at the Munich Conference on Security Policy Munich 8 Feb. 2003

Toward A New Transatlantic Consensus Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson Mr Teltschik, Ministers, Members of Parliament, Congressmen, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Since these unique conferences were launched in 1962, Wehrkunde has been seen as a barometer for the state of transatlantic relations. If the mood here is positive, everything is rosy on both sides of the ocean. If Europeans and Americans are squabbling here, then expect squalls, gales or hurricanes in the Atlantic. A seductive analysis. But it is often wrong. Take last year. Following the horror of September 11, we were in the middle of a flood of speculation about NATO’s future. Critics were condemning the Alliance to irrelevance or disintegration. It needed to transform to deal with radically changed 21st century security challenges. But it could not, and would not, succeed in doing so. That was the emerging new consensus. Now fast forward through 2002. A whistle stop tour to Reykjavik, Rome, Prague, Brussels and Copenhagen. First, at Reykjavik in May, NATO’s Foreign Ministers put an end to 15 years of debilitating theological disputation on whether or not NATO could act “out of area”. You all know the issues. 9/11 made them irrelevant. At Reykjavik, nations recognised that the world had changed and gave the Alliance a formal tasking to confront threats to our security from wherever they may come. Step one towards a new NATO. Step two came only days later and was far more eye-catching. Outside Rome, 19 NATO Presidents and Prime Ministers met President Putin to together inaugurate a NATO-Russia Council. This truly historic spectacle of former adversaries working to unite, not divide, a continent brought down the final curtain on the Cold War. It produced a new chemistry of equal partnership “at 20”. It provided clear evidence that NATO was capable of stimulating and embracing profound change. Next stop, Prague in November. An Enlargement Summit which became the Transformation Summit. At Prague, we launched the biggest round of enlargement in NATO’s history. Another historic decision that was good for the invitees, good for NATO and good for Europe. We set NATO at the centre of collective military planning and preparations to meet future terrorist attacks. We agreed a package of military modernisation measures that will underpin NATO’s credibility as a military alliance and narrow the transatlantic capabilities gap we heard so much about last year. And we radically reformed NATO’s political structures. As Secretary General, I have to be an optimist and an advocate. But as a European and an Atlanticist, I was genuinely delighted by the outcome of Prague. Nineteen nations together designed a new NATO for a new post 9/11 century. A uniquely flexible vehicle for transatlantic consultation and multilateral cooperation. The world’s largest permanent coalition. The world’s most effective military organisation. That was the consensus agreed at Prague. When the British Guardian newspaper, not one of the Alliance’s most enthusiastic advocates, runs an article under the by-line “Peace, Love and NATO” next to a cartoon of John Lennon wearing glasses emblazoned with the NATO star, you know that some things are going well. And 2002 got better still. In December, we started to make better use of NATO’s multinational machinery by helping Germany and the Netherlands prepare to take over the next ISAF deployment in Kabul. Then in the middle of December, in parallel meetings in Brussels and Copenhagen, NATO and the EU at last broke the logjam on Berlin Plus, the mechanism for practical defence cooperation between the two organisations. As with the NATO-Russia Council earlier in the year, this agreement transformed the chemistry in the NATO-EU strategic relationship, which can now be developd to the profound benefit of all NATO and EU members. We are already seeing this as we work together on possible EU follow-on missions in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia, a joint strategy for the Balkans as a whole, and wider cooperation in other important fields. So back at Wehrkunde, a year on, is there a new transatlantic consensus? In my view, yes there is. This consensus is based upon a common understanding of the risks and challenges now faced by Europe and North America. It reflects a common agreement on the mechanisms needed to deal with these risks and challenges, and in particular the role of NATO, its strategic partnership with the EU and its new cooperative friendship with Russia. And this consensus has forged an effective tool for cooperation and consultation in the transformed post-Prague Alliance. Does that mean that all is sweetness and light? Of course not. First of all, NATO and its members have a difficult and demanding agenda ahead to deliver all the packages agreed at Prague. I am especially determined to keep Defence Ministers’ feet to the fire on the Prague Capabilities Commitments, which are fundamental to NATO’s effectiveness and credibility. In parallel, we must complete our links with the EU. NATO