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Updated: 14-Oct-2003 NATO Speeches

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9 Oct. 2003

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(in Russian)

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(in English)

Press briefing

by Sergey Ivanov, Russian Minister of Defence
(Interpretation in English)

Good afternoon dear ladies and gentlemen. I'm very much pleased to see such a confluence of the members of the press corps, to see a lot of familiar faces who represent not only the Russian but also the U.S. media outlets.

Today was quite a hectic one and a political one. In the first part of the day, in the morning, I had substantive full(?) bilaterals with Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Robertson, with the U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Rumsfeld, and the Defence Minister of Germany, Mr. Struck. We have covered an extensive bunch of questions which are of mutual, reciprocal interest.

A meaningful exchange of opinions has been logically continued for three to four hours within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council at 20... comprising the 20 defence ministers. The discussions were held rather constructively and in my eyes, has graphically showed how pressing and important today partnerships are in NATO-Russia co-operation.

The outcomes of our joint work with my colleagues from the Alliance countries once again convinced that we not only can but also have to, as simple as that, search for other ways to enhance our co-operation. Exactly the understanding of this premise allows us to gradually fill the spheres of our co-operation with deliverables, a small (inaudible) transfer them from the vein of theoretically discussions into a field of concrete hands-on affairs.

I can just cite one example for that. This year in this current year 2003, the plan of joint NATO-Russia activities in terms of the number thereof is double as much as that on previous year. A certain positive shift has also been brought about in the field of co-operation for the creation of the ABM system, as we call it theatre missile defences...missile defences for the theatre of operations within the NATO-Russia Council framework. There have been operative, joint working groups, its mandate is now endorsed, the program for co-operation until the year 2005 and their principal... the guidelines for this co-operation also being discussed not only within NATO-Russia Council, but also bilaterally with the U.S. And on this issue, quite recently during our presidential visit to Camp David, there has been a very substantive discussion as well.
Today, at their session, at the meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld, we also started immediate practical pragmatic work flowing out from the instructions and agreements which were given to us by the President, by the chief executives at Camp David.

It's not by chance probably in this context that the American side has invited me... to go to a very important city and as the military put it, military facility which represents the NORAD control installation. At the same time, it shows us how such functions, such installations function in the United States of America. I'm very much grateful for that to Mr. Rumsfeld.

As you understand, I also saw previously the likes of those facilities in the main upon Russian territory, and as a result of a frank encounter...exchange of experiences and discussions we came to a very simple conclusion which is jokingly it sounds like that, that smart people think the same.

I would like to underscore the fact that the foundation for the elaboration of the priorities of our co-operation should be a realistic understanding of the particularities of the present day geopolitical situation out in the wider world. Proceeding from this premise, Russia is reforming currently its armed forces and the military organization as a whole, taken into account a new level of political relationship that we have in place with the North Atlantic Alliance and we are currently revisiting quite a number of their premises which has been in place for decades and which had constituted the foundations, the pillars for the Soviet and for the on Russian military plan and I'm thinking with a view in the first place of adapting our new military policies to the challenges and emerging threats.

I, in the course of my meetings extensively and in detail explained to my NATO partners the major principles and the objectives as pursued by the armed forces, including those which last week were endorsed in Moscow by the president of Russia during the defence minister session.

I must say that the partners took a very (inaudible) close attitude to these and with an understanding to those problems. In fact today, both NATO states and Russia in the military thinking and planning in the upgrade and effort for the armed forces are encountering absolutely identical similar problems.

I can just cite one example for you. Probably you have heard that yesterday, if we are to deduct the United States armed forces from the overall armed forces of NATO states this figure would constitute 1.5 million service personnel. Out of this usable troops out of the area of responsibility of NATO only 55,000 soft service personnel can do that.

The defence ministers of NATO countries naturally enough are not satisfied with this, are disaffected with the state of affairs and Russia is also disaffected with this fact that it still has a very little number of standing readiness. Units have still very little numbers of professionalized service personnel and units which could be at trial, which are capable of tackling in efficient way the objectives to assert defence of a state which covers ten time zones with overall numeric strength of the armed forces of one million.

