Header
Updated: 26-Feb-2002 NATO Speeches

Warsaw,
Poland
23 Feb. 2002

Closing remarks

by Mr. Adam D. Rotfeld, Undersecretary of State,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to congratulate you and all of us for one and half day of fruitful work.
I want to thank specially to the chairmen of the working tables, who delivered the summaries of the seminar's proceedings. I do not want to repeat their work, however, I intend to highlight some outcome of our efforts. But before doing so, allow me to share with you a few remarks of a broader nature. One of the German security analysts rightly noted that after 11 September there is a new sensitivity to the needs of partners. As a result the contours of a new structure of international politics is emerging. The architecture of main international security institutions and organisations, up to now has rested on the strong distinction between internal and external threats. The army and police, intelligence and counterintelligence, internal and external service are all set up on this bygone pattern. What we need instead is a radically new understanding and new organisation of our security.

To explain better what I have in mind, I would like to say that in the post Cold War period the international community was challenged by fifty-six major armed conflicts in recent 11 years. And only few of them were between the states. Now, in fact, all the conflicts but one, are of internal, domestic nature. It requires not only a re-thinking of combating terrorism (to respond to a terrorist threat of new proportions) but to think over defence priorities in the United States and Europe, Central Asia and all over the world. Some aspects of this new challenge were also subjects of the discussion.

The role of arms control in preventing the acquisition of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by terrorist groups is related to three issues: first, ensuring compliance with existing non-proliferation agreements; second, achieving participation in those agreements by all states with capacities that could contribute to nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programmes of concern, including those that are not currently parties; and third, ensuring that states that choose to remain outside existing agreements act in a responsible manner in regard to any entity that may sponsor or carry out terrorist acts.

From the output of the yesterday's work I hope we can expect in the future fruitful development of co-operation in the area of exchange of information as well as education and training in the EAPC format.

In the working table I we have had a substantial discussion about the challenges in the area of exchange of sensitive information. We have to think about new ways of future work in Brussels. Co-ordination of efforts among different international organisations and avoiding duplication is also a very important subject.

I am very glad that the table came out with, mentioned this morning, propositions, which can be worked out later on in EAPC format.
But, as Mr. George Smith chairing the table no 1 yesterday said: "…before we start to run, we should start to walk…"
In an overview talk at the working table II, the delegates addressed opportunities for co-operation in the area of WMD proliferation-related terrorist threats. The delegates agreed that the enormous damage to security and peace arising from international terrorism should no longer be accepted; the EAPC states should take effective co-operative action to stop the terrorism.

During the seminar, the facts have led us to a number of important cases where we need a common action on the part of EAPC. We need to strengthen norms and practice of non-proliferation to increase long-term stability. Non-proliferation regimes require national and international approach. There is an urgent need to strengthen the common international export control measures.

There is a scope within the EAPC for issues covering threat assessment and interoperability, common sense approach and common terminology, common policies and practices, common system of sampling and identification, vaccination policy, post exposure treatment, early detection of biological weapon usage disaster, radiological safeguard, control over radiological materials etc.

We noticed that we face many problems, to name heritage of the past, lack of proper information and experience what to do in the situation of disaster. Lack of international co-operation and monitoring add to this.

Additional requests for transparency, information and knowledge sharing within the EAPC on WMD were raised. We were all encouraged to establish and to use civilian and military emergency links to communicate and share information on potential threats.

Finally, we must be sure, that our objectives against international terrorism are the same. If we need co-operation we need to speak the same language. And we need to remember that protection of civilian population is the most important factor.

Hence I am glad that the discussion conducted at the working table III devoted to the civil protection issues in context of EAPC turned out to be most inspiring. It stressed the potential already existing in the EAPC with respect to fighting the threat of terrorist use of WMD and the consequences thereof. Due attention was given to the necessity to assist national authorities with respect to their efforts in the aforementioned area; as well as to the development of civil-military co-operation and consequence management. Participants stressed the importance of avoiding duplication of efforts and necessity to develop broad-spectrum co-operation with different international organizations, in particular the OSCE and the EU.

Some new concepts found their way to enter the proceedings of the working table III, in particular the question of whether the currently existing EAPC mechanisms and structures should not be modified so as to adapt to new challenges. In this area I believe three issues were most prominent. First, of the possible widening of the scope of interest of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Center (EADRCC). Second, of streamlining the intentional effort to create and up-keep the inventory of capabilities necessary to fight the consequences of possible use of biological and chemical agents. A most interesting notion was presented in this context of setting minimum standards for declared means. Third, the question of finding alternative means of financing the EAPC Civil Emergency Planning - oriented activities, other than NATO budget.

At the moment we are examining the whole Euro-Atlantic security architecture in light of the new security environment and new security perception as they appeared after the tragic events of September 11th. Two issues in particular appear to have become the main focus of attention: first, whether states that sponsor and support actors that carry out terrorist acts can make themselves immune from military measures applied against them; and second, how to prevent those carrying out terrorist acts from acquiring military capacities and in particular those that would allow them to carry acts of 'catastrophic terrorism'.

In many fora we try to answer one very important question: what we have learned from the events of September 11th. The first conclusion is obvious: either we are united, or, without wide co-operation, we will perish. Because our objective is not just fight against terrorism, but total elimination of this evil. The second remark is more complicated, because it tackles the problem of instruments we should use in our efforts and practical co-operation. The third, last remark is rather bleak: we have our own lessons learned after the events of September 11th.

Poland treats the threat of terrorism very seriously. Although, fortunately, so far the Polish soil did not witness acts of international terrorism, yet the Polish citizens are among the victims of the World Trade Center attack. I want now to pay tribute to all victims of terrorism, all over the world.

I am confident that this seminar will not be a soon-to-be-forgotten event, more than one hundred participants; one day and a half of work bound to produce results; ideas to be taken back to capitals - not least Brussels - and to be followed upon.

At the end let me thank all of you for being here; including the NATO International Staff for preparing a Discussion Paper that, I am sure, was useful for our work.

I also want to express my appreciation to Mr. Jaakko Laajava, Under-secretary of State in the Finnish MFA and Mr. Krister Bringeus, Deputy Director General from the Swedish MFA for hosting yesterday's evening reception and thank all chairpersons - in particular Mr. Speckhard - for all their efforts.

I thank you very much for your attention.

Go to Homepage Go to Index