City Forum, London 24 January 2003

Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson Ladies and Gentlemen, A journalist recently told me that whenever there is a slow news day, his paper runs a "whither NATO" piece. I took this as a compliment. For it points to NATO’s resilience. People are constantly worrying about its future. But, in the end, the Alliance always manages to stay in business. After September 11, however, there was a moment when this pattern no longer seemed to apply. NATO did not play the leading role in the military response to the September 11 attacks. There were good reasons for this, based around the need for a broader coalition. But it is also true that there were tasks which NATO could and should have done, yet was not asked to do. So it is not entirely surprising that for some observers, September 11 appeared to portend NATO's decline or even demise. If the Alliance had a role, it would only be as a military "toolbox" for coalitions of the willing. And if there were security problems to be tackled in Europe, the European Union would take care of them. For NATO, so far, so bad. But these gloomy predictions did not come true. Indeed, the Alliance’s November 2002 Summit in Prague was hailed as an outstanding success. Under the theme of transformation, we cracked issues as diverse as NATO’s enlargement, bio-chem and nuclear defence, a new NATO Response Force and the internal reform of our Brussels Headquarters. Prior to Prague, we had already put an end to a decade’s wrangling over the theology of out of area operations and created the truly historic NATO-Russia Council. After Prague, the good news continued when NATO and the EU resolved the last political obstacles to a European Security and Defence Policy that reinforces rather than competes with NATO. Early last year, I banned my press spokesman from engaging in debate about the “r” word – NATO’s relevance – because we risked fuelling a damaging self-fulfilling prophecy. Twelve months later, I am delighted to use the “r” word once again because the Alliance has won the argument. We are indisputably back in business and as relevant as ever before. How did this change come about? The answer lies in the unique ability of NATO to adapt, and reinvent itself. This was a particularly demanding challenge because in the post 911 world, we could not hope to maintain NATO’s effectiveness by leisurely change or tinkering at the margins. We had to aim for a rapid and radical overhaul of the Alliance’s missions, military capabilities, and organisational structures. Prague became the focus. It had been viewed previously as a second enlargement Summit. Enlargement remained a core component. But the challenge was now much greater. So Prague became NATO’s transformation Summit, to prepare the Alliance to deal with the risks and threats of the new century. There was inevitably an element of risk in this approach. If you pose Presidents and Prime Ministers with a case for transformation, you cannot guarantee that their response will not be that the price is too high, the world has moved on or that some other body should take on the job. The risk paid off. 19 nations accepted my arguments, and buried their theological differences to embrace a radical programme of change and reform. I will not bore you with a detailed list of measures but it is worth rehearsing why some of them were so important. The most eye-catching developments were political. At Prague, we launched the biggest round of enlargement in NATO’s history. All seven invitee countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia for those of you who were not paying attention) have made extraordinary progress in moving towards membership. They must sustain this effort. But I have no doubt that our historic decision at Prague was good for the invitees, good for NATO and good for Europe. Even before Prague, we had provided clear evidence of NATO’s ability to stimulate and embrace change. At Rome in May we met with President Putin to inaugurate the NATO-Russia Council, bringing down a final curtain on the sterile divisions of the Cold War. The new chemistry of 20 countries working together as equal partners was immediately apparent. Since then, it has borne real fruit in widening and deepening practical cooperation, especially in response to terrorism but also in other important fields. Our work with Russia on terrorism was only one strand in NATO’s contribution to defeating this first great 21st century challenge. The Alliance cannot and should not become the world’s counter-terrorist police force. But we have an important role to play, especially now that NATO has a formal tasking, agreed by Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik last Spring, to confront threats to our security from wherever they may come. This is what I meant when I referred earlier to the ending of our theological dispute on out of area operations. The practical impact of our decisions at Prague was to set NATO at the centre of collective military planning and preparations to meet future terrorist attacks. I am delighted that much of this work is being undertaken in concert with our 27 Partner countries. Equally important has been the contribution of Allied countries and the Alliance to operations against terrorists. Without the practical military cooperation and interoperability developed in and by NATO, neither the defeat of the Taleban nor the stability operations in Kabul could have been undertaken so successfully. I am especially pleased that NATO’s unique multinational assets are being employed by Germany and the Netherlands to help prepare for the next stabilisation deployment to Kabul. A great deal has been invested in NATO’s multinational machinery. It must be right to make the best possible use of it. That same principle underpins NATO’s defence links with the European Union, known in the trade as the Berlin Plus agreement, on which we made major progress in Brussels and at Copenhagen at the end of last year. Breaking the log-jam in developing a cooperative strategic relationship between NATO and the EU was a political achievement of profound importance for both organisations. We now have a real opportunity to develop this relationship across a wide spectrum of activities. But for all the undoubted value of NATO’s high