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Updated: 16-Oct-2003 | NATO Speeches |
Brussels 16 October 2003 |
Lessons
of NATO Involvement in the Balkans: Civilian Reconstruction and Political
Institutions speech
by Mr. Veton Surroi, Chief Editor, Koha Ditore, Kosovo at the conference "Securing
Peace: NATO’s Role in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution"
The important effects of the past four years of international military and civilian presence in Kosova are by all means impressive. Starting from scratch, in June of 1999 Kosova has gone successfully through tests of electoral democracy and can certainly be considered one today. Starting from scratch, it has also created the basis of administrative capacity, be it in civil registry, banking and business. The majority of the people have a roof over their head today, when only four years ago over 100 thousand houses had been partially or totally destroyed by Serb forces. And, instead of the rule of the gun in June of 1999 we now have an ever increasing police force educated to implement the rule of law, and an increasingly growing number of better and more efficient judges. Nevertheless, as time has gone by with the international administration of Kosova, objective impediments have emerged in the way of going further. We are now already for some time in a situation of blockage, due basically
to the limited capacity of the concept of international administration. KFOR has a precise mission, UNMIK has a vague mission due to be interpreted and reinterpreted at will. KFOR has a more or less clear chain of command, UNMIK has at its head an all powerful figure who rarely hears from his boss, if he can even identify him. But more importantly, there is an issue of balance of powers which has reached its peak, it is about the friction that is created by the natural evolution of the autochthonous democratic authority and of that of UNMIK. Presently, most of the governance levers are in the hands of UNMIK, whereas most of the responsibility for governance is nominally addressed to the kosovar institutions. This creates a series of gridlocks, of Catch 22’s in which UNMIK will rightly blame the kosovar institutions for slow application of their powers, and the kosovar institutions will blame UNMIK rightly for not handing them the right powers. Or the other in which UNMIK will rightly question the capacity of the kosovar institutions to have more competencies handed over, whereas the kosovar institutions will also rightly question the indecision of UNMIK in handing over decision making powers as a way to stop the path of building of the kosovar institutions. Kosova is today blocked, after at least two and a half years of continuous
restrictions in interpreting UNSC 1244, and of the joint negative attitude
of both UNMIK and the kosovar institutions. The first for taking the
short-cut, and monopolizing decision making , the second for not proving
dynamic or innovative in dealing with the powers they already have.
Both have succeeded very much in only one thing, the blame game. But this situation will not go on for much more. NATO needs its vision of future in Kosova, derived from its own mission and from how the future of Kosova will inherently be developed. Within the next 12-18 months, the status of Kosova will be defined. As the situation has developed, including the war and the post-war period, there are only two options at the table. One is the independence of Kosova with its entire territory, and the other is the independence of Kosova with part of its territory partitioned and annexed to Serbia. The second outcome, which has a certain degree of sympathy in a good deal of the Serbian political elite, and which to a certain extent is being applied even now through Serb parallel administrative structures in the Serb enclaves, would establish a negative precedent of ethnic territorial solutions. This precedent would in turn be a powerful negative trigger for both destabilizing Serbia in the Preshevo valley and for the stability, as well as an existence of a Macedonia as we know it now. Furthermore, such a precedent would derail the dynamic, although, albeit fragile, process of democracy building in Kosova. Be it as it may, the outcome will be one of Kosova earning its sovereignty in the near future. And that means a set of options for NATO:
The basic historical context of this independence of Kosova is one of the whole Southeastern Europe moving much faster into integration. As was the intervention of NATO of Kosova and emblem of NATO in the new century, involving itself in missions of out of area stabilization through security presence and democratic institution building, so is the independence of Kosova emblematic for the need for new relations. Independence, in the sense of Euro-Atlantic integrations means interdependence of partners, equal partners. If this is the case, let me mention the points that I see as crucial for embarking on a proper road:
One thing that has proven crucial in war, and that is a joint work of NATO, the EU and the US, has proven itself crucial in peace as well. There is no sustainable process towards finding the solution for the status of Kosova, until we have this Trio fully engaged , both as actors and as concept. ![]() |