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| Updated: 12-Feb-2004 | NATO Speeches |
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NATO HQ 16 May 2003 Eng. / Fr. |
Comments by
NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson
Declaration 315 on NATO Enlargement Allow me to start this comment by expressing how pleased I am to note that the views of NATO Heads of State and Government in Prague have proven to be so similar to those expressed by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly during its session in Sofia in May 2002: this holds true both for the specific decisions and the wider rational of enlargement. This is a promising sign, since National Parliaments are now pronouncing themselves on the decisions taken in Prague. I will follow with interest the debates on the protocols in the respective Parliaments. I believe National Parliaments will recognise that the decisions in Prague will strengthen security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and help achieve our goal of a Europe whole and free, united in peace and by common values. Let me update you on the accession process: the accession talks; the timetable for the completion of reforms; and the steps following the signature of the accession protocols on 26 March 2003. I will then address our policy towards those countries not invited in Prague. I expect the accession process (from invitation to accession) for the seven invitees to be marked by three general characteristics: First, the accession will be swift. We hope the ratification process can be completed in time for the seven countries to join the Alliance at the latest at the NATO Summit in May 2004. Second, the accession process will broadly follow the model used for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1997. Third, the invitees will continue to participate in the Membership Action Plan and they will be asked to establish a timetable for the completion of their reforms. This reflects the awareness of the importance, as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has phrased it, of maintaining the current efforts by the seven invited countries aimed at meeting the criteria for membership. Less then two weeks after the Summit we started the accession talks with the first invitee. These talks have covered political issues, defence/military issues, security issues, resource issues and legal issues and draw upon the Washington Treaty and NATO's Enlargement Study. We have asked that invitees commit themselves to comply with all relevant policy/political principles, as well as formal legally binding documents, and other decisions commonly subscribed to by the member states of the Alliance regarding the functioning and development of NATO. During the talks, all invitees also accepted a "cost-share", at which they should contribute to the Alliance's common-funded budgets and programmes. The talks served to ensure on the one hand that the invitees fully understand the obligations and commitments of membership, and to confirm their interest in receiving an invitation to join the Alliance, and, on the other, to seek confirmation of the willingness and ability of each of the seven invitees to undertake the obligations and commitments under the Washington Treaty and the Study on NATO Enlargement etc. Thanks to the intensive work with the 7 invited countries through the Membership Action Plan over the past three years, we are very well acquainted with their policies, and they also have a very solid understanding of how NATO functions. The accession talks have therefore been swift and efficient. Allies - no different from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly - are keen to ensure that invitees keep up the pressure and follow-through on the deep and meaningful reforms which they have already promised to undertake as part of the MAP process. That is why the invitees will remain in the MAP process until they become members of the Alliance. To substantiate these commitments, the seven invitees have drawn up timetables for the completion of reforms. The stress here is upon completion of reforms - these are all well-known issues which have already been discussed as part of the MAP process, and are not a new list of objectives. Throughout the ratification period, NATO will work with the invitees on the priority reform issues outlined in the timetable for the completion of reform. For this we continue to use the traditional instruments of the Membership Action Plan, such as the Annual National Programmes to be submitted by the invitees, and NATO team consultations on all aspects of membership. Foreign Ministers of the seven invitees forwarded letters
to me confirming their willingness and ability to meet the
obligations and commitments of membership. In recognition of
the importance which the Allies attach to the fulfilment by
invitees of their timetables for reform, the invitees were
asked to attach their timetable to this formal letter. Following
the transmission of these letters to NATO and on the basis
of a report from the Secretary General, Allies signed the Accession
Protocols on 26 March 2003 and invitees attended the signature
ceremony. These protocols are in essence amendments to the
Washington Treaty and therefore were only signed by the current
Allies. With the Accession Protocols signed, National Parliaments
are at centre stage as they started the process of ratifying,
accepting or approving the accession protocols, according to
