Dallas, Texas
3 June 2002
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Missile
Defence: A View from NATO
An
Address by Robert G. Bell,
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support
Introduction
General Kadish,
It is a great pleasure to be with you today here in Dallas
and to have this opportunity to give you a view from Brussels
(and from Paris, Bonn and London, you might say) on current
issues related to missile defence. I only regret that my Dan
Post cowboy boots are locked away in State Department-contracted
storage somewhere back in Maryland, together with the other
household goods I left behind when I moved to Belgium in 1999.
Last Fall, standing with President Bush in the Rose Garden
only a few weeks after September 11th, the Secretary General
of NATO, Lord George Robertson, said that "defense against
ballistic missiles is here to stay".
And just two months ago, when the Secretary General was back
in Washington to confer again with the President, he said in
an important speech to the Council on Foreign Relations that
NATO needs to give "new emphasis" to missile defence,
together with other critically-needed warfighting capabilities,
at its historic summit in Prague this November.
I agree with both statements. In this context, my intention
today is to share with you what I see as the new, post September
11th missile defense landscape in Europe. By way of preface,
let me first recall for you where NATO stands formally on this
issue, as Heads of State and Government agreed in the Alliance's
"Strategic Concept", signed at the 50th Anniversary
Summit in Washington in April, 1999.
The
1999 Strategic Concept
It is interesting to note that despite all the ink that has
been expended on the subject of missile defense over the past
decade, the words "missile defence" appear only once
in the Strategic Concept (paragraph 56). Let me quote the exact
text;
The Alliance's defence posture against the risks and potential
threats of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means
of delivery must continue to be improved, including through
work on missile defences. [
] The aim in doing so will
be to further reduce operational vulnerabilities of NATO military
forces while maintaining their flexibility and effectiveness
despite the presence, threat or use of NBC weapons.
There is both "good news" and "bad news"
here. The "good news" is that "work on missile
defenses" is enshrined in this fundamental document which
still today, and certainly beyond Prague (since no nation is
recommending NATO re-write its Strategic Concept), lays out
the Alliance's basic missions. Moreover, this "work"
is not formally delimited to theater missile defenses (TMD):
the language employed in the Strategic Concept reads
"work
on missile defenses". I am tempted to say that NATO took
the "N" out of "NMD" ahead of the Bush Administration
- but I won't.
The "bad news", if you will, is that as you can see,
the stated aim of missile defense in NATO's Strategic Concept
is restricted to the protection of NATO military forces, and
not the protection of population, cities or territories. This
is a fundamental distinction, which I believe NATO will need
to erase as it focuses its capabilities initiative on responding
to the full spectrum of WMD threats, and their means of delivery,
against our nations' territories and populations.
That said, I would maintain that since 1999, NATO has done
very well indeed in meeting this tasking. By any objective standard,
the Alliance is far from being a "BMD-free zone",
at least at the level of theatre ballistic missile defenses.
A remarkable number of national, multinational, and even NATO-wide
TMD programs and exercises, are being pursued, developed and
even fielded, and the Alliance is working hard to provide for,
and demonstrate, the interoperability of these various capabilities.
The range of the current efforts underway is pretty impressive.
For example:
- The United States, Germany and the Netherlands have deployed
the improved PATRIOT TMD system, known as PAC-2, and are working
together to deploy the more advanced PAC-3 system;
- Germany, Italy and the United States have entered a new
"risk reduction" phase in the development of the
mobile MEADS TMD system;
· France and Italy are cooperating in the development
of the Aster, or SAMP/T TMD programme;
- The United States is pursuing the so-called "upper
level" TMD programs known as THAAD and Navy Theater Wide,
as well as the Boeing 747-mounted boost-phase intercept laser
system known as the Airborne Laser, or ABL;
- In September last year, NATO allies participated in the
sixth edition of the annual Dutch/U.S. TMD exercise programme
known as Joint Project Optic Windmill (I really do not know
where they get these names!). This programme was the first
exercise of TMD operations at the tactical/operational level
in an "out of area" scenario;
- And last, but not least, all 19 NATO members are undertaking,
with common NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) funding,
a major new initiative to examine how a layered TMD capability
could be overlaid on top of the planned deployment later this
decade of the new NATO extended air defence system, known
as ACCS (or Air Command and Control System), which will replace
the old, Cold War-era NADGE integrated air defense system.
In the summer of 2001, two Feasibility Study contracts were
let to two transatlantic consortia. As a result, and with accompanying
analysis by the NATO C3 Agency, NATO should be in a position
by 2004 to decide whether to field, by 2010, a layered TMD system
using ACCS's BMC3I capabilities that could protect NATO military
forces in a future conflict with an adversary possessing ballistic
missiles of short- or theatre-range. I am not presuming that
a go-ahead decision will be taken in 2004; I am simply underscoring
that NATO is diligently "teeing up" such an option.