We believe this figure to be an optimum, the best possible one, and we are not going to embark on any further reductions in this strength of the military. The armed forces of Russia should also reinforce its mobile agile component and the training of such units for the actions to be taken in different emergency situations. So, on this there are problems which (inaudible) by the armed forces of Russia and NATO are absolutely identical. I would like to stress it once again.

Today, priority tasks and problems which are encountered by the armed forces of Russia, all of the security agents, power wielding agencies of Russia are naturally enough the proliferation problem and terrorism, as well as ethnic and religious radicalism, drug trafficking in large scales... on a large scale.

Today, I have pointed out the fact that our cross-border service men of the Tajik-Afghan border confiscates on an average per annum about three tonnes of pure heroin. They gauge it up exactly in tonnes, not in grams as people do out in the streets. The police, the law forces do that. We count heroin confiscated in towns and we are pretty well aware of the fact that's just the tip of the iceberg, but that most of the drugs unfortunately makes it out to Europe and to a less extent to the U.S. as well.

We also came to a conclusion, to a unified conclusion, that their principal stress should be placed upon the timely identification and neutralization of the root causes of such phenomena as terrorism extremism and not on the ramifications thereof to be eliminated.

And in conclusion, I would also like to say that I have raised an issue of the necessities sooner or later to elaborate a unified set of rules to go by, of unified standards from the standpoint of countering the threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and counter-terrorism, I can briefly tell you what I mean.

When we say about the Bushehr say, one of the installations in Iran that's a light water reactor unit, that's a nuclear power station, power plant, which has been built by Russia without transcending(?) any international controls or regimes.

As we hear accusations, allegations hurled at us that by doing so we promote any nuclear arms program in Iran, we naturally enough cannot accept such an allegation at the same time when pretty well of a number of other objects, installations where such equipment is identified, spotted, which in case of supply of it by Russia and not by other states, including by the developed, industrialized states would cause... would arouse a storm of public outcries and repercussions, indignations, resentment, but in this case, we do not see any outcries or outrage.

So in respect to those who have supplied this, if we are to talk about terrorism, unfortunately there are still instances where a number of states, a number of states does not co-operate with us in terms of extradition of... extradition of such persons who are officially by the UN black-listed as international terrorists or of any other persons who are still not recognized as such. But in respect to whose, the Russian Federation, year in, year out, sent out a great quantity of documents corroborating their implication in the past into the terrorist activities upon Russian soil. So far silence is anything, dead silence is what we get in response.

So that's why we believe that sooner or later what is required is an establishment of unified standards in terms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and counter-terrorism.

So that's about all for this (inaudible)... taking of your questions.

Questions and answers

Q: That's the RIA Novosti question. You have now outlined in general that the... your colleagues positively taken your explanation... clarifications as to this new open doctrine of Russia, a new one. What questions they pose to you? Could you please clarify what they said?

Ivanov: I would like to say from the outset no questions were put to me after my presentation. Everything was quite clear and understandable to all. It was unanimously, practically that all the speakers after my contribution, after my report, all the speakers after me, they pointed out the fact that in the first place they... for the first time see in present day Russian history a possibility to openly expose our views on the development of armed forces and key pivotal issues of international security.

This is true that in our political culture previously, something like that was a misnomer and now it's part of our lives, it's a basic fact of life and everybody has taken it quite positively. The earlier mass media outlet aired comments... and those mass media (inaudible) said to be, by me, to be quite unqualified and they did not bother even to read anything which is posted a long time ago on the Internet and published in the open press. They were saying that Russia is... stipulated some kind of preventive nuclear strikes. I was just reading something like that, quoting that from the text naturally enough. There's no stipulation like that in terms of nuclear... preventive nuclear strikes.

There's another thing: Russia reserves the right for itself to utilize in a preventive fashion the military force. And I did drive home to my partners in detail why we're... and under which conditions and why, wherefore, this should be done, including in the CIS states.

