Reykjavik, Iceland 15 May 2002

Remarks by H.E. Wlodzmierz Cimoszewicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Panel III:The Adaption of the Alliance and its impact on Partnership To discuss the adaptation of the Alliance and its impact on the Partnership, one needs to address three basic issues first, what are the new international security factors; second, how they affect the mission of the Alliance; and third, what needs to be done in practice. New factors As for the new security factors: adaptation of the Alliance takes into account,inter alia, the following key elements: Changing security environment with unpredictable threats and risks as exemplified with tragic events of September 11, A shift in the security gravity centre, with direct threats being located outside of Europe; Technological gap between the US and the rest of the world as demonstrated in recent aimed operations; Emerging common European defence. New missions The basic conclusion to be drawn, is mat NATO needs to increase its focus on the ability to act against immediate and unpredictable threats. As a consequence, the Alliance should also answer the question whether, and, if yes, how it wants to expand its geographical and functional mandate. Principles and forms of effective military co-operation between NATO and the EU must be addressed, too. In practical tenns, which will have implications for the future of the Partnership, it seems that the key requirement for me Alliance and its members is to develop more mobile rapid reaction forces. They should be able to better operate against terrorism. Adapted Defence Capabilities Initiative would be crucial in this respect. In particular with a view to modernise the force postures of many European Allies, Adaptation of military capabilities is, however, a complex issue. It is affected by: financial constraints, long-term planning cycles, legal questions, public opinion and other competitive needs (social, economic, political). In this context, the question of specialisation could come to me fore. Other key deliverables of the NATO adaptation process are: an increased ability to act against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; more intelligence sharing and co-operation to identify sources of threats; and intensified co-operation against threats other than military (e.g. international crime). What needs to be done The third problem is what has to be done practically- Changing Partnership is an important part of the Alliance adaptation. By definition, key elements of the changes in the Partnership are influenced mutatis mutandis by the factors affecting NATO itself- at the same time and within shared security area. Strengthen and further developed Partnership instruments should reflect therefore me spirit and direction of changes Alliance has been undergoing itself. Facing new challenges Partnership require to be more operational and better tailored to specific needs of Allies and Partners. Better-differentiated, more individually focused approaches could provide frameworks for more substance driven interaction. Improved and more interoperable military and civilian capabilities of Allies and Partners would give strong response to international terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Having in mind the results of the Warsaw conference on the role of Partnership in combating terrorism we note mat there is an unique potential in Partnership to be used in common action against terrorism. One of the key elements of Alliance's response to new security challenges is an enlargement process. Talking about relations between NATO's open - door policy and the future of the Euro Atlantic Partnership some people fear that the unique co-operative momentum of NATO's remarkable Partnership initiatives will fizzle out after NATO enlargement. I believe that they are wrong. Whatever the size of NATO's enlargement, we will still need a robust mechanism that links me larger NATO with the rest of Euro Atlantic area. Hand in hand with a NATO and Partnership adaptation there is a redefinition of NATO's relationship with Russia. The character of our co-operation has changed. September 11 created an entirely new context for NATO-Russia relations. It highlighted the fact that NATO and Russia share common interest and concerns - and that they need to address these concerns together- A new forum should give the new impetus for better-tailored co-operation- This initiative gives us the chance to transform the strategic picture of security as well as offers us the opportunity to change the overall climate for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. Prague Summit is a natural point of reference in the debate on NATO's future. However, one should expect no fixed answers by that date. Nevertheless, unequivocal indication of directions is required. Our work is accompanied by a strong pressure from media and research community which question the relevance of the Alliance. The Summit should demonstrate mat NATO is on the course of changes. Evolutionary but firm changes. Stronger politically with potential based on military strength. For Prague we will need four basic elements to make up me Partnership package: First, a clear vision of its role in the security field. It should not deviate from me key objectives of the current course. It is mainly spreading of the security culture based on shared values and widest possible convergence of the political agendas of participating states, Second, An up-to date mission statement, as close as possible to post September 11 developments in NATO. Third, shared goals - based on a substance-driven co-operation, better tailored (focused) activities, based on tile principles of inclusion and transparency, and loosing nothing from me opportunities for flexible "variable geometry" {19+n. or n+n) offered by me EAPC Basic Document. Fourth, a renewed political approach to better reflect the difference of me EAPC membership. In other words, while thinking about returning Partnership to the Partners (which is feasible for those prepared for that), we cannot fail to increasingly assist and even steer the partnership-oriented activities of those in greater need.