So, as my French - speaking NATO colleagues would say, "il
y a du pain sur la planche", which roughly translated means
" we have bread on our plate". In other words, there
is a lot of action going on!
NATO's efforts in the TMD area are being pursued within a clear
policy context. In addition to paragraph 56 of the 1999 Strategic
Concept, several Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) action
items require expanded efforts in the TMD area, and TMD is an
integral element in the Alliance's approved doctrine for modernising
its Extended Air Defence posture. And just last week in Rome,
NATO Heads of State and Government, meeting with President Putin,
agreed that the United States and Russia will, within the framework
of the new NATO-Russia Council, explore opportunities for intensified
practical cooperation on missile defence for Europe. The objective
of this joint work is, first, to enhance consultations among
the 20 nations on TMD concepts, terminology, systems and systems
capabilities; second, to analyse and evaluate possible levels
of interoperability among respective TMD systems; and third,
to explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation,
including joint training and exercises.
Options
for the Allies
Under the Bush Administration, the United States has laid out
a strategy and a program to implement its fundamental belief
that ballistic missile defenses must be deployed globally that
are capable of defending the United States, its friends and
allies, and their military forces around the world. In other
words, that missile defense - at least against small-scale or
limited proliferation threats --should be seamless, both with
regard to removing the old distinctions between "theater"
and "strategic" capabilities and with regard to global
geography. To accommodate this reorientation of past efforts,
the Administration in December gave formal six-month notice
of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, a withdrawal which will
take effect on June 14.
With regard to its European allies in NATO, the Administration
has begun to encourage the Alliance to consider how it might
best engage itself in the development and deployment of missile
defences capable of providing protection for forces, populations
and territory in Europe or North America against current or
future ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. In this
respect, the United States has argued that the allies should
draw on what it has termed "established models" of
past US-NATO weapons deployment experience.
- The first option would be a "division of labour"
model. In this scenario, NATO would focus on TMD, but not
cross over formally into the strategic defense realm. In short,
NATO would take the lead responsibility, at least in Europe,
for the TMD element of a global allied BMD architecture in
a sort of "low-end/high end" division of labor approach.
- A second option would draw on the "GLCM experience".
Under this option, European allies would accept the deployment,
on their bases, of U.S.-owned and operated strategic-capable
mid-course intercept missiles or radars.
- A third option would be the "F - 16 model", where
NATO allies would participate in developing or co-producing
individual BMD elements in a cooperative hardware fashion,
along the lines of the F-16 multinational programme; for example,
by joining the United States in deploying sea-based boost-phase
intercept-capable BMD systems on allied surface warfare ships
capable of intercepting either theater-range or intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
- At the high end of the scale, a fourth option would draw
on the NATO AWACS model - NATO allies could join together,
to deploy NATO's own core-owned and operated, and commonly-funded,
ABMs and radars in Europe.
I want to stress that at this stage, these are models, and
that the options to which they give rise are strictly hypothetical.
As a practical reality, I think it extremely unlikely that the
Alliance could, by Prague, establish a consensus position on
any, except perhaps the first, "division of labor",
option. In the meantime, a number of the leading European defense
consortia have already opted to detail employees to join the
new US "national team" that has been established by
General Kadish to integrate the missile defense effort. Certainly
Ambassador Galbraith deserves credit for his diligent efforts
in this regard.
In my judgement, how NATO will, in the longer term, address
and hopefully act on these options will depend on how at least
five important overarching questions are answered in the months
and years ahead. A few months ago, I would have said "six"
questions. But I believe the first question: "what will
be the outcome of the U.S.-Russia discussion on a new Strategic
Framework?", has now been answered, and indeed answered
quite positively.
There is no question most European leaders had hoped, if not
prayed, during 2001, that President Bush and President Putin
could reach an agreement on a new stability regime. This was
certainly a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for any
realistic trans-Atlantic progress on strategic missile defense.
And the hopes and prayers were answered. The strategic arms
limitation treaty signed in Moscow last week was a landmark
agreement, one for which both Presidents deserve great credit.
One can speculate whether this extraordinary act of cooperation
and partnership would have been likely absent the new cooperative
relationship that was ushered in by the horrific events of September
11th - but such speculation now would be idle.
But, as I said, I believe that while resolving the ABM Treaty
question without upsetting strategic stability or rupturing
strategic relations was a necessary condition for Europe's going
farther on missile defense, it is not necessarily a sufficient
condition. Several other questions must still be answered.
First: are there new "surprises" or "shocks"
in store for us with regard to future ballistic missile proliferation
trends and evolutions in the WMD threat; for example: a nuclear-armed
missile exchange on the Subcontinent of India?
I say this because although most of us in the United States
were all taken off-guard by the North Korean three-stage missile
test over Japan in 1998 (excepting, of course, the members of
the Rumsfeld Commission and some other like-minded analysts),
and moved quickly to respond to this development, Europe is
not yet convinced that the compelling evidence with regard to
rogue - state long range missile capabilities is matched by
rogue - state intentions. For example, in a Joint Memorandum
to the House of Commons' Defence Committee from the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
of February this year, the UK government stated that;
"We currently assess that at present there is no significant
threat to the UK from ballistic missiles."