their respective national procedures. We will not wait until formal accession before preparing the successful integration of the invitees into the Alliance. In line with the commitments undertaken in Prague in this regard, we intend to involve the invitees as observers in many of our meetings in the near future, so that they can become better acquainted with how business is conducted. We have already opened up a number of committees to involvement of the invited countries. We hope this can be broadened to the vast majority of NATO committees in the months ahead. With regard to the aspirant countries that were not invited in Prague, NATO's door will remain open to European democracies willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, in accordance with Art 10 of the Washington Treaty. The invitees from Prague will not be the last. NATO will continue to help Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , including through the MAP, to achieve stability, security and prosperity, so that they can meet the obligations of membership. In this context, NATO has decided to improve our capacity to contribute to Albania's continued reform, and to further assist defence and security sector reform in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia through the NATO presence. Allies have already given direct feedback to the three continuing aspirant countries on their Annual National Programmes during meetings in late January. Individual Progress Reports on the performance of these three aspirants in the framework of the MAP have been drawn up. These reports will form the basis for meetings of the North Atlantic Council with each of the three countries during the month of May. A Consolidated Progress Report will be prepared for the Foreign Ministers meeting in Madrid. In short, the message is simple : 1) The Membership Action Plan will remain the vehicle to keep the aspirants' progress under review; 2) Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) will all be under consideration for future membership.
I welcome the Assembly’s comprehensive and balanced resolution on Kaliningrad (Resolution 316). Like the Assembly, NATO is aware of the challenges presented by the unique geographical situation of the Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation, which has shared a border with the Alliance since the accession of Poland to the Washington Treaty in 1999. Allies have worked hard to demonstrate to Russia and other Partners that NATO’s own enlargement process is not designed to create new dividing lines in Europe. On the contrary, Allies are committed to ensuring that an enlarged Alliance will provide a net gain in security, stability and prosperity, for current Allies, for those states invited to join the Alliance and for their neighbours. Of course, the Alliance has welcomed complementary steps that have been taken in this regard in the course of the EU enlargement process. Since the creation of the NATO-Russia Council on 28 May 2002 by the Heads of State and Government of NATO member states and Russia, the members of the NRC have worked diligently to intensify cooperation between NATO Allies and Russia in standing up to common threats and risks to their security. This new quality of NATO-Russia relations has gone far in combating lingering Cold War stereotypes and reinforcing the principle that NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation are two mutually reinforcing elements in a more inclusive Euro-Atlantic security architecture. EU-Russia cooperation is another such element. Like the Assembly, I welcome the agreements reached at the EU-Russia Summit of 11 November 2002, as a significant attempt to address the practical concerns of Kaliningrad residents.
Resolution 317 on NATO structural reform and ESDP I warmly endorse the Assembly's Resolution on NATO Structural Reform and ESDP (Resolution 317). As members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly will be very well aware, the Heads of State and Government of the Alliance took a number of decisions at the Prague Summit affecting the Alliance's role in Euro-Atlantic security and its ability to play that role effectively. The agenda set by the Alliance's leaders will have far-reaching consequences for virtually every aspect of the Alliance's character and activities -- for its tasks, its membership, its relationship with its Partners and other organisations, its decision-making practices and internal structures, and its ability to conduct modern military operations across the full range of the Alliance's missions. The decisions taken at Prague were, I believe, entirely consistent with the recommendations of the Assembly in this resolution. With respect to the fight against terrorism, the Heads of State and Government were presented with a package of measures to enhance the Alliance's ability to respond to this threat to our common security. The main elements of the package were: a commitment to improve military capabilities related to terrorism; increased efforts to equip ourselves to respond to the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons (CBRN) against our forces or populations; a Civil Emergency Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness for possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological agents; improved arrangements for intelligence sharing and assessments; improved crisis response arrangements; and increased cooperation with the Partners, most notably through a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism. But perhaps the most important part of the package was the new military concept for defence against terrorism. The concept is based on the Allies' agreement that in order to defend against terrorism:
On 16 April NATO decided to enhance its support to ISAF by taking on the command, coordination and planning of the operation. The Alliance already plays a significant role in support of ISAF, with NATO members providing 95% of the troops involved. The decision by the NAC for additional support is therefore a logical continuation of NATO's efforts to date on the ground. Neither ISAF's name nor mission will change. What will change is the means by which the international community meets its commitment to ensure greater stability. NATO's involvement will be within the context of the UN mandate on ISAF. We will operate according to the current and possible future UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan. The additional support being provided by NATO will consist of the following:
Consistent with Resolution 317, the Summit also witnessed a reaffirmation of the Alliance's commitment to augment its defence capabilities against nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons more generally, beyond their possible role in terrorist attacks. Of particular importance in this respect was the endorsement by the Heads of State and Government of five initiatives to enhance our capabilities against weapons of mass destruction: a prototype deployable NBC analytical laboratory, a prototype NBC event response team, a virtual centre of excellence for NBC weapons defence, a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile, and a disease surveillance system. I can only welcome the emphasis Resolution 317 places on the need for the continued transformation of Alliance structures and capabilities. The Summit was a milestone in this respect as it resulted in the approval of a number of initiatives to adapt the Alliance to the new challenges we face. This ongoing process of transformation will have three especially important features: the streamlining of NATO's command arrangements, the creation of a NATO Response Force, and the improvement of our military capabilities in specific, particularly significant areas. As members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly will appreciate, we have been pursuing improvements in these areas for a number of years: today's command structure is quite unlike the one NATO had when the Cold War ended; we already have a capability to deploy high readiness forces; and we have sought to improve the military capabilities needed for all of NATO's missions, new and old, both through DCI and the regular defence planning process. Despite the progress that has been achieved, however, we have a long way to go. The work on the revision of the command structure is proceeding well, but the decisions that remain to be taken, especially about the number and location of headquarters and related facilities, will be difficult, and I hope that the members of the Assembly can assist in achieving a consensus on a structure that is leaner, more deployable, more cost-effective, better suited to contemporary military requirements, and capable of promoting the further transformation of our military capabilities on a continual and deliberate basis. I naturally endorse your call for the development of national armed forces that can be deployed and sustained wherever they are needed. In addition to the needed national efforts, there are of course also important opportunities to promote this goal through collective action. At the Summit, the Heads of State and Government agreed to create the NATO Response Force which will provide the Alliance with deployable, technologically advanced, and sustainable forces able to move quickly to meet a wide range of threats to Alliance security. The Force, which, as the resolution urges, will be entirely compatible with the related efforts under way in the European Union, will not only have an important operational role but will also serve as a catalyst for promoting improvements in our military capabilities. The Prague Capabilities Commitment will be the centrepiece of our efforts to ensure that our forces have the characteristics set out in the resolution. In the months to come, we need to translate the commitments made at Prague into real capability improvements. It is essential that the Prague Capabilities Commitment succeed -- failure will not only diminish our ability to meet the challenges we face, but will damage the European pillar and place additional strain on the transatlantic link. The principal responsibility for ensuring success lies with the Allies themselves, and the support of parliaments will be indispensable. I agree entirely with the resolution's recommendations that nations fulfil their Force Goals. I also believe that, as the resolution suggests, we have not done enough to make the need for improvements in capabilities intelligible and compelling to parliaments and publics. I am pleased to be able to note that, following the break-through in December 2002 on the participation problem, we have established a Strategic Partnership with the European Union. The first illustration of this Partnership is the NATO-EU cooperation in the Western Balkans, in particular, the EU take-over on 31 March 2003 of the NATO-led operation “Allied Harmony” in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1) . This EU-led Operation “Concordia” makes use of NATO assets and capabilities with DSACEUR as Operation Commander. Several Allies non-EU members are participating to this operation. The current NATO-EU discussions are gradually broadening to cover other areas such as fight against terrorism and capabilities (work on PCC-ECAP mutual reinforcement) within the agreed framework governing NATO-EU relations. There is also an agreement to organise a Joint NATO-EU Crisis Management Exercise in November 2003. Lastly, I want to highlight that the NATO-EU informal meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers on 3 April, discussed transatlantic relations and post-conflict Iraq.
