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| Updated: 09-May-2003 | NATO Speeches |
| Co-hosts: 3 April 2003 |
Remarks by Robert G. Bell, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment As we meet here in Paris today, there are two very important meetings taking place only one hour and twenty minutes by fast train up the road at NATO HQ in Brussels. The first the whole world knows about: Secretary of State Colin Powell’s meeting with NATO and EU Foreign Ministers to discuss – and indeed to begin to repair – the rifts that have arisen in transAtlantic relations as a consequence of disagreements over Iraq. I am confident that NATO will come through this bumpy patch and emerge intact, just as I am confident that the coalition will prevail in the war in Iraq. As Lord Robertson said to President Bush in the Oval Office during his visit last month, paraphrasing Churchill’s famous quote about America, “NATO can be counted upon to do the right thing, after having, that is, exhausted all other possible alternatives.”With that sense of confidence in mind, we who are tasked with leading the work of the United States’ most important alliance can keep out heads down, focus on the immediate post-Prague challenges at hand (including in particular the establishment of the NATO reaction Force (NRF) and the full implementation of the Prague capability enhancement commitments), and even dare to leave Brussels for Paris when Ministerial meetings on Iraq are taking place! But before catching the Thalys this morning, I stopped in on the other important meeting occuring at the Headquaters today – and that is the inaugural session of the newly-renamed and re-oriented NATO Missile Defence Project Group (MD PG), chaired by David Martin of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency. As Chairman of NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), to which the MD PG reports, I must say that this is truly an exciting time for missile defense at NATO: exciting for TMD, exciting for full-spectrum Missile Defense, and exciting for NATO-Russia missile defence co-operation. Let me briefly review what we are doing, and present my own views as to where this all might lead. Let’s begin by recall the tasking that was given by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Prague. In addition to supporting the completion of the current Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) Feasibility Study (FS) within the agreed timelines, the Heads of State and Government tasked the CNAD to initiate the new MDFS in a timely manner “once the initial results of the TBMD FS had been made available to nations”. This precedent condition was satisfied on schedule in January 2003, when the two transatlantic industry study teams submitted their study results to NC3A as host nation, and comprehensive briefing reports were delivered to the nations. In the ongoing phase, the study results will be "consolidated" into solid architectural recommendations as key inputs for the elaboration of the NATO Staff Requirements (NSR) for a layered TBMD System. Although the analysis of the study results are at an early stage, it is obvious that the dual track approach with two parallel studies was a very successful one. Both teams took significantly different approaches leading to complementary results as a broad basis for the evaluation and consolidation process. The NATO TMD Project Group (TMD PG) identified in both contractors' reports some areas where significant benefits could be obtained from further analysis by both contractors. As a result, NATO’s Infrastructure Committee recently approved an extension of the TMD FS for additional analysis within the previously authorised scope of the current FS. Soon after the Prague Summit, I conducted in my capacity of CNAD Chairman several meetings of an ad hoc missile defence task force composed of all the key players at the NATO HQ IS and IMS staff level. Recognising that time was a critical factor, the Task Force conducted a carefully focussed study aimed at identifying ways to optimise the normal NATO funding and contractual procedures and developed a Programme of Work (PoW) identifying a possible date for contract agreement in September/October, 2003. The Programme of Work is based on a series of ambitious assumptions and critical elements, including:
Such a compressed schedule is perhaps unprecedented at NATO, and the programme must necessarily follow a critical path, which means that any delay at one step will cause delay to the whole programme. This means that keeping the project on schedule will require a lot of co-ordination efforts by national and Staff personnel. Where are we with respect to this new Missile Defence initiative? Some important activities have already started. Let me note at this point that the CNAD has always recognised the TMD PG as its principal body of expertise in this area. It was therefore necessary to amend the mandate of this group to be empowered to act also as steering committee for the new MD FS and to rename itself as the Missile Defence Project Group (MD PG). Revised Terms of Reference were approved by NADREPs on behalf of the NAD's under a silence procedure. The TMD PG has developed and approved the outline the Statement of Work, the Scope of Effort as well as defining the Host Nation and the number of studies. SHAPE has worked hard to develop on time and submit for joint IS/IMS staffing the Military Operational Requirement and the Stand Alone Project. The critical elements thereafter will be:
