|
| Updated: 04-Oct-2002 | NATO Speeches |
| At
the 3 October 2002 |
"Challenge
and Change for NATO. Address
Moderator: It is a great pleasure to have with us today Stephen Hadley who is the Deputy National Security Adviser in the White House for President Bush. He is somebody who has had extensive experience in dealing with the Alliance and NATO over the years. From 1989 to 1993 during the Bush I Administration he was Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy and as such was responsible for defence matters relating to NATO and Western Europe. He has been intimately involved in the strategy and policy making regarding nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence and arms control and he is probably in one of the most demanding jobs I can think of in government, with time pressures both at the start and end of his day, so we are delighted that he could make time from his busy schedule to join us today to address the issues that we are discussing here regarding the future of the Alliance, so it's my pleasure to introduce Stephen Hadley. Mr Hadley: I'd like to offer a few thoughts on the important choices facing NATO as it continues to provide for our common security in what is increasingly a changing world. We live in a time of great danger, and great challenge. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the toppling of the World Trade Center marked respectively the beginning and end of a long transition period. During that period foreign policy thinkers searched for an all-encompassing theory that would describe the new threats, and the appropriate way to respond to them. Some said that global markets, linked by modern technology, would reign supreme, leaving nations and their militaries with a diminished role in the world. Others said that ethnic conflict would be the defining feature of the 21st century, and some even advanced the idea that military forces would be spending most of their time mediating civil conflicts and dispensing humanitarian aid. We are still years away from understanding the long-term effects of last September's terrorist attacks, but the tragedy has helped to clarify a number of issues in a most vivid way. We are still vulnerable in ways we did not anticipate and with consequences that can be grave. Military force and self-defence are not, it turns out, destined for the dustbin of history. Within my country we have been trying to understand the significance of this new circumstance for our national strategy. President Bush's new national security strategy reflects today's new realities and new opportunities. The strategy calls for America to utilise its power and influence to create a balance of power that favours freedom. As the President says in his cover letter to this strategy "We seek to create the conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. " The strategy has 3 pillars: We will defend the peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorist and outlaw regimes; we will preserve the peace by fostering an era of good relations among the world's great powers; and we will extend the peace by seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe. As you can see from these 3 pillars this is a strategy that does not render NATO obsolete but rather envisions a central place for NATO, for NATO can be a critical vehicle for achieving all 3 of these objectives. But it can do so only if it is prepared to change to meet the new circumstances. Next month our leaders will meet in Prague where they will
take up these challenges. The agenda is only slightly less ambitious
than the agenda for the first meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers
in September 1949. Leaders will be asking four fundamental questions
about the Alliance. What is NATO for? What tools does NATO need?
With whom does NATO First, what is NATO for? NATO's core mission is the same today as it was at its founding. Collective defence and consultation about threats to peace and security. NATO put this mission into new practice following the 11 September terrorist attacks. No-one would have predicted that NATO's first invocation of Article 5 would have come in response to an attack hatched in Afghanistan, planned in places like Germany, Spain and Malaysia, and executed in Washington and New York. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty became real that day in a new one, and one that should surely give pause to those who question NATO's purposes. NATO's core mission has not changed. What has changed is the source of the threats to our countries. These threats are likely to come less from massing great armies than from small shadowy bands of terrorists. Less from strong states than from weak or failed states, including those led by aggressive dictators. Less from inside Europe than from exotic locales beyond Europe. Last May in Reykjavik in a major, but often overlooked, decision NATO acknowledged that it must have the capabilities to meet threats wherever they arise. This effectively ended the in area - out of area debate that had burned up so much of our time and energies throughout the 1990s. A historical line has been crossed. NATO will go to the Article 5 threats wherever they are. This does not mean that NATO will be profligate or go searching for adventures. It does mean that defence in the future will be very different than defence we knew in the past. NATO must change if it is to play a critical role in defending our societies against the real threats of our time. The second question that NATO will answer in Prague is what tools does NATO need, or how should NATO change. To answer