Following Turkey’s request for consultations in the framework of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed in its letter of 10 February, and pursuant to Article 4 of the Treaty which states that “the Parties will consult whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened” Allies began consultations. On 16 February the Defence Planning Committee requested the military authorities to provide military advice on a number of measures to assist Turkey. It authorised their implementation on 19 February as a matter of urgency. Operation Display Deterrence – NATO’s defensive measures in support of Turkey – aimed at defending Turkey from a threat from Iraq and deterring aggression. NATO’s military deployment consisted of AWACS surveillance aircraft and crews, TMD units and biological and chemical defence equipment. Operation Display Deterrence played an important part in maintaining stability and demonstrating solidarity at a volatile time. Following the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq during the night of 19 March, NATO Permanent Representatives met on 20 March in both North Atlantic Council and Defence Planning Committee format to discuss the crisis. A meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was held in the afternoon. Throughout the crisis, NATO maintained regular and detailed discussions. In the context of its discussions, the North Atlantic Council was updated regularly by the US and the UK on the ongoing military operations. On 3 April the Council met at the level of Foreign Ministers to consult on the situation in Iraq, to reaffirm the crucial importance of transatlantic relations, and to emphasise the solidarity which exists among the Allies on their fundamental security issues. Ministers underscored the vital role of the Alliance as a forum for transatlantic consultation and dialogue. In general, Ministers recognised that past and present differences among Allies were not unprecedented and that Allies remained united by common values and purposes. Moreover, recent debates over Iraq have not affected the commitment of the Allies to the transatlantic link, to collective defence, or to mutual solidarity as shown in the steps taken for the defence of Turkey. While some Allies strongly favoured some kind of a NATO role in post-conflict Iraq, none excluded it. On 16 April the Council agree to conclude its formal consultations on Turkey’s security under Article 4. The decision was taken on the basis of NATO military and other assessments and advice, and Turkish views. Measures initiated to address the civil emergency and humanitarian aspects of NATO’s support to Turkey were brought to an end. On the same day, the Defence Planning Committee decided also to conclude Operation Display Deterrence through a gradual redeployment of NATO’s forces from Turkey. While hostilities are over in Iraq, consultations on the situation in the country remain an important item on the agenda of the Council as the International Community addresses the post-conflict situation.
Resolution 319 on terrorist financing 1. Economic and financial capabilities needed by terrorist groups to work efficiently should be disrupted (damaged or destroyed) by the international community. Terrorist groups are funded through a variety of sources, including state sponsors, legal and illegal businesses, so-called “charities” and criminal activity such as the drug trade. The well-established money-laundering techniques of organised crime are also utilised by terrorists. Moreover, informal and difficult to regulate money transfer systems, such as the “hawala” system and even illegal migration, play a prominent role. 2. In general, in comparison with total worldwide financial flows, funding of terrorist activities is extremely low. In other words, terrorism in economic terms is usually conducted on a very small scale. Nonetheless, when terrorists are involved in highly profitable criminal activity (i.e. drug trafficking) the financial resources needed by terrorist groups can be large enough to rival the resources devoted to public security by some governments. This, then, is the crux of the security issues surrounding financial activities by terrorist groupings. 3. Large-scale terrorist activities – particularly in the international arena – require the support of well-functioning and integrated international networks maintaining cross-border business and financial capabilities. These large networks, by its very complexity, could offer some visibility and hence, vulnerability, to groups usually thriving in the shadows. Therefore, when moving against terrorism, the international community must respond with a comprehensive strategy, attacking terrorist networks at every point and exploiting the entire spectrum of available tools – military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and financial and accounting controls. 4. Nonetheless, it is important to be realistic. Despite the best efforts of the international community, terrorists now have, and will continue to have, adequate funding to plan and execute attacks. They cannot be shut down. Given this state, the disruption of financial networks becomes a priority. It is necessary to target not only the operatives themselves, but their financial intermediaries and supporters. Moreover, such disruptive activity must be carried out at the national as well as the multinational level. While NATO itself has no operational role in this field, the Alliance is aware of its responsibility to inform the Allies of the importance of their cooperation in this arena. 