is responsible for ensuring stability and security in the Balkans. But in the improving climate on the ground, individual operations such as FYROM and Bosnia no longer necessarily need the full weight of the Alliance. Thirdly, the international community must confront the post-conflict challenge in Afghanistan. Our governments have yet to show convincingly that they are as committed to building a stable, peaceful and free Afghanistan as they are in Bosnia, Kosovo or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The continuing reliance on ad hoc solutions to deep and enduring problems – exemplified by the unseemly six-monthly scramble to find a country to command ISAF in Kabul – gives neither the Afghans, their neighbours nor the remnants of the Taleban and Al Qaida the sense that we are there for the long haul. So it is not surprising that the security situation is still not improving. Afghanistan is not a regional problem. If peace is not built there, NATO members will all suffer the spillover consequences, in instability, terrorism, drugs and refugees. My personal view is that NATO can play a bigger part in the international effort in Afghanistan. The Balkans experience offers a number of possible models. But the bottom line is that having invested so much in NATO’s multinational machinery, it must be right to use it when and where that makes political and military sense. Especially where there seems increasingly to be no credible alternative. And so to Iraq. This year’s cause celebre for the transatlantic doomsayers. Their emerging consensus for 2003 is that the transatlantic family cannot and will not agree on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein or on how to deal with it. Their conclusion is that NATO, the EU and the UN are being fundamentally damaged as a result. I disagree. Similarly gloomy conclusions were drawn at various stages during Desert Storm, Bosnia and Kosovo. They all proved to be wrong. I am confident that the same will be true this time around. Of course, there are strong and honourable differences of opinion within NATO, the EU and the UN. But they are essentially about means not ends, tactics not strategy. There is an extraordinary degree of international consensus about the threat posed by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction and the urgent need to disarm him. This consensus is enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 1441, a remarkably tough demand by the whole international community that Saddam prove to the world his claims to have disarmed already. This same consensus underpins the NATO statement at Prague committing its members to take effective action to assist and support UN efforts to ensure full and effective Iraqi compliance with 1441. Not a bad basis for a new transatlantic consensus. However, as in previous post-Cold War crises, we are now engaged in the necessary, but sometimes painful, process of deciding how to translate agreement on ends into agreement on how best to achieve them. This makes good political theatre but it does not amount to a fundamental transatlantic crisis, nor an Alliance breaker or a European Union breaker. Take the disagreement in NATO about the proposal to begin formal planning for prudent deterrent and defensive measures to meet a possible threat to Turkey. We have not yet agreed this tasking. But there is complete agreement among all 19 NATO countries about their commitment to defend Turkey and on the substance of the planning measures. The point at issue is the timing of our tasking. Not whether to plan but when to plan. I am confident that we will reach agreement on that in the coming days. So NATO’s solidarity with Turkey is not a question. The Washington Treaty imposes responsibilities on all NATO members. I have no doubt that these responsibilities will be met. Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not underestimate the importance of current debates and disagreements on Iraq. Especially if we cannot reach agreement among ourselves in the coming days. I do disagree, profoundly, that they undermine the new transatlantic consensus which I set out earlier. If I thought that the transatlantic family was so fragile that it could not weather the current storms, then I would be pessimistic indeed, not only about NATO’s future but about the whole multilateral framework in Europe and North America. Instead, I am even more optimistic this year than last year about NATO, ESDP and Euro-Atlantic security as a whole. In 2002, the Alliance demonstrated that it was able to transform quickly and effectively to be able to meet its members’ fundamental security needs in a radically changed security environment. In so doing, it answered those critics who said that it was doomed to irrelevance. In 2003, I am equally certain that the new transatlantic consensus forged in this process of transformation will prove as robust as its predecessors in meeting the challenges of this new century. I therefore look forward to hearing a different set of reasons to be gloomy when you meet again next year. Additional information: Munich Conference on Security Policy online