this question, I think we need to look no further than Lord Robertson's observation from his first press conference on becoming Secretary General. There he said that the Alliance's future depends on capabilities, capabilities, capabilities. And he was right. It is important to understand that this does not mean that every member should try to be state of the art in every field. We know what the most important capabilities are in meeting the new threats. We need better defences against nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, both protection and detection. We need better counter-terror capabilities. We need to improve interoperability across a broad range of functional areas, from communications to ground surveillance, to strategic air lift. We need better precision strike capabilities, meaning more unmanned aerial vehicles, more precision-guided munitions, better intelligence. These capabilities are needed soon. Not in 5 years, not 10 years. They need to be fully funded, they need to be available promptly. They need to be ready if you will by date certain to begin contributing to our common security. Developing these capabilities will require more than just new spending. It will require smarter spending. Some nations will need greater specialisation within their militaries. In some areas some nations will need to pool their capabilities. Allies will need to find the wallet to build these capabilities and the will to use them when they are needed. Few nations will possess all these capabilities, but every nation should be prepared to develop some of them. As is often the case in NATO we have begun in practice to act on this principle long before we have quantified it in theory. In Afghanistan NATO backed up their solidarity with action. Afghanistan is hardly an example of the United States going it alone. It is true that Operation Enduring Freedom was not a NATO operation, but NATO militaries provided air space, refuelling, access to ports and bases for the operations in Afghanistan. Nearly every NATO member sent forces to the region for either warfighting or peacekeeping and for over 7 months NATO AWACs patrolled the skies over the United States, helping to keep us safe. Our coalition against terror has been global. Many people talk about the coalition that President George Herbert Walker Bush put together in the Gulf War in 1990/91. That coalition consisted of 36 countries. In our collective campaign against terrorism we are standing together with about 90 countries. Approximately 3,000 coalition troops participated in Operation Anaconda in the active phase of the war in Afghanistan. These troops came from the United States, Canada, Italy, Australian, the United Kingdom, Spain, Jordan, France, Germany, Denmark and Norway. A number of countries have also made non-military contributions in Afghanistan. Jordan built a hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif that has treated more than 90,000 patients to date. Russia has rebuilt a key tunnel that links Kabul with Northern Afghanistan facilitating the shipment of thousands of tons of food, medicine and supplies, and Germany is helping to rebuild the country's police sector. So much for the United States going alone. The coalition we assembled last year was assembled on the run, in an emergency. Many governments, including our closest friends, urged us to look to NATO more specifically. We thought about this, and believe our allies have a point. We need to think hard about the lessons of the Afghanistan campaign, and what we might need in the future. In addition to new capabilities we need new NATO structures that will allow us to package capabilities to fit new sorts of missions. The NATO response force proposed by Secretary Rumsfeld would be an enormous asset. This force will be highly ready, and quickly deployable with air, sea and ground capabilities. These are the qualities needed to meet 21st century missions. In addition, NATO's new command structure must be redesigned to support these capabilities. NATO needs to be able to develop 21st century forces fast, lethal with superior weapons, supported by superior intelligence, and to get them where they are needed, wherever this might be. They will need to be trained and ready to respond to every type of contingency. And these could come in very different forms. NATO-led missions, NATO-supported missions, instances where NATO members, and perhaps even NATO itself, would be part of a broader coalition of the willing. The third question is more open-ended. With whom does NATO co-operate? Obviously NATO co-operates with many nations including all the members of the Partnership for Peace. But NATO has also worked closely with the European Union in the Balkans. Co-operation we would like to see extended. NATO seeks to build a special partnership with Ukraine and it has worked with the OSCE protecting monitors in Macedonia, and supporting OSCE-led police training in Kosovo. But I particularly want to highlight NATO's new relationship with Russia. The passing of the ABM Treaty, the signing of the Treaty of Moscow and Moscow's strong co-operation in the war against global terror signalled that the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras have finally passed. We are now moving into the post post-Cold War era. We have done more than just settle old business. We are now entering new territory. The NATO-Russia Council we founded in May is a tangible expression of this fundamental fact. Our purpose is to build common security with Russia. Our means are the common projects we have agreed upon, such as developing a joint