5. Moreover, it should be noted that techniques used against organised crime groups will likely be useful against terrorists, and also action against terrorists is likely to impede criminal activity as well. This is true as the lines between purely terrorist activities and purely criminal activities are blurring. Terrorists often use criminal methods to fund and implement their activities, they draw on the channels and services of organised crime and mix criminal and ideological motives. Thus, both groups use some common funding methods and, in addition, terrorist financial structures can be hidden by dilution into those of organised criminals. 6. There are especially pertinent links between terrorists and drug traffickers. These take forms ranging from facilitation (protection, transportation, taxation) to raising funds through direct trafficking by the terrorist organisations themselves. Both terrorists and criminal groups rely on cell structures to accomplish their respective goals. This structure enhances security and conceals financial flows. They both use informal transfer systems such as hawala and rely on cash smuggling and multiple accounts. Moreover, both are assisted by corrupt officials whose services can include: access to fraudulent personal documents and customs documentation to facilitate smuggling of goods and weapons. 7. Illegal migrations are also used by terrorists as conduits for smuggling cash, for example, to terrorists already living in a third country. Terrorists can also use “people smuggling” as a “business” to generate additional income. 8. One could argue that terrorist groups differ from other criminal organisations because of the motive of the crime. Unlike drug traffickers and organised crime groups that primarily seek monetary gain, terrorist groups usually have non-financial goals: publicity, dissemination of ideology, destruction of a regime or society in general, and simply spreading terror and intimidation. It is becoming increasingly difficult, however, to clearly separate terrorist from criminal motives. The reason is that, in many cases, terrorists are profit-oriented groups in addition to their ideological motivations. 9. Despite the blurring of the lines between terrorist and criminal groupings, there can be no doubt that – in general – financial resources flowing through organised crime groups are of another order of magnitude than those flowing to terrorists. Indeed, the financial flows linked to terrorist activities are often so low that they remain below the thresholds of institutional financial controls. For reference, consider that global money laundering is estimated at ranging between 2% and 5% of the world’s GDP, roughly some US$600 billion to US$1.5 trillion. 10. Resolution 319 provides an accurate description of the challenges to the international community’s efforts against terrorist financial methods and resources and provides appropriate recommendations to NATO member governments and parliaments. Indeed, the Economic Committee has already moved to integrate the subject, very much along the lines of this recommendation, into its agenda. For example, an annual meeting of the Economic Committee, reinforced by experts from national capitals, and focusing on the economic and financial dimension of terrorism is on the Committee’s standing work program. 11. Moreover, the Alliance is concerned with the analysis of, and advice on, terrorist capabilities and the threat they pose to NATO and NATO countries. This is why the Economic Committee, at 19 and in the EAPC format, has been tasked to work in this field, without duplicating the activities undertaken by other international institutions and bearing in mind that areas of analysis and advice are not areas of operation. 12. The Economic Committee plans to focus its future work on the following issues:
13. In addition, the Committee could consider further analysis and evaluation in the following areas:
Resolution 320 and declaration 322 on strengthening the transatlantic security partnership and on nato’s transformation In Resolutions 320 and 322, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has made a strong case for NATO’s transformation to meet the threats and challenges of the 21st Century, and to strengthen the transatlantic relationship. NATO’s Heads of State and Government share that perception, and they have taken action on it. The past 18 months have seen perhaps the most dramatic adaptation in Alliance history, with the Prague Summit as the centrepiece of NATO’s 21st century transformation. Combating terrorism The terrorist attacks of September 2001 transformed terrorism from a domestic issue of law enforcement into an international security threat, including a threat to NATO territory. NATO has acted to counter this threat. In Prague, the Allies agreed to beef up intelligence sharing. They will develop specific capabilities to deter terrorist activities and potential attacks, and to counter them if they occur. The Allies also agreed