I have explained to my colleagues that the CIS represents to Russia a very important and sensitive sphere of security. In the CIS states, there are dozens of millions of ethnic Russians and just Russian nationals. More often then not, they even live in families...a part of the family live in CIS states or one of them living out in Russia. Naturally enough, they have a good command of Russian are just ethnic Russian just in those states. It's so that de facto some were de jure(?), some were de facto; all of those speak Russian.

To these countries, Russia supplies in large quantities energy supplies at prices which drastically differ from those at the international market, so I would like to ask our colleagues to take into consideration their political and military...and political activities, this fact, and nobody was opposing me and everybody was taking that with an understanding.

Q: Hi. You... perhaps I'm a bit confused about what you just said. You said Russia does reserve the right to use preventive military force and you seem to suggest and perhaps you said that you do no reserve the right to use pre-emptive nuclear force, perhaps against it. Is that correct? You do not preserve the right to use pre-emptive nuclear forces, is that what you're saying?

Ivanov: In fact, you are right, Charlie. In fact, you are right. Russia still regards nuclear weapons as a means of political deterrence. And in no fashion, in no scenario, there's no mention of a possibility to utilize such weapons and to go first about utilisation thereof.

As for the military use, we also do not welcome the preventive use of military force, of conventional, non-nuclear, classic... classic... non-nuclear, conventional military force. We also do not welcome something like that, but in the first place, in actuality, such a phenomenon is in place out in the wider world and we're not going to give it up on a voluntary basis.

And on that account, we have unequivocally said when we are going to do that if other means, political, diplomatic, economic, are exhausted, and we have no other option, no other way out, and the lives of our citizens, compatriots are jeopardized, so the civil and civic and human rights of such people are also jeopardized, theoretically we do not rule out something like that. And we tell that in open fashion too. We're not shy about saying that.

Q: My name is Tom Squitieri with USA Today. Just a follow-up on that question. As you know the United States has a policy of pre-emptiveness strikes that could include the use of a nuclear weapon. I want to make sure I understood what you just said. Russia's policy is not like the United States' policy, it is different.

Ivanov: It is.

Q: Okay. Therefore, do you believe it is fair for one nation, in this case the United States, to have such a policy and no other nation in the world to have a similar policy?

Ivanov: That's a good question. I would prefer Donald Rumsfeld were in the vicinity so that he could respond to this question, for this is a question addressed exactly to him, not to me. We're openly saying what we think, where we stand on this. We have just explained what Russia is ready for, and naturally enough, we have the nuclear policy that is going to be preserved for all times. We are going to upgrade it and develop, we do not conceal this fact, but we regard the nuclear weapons as a political deterrence means to ward off any aggression on our country and our allies.

We do not have a lot of allies, but still we have them. Those are in the first place, they're party signatories to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. That's all there is to it as far as our views of the employment of nuclear weapons is... are concerned. As for the other states, I'm sorry, I'm just responsible for the Russian Federation in terms of defence solely.

Q: (inaudible), Russian Television channel. If possible, as for the bilaterals you had, what practical steps have you taken? Probably some exercises have been covered you have agreed to, could you please clarify that, thank you.

Ivanov: If we are to talk about the meeting with Mr. Rumsfeld today, in the first place, as I've now said, we started a concrete and practical, pragmatic hands-on elaboration of the instructions which were given to us by the presidents back at Camp David, including as bearing upon the issues of co-operation and interaction in the theatre missile... in the missile defences, in the theatre missile defence and to aircraft defences and bilaterally. Such elaboration, such co-operation is possible and we are engaged in this together with NATO. So we are kind of working on two tracks, both purely a Russian-American track and NATO-Russia track. Both ways, we have concrete plans currently set up for more concrete activities. I can't elaborate on these, I'm sorry, I'm not authorized to do that.

Naturally enough, we have covered the issues of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation. This is a very serious problem. This is a real world threat and believe me, on a number of avenues, on a number of routes, it's even more serious for the U.S. rather and for Russia. Take into account the geography, Russia is by the way bordering on 17 states as contrasted to the United States which has only two good, trusted, peaceful... peaceable and quiet neighbours, Canada and Mexico. What we have on the ground is the direct opposite. But as they put in Russia, you do not choose your own relatives and neighbours in your life.