And finally MDFS contract award in early-mid October, before the Informal Defence Ministerial meeting in Colorado Springs. However, let me underline again that this will only happen on this timeline if political will and consensus are continuously support the process. So, where might all this activity lead? Let’s begin with TMD. First, it cannot be overemphasized that, as affirmed by Defence Ministers last June, “there is currently an Alliance consensus on the need to deploy theatre ballistic missiles defences to protect our deployed forces.” Our challenge is to determine where the appropriate balance in this regard lies as between national TMD assets and common NATO-owned and operated TMD assets. I believe a consensus is already emerging at the expert level that it will be crucial for NATO to provide the Battle Management/C3/Intelligence (BMC3I) “backbone”, or foundation, for an Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) system. I think this is, as my British friends would say, “spot-on”. The crucial element of TMD is a joint, combined, integrated BMC3I capability. Without this capability, the other Extended Air Defence pillars (active defence, passive defence, and conventional counterforce) will not be able to function in a coherent manner. One major question, though, has been whether NATO should assume that it will be unaffordable for NATO to go beyond a NATO owned and controlled BMC3I to use common NATO funding to acquire TMD interceptors and most TMD sensors. I believe there may well be an intermediate option under which a limited number of TMD interceptors (approximately one battalion – or what now would amount to three PAC-3 batteries) would be NATO-owned and operated as a core NRF asset. Over time, this core NRF TMD capability could evolve, to include MEADS, SAMP/T, maritime assets and an upper layer system. The general concept that the NRF should be underpinned by core NATO-owned and operated assets (such as NATO AWACS and NATO Alliance Ground Surveillans (AGS)) is already well established. Indeed, the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Kujat, has repeatedly emphasized that he viewed such core NATO “enablers” as the “glue” that would hold the NRF together. This reflects his understanding that while the NRF must be capable of participating in the “full range of Alliance missions”, including high-intensity combat at the upper end of the conventional conflict spectrum, very few NATO allies are equipped within their national inventories for carrying out the full range of conventional war-fighting tasks. It is also clear that the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) do not view the NRF itself as a “loose pool of forces” from which ad hoc arrangements can be made upon receipt of a deployment mission. Rather, the NMA see the NRF as a joint and combined unit of brigade size that is identified well in advance and then trains for a period of six months before being placed on stand-by alert status for another six months, ready to deploy on 5-30 days notice as a cohesive unit. Since all NATO allies will take their “turn” (either individually or, for smaller allies, in multinational groupings) in the NRF rotation, but very few allies have or will have their own national TMD systems, most NRF rotations will require outside provision of TMD assets. The question arises, therefore, whether those allies that do have TMD can be expected to commit TMD batteries to the NRF repeatedly for up to a year as non-TMD equipped allies take their turn in the “six and six” rotation. I think this is unlikely, since those nations with TMD would want to assess the implications of such a lengthy commitment on a case-by-case basis, rather than as a “standing offer” to the NRF. But relying on an ad hoc force generation process to locate available TMD assets for the NRF only after the deployment needs arises not only would go against the concept of six-month integrated training for the NRF units, it could also prove problematic in terms of availability – as the recent Article IV force generation process underscored with regard to the deploying of PAC-3 batteries for the defence of Turkey. One final observation: in an important presentation to the U.S. Congress earlier this month (House Armed Services Committee hearing on U.S. Missile Defence Policy, March 20), U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy J.D. Crouch II described the U.S. concept of an “evolutionary approach” to fielding missile defences. As ASD Crouch stated: “This approach facilitates the timely delivery of a modest, but still useful defensive capability that can then be improved with the benefit of technical advancements and operational experience.” Moreover, he added, “fielding modest capabilities in the near-term will provide not only timely defensive coverage, it will allow operational imput from combatant commanders,” which, he noted, is “especially important for the missile defense mission wherein there is little previous operational experience to serve as a guide”. As we look ahead to the new Feasibility Study on full-spectrum missile defense tasked by Heads of State and Government at Prague, these rationales for an “evolutionary approach” would appear highly relevant to the decisions NATO soon will be making on TMD. As a well-know American expression goes: “sometimes you have to learn to walk before you can learn to run.” I believe operation of a limited-scale, NRF-dedicated NATO-owned and controlled TMD interceptor force would not only meet the “full range” war-fighting requirements for the NRF, it could also serve the broader purpose of providing a point of departure should NATO decide to complement the individual national contributions some allied states will make on a bilateral basis (e.g., Fylingdales, Thule, perhaps other sensor sites), and the contribution individual European industries may make on a corporate basis, to take on a more ambitious collective role within the global U.S. missile defence architecture as it evolves over the years. Thank you. 
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