a new military concept for the defence against terrorism, which gives guidance to the Alliance’s military planners. The concept states that the forces of the Allies must be able to "deter, disrupt and defend" against terrorists, and to do so wherever required. Finally, Allies agreed a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, in order to involve NATO’s Partner countries more closely in this struggle. NATO is also taking concrete action to combat terrorism. In Afghanistan, NATO decided to increase its support to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by taking on the command, coordination and planning of the operation as a logical continuation of NATO's efforts to date on the ground. The Alliance is also conducting maritime patrols in the Mediterranean to protect against terrorist attacks, and taking action against terrorist cells in the Balkans. Dealing with weapons of mass destruction The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a gathering threat for many years. It was an area of Alliance attention well before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 highlighted the risk of terrorists using these kinds of lethal weapons. Against this background, at Prague, the Allies took a number of steps to increase their defence posture against possible attacks involving nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons. These measures include enhanced detection capabilities, better protective equipment for NATO forces, and improved support for civilian authorities in case of an emergency. Cyber defences will be hardened. The Allies also agreed to begin a new NATO Missile Defence feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory, forces and population centres against the full range of missile threats. Acquiring new capabilities In Prague, Allies took a number of measures to adapt NATO’s military capabilities for 21st century requirements. They decided to reform NATO’s command structure -- to make it more responsive, and more rapidly deployable. They also agreed to create a NATO Response Force: a state-of-the-art capability able to move very quickly, wherever required, and hit hard. In addition, by bringing together the best forces from both sides of the Atlantic, the NATO Response Force will also serve as a catalyst for the necessary transformation of our forces. A key decision taken at the Summit was the Prague Capabilities Commitment. All 19 Allies formally pledged to improve their military capabilities in areas that are critical to modern operations, such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refuelling, WMD protection and precision-guided munitions. Some Allies committed to making improvements individually, others agreed to form groups to address particular shortfalls more effectively. But critically, all the commitments made are very specific, with defined time frames. The Prague Capabilities Commitment stands as a real turning point in NATO’s, and particularly Europe's, adaptation to the requirements of a new security environment. NATO enlargement In Prague, seven countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) were invited to start accession talks with the Alliance. Following Slovenia’s referendum supporting accession to NATO, the Alliance has now signed the accession protocols for all seven countries, These countries should formally accede by Spring 2004, which, together with the enlargement of the European Union, will help to consolidate Europe as a common security space from the Baltic to the Black Sea. NATO and Russia NATO enlargement has proceeded without sabotaging the new NATO-Russia relationship. The reason is simple: the NATO-Russia Council is delivering concrete results to the benefit of both parties, in such important areas as combating terrorism, preventing WMD proliferation, theatre missile defence and peacekeeping. This is an agenda for the future. It is sustainable, and it is fruitful. Today, NATO-Russia relations have finally shed their Cold War baggage. Deepening partnership more broadly The attacks of 11 September 2001 were masterminded by a Saudi who lived in Central Asia. They were planned by people who came from the Eastern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean, who lived in Western Europe, and who finally carried out their attacks on the North American continent. Nothing illustrates better the need for security cooperation within, across and beyond Europe and North America. If we want to prevent such tragedies from occurring again, we have to build ties of cooperation that extend well into Central Asia and across the Mediterranean. The Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the Mediterranean Dialogue thus all have an important role to play in the new security architecture. At Prague, the Allies decided to upgrade and adapt these mechanisms. The Partnerships will focus more on 21st century threats, such as proliferation and terrorism, and they will encourage regional solutions for regional problems. Modernising the NATO organisation NATO’s membership is expanding, as is its agenda. Were its working methods to remain unchanged, the Alliance could have faced the prospect of exhaustion or paralysis. The Prague Summit gave a strong push for reform in this vital area. Heads of State and Government