EAPC Conference 10 years of Partnership and Cooperation NATO HQ 09:00 hours 26 October 2001

A New Partnership Speech by Mr. Franklin D. Kramer, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Defence One of the great tasks for the 1990s was the establishment of an organized security system for Europe. It was less than obvious after the events of 1989 and 1991 what that security system would be. Now, ten years later, such a system has emerged. NATO and the Partnership for Peace are key focal points. Together they provide security integration at various levels from the Atlantic into the Caucuses and Central Asia. These are both political and military structures - permanent ongoing coalitions of countries that have been able to interact together and with other institutions such as the European Union, the OSCE and the United Nations, combining to create substantial stability overall. Challenges to stability did emerge, particularly in the Balkans. So far, the institutions have kept pace. The Partnership for Peace has been a showcase among those institutions. It has been an organization for change. Its value has been shown both in terms of military capability, as, for example, in the peacekeeping efforts in which Partner countries have taken their place fully and indistinguishably from the NATO countries and in political solidarity, as, for example, during the events of the Kosovo crisis. On September 11, however, everything changed. So too did the challenges facing the Partnership for Peace. So let us consider where the Partnership for Peace stands today. To do so, let me review four of those changed challenges: The importance of dealing seriously with the terrorism and WMD threats. The need to focus on Central Asia and the Caucuses The value of extending the PFP or some version into the Middle East, beyond what is now encompassed under the Mediterranean Dialogue. The criticality of creating a real Partnership relationship with Russia. In light of the horrific events in the United States on September 11 and the subsequent -and still ongoing - anthrax attacks, there should be little doubt in anyone's mind that the threat landscape has changed. Globalization has come to security issues - and with a vengeance. But what in actuality has the Partnership for Peace done to prepare for this new reality. From the counter-terrorism and WMD prospectives: Are there capabilities that could hunt down terrorists? Could the Partner countries contribute against a state that supports terrorism? If there were a WMD attack in Europe, could the Partners contribute to its resolution, through consequence management, intelligence sharing, or otherwise? Geographically, the Partnership encompasses the Caucuses and the Central Asian countries. Those countries have long faced immediate problems of terrorism and insurgency. Now, several of those countries are active participants in support of the actions in Afghanistan. Politically, the PFP should recognize this. But also needed is on-the-ground, real support for this part of the world. Our allies in the war against terrorism include not only the PFP countries but important Arab and Muslim countries. The interface with those countries, through NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (and despite last weeks' meetings) has been limited in number and substance. Facing an all too obvious globalization threat, should not NATO - and the Partnership for Peace - expand its horizons for a serious working relationship with those countries. Finally, there is the issue of Russia. We are all aware of the problem. Russia has yet fully to conclude that its security lies in working with Europe and the U.S. rather than in considering Europe and the U.S. as a potential source of insecurity. But Russia has been an important effective partner since September 11 with the United States in the fight against terrorism. That bilateral relationship is changing. Shouldn't we do the same in NATO - ending what has been an all-too-sterile dialogue in the Permanent Joint Council, and making Russia a real participant in the PFP? Let me propose some concrete steps. In response to the terrorist and WMD problems, it is important to review Partner force structure, Partner training and Partner intelligence sharing. The PFP which had taken substantial steps forward previously, in establishing the Enhanced PFP and the Operational Capability, needs a further step - a WMD / CT Initiative for Partners. Second, there needs to be a greater focus on the Caucuses and Central Asia, in terms that will add to the security of those countries. Upgrades to training and intelligence sharing would be good first steps. The NATO exercise program and the PFP exercise program should be reviewed so that, in tandem, they provide capabilities relevant to the problems of this area. The NATO Security Investment Program was opened in principle to Partners some time ago. Little has actually been provided - yet the Partner countries have obvious pressing needs. Meeting those needs, as the U.S. deployments indicate, would enhance all NATO and Partner countries' security. The countries of the Middle East with whom we work have capable militaries. In a prior incarnation, I spent considerable time working with them. It is time - and past time - to create a more effective relationship between them and NATO and PFP countries. Many of the NATO countries participate in activities such as Bright Star in Egypt or the Maritime Interdiction Force in the Gulf. It is beyond sterile to suggest that NATO and the PFP could not usefully have greater interaction with those countries. After all, these countries have come to Europe to keep the peace in Bosnia and in Kosovo. They work alongside NATO and the Partnership countries in peacekeeping. I propose that NATO and the Partnership consider a common peacekeeping school (which could utilize existing schools) and the creation of contingency structures and training arrangements for common peacekeeping activities. Finally, there is the issue of Russia. It is common wisdom that we need a new relationship in deed as well as in rhetoric. To turn that common wisdom into reality requires changes on both sides of the NATO-Russia relationship. Much of that will come outside the immediate PFP context. But if Russia is to have an integrated approach to security with the rest of Europe, it must work with the PFP countries. In the PFP, one good place to start, on the Russian side, would be real participation on the PFP - but, as I have suggested, that should be in a PFP effort focused on the real problems - including such issues as WMD and terrorism and the Caucuses and Central Asia. Russia has important capabilities in these areas and a task force or task forces that included Russians could be important. Of course, Russia will not participate if participation is not meaningful, and the PFP should itself deal with meaningful concerns. Ultimately, the goal for the Partnership is to deal with real problems. For the Partnership will surely change. Next year will bring greater enlargement. Yet, while the Alliance and the Partnership can not forget key problems already being worked on - most specifically the Balkans, it is likely that the greatest new problems for the Alliance will exist in the areas that enlargement will not touch. A more effective Partnership for Peace is one way to increase security both for the countries of those areas and for the NATO and PFP countries affected.