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Updated: 22-Feb-2002 NATO Speeches

Warsaw,
Poland
22 Feb. 2002

Keynote speech

by Mr. Krister Bringéus, Deputy Director-General,
Head of the Department for European Security Policy, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
at the EAPC Seminar on Combatting Terrorism

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me start by expressing the gratitude of the Government of Sweden to Poland for its inititive to arrange this important seminar. It is also very gratifying to see that almost all EAPC countries are represented here in Warsaw.

Clearly, we would not be here today but for the horrific attacks in New York and Washington last year. However, even if we had been spared that trauma, we would have had compelling reasons for convening this seminar. The terrorist threat of course predates 11 September, 2001. But 11/9 brought home to us how far terrorists are prepared to go to achieve their misconceived aims. Let us make sure that this brutal eye-opener serves as a catalyst for effective prevention, pre-emption, disruption and consequence management of terrorist activities.

This will not be an easy or necessarily thankful task. The nature of the threat is so different from the ones which our current security structures are designed to meet - it blurs traditional distinctions between internal and external threats, it involves non-state or state actors or a combination of them. Realistically, I also think we have to recognize that our day-to-day work will not always receive the political attention it had during the past months. It will be a continuous, long-term effort where partial victories may be won, but for which a definite end might prove illusive. Still, we face today one of the most important security policy challenges.

As a co-sponsor together with Finland of the discussion paper on EAPC and terrorism presented in November, Sweden of course warmly welcomes this opportunity to explore the potential of the Partnership in the fight against terrorism. The positive reactions to our initiative demonstrated a broad political interest in engaging EAPC in this field. That was also logical in view of the extraordinary EAPC declaration of 12 September, which lay the political foundation for a vast euro-atlantic coalition in the fight against terrorism. In itself, this declaration showed the value of the continuing dialogue pursued in the EAPC framework.

NATO for its part has made clear that it seeks the closest possible cooperation with Partners on terrorism, and that the political-military framework applies even though part of NATO's efforts in this regard fall under article 5.

The task before us is to translate this ambition into concrete action. Our aim should be to generate as many ideas as possible. In certain areas, the potential of the EAPC will be easier to assess once NATO's own role has been further clarified. But that should not hold us back. Instead, we should proceed along parallell tracks, mutually reinforcing and stimulating each other.

We do not start from scratch. One obvious point of departure is the EAPC Action Plan for 2002-2004. In addition, proposals have been put forward by the GUAM states, and recently by Ukraine. They all merit our careful consideration.

To a considerable degree, the working method will be mainstreaming the anti-terrorist aspect into existing activities. To ensure visibility and give a sense of cohesion to the work, we should early on seek to establish mechanisms which provide overview and communicate the strategy chosen.

One striking feature of combatting terrorism is that it requires a comprehensive approach. We welcome that the UN has taken the lead in the international work now being initiatied. But success will not be achieved unless other key actors - the EU, NATO EAPC, the OSCE, the OECD and others - provide their contributions. The fight against terrorism will be an incentive to intensify institutional cooperation. By the same token, it will require a clear division of labor, avoiding unnecessary duplication. It seems likely that, as the work proceeds, some clearing-house mechanism encompassing a wide array of organisations, will be required. What is important is that we let the issues, not our organizational structures, govern our actions.

With the Prague Summit only nine months away, intensive preparatory work is now being launched. NATO is committed to come up with a package of measures strengthening the Alliance's anti-terrorist capacity. In order to ensure the future political relevance of the EAPC and PfP, we must reflect this also within the Partnership framework.

Before elaborating on possible anti-terrorist measures within this framework, a word of caution: Let us be careful not to venture into areas where others are better poised to act. Important areas such as law enforcement, immigration, financial control and domestic intelligence, should obviously not be dealt with in a Partnership context.

Mr. Chairman,

What then could be the specific, value-adding contributions of the EAPC and PfP in the fight against terrorism ? I believe important work can be done in all the areas I mentioned in my introduction: prevention, pre-emption, disruption and consequence management. I would like, however, to emphasize prevention and consequence management as particularly promising areas for cooperation.

The task to define the Partnership's role in the fight against terrorism goes hand in hand with - indeed, should be a part of - the comprehensive review of the Partnership now underway. Without any doubt, it will have to be a key dimension of the new Partnership emerging after the Prague Summit. Let me stress one particular point: the discussion on the Partnership contribution to fight against terrorism, like the Partnership review as a whole, is a common concern. In order to make this a meaningful exercise, the 46-format must be the rule rather than the expection right from the start.

As we proceed, we should make full use of the two pillars of the Partnership: the consultative framework of EAPC, and the practical cooperation of PfP. By using them in a coordinated way, we play at one of the comparative advantages of the Partnership. A broadened interoperability concept encompassing the security sector in a wide sense should be further explored and terrorist aspects introduced in the PARP and PWPs. Furthermore, as a part of developing the PfP exercise policy, scenarios including asymmetrical threats should be introduced. Barents Rescue, held in northern Sweden last fall, was an example of a complex exercise, involving such terrorist-related scenarios.

In some domains the requirements of counter-terrorism will entail fundamentally new ways of operating. This is true for information-sharing and early warning, one of the key areas in any comprehensive strategy and an area where we certainly need to improve our routines. While being sensitive to professional needs, the pooling of information could significantly improve our ability to fight terrorism. Opening up NATO's Special Committee for Partnership participation on terrorist issues should be actively considered.
Improved information-sharing might help us to prevent one of the true nightmare scenarios: terrorists with access to weapons of mass destruction.

We must also improve our abilities to protect our populations from the WMD threat. Partner involvement in the non-article 5 related activities of NATO's WMD Centre should be further explored. Much could be gained by focusing on consequence management - including civil protection, verification analysis, preventive health measures and protection of essential infrastructure - in the Partnership context. Sweden will arrange a workshop in September where the challenges of terrorist attacks for "Medical care and rescue service in international operations" will be addressed. We are also actively exploring the possibility of following up with a seminar on "NBC protection from low-level threats" this fall.

On civil emergency planning, the CEP Action Plan provides a good basis for comprehensive Partnership work. In order to be able to meet our new and added ambitions in this area, the existing NATO/EAPC committee structure should be reviewed to take into account the need for a more holistic approach on CEP issues. In Sweden, a new government authority with a wider mandate is being established to deal with the challenges and vulnerabilities of modern societies.

Terrorism is a threat to all of us, no one country or region is more prone to fall victim to terrorism. During our discussions last fall, the risks to which our Central Asian Partners are exposed were frequently pointed out.

This is why the Finnish-Swedish paper contained proposals explicitly designed to support these countries. We encourage our Central Asian and Caucasian Partners to take full advantage of existent PfP tools. In this context, a wider use of the trust fund mechanism should be explored urgently.

Moreover, we should increase EAPC and PfP activities which are designed to meet the specific needs of these regions. Efforts should be made to ensure that PfP and EAPC events in Central Asia reach the widest possible audience.

As these examples show, there is no lack of relevant areas where we could engage the EAPC and the PfP. Our discussions here will add many new ideas to our list, and if we bring with us from Warsaw not only a package of potential measures, but also ideas for implementation, we can congratulate ourselves on two productive and rewarding days.

Thank You

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