Closing
remarks
by
Mr. Adam D. Rotfeld, Undersecretary of State,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I want to congratulate you and all of us for one and half day of fruitful
work.
I want to thank specially to the chairmen of the working tables, who delivered
the summaries of the seminar's proceedings. I do not want to repeat their
work, however, I intend to highlight some outcome of our efforts. But
before doing so, allow me to share with you a few remarks of a broader
nature. One of the German security analysts rightly noted that after 11
September there is a new sensitivity to the needs of partners. As a result
the contours of a new structure of international politics is emerging.
The architecture of main international security institutions and organisations,
up to now has rested on the strong distinction between internal and external
threats. The army and police, intelligence and counterintelligence, internal
and external service are all set up on this bygone pattern. What we need
instead is a radically new understanding and new organisation of our security.
To explain better what I have in mind, I would like to say that in the
post Cold War period the international community was challenged by fifty-six
major armed conflicts in recent 11 years. And only few of them were between
the states. Now, in fact, all the conflicts but one, are of internal,
domestic nature. It requires not only a re-thinking of combating terrorism
(to respond to a terrorist threat of new proportions) but to think over
defence priorities in the United States and Europe, Central Asia and all
over the world. Some aspects of this new challenge were also subjects
of the discussion.
The role of arms control in preventing the acquisition of nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons by terrorist groups is related to three issues: first,
ensuring compliance with existing non-proliferation agreements; second,
achieving participation in those agreements by all states with capacities
that could contribute to nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programmes
of concern, including those that are not currently parties; and third,
ensuring that states that choose to remain outside existing agreements
act in a responsible manner in regard to any entity that may sponsor or
carry out terrorist acts.
From the output of the yesterday's work I hope we can expect in the future
fruitful development of co-operation in the area of exchange of information
as well as education and training in the EAPC format.
In the working table I we have had a substantial discussion about the
challenges in the area of exchange of sensitive information. We have to
think about new ways of future work in Brussels. Co-ordination of efforts
among different international organisations and avoiding duplication is
also a very important subject.
I am very glad that the table came out with, mentioned this morning,
propositions, which can be worked out later on in EAPC format.
But, as Mr. George Smith chairing the table no 1 yesterday said: "…before
we start to run, we should start to walk…"
In an overview talk at the working table II, the delegates addressed opportunities
for co-operation in the area of WMD proliferation-related terrorist threats.
The delegates agreed that the enormous damage to security and peace arising
from international terrorism should no longer be accepted; the EAPC states
should take effective co-operative action to stop the terrorism.
During the seminar, the facts have led us to a number of important cases
where we need a common action on the part of EAPC. We need to strengthen
norms and practice of non-proliferation to increase long-term stability.
Non-proliferation regimes require national and international approach.
There is an urgent need to strengthen the common international export
control measures.
There is a scope within the EAPC for issues covering threat assessment
and interoperability, common sense approach and common terminology, common
policies and practices, common system of sampling and identification,
vaccination policy, post exposure treatment, early detection of biological
weapon usage disaster, radiological safeguard, control over radiological
materials etc.
We noticed that we face many problems, to name heritage of the past,
lack of proper information and experience what to do in the situation
of disaster. Lack of international co-operation and monitoring add to
this.
Additional requests for transparency, information and knowledge sharing
within the EAPC on WMD were raised. We were all encouraged to establish
and to use civilian and military emergency links to communicate and share
information on potential threats.
Finally, we must be sure, that our objectives against international terrorism
are the same. If we need co-operation we need to speak the same language.
And we need to remember that protection of civilian population is the
most important factor.
Hence I am glad that the discussion conducted at the working table III
devoted to the civil protection issues in context of EAPC turned out to
be most inspiring. It stressed the potential already existing in the EAPC
with respect to fighting the threat of terrorist use of WMD and the consequences
thereof. Due attention was given to the necessity to assist national authorities
with respect to their efforts in the aforementioned area; as well as to
the development of civil-military co-operation and consequence management.
Participants stressed the importance of avoiding duplication of efforts
and necessity to develop broad-spectrum co-operation with different international
organizations, in particular the OSCE and the EU.
Some new concepts found their way to enter the proceedings of the working
table III, in particular the question of whether the currently existing
EAPC mechanisms and structures should not be modified so as to adapt to
new challenges. In this area I believe three issues were most prominent.
First, of the possible widening of the scope of interest of the Euro-Atlantic
Disaster Response Co-ordination Center (EADRCC). Second, of streamlining
the intentional effort to create and up-keep the inventory of capabilities
necessary to fight the consequences of possible use of biological and
chemical agents. A most interesting notion was presented in this context
of setting minimum standards for declared means. Third, the question of
finding alternative means of financing the EAPC Civil Emergency Planning
- oriented activities, other than NATO budget.
At the moment we are examining the whole Euro-Atlantic security architecture
in light of the new security environment and new security perception as
they appeared after the tragic events of September 11th. Two issues in
particular appear to have become the main focus of attention: first, whether
states that sponsor and support actors that carry out terrorist acts can
make themselves immune from military measures applied against them; and
second, how to prevent those carrying out terrorist acts from acquiring
military capacities and in particular those that would allow them to carry
acts of 'catastrophic terrorism'.
In many fora we try to answer one very important question: what we have
learned from the events of September 11th. The first conclusion is obvious:
either we are united, or, without wide co-operation, we will perish. Because
our objective is not just fight against terrorism, but total elimination
of this evil. The second remark is more complicated, because it tackles
the problem of instruments we should use in our efforts and practical
co-operation. The third, last remark is rather bleak: we have our own
lessons learned after the events of September 11th.
Poland treats the threat of terrorism very seriously. Although, fortunately,
so far the Polish soil did not witness acts of international terrorism,
yet the Polish citizens are among the victims of the World Trade Center
attack. I want now to pay tribute to all victims of terrorism, all over
the world.
I am confident that this seminar will not be a soon-to-be-forgotten event,
more than one hundred participants; one day and a half of work bound to
produce results; ideas to be taken back to capitals - not least Brussels
- and to be followed upon.
At the end let me thank all of you for being here; including the NATO
International Staff for preparing a Discussion Paper that, I am sure,
was useful for our work.
I also want to express my appreciation to Mr. Jaakko Laajava, Under-secretary
of State in the Finnish MFA and Mr. Krister Bringeus, Deputy Director
General from the Swedish MFA for hosting yesterday's evening reception
and thank all chairpersons - in particular Mr. Speckhard - for all their
efforts.
I thank you very much for your attention.
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