We also discussed the issues of counter-terrorism. As for the meeting with the... as for the Minister of Defence of Germany, Minister Struck, we were very pleased to get to know that today in Ekaterinburg. The German Chancellor Schroeder and Russian President Putin signed a bilateral agreement on the transit of service personnel and military cargo through Russian territory to Afghanistan. That's the first practical step related to the fulfilment by Russia of its own undertakings as related to assistance to to be granted(?) to Afghanistan both within the UN framework and with the NATO-Russia co-operation later on.

I also informed all of my NATO partners that this is an agreement we just signed now, and if anyone is wishing to have any similar entitlements, the precedent is there. One should not reinvent a bicycle once again. Once should not ask for the legal experts' opinion who... whom it takes more often than not months to do that. Examining this on a bilateral basis, we can conclude such an agreement now rather quickly in case there is such an interest.

We also discussed the situation... the developments in Afghanistan rather extensively with our German partners who are alongside with the Canadians there also... they also constitute the bulk of the ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force out in Afghanistan.

Q: ...Fox News Channel. Two-part question for you. First of all, do you believe that Iran is trying to make a nuclear bomb?

Ivanov: Well, it's not an issue of belief or confidence or personal attitude. The most important, fundamental, crucial thing about this is that the international community, the family of nations could be persuaded through their legal norms of international law, through the agency or procedures of the IAEA, of these, and could get a final, definitive and unambiguous reply to the question you have put now. As it was... as was previously said on these by our president, we should sent to Iran a respectful but an unambiguous message to the effect that it's in the... in the best interest of Iran itself to adhere to all... to accede to all of the documents as published by the IAEA and probably to the additional protocol as well so that it could be proved what we hear from the Iranian quarters to the effect that they have absolutely no plans to develop any nuclear weapons.

Q: On the issue of proliferation, what is Russia's stance on stopping that, even by boarding ships on the high seas?

Ivanov: Yeah. I know this pretty well. Russia prefers to proceed from around the agreed concerted action to be taken by the international community, international law rules in the first place within the framework of the UN and possibly, as I previously said, in joint agreements as worked out collectively within a framework of different international institutions, for example within the framework of the G8 countries, industrialized states.

Q: (inaudible) KDN Radio of Georgia (inaudible). So my first question, how do you imagine the future relations between Georgia and Russia considering Russian bases, Abkhazian conflict and Russia's role in it. And my... another question: will Russia's strike Georgia if Moscow has some information about removing, for example, boyeviks or some... something like that on the territory of Georgia from maybe Chechnya and some other places...

Ivanov: Excuse me, can you repeat the second part of your question. I didn't get it.

Q: Will Russia strike Georgia...

Ivanov: In case...?

Q: In case Moscow has any information about boyeviks from Chechnya removing...

Ivanov: Ah! Boyeviks.

Q: Yes.

Ivanov: Nobody understands such word in English. Now I get it.

Q: And one more. Why Russia never... Why Russia never participates in PFP exercises in Georgia? Is it protest... a form of protest?

Ivanov: I'm afraid there are too many questions. You asked three. Let me... not to forget all of them. As for the first question referred to me, as for the relationship between Russia and Georgia, naturally enough, this was something which was not discussed today. I can't add or deduct anything.

As for the Russia-Georgia relationship, we, the Russians, need just one simple basic thing so that from the Georgian territory there would not emanate any threats to the Russian Federation in the shape of penetration, infiltration of the very different rabble(?) from around the world. You know, each animal has a pair for that if we are to use a biblical expression from Georgian territory to Russia so that backing up terrorists and gunmen would be as stopped, who are now acting on... a bit lesser scale than previously a couple of years ago on our territory. Nothing more is needed by us.

As for the bases, the two Russian military bases stationed upon Georgian territory, well, this is a matter of bilateral Russian-Georgian negotiations which are currently underway. Now, other Russian military bases are there.

As for the Abkhazian settlement issue, the Russian peacekeeper force, I would like (inaudible)...quote this fact, not their base but the peacekeeper force under the UN mandate has been... have been operative there for many years now and over this time over 90 Russian soldiers died. We have to prevent an escalation to go out into an open, armed confrontation until there is a CIS mandate, Russia is willing to fulfil those peacekeeper functions and I forgot the last question.