Second, what BMD architecture will the United States eventually
downselect for its global, layered BMD capability: mid-course,
boost-phase, space-based, or some combination of the above?
Obviously, it will be some years before testing will allow such
decisions to be made. But I am sure you appreciate that asking
Europe to participate in strategic-capable space-based defenses
is a far different, and more daunting, proposition than asking
Europe to participate in land or sea-based deployments of a
more "traditional" kind.
Third, can Europe find extra funding, that is, the "incremental
defense Euro or dollar", for BMD? This question is directly
related to the previous question, since at present spending
on enhanced BMD programmes in almost all European allies could
only occur at the expense of already-inadequate spending on
conventional capability improvements demanded by the DCI and
the Helsinki Headline Goal - spending that has already been
further strained by the necessity of supplemental spending on
internal security and Afghanistan-related operations tied to
September 11th.
Fourth, will the United States Administration act decisively
to overhaul its export licensing and technology transfer regulatory
regimes? There is a question in my mind whether an enhanced
transatlantic industrial partnership for enhanced BMD, to include
strategic-capable systems, can be forged under any ground rules
acceptable to Europe absent much-needed and overdue reforms
in these regimes and their underlying legislation. But is there
a chance that BMD cooperation could be the "cutting edge"
issue that might just persuade Congress to join consensus?
Last, but not least, how will the current war on terrorism
end? It is one thing to try to forge a new cooperative partnership
between Europe and the United States on global BMD capabilities
in a scenario where Operation Enduring Freedom ends, at least
in its military phase, with the dismantlement of Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban, the capture or death of Bin Laden and Omar, the
settling in of a reasonably viable interim government in Afghanistan,
and a the establishment of a broad pattern of sustained alliance
cooperation globally in dealing with terrorism through enhanced
intelligence sharing, banking, and diplomatic controls. It would
be another, altogether, in a scenario where the alliance was
badly fractured over a U.S. decision to initiate large-scale
military hostilities against another rogue state if the United
States can not point to a "smoking gun" connecting
that country to the attacks of September 11th.
The
Way Ahead
In posing these questions, it is not my intention to obliquely
suggest that Europe cannot be expected to "do more"
on missile defense than its current TMD efforts. In fact, I
believe there is a way ahead under which current NATO efforts
could be expanded, at least incrementally, to produce what the
US could view as a "downpayment" at Prague toward
broader collective cooperation on missile defense.
I believe such a "Prague deliverable" could encompass
three elements: First, the contract teams conducting the Feasibility
Studies already believe that the NATO Staff Target is sufficiently
flexible and broad in its wording to allow them to examine the
feasibility of TMD defense of "wide - areas" against
theatre - range ballistic missile threats. NATO Heads of State
and Government should approve a tasking to the NC3A Agency to
ensure the current work addresses the full spectrum of SRBM
and TBM threats, including threats to populations and cities,
and to direct that the NATO staff requirement (NSR) we draft
beginning next year specifically include this objective.
Second: the NATO TMD Project Group is facing a gap of at least
one year after the two Feasibility Studies are submitted before
NATO decides whether to launch the development phase of an actual
layered TMD system to be operational by 2010. Rather than disbanding
the industrial multinational teams, a second step could be to
contract them to study options for an eventual expansion of
a future NATO layered TMD to give it intercept capabilities
against longer-range ballistic missile threats. In other words,
to study how best a NATO layered TMD system could be expanded
to contribute to a US-led global, integrated strategic intercept
- capable architecture.
Third: NATO could note, favorably, the decision by leading
European defense industries to join General Kadish's "National
Team".
Ladies and gentlemen, this set of "next steps" would
admittedly be only an incremental advance. But it does reflect
my sense of the outer limit of the degree to which the current
envelope can realistically be stretched. And it is also entirely
consistent with the direction which I believe the US Administration
intends to pursue on the issue. In a speech on May 30 to a EUCOM
Conference in Germany, Assistant Secretary of Defense Crouch
said that;
"Once the ABM Treaty's proscription against cooperation
on defense against longer - range threats falls by the wayside,
we will initiate more detailed studies of how the United States
and its allies can deal with the longer- range threats to their
population centers. As important, we will seek government and
industrial cooperation in acquiring the appropriate defense
capabilities."
I am by nature an optimist. I have always believed, as William
of Orange once reminded us, not in Spanish or in English, but
in French that,
"Point n'est besoin d'espérer pour entreprendre,
ni de réussir pour persévérer."
("One need not have hope to begin an undertaking, nor
a guarantee of success to persevere").
Or, ladies and gentlemen, as Colin Powell once said: "Optimism
is a force multiplier".
Thank you.

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