threat assessment and co-operation on civil emergencies. But we can and should do more. As we tend to this new relationship we must think ambitiously and creatively asking fundamental questions. For example, should NATO and Russia develop military capabilities to work together to face terrorist threats. And as NATO works on missile defence should we develop a common missile defence system with Russia. It has been over a decade since NATO and Russia viewed each other through concertina wire with hostility. Now we must overcome the habits of mind that linger over a divide of different perspectives and different histories. Prague will also answer a fourth question, who is in NATO? President Bush has clearly stated his view that the United States believes in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it, and are ready to share the responsibilities that NATO membership brings. No final decisions have been made on this fundamental question, but the advantages of a growing NATO have been made clear. In both rounds of enlargement the prospect of membership has provided a powerful incentive to political, economic and military reform. And the fact of membership has helped new allies consolidate reforms. What is too often overlooked is that a larger NATO is also proving to be a stronger NATO. In the first round of enlargement we were still stuck in Cold War logic that assume that more members meant a greater burden rather than a greater benefit. That by expanding the perimeter of NATO's defensive line we were adding to our problems. Today we are moving beyond this old think. If, for example, Romania enters the Alliance we will spend little time worrying about defending Romania against a hypothetical Soviet threat. We will spend time finding the best possible use for Romania's capabilities such as its battalion-strength combat unit the Red Scorpions that is already serving in Afghanistan. As another example Slovenia has well-trained mountain troops and plays a leading role in humanitarian de-mining. We are confident that as these nations aspiring to NATO membership become members they will follow the path of those that have gone before and will make a real contribution to our common security. The Czech Republic has strong biological and chemical response units. Poland has highly skilled Special Forces and Hungary has capable engineering units and military police. We recognise that not all allies can do everything, but all allies can do something, and NATO provides a critical vehicle for training together so if need be one day we can fight together. NATO is a critical instrument through which Europe will become whole, free and at peace for the first time in its history and Russia will find a comfortable place in Europe for the first time in generations. This goal is within our grasp and the European Union has a critical role to play in realising this vision. Together we have an opportunity to finish building what President Bush has called the House of Freedom, and as we complete it we need to continue looking beyond Europe's boundaries so that we are prepared to meet tomorrow's security challenges. Even a cursory glance at any current American or European newspaper makes clear that Prague will be a place where NATO must speak about Iraq. As our President has said, the Iraq regime poses a unique threat to the national security of each of our countries. This means that it is a challenge for NATO implicitly, if not explicitly. The Summit will be a valuable opportunity to show allied solidarity in the face of this common threat. A month ago President Bush met with the Estonian Prime Minister Sim Kalis (phon.) and they talked about Iraq. As the President began to explain the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, and the need for the international community to be prepared to act, Prime Minister Kalis interrupted and said you don't have to tell me. We know from history when the great democracies of the world are unable to decide on action, countries like mine lose our freedom. The Prime Minister is acutely aware of the gravity of the issues we face today and his words made a profound impression on the President. The message is crystal clear. The free nations of the world must act together, and we act most effectively when we do act together. A lot has been made recently over the different approaches of America and Europe to common problems. Much of it is overstated. Almost all of it is cliched. Europe is not Venus, and America is not Mars. Nor do we support some crude division of labour separating high tech warriors from foot soldiers on the ground. Europeans understand the need for so-called hard power, that is why so many of them fought in and around Afghanistan. Americans understand the need for so-called soft power. That is why for example the President has proposed a 50% increase in US development assistance. And both Europeans and Americans understand that meeting 21st century challenges will require all of us to use all our power and every tool if we are to build a world that is not only safer, but better and that should be our goal. No power in the world can accomplish much of lasting consequence in the 21st century without the co-operation of friends and allies. But effective co-operation on our common threats depends upon forging a common approach backed by strong capabilities and a strong will. These are the essential elements of a 21st century NATO that
lives up to the high purposes of its founding. Let us make Prague
a time and place where we renew this great promise, and the
light it casts on all our peoples. Thank you very much. 
|
