia for my farewell visit in this job and they asked if I would address the parliament, something that I’ve already done twice before. I said I’d rather not because if the time was limited, I wanted to go where the crisis was in the year 2001. I went to a village called Tearce, which was a mixed village before the trouble and remained a mixed village with all different ethnic groups throughout the trouble, despite the burning of houses, the intimidation and the violence that went on. I met some of the villagers who stuck it out with theirs friends of various types and it was inspiring enough to do that. Then I went to the school where the children were being taught by dedicated and committed teachers. Loving attention was paid to these children whose ethnic origin I couldn’t tell from looking at them at all. I must say I reflected then at that moment on what the fate of these children would have been if we’d failed in 2001. If Javier Solana and I and the foreign minister of Romania Mircea Geoana, who was then the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, had not gone down there week after week, made endless telephone calls or helped the government of Macedonia to get through the troubles and to get over it. If the EU had not deployed money and diplomacy, if NATO had not supplied the troops for Operation “Essential Harvest” that took the guns from the insurgents as they disarmed and if the OSCE had not been there with monitors and inspectors for the election. These children in many cases would simply be dead. Those who would have survived would have been scattered outside of that country almost certainly and probably never able to return. So as I end my term of office, it is the faces of these children and of the soldiers who served to protect them that will stay in my mind the longest. Polish troops were there in Macedonia, in fact two of them died in Macedonia during Operation “Essential Harvest.” They are in Bosnia and Kosovo today. They are in Afghanistan and, of course, they command that division in Iraq today. So, I would like to think that we think of them with pride because their conviction, dedication, skill and bravery is what the defence of our values is all about. They are doing the dangerous work on our behalf and I think we’ve got an obligation to make sure the alliance rises to the standards they set. Thank you. 1.Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.