Brussels 16 October 2003

Lessons of NATO Involvement in the Balkans: Civilian Reconstruction and Political Institutions Speech by Mr. Adam Kobieracki, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this conference and to be part of this particular panel. My presence here today, and more broadly at NATO in Brussels is, in a way, a direct consequence of "lessons learned". I have had to the good fortune to join NATO this past summer as the first ASG for Operations, a new division within the NATO IS that has come into being as a result of internal restructuring, at the initiative of the Secretary General. The main idea of a new, separate OPS division was to create a focal point for all operations-related matters, from co-ordinating the day to day operational/ political oversight to maintaining relations with other international organisations. In this sense, we have been able to rectify some of the in-house co-ordination problems that we had in the past. The new OPS division has been up and running since early September and draws together staff from several divisions. In short, a new boss, a new division and, as you can imagine, a full plate of work. Let me now address some lessons learned from the NATO perspective as far as our engagement in the Balkans is concerned. Some of these lessons, I believe, are just as important for NATO's new missions, such as Afghanistan that we will discuss later this afternoon. Lesson Number 1: Early and timely involvement by the International Community As we have seen in the past, local conflicts have regional implications and can quickly get out of hand. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we clearly acted too late. This painful lesson was rectified a few years later, especially in the case of South Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the year 2001, where we intervened in a timely fashion. By doing so, we not only put an end to the spread of extremist activity, but helped local players address the root causes of instability and introduce far-reaching political reforms. In a future crisis, early international engagement can help avert a worst-case scenario. Lesson Number 2: Don’t walk away Persistent follow-up and tenacity in post-conflict management remain equally important. As we have seen throughout the Balkans, the job of peace building is a long-term investment, whereby the International Community and local institutions must remain engaged. In both KFOR and SFOR, NATO has been playing a key role in providing security so that others can do their job. By keeping a robust presence and adjusting it to the specific security environment , we have also reassured the local populations that we are there to finish a job that we began a few years ago. To again take the example of Macedonia, the signing of the Framework Agreement in August of 2001 was just one step in what has proven to be a difficult reconciliation process. However, a continued EU, OSCE and now-reduced NATO presence has been crucial to keep the process on track. The presence of IC Principals in Skopje and their persistent interaction with the government on a host of issues has yielded positive results and helped defuse post-conflict tensions or a renewed crisis. Lesson Number 3: Close Co-ordination among key players in the IC When referring to "we" in the Balkans, I refer not just to NATO, but the entire international community. Over the last few years, co-operation and co-ordination among international organisations has reached new levels, thereby contributing to the overall success of the IC in crisis management. High-level, joint political initiatives and practical co-operation between NATO, the EU and many others on the ground has helped us develop a common strategy and convey a common vision. Co-ordination and co-operation has not only proven its value in how we do business together, but has been a key element in applying the necessary pressure on the parties to not only reach a political agreement but do the necessary follow-on work. We are seeing the dividends in Bosnia-Herzegovina where positive steps have recently been taken in the area of Defence Reform. In Kosovo, consistent, co-ordinated pressure on the local players to live up to their commitments remains key. Speaking in one voice is also important as we hold out the prospect of Euro-Atlantic integration for the countries in the Balkans. Without extrapolating at this point in the seminar, close co-ordination remains key for our success in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Lesson Number 4: flexibility in decision making As past experience has shown, we must adapt our approach and responses to the specific circumstances of any given crisis. While the Kosovo crisis eventually led to direct military intervention, we used different tools in FYROM and South Serbia where a small NATO crisis management team worked closely together with the EU and the OSCE in paving the way for eventual peace agreements. In both cases, we acted at the request of the legitimate governments in Belgrade and Skopje. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council agreed to the dispatching of a Special Representative of the Secretary General who interacted directly with the parties and helped prepare subsequent decisions that had to be taken in a NATO context. The new result? A small number of highly professional people made a real difference and pre-empted the dispatch of a large peacekeeping force that might have become necessary had the crisis not been brought under control. This model is not necessarily applicable to other scenarios but cannot be ruled out in the future if circumstances allow. Lesson Number 5: we are all in this together My last point is more broad. Peace building in the Balkans has shown that we all have a vested interest in the International Community's success and in consolidating "ownership" of the process with the local population. We cannot afford to allow institutional rivalries or specific political agendas to blur our broader vision. Problems must be solved in a pragmatic not from a dogmatic point of view. In the Balkans specifically, this means that a role for the EU, for instance, is not to be seen at the expense of NATO or vice versa. Indeed, past experience has shown that we can work together efficiently towards a common goal and build on agreed, practical arrangements to enhance this co-operation in the future. Without speculating about future scenarios or pre-empting any decisions that might be taken, NATO will continue to restructure its presence in the region, notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which could pave the way for a more operational role for the EU in that specific theatre. Let me conclude: I have listed a few lessons learned from the Balkans to show how past experience has allowed us to respond better and more efficiently to the challenges that we have been facing over the last few years. Some of these lessons can usefully be applied to our new operations - close co-ordination among IC actors to name only one example. In the Balkans, the emphasis has shifted from exclusively security and military matters to the political. As the peace becomes more stable and self-sustaining, fewer and fewer NATO troops will be needed. However, troop reductions do not signify a waning interest or decreasing engagement of NATO in the region as a whole. Civilian reconstruction and the strengthening of political institutions is an area where NATO will continue to provide a helping hand. For instance, NATO has played a role in enhancing border security co-operation . Such initiatives rely heavily on the partnership with other organisations that I have outlined above. Let us also not forget PfP and the MAP process that have provided important incentives for the countries in the region.