agreed to reduce the total number of over 400 NATO committees by some thirty per cent. More decisions will be delegated to subordinate committees, leaving the North Atlantic Council and the Defence Planning Council more room to discuss strategic issues. The procedures for Ministerial meetings have been streamlined as well, sacrificing formality in order to gain more time for substantive exchanges. These changes in structures and procedures will ensure that NATO is able to operate efficiently and effectively -- with nineteen members, twenty-six, or even more. Deepening the NATO-EU security partnership Just after Prague, in December 2002, we were able to achieve yet another breakthrough, by agreeing a formal basis for cooperation between NATO and the EU in crisis management and conflict prevention. And as of 1 April 2003, the EU has formally taken over peacekeeping duties from NATO in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The new NATO-EU relationship holds the potential of transforming
not only European security, but also the transatlantic relationship.
By enabling EU-led operations to draw on NATO assets and capabilities,
both sides of the Atlantic stand to gain. The EU will have
a long-sought opportunity to demonstrate its new role as a
serious security actor. And, by enabling the EU gradually to
take over more responsibility for stability in the Balkans,
the Alliance will be available for other pressing tasks. This
will facilitate a new, fairer and more sustainable burden-sharing
across the Atlantic. This broad, comprehensive set of reforms will help maintain NATO’s effectiveness in the 21st century. They will also help to rebalance the transatlantic relationship more fairly, and thus more sustainably. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly has always played an important role in explaining the Alliance to Parliamentarians in member governments, to the press and to the general public. That role is even more valuable now, as the pace and scope of NATO’s transformation increases. And at a time when relations between Allies are under some strain, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly can play an important role in reinforcing the ties that bond the two sides of the Atlantic.
Resolution 321 on terrorism with chemical, biological radiological and nuclear weapons The Alliance believes very strongly that non-military means, including diplomacy, economic and financial assistance, can play an important part in reducing the risk of terrorist attacks using CBRN weapons. As stated in the Strategic Concept of 1999, the Alliance is committed to contribute actively to the development of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation agreements as well as to confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). The Allies are fully aware of their distinctive role in promoting a broader, more comprehensive and more verifiable international arms control and disarmament process. All of these measures contribute to countering the potential use of CBRN agents by non-state actors. These issues are discussed during regular sessions of NATO’s Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), and work progresses on the practical implementation of related measures throughout the Alliance. NATO nations will continue to pursue all practical means to advance a global proscription on the possession and use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), signed in 1972, lacks robust compliance and verification provisions. NATO supports efforts to strengthen implementation of this Convention. In 2003 there will be consultations by all BTWC States on national measures to implement the prohibitions of the Convention, and on national measures to ensure the security of pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins. In 2004, the focus of the process will shift to enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, and to strengthening national and international efforts against infectious diseases. The 2005 meetings will address codes of conduct for scientists. The appeal from the International Committee of the Red Cross to elaborate an international agreement to make the possession and use of biological weapons and biotechnology a crime against humanity will be addressed within the Senior Politico-Military Group of Proliferation (SGP), where Allies will be able to exchange views on how to support the basic objectives which underpin this proposal. NATO nations agree that reinforcing the system of nuclear safeguards established by the NPT is necessary and in their direct interest. They support measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. With respect to nuclear testing and the ratification of the CTBT, all NATO nations continue to support the existing moratoria on nuclear testing and have urged all states to maintain these moratoria. The Alliance has repeatedly expressed its full support for cooperative efforts by the U.S. and Russia aimed at improving the security of Russia's nuclear stockpile. NATO also fully supports cooperation efforts by the U.S. and Russia to discourage or prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other nations. The significant achievements of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) are welcome. NATO member states