Brig.
Gen. James Baxter, UK Advisor on Military Restructuring to the government
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1)
"Securing Peace: NATO’s Role in Crisis Management and Conflict
Resolution"
Thanks etc
I arrived in Macedonia at the end of 2001 loaned by my Government following
a request from the Macedonian authorities for a high level adviser on
defence and security sector reform. As NATO shifted the emphasis of
its operations in the country from tactical operations towards an advisory
role I now have become the focus for the ongoing NATO advisory effort.
I am embedded in the Government and deal largely at the Strategic level.
I work principally on behalf of the Minister of Defence yet I support
and advise the President’s Office on military matters. I have
also been used on national security projects such as the production
of national strategies on defence and security and the development of
a national crisis management mechanism. I advise on operational principles
and procedures but by mutual consent I maintain a firewall that means
I will not be consulted on the conduct of actual operations.
The bulk of my contribution will cover the challenge of SSR. None the
less I felt I should provide one or two reflections from an insider’s
perspective on the key lessons from the NATO and EU operations in Macedonia
since the crisis. They are not new nor are they necessarily directly
applicable to the challenges that will face NATO, as we look further
east.
· The value of rapid projection of capabilities as demonstrated
in ESSENTIAL HARVEST
· The important role played by NATO negotiators, information
experts and administrators in the political process and in support of
military deployments. Perhaps NATO needs a deployable civilian staff
of this nature.
· The excellent cooperation and coordination achieved by the
main international bodies engaged in the reconciliation and stabilisation
process.
Moving now to SSR – I would like to set out what I see as the
nature of the challenge reformers and advisers face. The example I use
will inevitably be Macedonia. However, I describe a situation that persisted
over a year ago, much has already changed and much more I am certain
will change in the future. In addition many of the obstacles to change
I will cover have and will be encountered elsewhere:
- Firstly, Macedonia provides a very good example of inadequate civilian
political control and oversight of the security sector caused by a grey
constitutional framework that does not adequately define competencies
between the Government and the President which can provoke political
mistrust and allows both competition and duplication of effort right
across the security sector. Some of the more serious consequences of
this have been poorly coordinated reactions to security incidents, an
independent and conservative military establishment and a militaristic
and Para-military culture in the Police.
- Secondly the main security institutions are generally immature and
their development buffeted by a long period of instability. Crucially
until recently the Government did not have a unifying security strategy
and the response to instability was generally characterised by poor
inter ministerial cooperation, disjointed and poorly coordinated operations
at the political and operational levels and a preference for mass and
numbers at the tactical level as opposed to properly targeted intelligence
led operations.
- There is a lack of civilian management skills and expertise compounded
by a system of political patronage that often ignores talent and qualifications.
In defence this cedes dominance to wily, conservative and privileged
GS who generally fear reform. They in turn use their influence to cling
to unrealistic force structures.
- Next there is the high political and economic price of reform. In
a country where unemployment is currently in excess of 40% and where
there is negligible economic growth the downsizing of the military is
an activity fraught with political and social problems. In addition,
the cost of reform has to be set against a range of other pressing priorities
not least the implementation of the Framework Agreement resulting in
a constant search for the minimalist and least disruptive solution.
How then does one confront challenges like these and what are the issues
and dilemmas reformers like myself face are likely to encounter as NATO
looks to other areas.
· Firstly, I believe it is very important to take a broad approach
to security sector reform. Effective and enduring reform is not possible
unless the process embraces a fairly wide definition of the security
sector to include, the police, the military, border guards, intelligence
services, crisis management mechanisms and customs services. Too broad
a definition can cause a loss of focus but account must also be taken
of parallel reform efforts in areas such as developing good governance
and Justice and Home Affairs Reform. There is a tendency for international
bodies to approach Security Sector Reform on a compartmentalised basis
with different aims and objectives without linking the processes together
under an overarching strategy. This does not match the trend since September
11 for much deeper integration of security sectors. In Skopje a range
of reformers principally comprising the Stability Pact but also the
IMF, public administration reform programmes meet regularly to share
experiences and coordinate where coordination is required. We do not
work to a strategy but we wish we did.
· An associated point is that through our rather compartmentalised
efforts at reform I believe that we fail to do enough to bind security
activity together. In Macedonia we have numerous ongoing reform efforts
targeted at every element of the security sector but there is still
little appreciation at the heart of government of how to synchronise
and to coordinate security. The Government must take responsibility
for this and I believe it is fundamentally important to start with a
national strategy, which identifies ends, ways and means and keeps them
in balance. Otherwise the tendency is for improvisation, duplication
and lack of coordination. If you agree with this it is essential that
the initial focus of reform is to work top down – to empower key
decision makers and officials charged with the implementation of change.
