Keynote
speech
by
Mr. Krister Bringéus, Deputy Director-General,
Head of the Department for European Security Policy, Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
at the EAPC Seminar on Combatting Terrorism
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Let me start by expressing the gratitude of the Government
of Sweden to Poland for its inititive to arrange this important
seminar. It is also very gratifying to see that almost all EAPC
countries are represented here in Warsaw.
Clearly, we would not be here today but for the horrific attacks
in New York and Washington last year. However, even if we had
been spared that trauma, we would have had compelling reasons
for convening this seminar. The terrorist threat of course predates
11 September, 2001. But 11/9 brought home to us how far terrorists
are prepared to go to achieve their misconceived aims. Let us
make sure that this brutal eye-opener serves as a catalyst for
effective prevention, pre-emption, disruption and consequence
management of terrorist activities.
This will not be an easy or necessarily thankful task. The
nature of the threat is so different from the ones which our
current security structures are designed to meet - it blurs
traditional distinctions between internal and external threats,
it involves non-state or state actors or a combination of them.
Realistically, I also think we have to recognize that our day-to-day
work will not always receive the political attention it had
during the past months. It will be a continuous, long-term effort
where partial victories may be won, but for which a definite
end might prove illusive. Still, we face today one of the most
important security policy challenges.
As a co-sponsor together with Finland of the discussion paper
on EAPC and terrorism presented in November, Sweden of course
warmly welcomes this opportunity to explore the potential of
the Partnership in the fight against terrorism. The positive
reactions to our initiative demonstrated a broad political interest
in engaging EAPC in this field. That was also logical in view
of the extraordinary EAPC declaration of 12 September, which
lay the political foundation for a vast euro-atlantic coalition
in the fight against terrorism. In itself, this declaration
showed the value of the continuing dialogue pursued in the EAPC
framework.
NATO for its part has made clear that it seeks the closest
possible cooperation with Partners on terrorism, and that the
political-military framework applies even though part of NATO's
efforts in this regard fall under article 5.
The task before us is to translate this ambition into concrete
action. Our aim should be to generate as many ideas as possible.
In certain areas, the potential of the EAPC will be easier to
assess once NATO's own role has been further clarified. But
that should not hold us back. Instead, we should proceed along
parallell tracks, mutually reinforcing and stimulating each
other.
We do not start from scratch. One obvious point of departure
is the EAPC Action Plan for 2002-2004. In addition, proposals
have been put forward by the GUAM states, and recently by Ukraine.
They all merit our careful consideration.
To a considerable degree, the working method will be mainstreaming
the anti-terrorist aspect into existing activities. To ensure
visibility and give a sense of cohesion to the work, we should
early on seek to establish mechanisms which provide overview
and communicate the strategy chosen.
One striking feature of combatting terrorism is that it requires
a comprehensive approach. We welcome that the UN has taken the
lead in the international work now being initiatied. But success
will not be achieved unless other key actors - the EU, NATO
EAPC, the OSCE, the OECD and others - provide their contributions.
The fight against terrorism will be an incentive to intensify
institutional cooperation. By the same token, it will require
a clear division of labor, avoiding unnecessary duplication.
It seems likely that, as the work proceeds, some clearing-house
mechanism encompassing a wide array of organisations, will be
required. What is important is that we let the issues, not our
organizational structures, govern our actions.
With the Prague Summit only nine months away, intensive preparatory
work is now being launched. NATO is committed to come up with
a package of measures strengthening the Alliance's anti-terrorist
capacity. In order to ensure the future political relevance
of the EAPC and PfP, we must reflect this also within the Partnership
framework.
Before elaborating on possible anti-terrorist measures within
this framework, a word of caution: Let us be careful not to
venture into areas where others are better poised to act. Important
areas such as law enforcement, immigration, financial control
and domestic intelligence, should obviously not be dealt with
in a Partnership context.
Mr. Chairman,
What then could be the specific, value-adding contributions
of the EAPC and PfP in the fight against terrorism ? I believe
important work can be done in all the areas I mentioned in my
introduction: prevention, pre-emption, disruption and consequence
management. I would like, however, to emphasize prevention and
consequence management as particularly promising areas for cooperation.
The task to define the Partnership's role in the fight against
terrorism goes hand in hand with - indeed, should be a part
of - the comprehensive review of the Partnership now underway.
Without any doubt, it will have to be a key dimension of the
new Partnership emerging after the Prague Summit. Let me stress
one particular point: the discussion on the Partnership contribution
to fight against terrorism, like the Partnership review as a
whole, is a common concern. In order to make this a meaningful
exercise, the 46-format must be the rule rather than the expection
right from the start.
As we proceed, we should make full use of the two pillars of
the Partnership: the consultative framework of EAPC, and the
practical cooperation of PfP. By using them in a coordinated
way, we play at one of the comparative advantages of the Partnership.
A broadened interoperability concept encompassing the security
sector in a wide sense should be further explored and terrorist
aspects introduced in the PARP and PWPs. Furthermore, as a part
of developing the PfP exercise policy, scenarios including asymmetrical
threats should be introduced. Barents Rescue, held in northern
Sweden last fall, was an example of a complex exercise, involving
such terrorist-related scenarios.
In some domains the requirements of counter-terrorism will
entail fundamentally new ways of operating. This is true for
information-sharing and early warning, one of the key areas
in any comprehensive strategy and an area where we certainly
need to improve our routines. While being sensitive to professional
needs, the pooling of information could significantly improve
our ability to fight terrorism. Opening up NATO's Special Committee
for Partnership participation on terrorist issues should be
actively considered.
Improved information-sharing might help us to prevent one of
the true nightmare scenarios: terrorists with access to weapons
of mass destruction.
We must also improve our abilities to protect our populations
from the WMD threat. Partner involvement in the non-article
5 related activities of NATO's WMD Centre should be further
explored. Much could be gained by focusing on consequence management
- including civil protection, verification analysis, preventive
health measures and protection of essential infrastructure -
in the Partnership context. Sweden will arrange a workshop in
September where the challenges of terrorist attacks for "Medical
care and rescue service in international operations" will
be addressed. We are also actively exploring the possibility
of following up with a seminar on "NBC protection from
low-level threats" this fall.
On civil emergency planning, the CEP Action Plan provides a
good basis for comprehensive Partnership work. In order to be
able to meet our new and added ambitions in this area, the existing
NATO/EAPC committee structure should be reviewed to take into
account the need for a more holistic approach on CEP issues.
In Sweden, a new government authority with a wider mandate is
being established to deal with the challenges and vulnerabilities
of modern societies.
Terrorism is a threat to all of us, no one country or region
is more prone to fall victim to terrorism. During our discussions
last fall, the risks to which our Central Asian Partners are
exposed were frequently pointed out.
This is why the Finnish-Swedish paper contained proposals explicitly
designed to support these countries. We encourage our Central
Asian and Caucasian Partners to take full advantage of existent
PfP tools. In this context, a wider use of the trust fund mechanism
should be explored urgently.
Moreover, we should increase EAPC and PfP activities which
are designed to meet the specific needs of these regions. Efforts
should be made to ensure that PfP and EAPC events in Central
Asia reach the widest possible audience.
As these examples show, there is no lack of relevant areas
where we could engage the EAPC and the PfP. Our discussions
here will add many new ideas to our list, and if we bring with
us from Warsaw not only a package of potential measures, but
also ideas for implementation, we can congratulate ourselves
on two productive and rewarding days.
Thank You
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