profile political achievements, I attach the greatest importance to the package of military modernisation measures agreed at Prague. NATO is and must remain a military alliance. Its credibility therefore depends on its military effectiveness. Yet changing missions and rapidly evolving technologies are transforming what armed forces are required to be able to do. So the Prague Capabilities Commitment to fill key shortfalls such as strategic airlift and tanker aircraft, the cutting edge NATO Response Force, and the streamlining of NATO’s command structure are absolutely fundamental to the Alliance’s future. All Heads of State and Government have made firm political commitments to deliver these essential new capabilities, and thereby to close the transatlantic gap about which we heard so much in the first part of last year. No matter how successful the transformation of our armed forces, they cannot be fully effective without the parallel reform of the Alliance’s political structures. Our decision-making machinery was designed to work with a dozen member countries. From 2004, it must do so at 26. I was blunt with nations about the implications. Without radical reform, NATO would face institutional gridlock. As many of you will experienced, reforming international bureaucracies is no easy matter, especially where consensus is needed for all decisions and vested interests have become entrenched. but here too, nato’s member countries embraced the need for change. last year, we streamlined working methods and pruned committee numbers by over 30 %. a radical restructuring of the international staff will be completed during the summer. we are introducing modern delegated budget management processes. and this week we selected a design for the alliance’s new headquarters building. So contrary to many expectations, 2002 was a very good year for NATO. In the wake of Prague, the Alliance is much better placed than 12 months ago to deal with 21st century challenges. It is a uniquely flexible tool for transatlantic consultation and multilateral cooperation. It is the world’s largest permanent coalition. And it is the world’s most effective military organisation, with a proven record of operational success. Of course, not all is sweetness and light. First of all, NATO and its members need in the coming months to deliver on the packages agreed at Prague. This is a demanding agenda. In parallel, we must complete the links with the EU, leading perhaps as early as March to a smooth transition from NATO command to EU command of the small force protecting monitors in Macedonia(1). Beyond that, I see no reason to rule out the prospect of a similar transfer from NATO to the EU in Bosnia. NATO has a fundamental responsibility to ensure stability and security in the Balkans. But in the improving climate on the ground, individual operations no longer necessarily need the full weight of the Alliance. NATO and the international community have stayed the course in the Balkans. We have stopped wars, brought peace and helped to build stability. There are lessons here for international engagement elsewhere. Afghanistan is the most obvious example. No-one today laments the Taleban or argues seriously that Afghans are worse off now than before the coalition toppled the Taleban regime. But Western governments have yet to show convincingly that they are as committed to building a stable, peaceful and free Afghanistan as they were in Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia. To be frank, the continuing reliance on ad hoc solutions to deep and enduring problems – exemplified by the six-monthly scramble to find a country to command the ISAF stabilisation force in Kabul – gives neither the Afghans, their neighbours nor the remnants of the Taleban and Al Qaida the sense that we are there for the long haul. It is therefore no surprise that the security situation is still not improving. I welcome the initiative by Germany and the Netherlands to seek NATO’s help in organising the next ISAF deployment. But I wonder whether this is enough. Afghanistan is not just a regional problem. If peace is not built there, NATO members will all suffer the consequences, in instability, terrorism, drugs and refugees. I leave you to draw your own conclusions on how the Balkans model might sensibly be applied to help deal with these – our – problems. Finally, you will not expect me to say a great deal on Iraq. The action is, rightly, in the UN. You will have seen that the US has tabled in NATO a package of possible measures, primarily to help Turkey should the need arise. We are working on how best to coordinate this work with the UN timetable. And that is the formal position. I would, however, like to end with some brief personal thoughts. There can surely be no doubt but that the way in which Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass destruction is handled strikes at the very credibility of multilateralism and the UN. The international community asked the US to deal with Saddam’s flagrant breach of Security Council Resolutions through the UN. Washington did so. There was a new unanimous Security Council Resolution, UNSCR1441. Now the inspectors are uncovering clear evidence that Saddam has continued to lie to the UN. In the light of this chain of events, it seems to me that if Saddam does not change course completely, the international community must act if it – and especially the UN – is not to lose all credibility in the face of dictators and outlaw regimes throughout the world. To conclude, let me simply remind you that at Prague, NATO Allies committed themselves to take effective action to assist and support UN efforts to ensure full and immediate Iraqi compliance, without conditions or restrictions, with UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Ladies and Gentlemen, NATO’s job is to meet its members’ fundamental security needs in a radically changed security environment. In 2002, we demonstrated that those who doubted whether we could succeed were wrong. The transformation agreed at Prague has reinforced NATO’s role at the heart of its members’ 21st century security and defence needs. So the papers will have to look elsewhere for a stock article for slow news days: “whither NATO” is off the agenda again. 1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.