and Russia are working together, making progress on a range of WMD and missile issues. These consultations cover a wide spectrum of proliferation problems. The issue of dismantling any remaining biological weapons facilities in the former Soviet Union and of preventing them from falling into the wrong hands is indeed important, and it is expected that this issue will be raised in the context of the NRC consultations. Important contacts exist between the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and NATO. During recent discussions, issues such as elimination of CW stockpiles and equipment, verification of non-proliferation problems, and international assistance and protection in the event of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons have been discussed. It is envisaged that further contacts will take place to explore areas of potential cooperation and synergy on these issues. NATO nations strongly believe that it is important to develop control of the transfer of classified information that could be used for chemical and biological weapons, and to restrict access to genetic information on dangerous pathogens, while remaining sensitive to legitimate scientific and medical matters. To tighten bio-security regulations and increase physical protection of highly lethal biological agents, concerted national actions have been conducted within the Alliance through different land armament and medical working groups dealing with protective clothing against biological weapons, international rules for evacuation of contaminated personnel, medical countermeasures and stockpile initiatives. The Alliance’s Matrix of Bilateral WMD Destruction and Management Assistance Programmes, which highlights the programmes of assistance by NATO countries, non-NATO countries and International Organisations to Russia and NIS countries in the field of decommissioning Weapons of Mass Destruction, is a tool which can be used as a means to avoid overlap between national assistance programmes of Allies. Its main purpose is to contribute to the enhancement of multilateral co-ordination of assistance. NATO nations continue co-ordination on WMD issues, which includes the intensification of cooperation to address the threat of illegal nuclear trafficking. NATO nations will also discuss these issues with various Partners over the next several months. The Alliance will continue its co-operation in enhancing civil preparedness for possible terrorist attacks against civilian populations with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons by continuing to implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan. NATO will improve it ability to provide support, when requested, to help authorities to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks, including attacks with CBRN against critical infrastructure, as foreseen in the CEP Action Plan. This work is carried out in close co-operation with Partners. Partners will be invited to participate in training opportunities and exercises related to terrorism to be co-ordinated by the military commands. The Partnership Work Programme will provide more anti-terrorism-related opportunities and activities in this field. Exercises will also be used to share experiences in the fight against terrorism. A recent NATO workshop held in Ahrweiler, Germany (end of January 2003), organised jointly by the Civil Emergency Planning Directorate and NATO’s WMD Centre, focussed on threat assessment, detection, decontamination and countermeasures based on a scenario related to a possible radiological accident or terrorist attack. A further Workshop on Chemical Contingency issues will be held in May 2003. A NATO Advanced Research Workshop on “Preparedness against bio-terrorism and re-emerging infectious diseases – regional capabilities, needs and expectations in Central and Eastern European countries”, which was held in Warsaw, Poland, helped to increase awareness of the problem at the political level in the region, consolidated the community of experts and reinforced connections with NATO and other international organizations, including the World Health Organisation. NATO has undertaken work on an updated database of terrorist groups and incidents involving CBRN weapons, and is also developing a database of global endemic diseases. To enhance the capabilities of the World Health Organisation to monitor global infectious disease trends and unusual outbreaks, an effective interface between different epidemiological systems has to be developed. NATO is developing interoperability concepts for medical surveillance which will support deployed forces, and such a network could eventually be linked to the overall WHO system. NATO has accomplished a great deal in the overall area of NBC defence over the last year, and a robust exercise programme in 2003 will validate and enhance the initiatives which have been taken to date. Enhancement of the Alliance’s defence capabilities against weapons of mass destruction has focussed on five chemical, biological and nuclear defence initiatives:
All of these initiatives were endorsed by the Prague Summit, and are currently being implemented. NATO reaffirms it commitment to improve expeditiously its NBC defence capabilities. 
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