Q: Invitation...

Ivanov: Russia takes part... is part of the PFP and in concord activities under this program where it sees for itself at least some... a modicum of practical use for itself...benefit for itself. It's quite thoughtless to expand budgets (inaudible) on you know not what, for and we're not going to do that. And we invite all of our partners, as it was the case previously in the Pacific Ocean even back then we are co-operating with a number of states, say with Canada or the U.S., or the recently-held Baltic exercise. We invite also to such exercises and we go to such exercises.

As well, when it's stipulated that the objectives and purposes of such an exercise is of some practical interest to us we have a more practice interoperability drills for the combat readiness... permanent combat readiness of the defence ministry for the special units of the defence ministry, with counterpart units from the NATO states.

But here we are, naturally enough, talking about serious no-nonsense matters about technical maintenance, in terms of intelligence communications and decision making.
And just to spite anyone, we are not refusing to anyone on not doing anything like that.

Q: ...the Associated Press. Minister Ivanov, could you clarify for us the status of the document which apparently came out of your ministry last week which referred to NATO as an offensive organization with anti-Russian components?

Ivanov: I don't know who has thrown our this canard, these newspaper quotes. Today I was reading that actual report through my colleagues sent to the defence ministers sent to the NATO-Russia Council item by item. I was asking there whether there were questions. They did not tell me they had. Nothing offensive and nothing radically anti-NATO was found there by my colleagues.

Sure, we have some certain disagreements which are related in the first place to the attempts of advancement of the purely military infrastructure of the block closer to our bodies to the extent that we're not very much placed with a situation where the aircraft of (inaudible)... NATO state would be stationed together in a place which is a three minutes flight away from St. Petersburg. Nobody would like that.

We also dislike some overflights by specific (inaudible) AWACS aircraft along our borders or the previously practised flights of this kind and we also say that in an open manner. But all those things are being discussed and debated upon in a normal proper way with a common understanding that their major tasks and objectives for the armed forces development for NATO and Russia are actually similar. I was talking about that extensively today, the challenges and threats to NATO and Russia are also absolutely identical and they spring out from pretty much the same places and situations. This is a fait accompli, a factor itself, and we have not been in any discussions with NATO on the...

Q: ...New York Times. Thanks for your time today. I wanted to ask about the continued American military access to bases in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Those were negotiated before the war in Afghanistan, of course. Now that major combat is over in Afghanistan, are you concerned that the American military can still use those bases? Do you wish that access would end, or do you support limits on the America military's access to those bases?

Thank you sir.

Ivanov: That is a good question. Really, we have to go back to the past for a while and to remember the time has not been (inaudible) NATO states, not for years, but the NATO states constituted a number of their base in sizes in the first place for the aircraft in Uzbekistan and Manas, in Kyrgyzia, Russia. It was understood the necessity behind such bases in places without which the toppling by military means of the Taliban would be either very difficult or very... quite impossible. And the Russian Federation supported those plans and voiced its attitudes, by the way, not to the U.S. government, but also to the states where those bases were being planned upon to be set up.

This having been said, we have always been proceeding from the fact that those bases exist solely for the period as requisite for the final definitive stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. I would like to correct what he said. Right now sorties flights by aircraft are still continued today. Yes, they end tomorrow, but so we understand this pretty well, but we also trust for the pre-notified tasks of stabilization in Afghanistan and nothing more.

In this sense we proceed from what was brought home to us initially by our American partners. That was exactly how they formulated the question.

As for Russia, as I have said previously, we have different plans and different allied commitments in respect of many of their CIS states. We have closed our... we have scaled down our military presence and we believe it was outliving itself, it has outlived itself. It was not quite a requisite in such states as Vietnam and Cuba, but at the same time we are also boosting and scaling up our military presence in the CIS states, and we're going to carry it forward. On the 23rd of October there will be the (inaudible)... Russian military base in Kyrgyzia in the city of Kant, just two minutes...

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