This is the way I have worked – but I have not had and equivalent
counterpart in the Interior Ministry or more particularly in the PM’s
office, a gap I have sometimes filled but a balance that is essential.
In spite of this, we are now starting to see substantial progress in
Macedonia on the basis of new hierarchy of strategies – at the
top end there is a new overarching concept for National Security and
Defence and the Government are about one third of the way through a
Strategic Defence Review. At lower levels there are police reform strategies
and integrated border management strategies. Work is underway to develop
a crisis management mechanism that will coordinate security operations
and the work of the intelligence agencies. Implementation will not be
simple but the approach is correct.
· The need for adequate resources for reform is a key issue and
here Governments face the dilemma that you have to invest and spend
in the short term to make defence and security affordable over the long
term. This is a difficult concept to inculcate and realise when budgets
are tightly and centrally controlled on an annual basis and there is
insufficient appreciation of the need, particularly in defence, to plan
and programme over a period of years. It is important that NATO and
other organisations in the future and elsewhere are able to provide
more focussed advice and help to identify additional resources or donations.
It is not something that can be done easily at the coalface and the
current processes are rather slow and complex.
· Balance between ownership and dependency. Truly enduring reform
cannot be imposed from the outside it must be developed and grown from
within. Such is the comprehensive nature of the international community
presence and reform agenda in Macedonia that there is a clear tendency
for the various external actors to try and do too much. Too many advisers
are a bad thing and I have too often been asked for advice on advisors
or to mediate and coordinate between well intentioned groups. More importantly
we must be careful by working in this manner that we do not create too
deep a state of dependency. Embedded advisers are essential in the initial
stages of a reform effort but we must take care not to take on too many
responsibilities and focus on developing the skills of decision makers.
· Too often we ignore the fact that there is a pressing need
to educate civil society in defence and security matters. Whilst Governments
have done a great deal to adapt old structures to new realities reform
requirements are rarely adequately exposed or discussed as part of an
inclusive and transparent public debate. The paucity and often-partisan
and badly informed media reporting of security issues is partly to blame.
However, unless public opinion is properly engaged there will be a serious
lack of a non-governmental capacity to make a contribution to the checks
and balances required in civil military and civil-security sector relations.
The final area I felt it is important to cover is who does it and how
perhaps we could do it a little better:
- International bodies – many of the international bodies are
reinventing themselves as SSR has risen in importance and become entwined
in a broader range of transitional issues. SSR cannot be run by one
organisation. The co-operation within the Stability Pact has been a
framework of sorts for coordinating efforts in the Balkans. A similar
but much more focussed and comprehensive approach – making clear
who does what will be essential as attention shifts to the greater Middle
East. I feel that NATO should not necessarily confine itself to military
matters, especially as security sectors become more interlinked. National
crisis management, intelligence coordination, supporting democratic
oversight of armed forces, resettlement of redundant military and demobilised
militias, centralised training and assistance and the extension of the
clearinghouse process to the security sector are all potential growth
areas for NATO. This is an activity where the IS/IMS and the military
chain of command need to combine and unify their efforts.
- Bi-lateral efforts and assistance programmes are important but they
need to be coordinated properly or they can become counterproductive
to states overloaded with reform. Something we have managed to do in
the NATO Advisory presence in Macedonia is to secure the acceptance
of the Allies that I should play a coordinating role and direct national
programmes more precisely to the needs of the Macedonians. This has
not always been easy especially in the area of equipment donations and
sales where the potential rewards for nations can be lucrative.
- Non-state actors – I will cover 2 main groups: firstly, NGOs
who are essential to the process of educating civil society. Certainly
we need more involvement of these groups but the focus should be directed
not to the direct support of policy and reform implementation but more
to the process of assisting ministers in promoting the understanding
of sector issues and advising ministers on how to communicate and legitimise
their plans. The other group comprises the private military companies,
principally the defence consultancy firms who operate throughout Central
and South East Europe. Opinions vary on these firms. The NATO Advisory
Team works with and alongside the US firm contracted to the Macedonian
MOD and our activities are entirely complementary – I tend to
work on policy and concepts they are experts at developing the appropriate
lower level processes. I have nothing but praise for their work, but
observe that ex soldiers in the advisory business adapt very quickly
to commercial imperatives. Serving officers want to see security self-sufficiency
and to trust that the nation they are assisting will be fit and competent
in all respects to fit into the Alliance.
In the first wave of defence transformation, NATO HQ and advisory teams
from several core nations of the Alliance have played a crucial role
in the enlargement process. As a consequence of which there is now a
new generation of hardened and experienced reformers. In the difficult
challenges posed by new operational theatres the Alliance has great
potential and knowledge that could be brought to bear. However, security
sector reform needs coordination from the highest to the lowest levels
and we must be mindful that it will never be a short-term activity,
if we commit it is for the long haul.
1. Turkey recognises the Republic
of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
